UNIVERSITY OF KENT

SCHOOL OF SOCIOLOGY, SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH

COLLABORATION, COMPETITION AND CONFLICT: SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND INTERACTION DYNAMICS OF LONDON'S ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

by

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

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

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Abstract

There is a wide variety of types of environmental movement organisations (EMOs) in London, ranging from relatively small direct action networks and Friends of Parks groups, to EMOs of international significance such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Although there is a degree of conflict and competition between some of London's EMOs, there is sufficient networking to label London's environmentalism as a 'movement'. Especially at critical campaign times, the movement's ideological and spatial divisions join together to form dynamic campaigns that are difficult for decision-makers to ignore.

This thesis explores the conflict, collaboration and competition within the movement using an integrated social movement theory approach. Resource mobilization, political opportunity, and new social movement theories are critiqued and scaled

Acknowledgements

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AEF	Aviation Environment Federation
AGM	Annual general meeting
ALARM	All London Against the Road Menace
ALG	Association of London Grants
AWO	Animal Welfare Organisation
BA	British Airways
BAA	British Airports Authority
BCC	Baku Ceyhan Campaign
BOND	British Overseas NGOs for Development
BTC	Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan
BTCV	British Trust for Conservation Volunteers
CB	Collective behaviour
CCC	Campaign Against Climate Change
CCND	Christian CND
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism (part of the Kyoto Protocol)
CEO	Chief executive officer
CJA	Criminal Justice Act (1995)
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CO2	Carbon dioxide
COP	Conference of the Parties (to UNFCC climate change conventions)
CPP	Crystal Palace Protest
CPRE	Campaign for the Protection of Rural England
CTRL	Channel tunnel rail link
CWT	Chiswick Wildlife Trust
DETR	Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions
DFID	Department for International Development
DfT	Department for Transport
DiY	Do it yourself
DTI	Department for Trade and Industry
EBC	Ealing Borough Council
EBRD	European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
ECGD	Export Credits Guarantee Department
EDAG	Environmental Direct Action Group (pseudonym)
EFI	Earth First!
EIA	Environmental Investigation Agency
EMO	Environmental movement organisation

ERM	Environmental Resources Management
EU	European Union
FIT	Forward Intelligence Team
FoE/FoE EWNI	Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland
FSC	Forestry Stewardship Council
G&LFoE	Greenwich & Lewisham Friends of the Earth
GBC	Greenwich Borough Council
GLA	Greater London Authority
GM	Genetically modified
HACAN	Heathrow and Communities Against Aircraft Noise
HANT	Hounslow Against New Terminals
HBC	Hillingdon Borough Council
HFoE	Hillingdon Friends of the Earth
HSRA	Harmondsworth & Sipson Residents' Association
IFAW	International Federation for Animal Welfare
IFC	International Finance Corporation (the World Bank's)
IMC	Indymedia Collective
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JI	Joint Implementation (part of the Kyoto Protocol)
LACS	League Against Cruel Sports
LARC	London Action Resources Centre
LCI	London Counter Information
LDA	London Development Agency
LFAS	London Forum of Amenity Societies
LFoE	London Friends of the Earth
LRA	Longford Residents' Association
LRT	London Rising Tide
LSCN	London Social Centres Network
LSx	London Sustainability Exchange
LULU	Locally unwanted land use
LWT	London Wildlife Trust
MP	Member of parliament
NEP	New ecological paradigm
NGO	Non governmental organisation
NIABY	Not in anybody's backyard
NIMBY	Not in my back yard
NoTRAG	No Third Runway Action Group
NSCA	National Society for Clean Air
NSM/NSMT	New social movement / new social movement theory

NVDA	Non violent direct action
OFH	Oil Festival Hall
OPT	Optimum Population Trust
PARC	People Against the River Crossing
PCEG	Plumstead Common Environment Group
PETA	People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
PO/POs	Political opportunity / political opportunities (*not structures*)
POS/POST	Political opportunity structure / political opportunity structure theory
RA	Ramblers' Association
RCC	Regional Campaigns Coordinator (Friends of the Earth)
RM/RMT	Resource mobilisation / resource mobilisation theory
RSPB	Royal Society for the Protection of Birds
RSPCA	Royal Society for the Protection of Animals
RT	Rising Tide
RTS	Reclaim the Streets
SAGE	Southeast Action Group for the Environment
SERA	Labour Environment Campaign
SERA	South East Regional Assembly
SERAS	South East Regional Assessment Studies
SESA	Save Ealing Streets Association
SMT	Social movement theory
SNA	Social network analysis
SSE	Stop Stansted Expansion
SWP	Socialist Workers Party
T5	Terminal 5 (Heathrow Airport)
TCA	Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas 1985)
TDA	Twyford Down Association
TEA	Transformation of Environmental Activism
TLIO	This Land is Ours
UK	United Kingdom
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US	United States of America
WEN	Women's Environmental Network
WHO	World Health Organisation
WLFoE	West London Friends of the Earth
WOMBLES	White Overalls Movement Building Libertarian Struggles
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This chapter begins with an introduction to the central aims of the research and the key research questions. This is followed by a rationale for studying environmentalist interaction. Especially it highlights the importance and location of the research within social movement, cultural and organizational studies. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the structure of the chapters that follow.

1.1 Aims

The research aims to identify and account for interaction between environmental organisations (EMOs)[1] in London's environmental movement, emphasising interaction between its spatial (national, regional and local) and ideological divisions (conservationists, political ecologists/reformists and radical environmentalists). The findings are interpreted through various sociology/political science traditions, structured around strands of social movement theory (SMT). Specifically, the relevance of Resource Mobilisation (RM) theory, Political Opportunity (POS) theory and New Social Movement (NSM) theory are assessed. The strong case for integrating social movement theories is espoused and 'theoretical triangulation' is used to enhance research findings.

Greater London was chosen as the spatial boundary of the network because it has the highest concentration of UK EMOs (Rootes & Miller, 2000) - 73 of the 203 national EMOs listed in The Environment Council's *Who's Who in the Environment* (1999) are located in London - as well as numerous regional groups - such as the London Wildlife Trust, the Sustainable London Trust and London RSPB. London has also spawned vibrant local environmentalism, as identified in Greenwich, Southwark and Lambeth (Rootes *et al* 2001).

Two locales have been selected for the study of the 'local' dimension of environmentalism in London. These are a pocket of southeast London, and an area in northwest London surrounding Heathrow Airport. The former has a rich and lively local environmental movement, despite being

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[1] I am aware that the term 'organisation' is a problematic concept in the study of environmental activist groupings. Some radical groups for example call themselves 'disorganisations' to reflect their non-hierarchical and participatory structure. The term is used here to refer to all types of groupings of environmentalists whether an organisation or not.

relatively socially deprived and poorly integrated into Greater London's transport infrastructure (Rootes, *et al* 2001). The locale in northwest London was chosen because of its location close to Heathrow and because its activist milieu is at least as, if not more, industrious than the southeast's. Having recently lost the protracted campaigning battle against T5 (a 5th passenger Terminal at Heathrow Airport), action groups in the surrounding towns and villages were at the time of writing actively engaged in an on-going campaign against a third runway – a possible option for meeting the predicted increase in aircraft demand as outlined in the Government's airport expansion consultation (DfT 2002).

1.2 Key research questions

1. *From a General Perspective:*

- Is the environmental movement a cohesive[2] integrated movement, or are ideological and spatial divisions isolated sub-movements?
- Is the movement's interaction best explained by amalgamating the various strands of SMT?

2. *From a Resource Mobilisation Theory Perspective:*

- To what extent do local activists and groups seek and use assistance in terms of resources and expertise from national groups and how forthcoming are national groups?
- How do national groups decide which local campaigns to support?
- What determines whether EMOs will compete?
- Does a lack of resources constrain an organisation's ability to maintain ties with others, or does this create more intense interaction in the absence of other resources?

3. *From a Political Opportunities Perspective*:

- Although national and community groups often, for tactical reasons shun the actions of radicals (to avoid damaging relations with decision makers), are there in practice private links that are not publicly apparent?
- Being unable to secure political access for themselves, do radical groups seek to convey their message to governmental institutions via reformists as their intermediaries?
- What are the effects of repression on movement networking?

4. *From a New Social Movement Perspective*:

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[2] By cohesive, I mean 'are the densities of relations between EMOs across spatial and ideological dimensions relatively high, or is the movement factionalised?'

- How important are umbrella organisations in facilitating the passage of environmental protest from latency to visibility?
- Does the ideology of radical environmentalists cohere with a withdrawal from the social praxis, and does this lead to isolated cliquey or sect-like behaviour?
- What role do solidarity, collective identity (including the presence or absence of sub-cultural credibility) play in determining interaction between radicals and their more staid counterparts?

1.3 Rationale

Why Research Environmentalist Interaction?

Della Porta & Rucht (2002) note three phases of environmental movement research that they label new values, the institutionalisation debate and radical conflicts / local oppositions. These approaches have resulted in either broad-brush descriptions of the movement as if it has ideological and tactical homogeneity, or studies of individual organisations or specific conflicts. Focussing on inter-organisational environmentalist interaction overcomes this shortfall as well as firmly placing frequently over-looked regional and local manifestations of movement activity in the picture. Although local environmentalism is 'very lively' and 'appears to be expanding in Britain' (Diani & Donati 1999:24-25), the environmental movement has generally, with the exception of Lowe & Goyder (1983) been interpreted through national organisations (e.g. Jordan & Maloney 1997; Rawcliffe 1993) and where local environmentalism has been researched, findings often materialise as useful, but limited discussions of particular case studies of contentious issues (e.g. Fillieule 2001, Barcena & Ibarra 2001, Seel 1997, North 1997). To date, there has been little, if any research on the relationship between local, regional and national groups in London.

To my knowledge, the most extensive survey of local environmental activism undertaken was by Kempton *et al* (2001:578), who go so far as to suggest 'we know of no census of local environmental groups previously reported in the literature'. They compare two sites of local environmental activism in the US, and conclude that there is much more diversity in local EMOs than the case study approach credits. Their paper also notes the general importance of local environmental groups: 'we propose that local environmental groups are not pale, less influential versions of large national organisations, but are significant in their own right' (p.557). Parisi *et* al (2004) similarly note the importance of local activism, but both sets of scholars fail to locate local groups within the broader movement.

The environmental movement is a pervasive component of citizen politics in Britain (Carter 2001:131), having a greater total membership than political parties (Jordan, 1999). Many political and social commentators have noted the ever-increasing importance of citizen politics in British societies and unconventional political participation has proliferated (Dalton 1996, Baggot 1995). The environmental movement has a huge support base, with recent surveys indicating that over five million British people are members of EMOs (MORI et al 2003). Besides actual membership support, the British are generally favourable towards environmental issues. Corrado (1997) reports that 18% of adults in Britain are environmental activists[3] and that nearly 75% of us recycle bottles, paper and cans. Environmental concerns are ranked second by the public in response to a question asking 'what is the most important problem facing our nation today', second only to unemployment and tying with crime/violence/moral decay (Leaman 1998).[4]

This research will therefore be of relevance to policy makers, looking to improve integration of citizen politics and understanding of the environmental movement, as well as academics interested in environmental politics and social movements. In particular it will contribute to the emerging literature on networks and social movements, which have been largely treated in terms of their role in mobilising activists (e.g. Tindall 2000, Olivier and Myers 2000). The research will also be of use to EMOs and activists themselves who could use the findings to assist their networking and campaigns and thereby make a more effective contribution to environmental sustainability. As the logic of Local Agenda 21 implies, local citizen politics has a key role in the realisation of truly sustainable development (Cope 1992 in Cowell & Jehlicka, 1995).

The Importance of Interaction and Networks

'Inter-SMO relations are a central dynamic of any social movement'
(Zald & Ash-Garner 1987:179)

In both environmental and social movement studies, organisational interaction has been understudied (*cf* Zald & Ash-Garner 1987) and disproportionate emphasis has been given to the role of individuals' social networks in the mobilisation process (e.g. Passy 2000; Mische 2003;

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[3] Activism here is defined as engaging in at least five environmentally friendly behaviours, for example using energy efficient light bulbs, recycling household waste and buying eco-produce.

[4] This salience of the environment and environmental issues does, however, vary over time.

Gould 2000).[5] Despite the lack of consensus as to what constitutes a social movement amongst theorists, most agree that social movements can be conceived of as *networks of interaction* between individuals and organisations engaging in collective action aimed at achieving or resisting social change (Diani 1992a) and this conceptualisation is growing in popularity (Diani & Eyerman 1992:7-10).[6] Considering the abundant use of the term network in SMT and its centrality in defining social movements, it is ironic that systematic studies of intra-movement interaction are largely absent from the literature (except for Diani 1995). The focus on interaction also addresses Melucci's (1985:799) concern over the inadequacy of the term movement ... 'I prefer to speak of *movement networks* or *movement areas* [rather than 'social movements] as the network of groups and individuals sharing a conflictual culture and a collective identity'. To understand a movement properly requires due consideration of interaction, otherwise research becomes over-focused on mobilisation processes and organisational characteristics (Diani 1992b:18).

Interaction involves passing skills, information, resources, joint memberships and joint promotion and collaboration in collective action between individuals and organisations. Multiple affiliations of activists are important because they open up new channels of information that increase the likelihood of future co-operation (della Porta & Diani 1999:120). Networks provide the solidarity and reinforcement crucial for movement success (Melucci 1985). Interaction is no less than the glue holding movements together (Gerlach 1983:145), making them hard to suppress, increasing recruitment bases, and encouraging innovation and adaptability. Further, by considering movement networks, a weakness in social movement studies – that they suffer a 'myopia of the visible' (Melucci 1989:44) – by tending to focus exclusively on active protest events at the expense of gaining an understanding of underlying ideologies, collective identity formation and other important behind-the scenes activities – will be avoided.

Jasper (1997:61) has been critical of the network approach, suggesting that the role of networks is over-emphasised and shows no more than expected patterns. This criticism stems mostly from his tendency to see the network approach as a single paradigm – one that seeks to explain collective action solely on the basis of the extent to which actors are embedded in existing systems of social

---

5 The importance of networks in mobilisation is not to be over-looked. Diani (1995) found that 72% of the environmental activists he surveyed in Milan joined EMOs through their social networks.

6 Chapter 2 opens with further clarification of woolly and variably used term 'social movement', comparing it with definitions of pressure groups, interest groups, protests, political movements and social movement organisations, in an attempt to create a workable and meaningful definition of the term 'environmental movement' for the context of this research.

relations, and assuming that other attributes of actors are insignificant, which of course they are not. Part of his critique is directed towards Diani (1995), who found very few ties between activist groupings in Milan, and overrated their significance. Jasper suggests that 'we need to push beyond the network metaphor ... to see what resources, rules, cultural schemas and patterns of interaction lie behind it'. My retort would be that, with the addition of the pattern of opportunities and constraints, this is what this research does, using theoretical insights from RMT, POS and NSM. Also, London's environmental activist network appears to be much more vibrant than Milan's with at least 400 groups as opposed to the much lower number (just 42) surveyed by Diani (1995).

Doherty (2002:18) also questions the significance of placing strong emphasis on network links, especially in terms of their being a key determinant of the existence of a movement. He suggests that focussing on networks as an indicator of social movement membership prevents us from distinguishing between radical groups, reformist groups and those with conservationist orientations. However, network analysis has become so sophisticated that the differences between these types of orientations can be an integral part of the network analysis procedure.

1.4 The Structure of the Thesis

Chapter 2 sets the scene in more depth by detailing the theoretical and empirical context, and by negotiating an applicable definition of 'social movements' for the environmental movement. It proceeds to outline the reality of the environmental movement, giving a short history of its development and how it can be split ideologically and spatially. I admit that any categorisation scheme has its problems because square pegs cannot be forced into round holes. In the face of this universal problem, I have attempted to come up with an acceptable categorisation of environmental movement types, based in part on Rucht's (1990) distinction between conservationists, environmentalists and political ecologists. My categorisation however pays more attention to strategic differences than ideological ones, because ultimately, the public, politicians and other EMOs will judge environmental organisation on the basis of their actions rather than their rhetoric. After clarifying the different types of environmentalism that exist in the British environmental movement, some brief contextual information is provided on the current organisational field in London.. The chapter ends with some information about the demography of the region and locales under study.

Chapters 3,4,5 and 6 provide a critical evaluation of the major strands of SMT including collective behaviour (CB), RM, POS and NSM and contextualises these in relation to the environmental movement at the meso-level. Examples of how we might expect EMOs to interact on the basis of

these theories are laid out. Each theory[7] has its weaknesses, and to fully explain any social movement we need to consider variables from all theories.

Therefore Chapter 7 sets the rationale for integrating SMT. The hypotheses are presented here, with the central hypothesis being that a variety of social movement theories is required to explain EMO interaction. As Chapter 7 makes apparent, even organisations that are apparently rational in the sense implied by RM are likely to have at least normative motivations, if not dramaturgical and communicative ones too. Hence, Habermas' (1984) *Theory of Communicative Action* is used alongside a non-deterministic approach to the 'network perspective' as a basis for integrating these apparently diverse, but related theories. Other studies of social movements using a network approach are reviewed at this juncture.

Chapter 8 outlines and appraises the quantitative and qualitative methodology employed. The overall focus of the chapter is an attempt to justify the methodological stance taken, whilst accepting the limitations caused by constraints and errors that can only be recognised in hindsight. Ethical considerations feature also in this chapter. Chapter 9 provides details of the eleven organisations chosen for qualitative research and details two contemporary environmental campaigns.

Chapter 10 attempts to define and delineate the environmental movement based on social network analysis. The problems of network boundary demarcation are sketched out and simple network measures of degree (which provides an indication of organisational centrality) and cohesive sub-groups are presented and discussed.

Chapter 11 turns back to the question of resources and addresses the research questions and hypotheses derived from Chapter 4. It explores the extent to which local groups find national and regional groups supportive and whether or not this is a result of national EMOs over-prioritising organisational maintenance or being hampered by bureaucracy. Issues of resource constraints, funding, competition, conflict, reciprocity and the division of labour are covered.

Drawing on Chapter 5, Chapter 12 looks at the effects of political opportunities and structures upon network linkages. It explores cases of conflict and collaboration where these are based on the

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[7] There is some doubt as to whether or not we can effectively call them theories because they tend to focus on a select few variables, give a broad-brush approach or are perhaps not comprehensive enough to be considered true and broad range theories (Lofland 1995).

political status of organisations, details key study groups' relations with each of local, regional and national government, compares networking at critical and normal times and considers the effect of repression of radical organisations on the network.

Individual activist identities, ideologies and multiple memberships are considered in Chapter 13. Networks are partitioned according to the ideology and strategy of organisations (as given in the questionnaire) to see if organisational identity is responsible for schisms in London's environmental movement. Ideological clashes are explored alongside a discussion of the nature of collective identities, particularly in the radical environmental movement, and how this affects its networking. Finally, the role of umbrella organisations in the passage from latency to visibility is explored.

Chapter 14 evaluates the definition of the environmental movement that was drawn up in chapter 2 and discusses the extent to which, according to a network approach, an environmental movement exists in London. The chapter ends with a discussion of the pertinence of the central hypothesis is assessed and the key findings are summarised. Chapter 15 concludes the thesis by discussing the main findings, the relevance of key bodies of theory, and providing final reflections on the research.

CHAPTER 2

Contextual Background: What and Where on Earth?

This chapter set the context of the research. It opens with a discussion of definitions of pressure and interest groups, and social movements to make it explicit what is meant by the term 'environmental movement'. This is followed by general background about the movement – seeking to define its theoretical boundaries and ideological and spatial divisions. This is followed by a brief geographical outline of the sites of the field research, a run-down of current contentious environmental issues in the localities under study, and a brief introduction to the environmentalist-organisational field within London.

2.1 Defining 'Movements'

Defining precisely what a social movement is, is a very difficult task. Theorists between and within different schools of thought on social movements frequently use the term to refer to different phenomena (Milton 1996:79). Attempts to synthesise definitions of social movements (e.g. Diani 1992a) provide a useful summary for the newcomer to the study of social movements. Nonetheless, it is wrong to assume that all theorists refer to the same reality when using the concept of 'social movement'. RM theorists frequently use the term to refer to organisational and at least internally institutionalised SMOs, whilst for some CB and NSM theorists this would be an anathema. For political process theorists, classification as a social movement requires being a non-institutionalised entity. To suggest that all theorists reach some kind of consensus in their definitions of social movements is to overlook important and functional differences between theories. Thus, this discussion sets out by defining social movements according to different schools of thought. Whilst many factors can be used to distinguish between different social movement definitions, it is instructive to to compare them according to the degree of institutionalisation insisted upon.[1]

Traditional movement theorists (pre-1960s, e.g. Turner & Killian 1957) saw social movements as non-institutionalised, and as having conventional behaviour and less structure than pressure

[1] I recognise that any generalisation does some violence to the particularities of individual cases. Indeed within schools of thought there is variation in definitions as much as between them.

groups. To a sizeable extent, this belief stemmed from pluralism that amongst other things suggested that all rational[2] bodies could gain access to the democratic decision making process. Disorganised groups without access that engaged in extra-institutional protest were regarded as separate from 'pluralist' politics and misleadingly but frequently regarded as episodes of irrational collective behaviour.

As SMT has developed (Chapter 3) there has been a recognition that semi- or non-institutional protest activity can be rational and contribute to democracy. Gamson (1990:138) notes how the 'old duality [between institutional and non-institutional protest activity] has been superseded by "simply politics"', recognising that both SMOs and pressure groups seek to directly and indirectly influence policy (Kaase *et al* 1979, Goldstone 2003). In practice, when looking at the environmental movement, the terms 'SMO' and 'pressure group' are used interchangeably. Rawcliffe (1998) talks of 'environmental pressure groups' in reference to many of the organisations that Rootes (2000) calls environmental movement organisations (EMOs). Over time, distinctions between pressure groups and SMOs have been weakened so that we can now talk of pressure groups being an integral part of a social movement (Dalton 1994, Diani 1992a, della Porta & Diani 1999 and McCarthy & Zald 1973 refer to 'professional social movements'). Others however, regard pressure groups as institutionalised and fodder for political scientists (e.g. Turner & Killian 1957, Smelser 1962).

Two central characteristics of pressure groups are being formally organised and seeking to influence policy (Stewart 1958:1). Confusingly, the terms 'pressure' and 'interest' groups are often used interchangeably, whilst some regard interest groups as a specific sub-type of pressure group, distinguished from cause groups.[3] Wilson (1990:8) uses the term 'interest group' as a synonym for pressure group, and distinguishes them from social movements according to the degree of institutionalisation:

> By requiring that for something to be an interest group, it must have an institutionalised existence, I distinguish interest groups from social movements (which need only have the most rudimentary linkages).

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[2] See section 4.1 for a discussion of the meaning of rationality.

3 Coxall (2001:5) for instance notes the important differences between sectional (a.k.a. interest) groups and cause groups. 'A sectional pressure group represents the self-interest of a particular economic or social group in society: examples are the confederation of British Industry, the TUC ... A cause group is formed to promote a particular cause based on a shared set of attitudes or beliefs'. Environmental groups generally fall into the latter category, although NIMBY groups could be conceived of as interest groups.

The problem arises as to where we draw the arbitrary line between rudimentary linkages with the polity, and constructive engagement. Is this invisible line an important distinction to make between organisations that are fighting for the same cause? And in which pigeonhole do we put groups that use a mixture of institutional and non-institutional tactics? The non-institutional view of social movements would imply that organisations like FoE, Greenpeace and WWF are not part of the movement because of their relatively involved level of engagement with the policy making process, and formally organised structures.

Removing 'large' and influential groups is inappropriate because they are important in setting the movement's agenda and shape public perception by virtue of the press coverage they obtain. Few people with knowledge of the environmental movement would find it acceptable to exclude FoE. Rootes (2003:2), who also rejects a non-institutional definition of social movements with reference to the environmental movement suggests:

> Such a restrictive approach sits uncomfortably with common usage in which those inside and outside environmentalist circles continue to refer to the environmental movement as a present reality.

The non-institutional viewpoint is also problematic because some social movements that began as non-institutionalised with informal networks, airing 'new' concerns, now have elements that are the converse. Now, the environmental movement is at least partially institutionalised, and groups that were once regarded as radical, like FoE, are respected interlocutors in some decision-making circles. In 1970, FoE was merely a small group of activists excluded from political participation because of its radical viewpoint. It is now possible to perceive of FoE as a semi-institutionalised body, taking, in some of its activites, a traditional pressure group role.

In the orthodox view of social movements as non-institutional, an organisation like FoE would become a pressure group once it had taken on the characteristics of such and therefore would leave the domain of social movements to find its place in the realm of 'proper' politics. Lofland (1996) tries to evade this temporal problem related to the inevitable growth and development of movements, with a non-institutional definition of social movements by adding an (italicised) qualifier:

> SMOs are associations of persons making idealistic and moralistic claims about how personal or group life ought to be organised that, *at the time of claims making* are marginal to

> or excluded from mainstream society – the then dominant constructions of what is realistic, reasonable and moral (Lofland 1996:2-3).

The qualifier could however, lead to the situation where an environmental group working to protect rainforests in the 1960s could be considered as part of a social movement because it was non-institutional and working on an issue excluded from mainstream society, whereas a group that formed in 2004 working on the same issue although in a slightly more formal way would be excluded on the grounds of the degree of group formality and because they are making a 'claim' at a time when the same issue is no longer excluded. The common interest should qualify *both* the 1960s group and its 2004 counterpart as part of the same movement.[4]

Doherty (2002) makes similar mistakes in trying to segment off the part of the environmental movement that he calls the 'green movement'. He uses Diani's (1992a)[5] definition of a social movement, but adds that to be part of the 'green movement', organisations must engage in action outside of political institutions and challenge the basic principles upon which society is organised. On this basis organisations like the RSPB and the Wildlife Trusts are excluded because (amongst other disqualifying factors) they do not engage mostly in noninstitutionalized protest. However, Doherty is modest enough to admit that his notion of the green movement is an 'ideal type ... a way of defining characteristics to aid empirical investigation' (Doherty 2002:17). Indeed the definition I end up with for this research is also an 'ideal type' (Saunders 2003).

Most social movement scholars have a viewpoint between these polarised conceptions (including McAdam 2002:282-3). Burstein (1995:76) regards SMOs and political organisations as part of a continuum without formal divisions. Della Porta and Diani (1999:16-19), similarly agree that pressure groups and even political parties can be part of a social movement if they are linked through formal or informal networks to other EMOs. However, they exclude them if specific organisations are the main source of participants' identities, assuming that this weakens loyalty to

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[4] Organisations working on issues to bring about environmental improvements or halt degradation (outside of purely corporate interests) can therefore be considered as part of a movement. However, to be part of a movement requires more than identification with a single issue. It also requires that the overall aims of the organisation do not conflict with the overarching aim of protecting or preserving the environment. For example if the Conservative Party began campaigning on rainforests, it could not be considered part of the movement because of its emphasis on neo-liberalism – the antithesis of green political thought. The Green Party on the other hand, could be considered part of the movement.

[5] See Chapter 10 for a critique of Diani's definition of a social movement.

the 'movement' as a whole (Diani 2003:302-2). This is problematic because it clashes with common usage of the term 'environmental movement'. For example it assumes that a stalwart FoE activist, who identifies mostly with FoE is not part of the movement and would inappropriately exclude many local EMO branches. For Diani & Donati (2001:134) there are four main types of organisation within a social movement including the 'public interest lobby' (i.e. a pressure group).

Table 2.1: Modern conceptions of social movement, bridging the pluralist bifurcation

	PLURALIST CONCEPTION		
CHARACTERISTICS	**INTEREST GROUP POLITICS**	**MODERN CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS**	**UNINSTITUTIONALISED SOCIAL MOVEMENT**
Organisation	Formal /bureaucratic	**BOTH LEVELS OF ORGANISATION**	Informal, non-hierarchical and participatory. OR, groups of atomised individuals
Demands	Small scale change – usually related to specific interests of members	**BOTH TYPES OF DEMANDS** (but interest groups **must** be seeking a wider change)	Radical social change –
Issues	Generally not system challenging	**BOTH TYPES OF ISSUES**	Generally system challenging
Strategy	Conventional / insider	**BOTH TYPES OFL STRATEGIES**	Unconventional / outsider
Network links / collective identity	None	***QUALIFYING FACTOR*** **MUST HAVE NETWORK LINKS**	Sometimes

It appears that the terrains of political scientists and sociologists have merged and the divide between pressure groups and SMOs is an artificial construct. The qualifying factors in the distinction between a movement organisation and an isolated pressure group are the existence of network links and a shared common agenda. This modern conception of a social movement (*cf* Snow *et* al, 2004) bridges the divide between irrational social movements and rational pressure (Table 2.1). The definition of the environmental movement used here is based on the following conception of a social movement:

> *A social movement consists of formally and informally organised groups or individuals seeking to prevent or produce a change in the social order. This may be via issues already on the political agenda, or newly emerged ones, using a variety of political and cultural strategies – from conventional to illegal. Groups and individuals may only be considered as*

> *part of a social movement when they are networked to others sharing a similar or related goal.*

I have unwittingly produced what I set out to avoid – a synthesis of social movement definitions. I would however, like to point out to the reader that this synthesis cannot be applied to the social movement theories outlined in Chapters 3-7 as each retains its idiosyncratic definition of a movement, which the reader needs to bear in mind for the theory to make sense. Generally we could suggest that RM theorists focus on formally organised SMOs, POS theorists on single political campaigns or counts of protest, and NSM theorists ignore formal organisations to focus on fluid networks.

In taking this viewpoint about social movements and in following this 'synthesised' definition for the purposes of *this research*, I am *not* suggesting that this definition is the most applicable for all social movements. It clearly fits what we would refer to as the 'environmental movement', but may be much less effective at describing others. Here I have taken Diani's (2002a) advice and selected that single social movement definition that is most applicable to the research in hand.

2.2 What is the Environmental Movement?

Given the quandary many movement theorists have got into over defining 'movements'. It is not surprising that McCormick (1991:29) prefers to use the term 'environmental lobby', which he says is 'made up of individual environmental "interest groups"'. However, it is more constructive for the purposes of this research to try to delineate and conceptualise the environmentalist realm as a movement. The term lobby is too restrictive because it ignores life-style activism, grassroots activism and less institutionalised organisations. We could convincingly include conservation groups, radical eco-activist networks like EF!, political parties (notably the Green Party) and single issue groups in a definition of the movement.

Although Castells (1997:173) unproblematically views NIMBY groups as part of the environmental movement because of their focus on 'establishing control over the living environment on the behalf of the local community', I argue that true NIMBY organisations should not be included as part of the movement because they may not necessarily have a shared agenda with the movement itself, and may even have aims contrary to the wider movement in their seeking of egotistical goals. True NIMBYists are local activists who claim a positive attitude to a development or type of technology *per se*, but express an aversion to it being located close to home (Wolskink 1994).

However, as Wolsink (1994) warns, we must not fall in to the trap of misrepresenting all local campaigns as NIMBY, or viewing true NIMBY campaigns as inconsequential. It is through NIMBY campaigns that activists begin to learn the issues and controversies surrounding particular locally unwanted land uses (LULUs), and during this process they may begin to network with others and change from being egotistically NIMBY to genuinely NIABY (not in anybody's back yard). The result is a 'scale-shift' in local campaigners' discourse, whereby there is a significant 'change in the number and level of coordinated contentious action leading to broader contention involving a wider range of actors and bridging their claims and identities' (McAdam *et al* 2001:331). NIMBYism can turn to NIABYism through forcing people faced with a LULU to become aware of issues that may not have otherwise crossed their minds (*cf* Rootes 1997, 1999 on contention over the siting of waste facilities, Robinson 1999 on M77 roads protest). Therefore, whilst true NIMBY groups are not part of the movement, the process of interacting with other groups can be important in transforming them from NIMBYs to NIABYs and making them a part of the movement proper.

Based on our earlier definition of a social movement, the environmental movement consists of formal and informal organisations with a common concern to protect or preserve the environment, using a wide variety of tactics – from conventional lobbying to eco-communes and, *crucially*, that these must be linked to one another. Rootes' (1999:134) definition is therefore useful:

> broad networks of people and organisations engaged in collective action in pursuit of environmental benefits,

especially if we recognise that that the networks and organisations may be formal or informal and that those involved use a wide range of tactics.

Bosso (1995:102) however, suggests that it is wrong to see the environmental movement as a single movement, seeing its various ideological and practical dimensions as separate movements. But Carter (2002:134), concludes that there is enough unity to conceive of it as a single movement due to shared concern about the environment, and the 'creative tension' that exists between them. Carter suggests that even relatively isolated Greenpeace can be considered to be part of the movement because of its response to creative tension. Here it is useful to fall back on the theoretical introduction to this chapter that argued that groups seeking to protect the environment can be regarded as part of the movement if they have mutually beneficial relations with others working to the same ends. Rootes and Miller (2001) show that Greenpeace is part of the network even if (viewed egoistically) it is relatively detached.

Defining Environmental Movement Boundaries

It is accepted in social movement studies that it is very hard to identify the boundaries of movements. Various attempts have been made to define the limits of the environmental movement. Lowe and Goyder (1983:3,9) and Doyle & Kellow (1995) adopted an extensive definition including EMOs and the 'attentive public' (i.e. those sympathetic to the movement), whilst Rawcliffe (1998:14) limits his definition to the committed and involved. Both definitions are empirically problematic because of the tendency to 'make the political personal' (Mooers & Sears 1992:66-67). Almanzar *et al* (1998) for example pose that engagement in environmentally friendly related behaviours (such as recycling, energy conservation and green consumerism [*cf The Ecologist*, 2002]) are behavioural expressions of allegiance to and therefore participation in the movement. Furthermore, multitudes of people may be sympathetic to the movement, but not participate. For Byrne (1997:11), 'the environmental movement is perhaps the most extreme example of blurred boundaries'.

For practical, yet not entirely unproblematic purposes, the focus of data collection for this research is on active organisations, more or less following Rucht (1999:209) who regards the environmental movement as 'the network of non-governmental groups and organisations that aim, by means of political and social intervention ... to prevent the exploitation and/or destruction of natural resources'. Data collection would become unwieldy and unfocused if it considered all individuals with movement allegiance. The boundaries of the environmental movement used for this research will be used as an analytical tool rather than the 'metaphysical truth' (Melucci 1985:795).

A combination of realist and nominalist approaches have been taken (Diani 1992a, 1995, Burt & Minor 1983), using the notion of collective identity alongside some researcher-generated notions of what ought to be included. Organisations had to confirm that they identify with the movement, are part of a network and have a main aim that seeks to protect or preserve the environment. To make for a comparable study with recently completed research on the environmental movement in Britain, similar categories for exclusion from the movement were used as on the TEA project (Rootes & Miller 2000). Excluded organisations are these:

- natural science / technological groups;
- national or local governmental institutions;
- scientific associations;
- commercial organisations (and sub-groups);

- animal rights groups.

For the TEA project, building conservationist organisations were also excluded. However, because this research focuses on an urban area with a proliferation of amenity societies and some well-established urban conservation associations, it was considered inappropriate to ignore them.

Whilst in some nations, animal rights and anti-hunting organisations are regarded as an integral part of the movement; this is not the case for Britain. Rootes (2000) shows that, on the basis of press reports in the *Guardian*, only five percent of reported animal rights/welfare protests coincided with an environmental one. Rootes & Miller (2000) present network findings from a comprehensive survey of national EMOs which similarly demonstrate the weakness of the connection between environmental and animal rights organisations.

On the fuzzy fringes of the movement boundary (*cf* Saunders 2003), there is overlap with the anti-capitalist/globalisation movement, most especially its anarchistic elements. Pepper (1996:45) for instance claims that 'most radical greens are influenced by anarchism'. Epstein (2001) indicates that youth involved in the anti-globalisation movement are mostly demanding human rights and environmental justice. DiY culture - a term that incorporates wider radical greens - is often regarded as 'anarchism in all but name' (e.g. Purkiss 2000:97). Fringe (radical anarcho-type groups and others which the researcher is not sure are part of the movement) and single-issue groups (e.g. transport groups, anti-incineration groups) were only included if they demonstrated movement identity (i.e. if they claimed to have a main aim that was environmentally oriented, and identified themselves as part of a network of EMOs in their questionnaire responses).

Spatial and divisions of the environmental movement

EMOs operate at a variety of levels – from very local guardians of single parks (e.g. Friends of Greenwich Park), to transnational organisations with worldwide influence (e.g. FoE, Greenpeace and WWF). It is possible to make a useful distinction therefore between the following types of environmental groups based on their sphere of operation:

1. Very local – looking after the environment of one or two streets, or a specific site.
2. Local – concerned with the environment within a single borough, or with two or more streets.
3. Regional – representing the interests of at least two boroughs.
4. National – concerned with national environmental politics throughout England/Britain.

It is also useful to look at the movement's ideological and strategic divisions.

It is argued here that there are three main types of environmentalism – conservationism, reformist/political ecology and radical environmentalism and that attempts to categorise environmentalism should consider both ideology/beliefs and the locus of their challenges and strategies.

Although there are precursors to 19th century conservationism (Lowe 1983) and the 1970s manifestation of environmentalism (Clapp 1994, Grove 1990), these eras are generally regarded as significant milestones in the development of modern environmentalism (Dalton 1994:27-39). The nature conservation lobby began as a middle class movement concerned initially with species loss and later with urban sprawl and associated damage to nature. As a result of its diverse history – stemming from, amongst other things, the clashing interests of hunting (Green 1981:42) and humanitarianism, the conservation movement incorporates 'a plurality of values' including preservationists and utilitarian/amenity groups (Green 1981:42) and hence, 'not a little ambivalence' (Lowe 1983:349).[6] Despite this, what conservationist groups do have in common is emphasis on 'the protection and preservation of flora, fauna and habitats perceived to be under threat' (Byrne, 1997:129). Included in this category are groups like CPRE, RSPB and the Wildlife Trusts. They share commitment to protection of natural countryside, but not necessarily the wider environment (Table 2.2). Conservation groups tend to exhibit the characteristics of archetypal insider-interest-groups – showing respect for the established social and political order, often having consultative status, and being conservative in both demands and political orientation (Atkinson 1991:19). Although many conservation groups take a broader view on the environment than in the past – for instance WWF now works on broad issues like climate change (Medley 1991), and RSPB has broadened its remit to consider habitat protection - these groups differ from political ecology groups in that the latter do not construct their agenda around nature conservation, wildlife and habitats in the same manner. The words 'countryside', 'conservation' and 'nature' appear less frequently if at all in the manifesto of political ecologists.

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[6] There is still a clashing of values in conservationism, especially between pro- and anti-hunting conservationists, and urban and rural conservationists who disagree on policies on the virtues of developing on brown field sites (see Chapter 13).

Table 2.2: Aims and Objectives of Conservation Groups

GROUP	AIMS & OBJECTIVES
CPRE	'We ... care passionately about our *countryside* and campaign for it to be protected and enhanced for the benefit of everyone. *The countryside* is one of England's most important resources but its *beauty, tranquillity and diversity* are threatened in many different ways' (CPRE website 2004).
RSPB	'The RSPB is the UK charity working to secure a *healthy environment for birds and wildlife*, helping to create a better world for us all... (RSPB website 2004).
Wildlife Trusts	'The Wildlife Trusts partnership is the UK's leading conservation charity exclusively dedicated to wildlife. Our network of 47 local Wildlife Trusts and our junior branch, Wildlife Watch, work together to protect wildlife in towns and the countryside ...The Wildlife Trusts lobby for better protection of the UK's natural heritage and are dedicated to protecting wildlife for the future' (Wildlife Trust website 2004).

In the 1950s, as links were increasingly made between industrial expansion and environmental degradation, 'political ecology' (Atkinson 1991, Doyle & McEachern 1998) emerged as a critique of unsustainable consumption patterns which were (and are still) regarded as having drastic global ramifications. Stimulated by eco-crises and publications of ecologically minded intellectuals such as Carson (1962), Elhrich (1968), Meadows *et al* (1972) and Goldsmith *et al* (1972), the need for a 'New Ecological Paradigm' (NEP) (Catton & Dunlap 1978, 1980) and a social movement to promote it was realised. For its realisation the NEP requires fundamental change in the social and political order based on decentralised radical self-management of communities in line with a holistic environmental ethic. The FoE International website provides a good example of the range of social, political and global issues which political ecology addresses (Table 2.3), contrasting significantly with the nature-based focus of conservationism.

As a result of these quite distinct 'waves' of environmentalism, commentators have distinguished between two main types of environmentalism. Dobson's (1990:1) distinction between '*environmentalism*' – which seeks a 'managerial approach to environmental problems' and '*ecologism*' - which holds that 'radical changes in our relationship with the natural world' are required to make human existence sustainable, is frequently cited. Like other similar distinctions (for instance Dalton's 1994 differentiation between '*conservation*' and '*political ecology*'), the categorisation is frequently forced, resulting in artificial divisions because organisations do not correspond to ideal types. Most typologies imply a polarisation of environmental attitudes, with

conservationism as conservative - seeking to protect the environment as an aesthetic or amenity resource, and political ecology as a polar opposite - being radical and seeking fundamental change. In reality, many political ecology groups deal with nature conservation issues, whilst traditional conservation groups like WWF (Medley 1991) and RSPB are becoming increasingly ecologically minded (Rootes 2001).

Table 2.3 : The Remit of Political Ecology : The Mission Statement of FoE International

Friends of the Earth International ... aims to:

- Protect the earth against further deterioration and repair damage inflicted upon the environment by human activities and negligence;
- Preserve the earth's ecological, cultural and ethnic diversity
- Increase public participation and democratic decision-making ...
- Achieve social, economic and political justice and equal access to resources and opportunities for men and women on the local, national, regional and international levels;
- Promote environmentally sustainable development at the local, national, regional and global levels.

(FOEI website 2000)

These typologies also need modifying because they imply that political ecology groups are radical which is often only true in relation to ideology. Many groups with a radical ideology believe that fundamental reform can most effectively be brought about incrementally, and so frequently target businesses and governments (FoE and Greenpeace are increasingly using such tactics) using a reformist rather than radical strategy. This is an important differentiation in the light of direct action roads protests that blossomed in the 1990s (Plows 1998, Doherty 1999) and the anti-capitalist/globalisation movement that developed. Some have called this the third 'wave' of environmentalism', which is also characterised by groups campaigning against LULUs and coalitions (Bosso 1997 in Carter 2001:141). The radical element of the 'new wave' makes political ecology appear increasingly moderate. Whilst political ecologists call for fundamental societal change, they do not necessarily ideologically oppose the concept of the 'state' as do radicals, neither do they 'engage in forms of action designed not principally to change government policy or to shift the climate of opinion, but to change environmental conditions around them *directly*' (Seel *et al* 2000:2), tending instead to adopt a pragmatic programme of change. EF! literature indicates the 'no compromise' (EF! website 2002) stance of the latest wave of environmentalism (Brower 1990, ix ,xi) (Table 2.4). These developments also suggest that Dalton's (1994) assumption that ideology is

the key variable to distinguish between types of groups[7] requires modification. Manifestations of radicalism of political ecology and radical environmentalists, despite ideological similarities, are vastly different and so to avoid conflation, any typology needs to consider both ideology and strategy.

Table 2.4, Radical Environmentalism

- 'Constant efforts to protect nature without moving the cause of destruction are pointless'
- 'EF! operates as a network of autonomous and non-hierarchical groups who use direct action to confront, stop and eventually reverse the forces that are responsible for the destruction of the Earth and its inhabitants'
  (From EF! Summer Gathering flyer 1997)
- 'Capitalism! No Thanks! We will burn your f****** banks!' *Do or Die* 9, 2000.,

Before showing how the ideologies of the main types of environmentalism outlined above differ, it is necessary to clarify 'ideology' in terms of EMOs, because numerous different conceptualisations have been proposed (Barker 2000:64). Although often used to outline how society's hegemonic dominant ruling class' ideas are produced and become translated by the masses into 'constitutive values' (Marshall 1998, Heberle 1951:12), what we are concerned with here is ideology at the meso-level - the way EMOs interpret reality and their cultural system of meanings. Snow (2004:396) conceives of ideology as 'a cover term for a relatively stable and coherent set of values, beliefs and goals associated with a movement ...'. According to Tucker (1985:34) there are two main aspects of social movement ideology: debunking the claims of opposing groups, and defining how the state of affairs would preferably be run. For a more rounded outline of the ideology of types of environmentalists, main issues of concern and perceived causes of the problems have been added (Table 2.5).

Clearly these ideal types generalise about environmentalism and cannot fully reflect the diversity of ideas and strategies (Pepper 1996 for example is able to convincingly delineate at least four types of eco-anarchism), but are required as an analytic tool. 'Pure, ideal-types [of environmentalists] exist only in the minds of social scientists' (Dalton 1994:49). The existence of three waves that can be distinguished does not mean that each of the three categories is a homogenous entity. For instance, the political ecology camp has internal conflict over the role that overpopulation has played in the environmental crisis, and the extent to which population control should be the solution

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[7] Dalton concluded that the environmental movement is an example of ideologically structured action in practice, but that the effects of ideology on courses of action were much less pronounced than he expected given the overriding influence of political structures and other contingent factors.

(OPT website 2002, Kenward 2002 personal correspondence). Similarly, deep ecology has been satirised by social ecologists for its misanthropic tendencies (Devall 1991, Bookchin 1994, Gerber 2002).

Table 2.5, A Typology of Environmentalist Ideologies

ELEMENT OF IDEOLOGY	TYPE OF ENVIRONMENTAL IDEOLOGY			
	Conservative		Radical	
	CONSERVATIONIST	REFORMIST	ECOLOGIST	RADICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST
Issues	♦Nature protection. ♦Localised on nature reserves and wilderness.	♦Tangible, often small-scale issues. ♦Locally based.	♦National and global issues. ♦Mixture of urban and rural environmental issues.	♦National and global issues. ♦Urban and rural environmental issues.
Problem attribution	♦Exploitation of nature ♦Interwar industrial. development and loss due to urban sprawl.	♦Poor town / country planning decisions. ♦Failure to cost environmental externalities	♦Consumerist society. ♦Over-consumption	♦Domination of nature and society by an elite (artificial power structures) ♦Global capitalism
Perceived solution	♦Practical conservation ♦Setting aside and managing reserves	♦More careful planning decisions. ♦Technocratic innovation / ecological modernisation.	♦Decentralised power ♦Participatory democracy ♦Restructuring of society piecemeal	♦Autonomy ♦Anarchy ♦Revolution ♦Sense of urgency
Examples	RSPB, Wildlife Trusts	NIMBY or LULU groups	FOE, Greenpeace	EF! RTS

A Typology of Strategies

The strategies used by EMOs groups are diverse, ranging from radical (sometimes violent) confrontation to more moderate/conventional approaches - involving consultation, dialogue and compromise with authorities (Young 1993:23), but also incorporating practical projects and cultural challenges. The latter are especially important fields of action for NSM-type EMOs (Melucci 1996). Most typologies of strategies of social movements focus disproportionately, if not totally on protest – ignoring the extreme forms of insider and outsider action - acting as consultees/negotiating with government ministers, and strategies used by the wider green milieu of DiY culture (McKay 1998, Purdue *et al* 1997), moral protests (Jaspers 1997) and practical projects. A useful bifurcation to make is between those types of strategy that focus on the political system as the locus of change, and those that seek self-directed change. The former may be seeking to influence political institutions directly or indirectly and the latter seeks direct change through legal or illegal direct action and DiY or practical projects (Table 2.6).

Table 2.6, Typology of Strategies

DIRECTED AT INSTITUTIONS		SELF-DIRECTED CHANGE	
Institutional	**Indirect-Institutional**	**Direct Action**	**DiY / Practical Projects**
•Consultees	•Marches	•Ecotage	•Practical conservation
•Lobbying	•Rallies	•Occupations	•LETS
•Negotiating	•Vigils	•Ethical shop lifting	•Permaculture groups

Groups from differing ideological persuasions share similar fields of action (Figure 2.1). In particular, radicals and conservationists both engage in practical grassroots localised projects, although radicals also engage in (sometimes illegal) direct action. Ecotage, for instance involves sabotaging construction equipment used in the building of ecologically damaging developments, or even damaging computer files and programmes of environmental villains. Ethical shoplifting involves the removal of ecologically damaging products from supermarket shelves to prevent manufacturers profiteering from environmental damage. What is distinct about political ecologists is, that despite their radical ideology, their activity is geared towards influencing already existing institutions, rather like reformists. Whilst FoE has a radical ideology, its strategy of seeking to force 'incremental change within an existing social order' (Weston 1989:208) places it firmly in the reformist camp.

Figure 2.1, Field of Action within the Environmental Movement



Radicals see the reformist approach as ineffective, comparing it to a hospital with only an emergency ward (Devall & Sessions 1985:3) and are differentiated from the others by focussing their efforts upon self-directed autonomous change by means of direct action and practical projects. The key defining words are, for conservationists – *conserve* (whether practically, or seeking changes in legislation), for political ecologists / reformists - *campaigning for change*, and for radicals - willingness to engage in *civil disobedience* or *alternative life-styles* (italicised sections are from O'Riordan's [1995] five-fold classification of environmentalists which also includes service groups). This demonstrates that whilst ideology is an important determinant in devising strategies for environmental groups, it is not as Dalton (1994:15) suggests the main 'reason and logic'. The notion of ideologically structured action assumes more ideological coherence than really exists and ignores practical constraints that prevent ideology dictating behaviour (Snow 2004:396, Klandermans 2000). In reality, for political ecologists, pragmatism is the key, for radicals direct action is the answer.

2.3 Geographical Boundaries of Study

Chapter one briefly outlined the main reasons for selecting London as the site for the study of environmentalist networks. This section builds upon those ideas by providing more detail about the localities.

London is a world-class city and economic centre of Britain. It is home of the monarchy, the Houses of Parliament and other government institutions. The headquarters of many national and international companies, banks and branches and offices of European and international decision making bodies reside in the City. Activists living in, working in or visiting London with their campaigns have an experience unique in Britain - being able to demonstrate their message in the heart of the country's decision-making machine.

For this research, all known national and regional EMOs within Greater London have been surveyed. Due to the sheer numbers of local EMOs (some boroughs have nearly 100), two smaller areas of London have been selected as a sample. The areas chosen are the Heathrow region, incorporating the Boroughs of Ealing and Hounslow and part of the Borough of Hillingdon (northwest), and the southern Thames Gateway region – western Bexley, Greenwich, Lewisham, Southwark and parts of Lambeth (southeast) (Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2, Area of Study

Like much of London, both areas have high levels of environmental grievances. Notably they suffer from poor air quality – mostly as a result of heavy traffic[8] - and a high degree of pressure on open spaces for conversion to housing, entertainment or industrial infrastructure. Recent campaigns in both areas have included mobilizations against entertainment parks on green space. In northwest London, Warner Brothers proposed to build a Movie World in Uxbridge on the usual site of the annual Borough Show (Sweeting, interview, February 2004). In southeast London there was a campaign against UCI Cinema's proposals for a fourteen-screen multiplex cinema on the site of the old Crystal Palace. The northwest London campaign was relatively small-scale, as the developers pulled out after a small amount of well-articulated opposition from the local MP and West London FoE. In comparison, the Crystal Palace campaign escalated into a full-scale legal and direct action battle.

Current issues of major concern are the seemingly never-ending expansion of Heathrow Airport for residents in the northwest, and pressures for development in the Thames Gateway (the Thames

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[8] The traffic in the Heathrow area includes air traffic. Although Greenwich is under the Heathrow flight path, its air pollution comes mostly from road traffic and highly polluting factories (in the Belvedere and Charlton areas) and an incinerator at Deptford.

Gateway Bridge and large-scale housing development) in the southeast. This time round, it has been northwest London protests that have attracted direct action activists at the site T5, which is being constructed at the time of writing. Many community and environmental groups have been mobilized, enough to warrant it the title of 'critical campaign' (Chapter 9). At the time of network data collection, a battle against proposals for a Third Runway there was in full swing. The Thames Gateway proposals have yet to catch the public imagination in the same way as airport expansion, despite the campaigning efforts of London FoE and the Wildlife Trusts. London FoE has been actively campaigning against the proposals by writing formal submissions and trying to influence what it regarded as a biased consultation process (FoE 2003). The Wildlife Trusts have been raising public awareness about the scale of the development proposals and the impact that this would have on valuable wildlife habitats. The two localities therefore provide a useful comparison – one has a campaign at a critical time (in the midst of a very active campaign) and the other is in the aftermath of a large protest and at the start of a newer campaign that has yet to mobilize to the same degree as the campaign before it.

Besides these local controversies, there are a host of other environmental organisational types in London that need to be briefly introduced to lay the foundations for the theoretical chapters that follow, as these use examples to help contextualise the theory.

2.4 An Introduction to London's Environmental Movement

The main types of EMOs are regional and national campaigning or conservation organisations, which coexist with local organisations ranging from Friends of Parks groups and Tenants and Residents Associations, to issue oriented groups, local branches of EMOs, LULU-based campaigns and radicals.

National Campaigning and Conservation Organisations

Some of the most well known EMOS including Greenpeace, FoE, CPRE and BTCV are based in London. There are also a number of less well-known and more specialised organisations including the Environmental Investigation Agency which seeks to provide objective research on environmental issues and policy and the Aviation Environment Federation (AEF) which actively campaigns on aviation issues. National EMOs campaign on a wide range of environmental issues, including from a womens' (the Women's Environmental Network) and ethnic minority perspective (Black Environmental Network).

Regional Campaigning & Conservation Organisations

There are many regional campaigning and conservation organisations in Greater London. Many national organisations now have regional departments because they are beginning to realise that influence can be exerted through this arena. London FoE has existed as a sub-group of national FoE for sometime, but CPRE has only introduced its London regional group in the last couple of years. Other groups include radical elements like London Rising Tide, which developed out of the remnants of the late Reclaim the Streets Network, and a newly formed London EF! Also there are organisations that help with environmental problems unique to the capital, for example London Planning Aid, which gives specialist advice on planning applications. London Wildlife Trust (LWT) is the main (they argue the only) organisation that is concerned with citywide conservation (Waugh interview June 2004). Many organisations have a broad focus on sustainability, like London 21 and London Sustainability Exchange, allowing them to advise on a broad range of social and environmental issues.

Local Campaigning & Conservation Organisations

It is clear that a wide range of local environmental groups is in existence. Amongst the most common local groups are Friends of Park groups that seek to maintain a balance between social and conservation interests in the management of their local parks. There are also branches of national organisations – FoE for example has 27 local (mostly borough) groups within London. There are many single-issue groups that campaign against LULUs, including Ealing's Save Our Streets campaign, which is protesting against a tramline being built through the town centre and People Against the River Crossing that has been campaigning against road developments in Greenwich since 1989.

Local amenity societies, although frequently incorrectly dismissed as NIMBY (Rootes *et al* 2001), are also an important part of local environmentalism. These societies tend to be upper-middle class in social composition and generally monitor planning applications and concern themselves with preservation of urban landscapes. Also at a local level, there are social centres where radical activists and squatters meet. Not all attendees are environmentally minded, or even politically active, but social centres are important places for holding meetings and passing around information about radical environmental campaigns.

2.5 Summary

This chapter has carefully defined the environmental movement theoretically and empirically. By providing concrete examples of EMOs in London, the brief empirically based introduction discussed immediately above clarifies the need to utilise a broad-based theoretical definition of a social movement as suggested. A definition of a movement insisting on non-institutional protest seeking profound change to the social order via political conflict against an identifiable opponent is inappropriate for the environmental movement. Organisations using a wide variety of tactics – from the pressure group tactics of FoE, and practical conservation focus of BTCV to the autonomous networking space found in radical social centres – that seek to preserve or protect the environment are part London's environmental movement. Now the scene has been set, we can proceed to consider how SMT can help predict, explain or understand the linkages between EMOs. The first port of call is collective behaviour theory that played an important role in shaping research on social movements that followed.

CHAPTER 3

Introducing Movement Theory: Theory Bashing and the Collective Behaviour Approach

This chapter outlines the theoretical underpinnings of the research, focusing on useful debates from the CB (collective behaviour) paradigm. The discussion begins with a general introduction to SMT at the meso-level, followed by an outline of the CB approach which, for important reasons has not been sidelined. An attempt is made here to rescue what is salvageable from this 'theory bashed' school of thought.

3.1 An Introduction to SMT

Social movement theories serve either *predictive* or *explanatory* functions (or both), including attempts to generalise the conditions required for the emergence of social movements (Smelser 1962), determine the likely shape and form of activity based on political structures (Kitschelt 1986), forecast the likely outcome based on the level of resources available (Jenkins & Perrow 1977) and predict future movement trajectories (e.g. Michels 1962 [1911]). In short, SMT seeks to explain either the emergence of, or maintenance/change within social movements using macro- or micro-indicators (McAdam *et al* 1988:698). Despite rigorous theoretical and empirical work, many predictive accounts inconsistently vary across time and space and there is a tendency to ignore the processes operating at the meso-level, which is where 'the real action in social movements takes place' (McAdam *et al* 1988:729).

The interest of this research is not to test the theories' predictive capabilities, but rather to evaluate their explanatory potential in relation to EMO interaction. This introductory chapter, along with Chapters 4-6 will attempt to spell out how social movement theories help answer the question : 'what makes environmental groups interact (compete/co-operate/conflict) in the way that they do?', focussing particularly on the meso-level. Macro-sociological approaches to social movements focus on underlying political dynamics and social structures, whereas micro-sociological approaches concentrate on explaining individual participation and defining the social bases of movements. Whilst both of these levels have important implications for this research, the intermediate meso-level is of central concern because it is at this level that individual grievances stemming from

macro-structural strains become collectivised and have the potential to develop into social movements. As Ferree & Miller (1985:46) suggest,

> without a homogenous, intensely acting group ... people are unlikely to realise that their private troubles are reflections of public issues.

In short, it is at the meso-level at which the activities of groups and organisations takes place, filling the void between grand theorising which refers to society at large (macro) and social-psychological (micro) theories.

Figure 3.1, Macro, Meso and Micro



The macro level, represented by the shaded circle (Figure 3.1), represents a society. We can make the safe assumption that there will be a variety of strains present in any given society. In the context of the environmental movement, the strain would equate with the persistence of environmental problems, which are omnipresent (yet not always salient) in modern society. Alone, such conditions cannot account for the emergence and dynamics of a movement. Arguably the conditions of the global environment are worsening (Goldsmith 2002), yet environmental groups – especially locally based grass roots groups – continue to wax and wane whilst new groups emerge.

There is no clear relationship between strain and persistence of movements and movement organisations. Within this hypothetical, yet realistic social environment there exist individuals (🚹 🚹) who are concerned about the environment (the micro-level). Singly, their concerns do not amount to movement, neither are the facts that they come from similar social (class, education, age) backgrounds and have been likely to weigh up the costs and benefits of participation especially pivotal. The bridge between these two levels is the meso-level, at which individuals organise themselves into groups/join movement organisations to express shared concerns and participate - be it by direct engagement, or indirectly through financial contributions - in strategies for change. It is on this point that the strength of Diani's (1992a) definition of social movements becomes evident. It is not the individual activists *per se* that constitute a social movement, neither can social and political conditions alone account for them. The crucial factor is the *connection* between individuals and groups, seeking to resist or promote social change through collective action in response to a 'strain'.

Whilst the research will be largely interpreted through the more recent social movement theories of RM, POS and NSM (which have developed since the 1970s) - the foundations of the discipline laid down by earlier CB theorists will not be neglected. Many of the pertinent points made by earlier theorists about social movement processes frequently appear within the newer theories - whether they have been hijacked or coincidentally re-expressed remains an open question. It is important to mention CB because it sets the development of SMT into context. In particular, it highlights the fashion amongst social movement scholars to carry out what Lofland (1993, 1996:372) aptly terms 'theory bashing', whereby up-and-coming scholars attack the work of their predecessors to carve out a theoretical niche for themselves.

A quote from Killian (1983:4) is reproduced here at length because of its effectiveness at describing the processes at the heart of the theory-bashing process. He suggests it is analogous to the means politicians use to oust opponents:

> ... quote the opponent selectively and out of context, carefully deleting statements of his which do not sustain the caricature. In particular, studiously ignore refutations of charges which have been levelled before you, or others – just repeat the charges. Quote from the opponent's political speeches regardless of the date they were made – never concede that minds do change. At the same time, do not hesitate to borrow freely from the opponents' ideas without acknowledging that despite party differences there is indeed a great deal of overlap in the platforms. Give the ideas you borrow new labels so the voters won't recognise them. Finally, use guilt by association by putting the opponent in the same bag

> with the others of which you're sure your opponents will disapprove and then quote what they say as if he agrees with it. Vague labels such as "right-wing", "liberal" and the like are particularly useful in smearing your opponent. The overall message is an old, familiar theme – turn the rascals out!

Indeed, as we shall see, there is much theoretical convergence between newer social movement theories and the earlier CB approaches.

CB, RM, POS and NSM are frequently seen as separate master theories, each disregarding the insights of other approaches and their applicability to different types of cases.[1] Lofland (1996:372) argues that a preference for a certain variable in movement theory does not amount to a school, or a theory, and that you cannot spar one off against the other if they are pieces of the same jigsaw puzzle. He goes so far as to say that separate theories are non-existent – they are just a way of categorising the 'sprawling, diffuse and inchoate' (Lofland 1983:48) field of SMT. Yet he does not deny that grouping certain scholarly works together into categories helps to cut through the 'complexity and befuddlement' of the literature.

Klandermans *et al* (2002) also argue that theory bashing is not necessarily a misplaced practice, but rather a sign of a healthy discipline. In particular, they argue that the debates between NSM theorists and political protest theories have strengthened the field, noting especially the juicy on-going debate between those vying for objective political opportunity structures and those with more faith in activists' subjective perceptions of opportunities as predictors of movement activity and activist involvement. Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of theory bashing, the scholarly bashing that CB theory has received is a sure sign of its prevalence in SMT. Some scholars even go so far as to suggest that CB theory provides us the best all-round theory for explaining social movements (e.g. Turner 1981:8, Eyerman & Jamison 1991:14).

The stereotypical interpretation of the CB approach to social movements conflates it with the separate and less useful relative deprivation approach (Gurr 1970, Davies 1969), premised on the spurious frustration-aggression link (Neff Gurney & Tierney 1982:35-39)[2] hence belittling its applicability to modern social movements. Hannigan (1985:432-436) is guilty of this sin, suggesting

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[1] There is, of course the more recent trend towards seeing the theories as complementary. This will be discussed later in the thesis.

[2] Neff Gurney & Tierney (1982) and Pinard (1969)suggest that other responses such as withdrawal, or lowering one's expectations are more likely to be the outcome of frustration than aggression. Others, including Dalton 1996, show evidence which suggests that protest is no more likely amongst the dissatisfied than those who are content with the political system.

that CBists view social movements negatively - as unorganised, non-institutional, irrational, spontaneous and amorphous conglomerations of isolated individuals. Similarly Jaspers (1997:20) places CB under the title of 'the myth of the maddening crowd' (McPhail 1991). Gamson in his famous (or for CB theorists infamous) *Stategy of Social Protest* (1975) suggested that the mass theory and relative deprivation theories of Le Bon, Hoffer and Kornhauser were part of the CB approach, incorrectly placing Smelser amongst their ranks. In his second edition of that same book, Gamson makes a worthy apology of making a 'too sweeping rejection of CB theory' (Gamson 1990:148). The stereotype of CB theory differs drastically from the much richer symbolic interactionist perspectives put forward by the main CB theorists - Park, Blumer, Turner & Killian and Smelser. Here I am not seeking academic trophies via theory bashing, and wish to give CB the space it deserves.

3.2 The CB Approach

Rather than seeing social movements as irrational, Park (1924:226-229) claimed they were a rational response to social unrest due to structural changes in the difficult transition from primitive communities to the state of global interdependence. Blumer (1951) added to these ideas, regarding social movements as 'collective enterprises [seeking] to establish a new order of life' (p.8), resulting from 'cultural drifts' (changes in perceived value of health, belief in free education, universal franchise and emancipation of children) (p.9). He even suggested that members acquire a 'we-consciousness' (an early conception of collective identity) which he saw as developing through an *esprit de corps* where members develop a sense of belonging, rapport and solidarity with comrades through being together and participating in ritualistic behaviour such as 'sentimental symbols ... - slogans, songs ... expressive gestures'. Turner and Killian (1957), appended further useful concepts, especially that of '*emergent norms*' which are developed through discursive practices between movement members, and '*value-oriented movements*' (which equate roughly with what were later conceived of as NSMs with universal goals) and '*participation oriented movements*' (which were reconceived in NSM theory as expressive groups) in which satisfaction stems mostly from participation. NSM theorists - Melucci (1989), Touraine (1981, 1984) and Habermas (1981, 1984) - years later, on some of these issues, were to reinvent the wheel.

Smelser's seminal (1962) work on CB is regarded by Crossley (2002:40) as 'one of the most persuasive and important' in the field. Whilst being the subject of extensive critiques (*cf* Crossley 2002), Smelser bravely attempted to produce a rounded predictive model for the emergence of a variety of forms of CB. According to Smelser, for a value-oriented movement to occur, four layers of

social system integration need to be realised. These layers are 1) situational factors – defined as actors knowledge of opportunities or restriction, 2) mobilization – how social structure facilitates action, 3) norms – regulatory principles in society, and, at the top of the hierarchy and 4) values – the broader underlying principles guiding social action. Activation of layers 1-3 he suggested would result in a norm-oriented movement, 1-2 in a hostile outburst, and 1 on its own in a craze or panic. Whilst it is correct to question the assumption that all types of CB require the same determinants, but different layers of social system integration, what is particularly useful about this is the principle of situational factors. It took POS theorists until the mid-1990s to overcome their preoccupation with objective 'structures' and realise that the perception and evaluation of opportunities by activists are important in spurring on the emergence of a movement and in the development of movement form, tactics and goals (Suh 2001). That is not to deny that political opportunities can have effects even when actors are not aware of them – SMOs can, and do, experience constraints on their campaigning due to economic or political factors even if activists are not aware of them.

Unsurprisingly, as with most predictive models, Smelser's has fallen short of its ambitious goals and can only be applied *post hoc*, in which case it is easy to find examples that fit the model (Traugott 1978:42). That is not to suggest that all *post hoc* analysis is worthless, merely that in this case, it fails in its predictive ambition. Many of Smelser's determinants persist in society, and do not always result in social movements. The theory is also over-generalised, as it seeks to account for all forms of CB – from crowds and fashions, to value oriented movements. Nevertheless, Smelser did identify some important determinants of CB, some of which (italicised) have recently reared their heads again in the POS approach – *structural strain*, *structural conduciveness*, growth of generalised beliefs, precipitating factors, mobilization and *social control*. Although some (e.g. Marx & Wood 1975:407) have regarded the notion of generalised beliefs as derogatory due to over emphasis on irrational / spiritual beliefs, the notion that movement ideology stems in part from mystical beliefs is useful for interpreting and understanding some radical/spiritual elements of movements, for example the pagan neo-tribal[3] Dongas prominent in the 1990s anti-roads protests.

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3 Neo-tribalism is a term coined by Maffesoli (1996) who, in his powerful argument against individualisation, suggested that neo-tribes -- those informal and informal groupings which we engage in -- are rife in society. Such tribes, though they may have weak powers of discipline 'have strong powers of integration and inclusion, or group solidarity. These powers are displayed and actualised in initiatory rituals and stages of membership' (p.ix). They are based on avoidance lifestyles, and 'characterised by fluidity, occasional gatherings and dispersal' (p.76).

As Marangudakis (2001:459) suggests 'modern environmentalism is particularly prone to fall under the spell of irrational values, namely of mysticism'.[4]

This section now attempts to set straight the 'myth of the maddening crowd' stereotype, by explicitly laying out the aspects the approach that have been adopted or adapted by RMT, POS or NSM theorists. In line with the RMT approach, CB theorists noted that organisation *is* necessary to sustain a movement, but, unlike the more restrictive RMT conception, that social movements and SMOs are not necessarily coterminous (Turner 1981:8). Besides the useful concept of situational factors, Smelser also foreshadowed POS theory by suggesting that differentiated societies – those with centres of participation (which POS theorists would call 'open')– lead to norm-oriented movements, whilst non-differentiated societies – those with strong social control ('closed')– lead to more broadly challenging value-oriented movements. Larana (1996:1-13), writing on theoretical convergence between NSM and CB approaches notes three main similarities. Firstly, both view social movements as agents for positive, revolutionary or utopian change. Secondly, they share a focus on collective/shared identity and lifestyles of movement participants, and finally, they both define social movements inclusively as agents working through a variety of media to promote or resist social change. Although often the subject of much disparagement, CB theory remains the closest theorists have got to a 'master theory' for explaining social movements and 'it has proved difficult to develop an alternative conceptualisation of similar explanatory potential' (Eyerman & Jamison 1991:14).

3.3 Network Implications of CB

Although mass society and relative deprivation theories downplay the role of networking in social movements by claiming that they consist of dissatisfied, atomised, and frequently irrational individuals, the richer accounts provided by the likes of Blumer, Turner and Killian, Park and Smelser make it clear that interaction between individuals and organisations is a crucial factor in movement formation and maintenance. These theorists pre-empted discussions about collective identity by suggesting that movement participants gain a we-consciousness and sense of belonging through participation in ritualistic behaviour. Existence of a we-consciousness implies strong interaction between movement participants that could come at the expense of fruitful out-group relations (see also section 6.4).

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4 It is possible to conceive of mysticism as rational. My assumption here is that Marangudakis is referring to the term rational in the traditional teleological sense of the term rather implying that environmental activists are themselves irrational.

3.4 Summary

Theory-bashing has without doubt been an active scholarly pastime in the study of social movements. Although it can help strengthen the field to criticise old theories and make improved new ones, CB theory seems to have attracted more than its fair share of criticisms. Much of the theory has re-emerged under the banner of different theories albeit with different titles and names (Lofland 1996:312, cf Wilson 1973). We must not equate CB theory with the disproven relative deprivation approach. The richness of Smelser, Park and Blumer's models, although by no means fault free, should not be discredited in the name of theories that are more precise but ultimately explain less. As regards network implications, the theory has laid down important precedents to some concepts that have been revisited in the NSM approach.

CHAPTER 4

Organisations and Resources: Competition or Co-operation?

This chapter focuses on the 'organisational' school of thought, coupling organisational ecology and RMT because of the considerable overlap between them. Early proponents of RMT were themselves organisational scholars. Before delving into the theory, the central concept of rationality is conceptualised. The role of resources in movement formation is explored, before the links with organisational ecology and meso implications are spelt out. The chapter ends with the implications of organisational/resource-based theory for movement interactions, and an evaluation of the approach.

4.1 RMT and Rationality

RMT developed in the 1970s in the USA in response to perceived weaknesses of earlier theoretical approaches, partly spearheaded by Gamson's (1975) 'path-breaking' (Burstein *et al* 1999:275) attempt to account for factors making supposedly *rational* SMOs *successful*.[1] It is not coincidental that much criticism directed towards RM centres around the meaning of rationality.

Generally RM's proponents imply economic or instrumental rationality, whereby actors seek the most cost effective means for realising interests (Crossley 202:58). This perspective constitutes the building blocks for rational actor theory, as incorporated into micro-level RMT. This assumes, not unproblematically, that potential activists weigh up costs and benefits of movement participation and that a favourable balance be struck before they join (Klandermans 1984). Klandermans' argument is based on an assessment of Olson's (1963) classic and hotly debated *Logic of Collective Action*. Olson believed that collective action[2] in the pursuit of collective goods was irrational, arguing that if collective actors were successful in achieving a collective good, individuals would stand to gain regardless of their participation. On the other hand, unsuccessful collective actors would be left with a deficit in their cost-benefit balance, having invested in a cause to no

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[1] NB. The work of Obserschall (1973) and some work of Zald and his colleagues (Zald & Ash 1966, Zald 1967, 1970, 1973) placed the approach on the starting blocks prior to Gamson.

[2] Olson's original theses sought to explain participation in the Trade Union movement. Others have, perhaps erroneously, regarded it as a more general theory about participation in collective action.

avail whilst still footing the bill for the cost of action. A rational actor would in Olson's terms *free-ride*, reaping benefits without personal commitment or outlay to the cause.

Why have people persistently supported groups seeking collective goods? Olson's answer was that organisations persuade members to join via distribution of selective incentives - material benefits exclusively for members, providing an incentive to join by swinging the cost benefit ratio in their favour. In reality, motivational bases for collective action are much broader than simple economic gain. People may join groups for a sense of belonging – to foster solidarity and develop consciousness of shared interests (Fireman & Gamson 1979). Some scholars have stretched the concept of selective incentives to include social, symbolic and normative incentives (e.g. Opp 1989, Cress & Snow 1986). Such generic use of the term is best avoided if we are to prevent loss of theoretical clarity. Using 'selective incentives' as a broad-range term implies that it would be 'rational' for an actor to join a collectivity seeking collective goods in return for non-material incentives and without recourse to material costs and benefits. Whilst such a bold statement may be true if one considers rationality to mean seeking the most appropriate course of action in the given circumstance, it twists the original meaning of rational-choice theories. Also the term selective incentives has become sufficiently slippery that it arouses suspicion that it is merely a means of justifying post-facto explanations.

4.2 Meso-level RMT

At meso-level, decision-making individuals within 'rational' organisations[3] are assumed to weigh up the costs and benefits of co-operating with others. This kind of rationality applies to procedures under bureaucratic control, involves impersonal quantitative calculation and is what Weber (1971 [1922]) would call 'formal rationality'. It stands poles apart from 'functional rationality' – a Weberian term which Habermas (1985) has adopted and applied to discursive communicative action in the public sphere in relation to the ultimate goal of universalism. Many variants of rationality exist on the continuum between these poles, but RM theorists' interpretations fall closer to the formal over the functional one. The term rational will henceforth, for theoretical consistency, refer to instrumental and economically guided rationality to which Weber's formal rationality and Olson's conception of rationality originally referred, and upon which most RM theorists built their theories.

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[3] 'Rational' organisations are organisations that organise their priorities on the basis of instrumental rationality (as discussed in section 4.1).

RMT originally argued that the source of movement emergence was neither strain, nor generalised beliefs, but an injection of external resources from an elite source. In their embryonic conception of the theory, McCarthy and Zald (1977:1215), went so far as to suggest 'that there is always enough discontent in any society to supply grassroots support for a movement if the movement is efficiently organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group'. It appears as if RM theorists selectively choose examples of insurgency that fit the theory, at the expense of ignoring wider movements (Crossley 2002:84), or other case studies. There are almost as many cases that do not fit the theory as ones that do, including Jenkins' (1985) farm-workers movement and the rise of black insurgency (McAdam 1982).

More than aspects of the theory that seek to explain movement emergence, of particular interest here are variables that affect SMOs' behaviour and choice of allies. These are clustered around the loosely defined concept of resources – as Oberschall (1973:28) suggests, 'resources are anything from material resources – jobs, incomes, savings and the rights to material goods and services – to non-material resources – authority, moral commitment, trust, friendship, skills, habits of industry', [4] and premised upon the notions of instrumental rationality and self-gain. Despite being a poorly conceptualised and 'loose[ly] cluster[ed] [set] of ideas that exponents use selectively and interpret idiosyncratically' (Turner 1981:8-9), it is especially useful for interpreting the activity of SMOs that have a neo-corporatist structure (Dalton 1994:10). Such groups have to maintain their organisations by seeking new members, encouraging existing members to re-subscribe, paying staff, funding research etc., and this makes cost benefit type appraisals an inevitable and important part of daily organisational life.

Links with Organisational Ecology

Of central importance to RMT are the ways SMOs take strategic action to secure a favourable resource balance – in members, money, press coverage or public sympathy. This apparently reveals itself through inter-movement competition or co-operation mimicking the market place. When demand for EMOs is high (when the issues are salient), product differentiation occurs, and new specialist groups emerge (Barglow 2002:1195). Rawcliffe (1998:77) notes that the early 1990s saw a dramatic rise in EMOs and WWF 'undoubtedly' lost some of its members to more specialist

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[4] Obserschall's emphasis on components of solidarity (e.g. 'moral commitment, trust, friendships ..') in his definition of a resource features little if at all in the work of most RM theorists including his own.

groups (Rawcliffe 1998:145). When only a few organisations exist, it is easier to obtain resources and there is less competition and less need to specialise.[5]

These implications of RMT are closely related to organisational ecology (Hannan & Freeman 1977, 1989), which suggests that organisations are affected by the configuration of other organisations in their social environment. Rooted in arguments from neo-classical biology, Hannan & Freeman sought to answer the question 'why are there so many kinds of organizations?' Their answer was that organisational diversity exists because organisations search for their own unique niches for optimal survival. Dimensions of the niche include target market, issues, ideology and organisational form. Niches lead to functional specialisation/division of labour, and to cooperation or competition. An organisation has found its niche when it is able to grow, or as a minimal requirement, to sustain itself. Interactions within niches can have positive and/or negative effects.

The configuration of organisational types is regarded to be a direct result of competition and resource availability:

> organisational forms presumably fail to flourish in certain environmental circumstances because other forms successfully compete with them for essential resources. As long as the resources which sustain organisations are finite, and populations have a limited capacity to expand, competition must ensue (Hannan & Freeman 1977:940).

The overall pattern of organisational diversity is regarded as the result of competitive and co-operative interdependencies that determine organisational survival and chances of prosperity as organisations 'find niches to protect themselves against competition' (Aldrich 1999:43). Competition apparently occurs when the presence of one organisation has an adverse effect upon another. Competition is pure when both organisations suffer, and a 'predator-prey relationship' describes the situation when competition benefits one but causes suffering to the other. Symbiosis is where two organisations co-exist to mutual benefit when interdependence is based on mutual need.

A multi-dimensional space diagram can effectively represent the concept of organisational niche and its impact upon competition between organisations. Figure 4.1 shows organisational niches for four hypothetical EMOs on three dimensions - target population, scale of operation and ideological leaning. In reality organisational niches have more than three dimensions including in addition, repertoires of action, issue focus, degree of participation and resources required.

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[5] Rootes (2004b:para 25) argues that this has 'encouraged WWF to see its role as complementary to those of other organisations'.

A represents a radical EMO with working class membership that campaigns internationally. **B** has a broad-based membership, campaigns at regional and national level and has a reformist ideology. **C** has a working to middle class membership and operates pragmatically at regional level, whilst **D** is a mostly local, conservationist organisation with elite membership. Organisational ecology tells that organisations with a smaller niche are more specialised (**A**) and less likely to share their niche with others and so experience little competition. If there is overlap between organisational niches, competition is likely. If the overlap impinges on a greater proportion of relative niche area of one organisation than another, that group with the largest impingement will suffer from the predator-prey relationship. Therefore, overlap between **B** and **C** will result in greater competition from **B** to **C** than **C** to **B** because **C**'s niche encroaches on **B**'s to a proportionally smaller extent. Whilst there may be competition between **B** and **D**, this, according to organisational ecology, will be less intense than between **B** and **C**, and will affect **D** more than **C**. McPherson (1983) used a similar methodology using niche diagrams to investigate niche overlap between voluntary organisations and reported the unsurprising finding that voluntary organisations serving youths and the elderly have little niche overlap on target members, and that they are, as niche theory would predict, free from competition with one another.

Figure 4.1, Niches of four Hypothetical EMOs



Organisational ecology does not provide a foolproof plan for determining the extent of inter-organisational competition. Perrow (1979:241-2) is critical of the approach because it is difficult to extrapolate from the natural to the social environment. Its central focus is not on interactions

between organisations, but on determining the likelihood of organisational survival and adaptations to competition – (like population ecology). Particularly he suggests that the central question 'why are there so many types of organisation' is misdirected; because, at least with firms, the market is dominated by large successful organisations that rarely die. This is of course less true of EMOs, as a wide variety of local to international groups flourish. Although local groups have high turn over, they usually 'die' due to activist burnout, or a campaign reaching its natural end rather than due to competition. Young (1988) comprehensively critiques the approach and most of its concepts. Young's most relevant criticism for the context of this research is that the concept of niche is difficult to define for organisations (p.4-5). How many dimensions do we include and which are most crucial? Another specific weakness is that it does not allow us to predict the type of competition that will occur as a result of niche overlap. What is missing is any convincing theoretical explanation for how niche overlap can just as easily result in cooperative or non-cooperative symbiosis as competition. It may be the case that similar types of organisation have a greater propensity for interaction – whether cooperative or competitive. The begging question remains - 'what are the conditions that determine whether symmetric organisations will co-operate rather than compete?'. Nonetheless, the proposition that groups operating in distinct and independent niches neither compete nor co-operate seems more watertight.

4.3 Competition, RM and implications for movement networks

RMT argues that competition exists because the main goal of any SMO is survival. Without survival further movement goals cannot be sought (McCarthy & Zald 1977:1220-1224). To survive, resources – whether in the form of money or active support, are crucial. NSM-groups tend to extract resources from members in the form of active participation (Chapter 6), whereas protest-businesses[6] (Jordan & Maloney 1997) mobilize direct-mail subscriptions to raise finances.

For protest businesses, the majority of movement supporters tend to be mobilized through postal appeals, remain at-a-distance from the organisation and tend not to interact with one another (Jordan & Maloney 1997), resulting in low levels of solidarity and communicative action (Habermas 1981). In contrast, those groups which can muster few monetary, material and professional

[6] A protest business is a campaigning organisation for which docile supporters who contribute financially are more important than active members. Policy is made in an oligarchic fashion, and supporters influence policy through their capacity for exit. Political action is taken by staff rather than by the supporters. Staff shape the perceptions of followers by providing them with partial information, and supporters tend to be interested in narrow issue areas (Jordan & Maloney 1997:22).

resources, for various reasons - such as being newly formed or radical in outlook - will apparently attempt to generate more ties 'as an essential replacement for the scarcity of organisational resources' (della Porta & Diani 1999:88) and also rely more on social capital, pre-existing networks or community relations (what Jenkins 1985 terms 'indigenous organisation'). According to this perspective, local, small-scale or radical grassroots groups would be expected to have closer, more meaningful networks as they strive to use limited resources to best effect, whilst national groups would be expected to exhibit looser networks (Edwards & McCarthy 2004:141).[7]

As national EMOs like Greenpeace acquire a large proportion of funds from 'supporters'[8], it is important to try to keep these loyal in the face of high levels of SMO multiple-memberships (in 1997 65.8% of FoE's paper membership belonged to at least one other EMO) (Jordan & Maloney 1997:82). It is argued that high levels of demand for environmental supporterships lead to variation in target-constituencies, tactics and issues and dictate movement networks. As McAdam *et al* (1988:715-6) suggest, 'the SMO must negotiate a niche for itself within the larger organisational environment within which it is embedded. This usually entails a complex set of relationships with other organisational actors representing the movement'. According to Juniper, Director of FoE (Habitats Campaigner at time of interview), the result is:

> regular informal liaison or co-ordination meetings with other major environmental ... groups... [to] make sure that there isn't a duplication of efforts and resources .. our objective is to recognise the limits of the resources we have [and] to make sure we use them effectively through not duplicating work that has been done by others – particularly those who have very similar objectives ... (interview in Szerszynski 1995:89).

This liaison includes the once-monthly 'Kentish Town Dinner', at which the executive directors of the big EMOs meet to formulate policy, work out how to divide labour and strategise (Sauven, interview with Seel 2000b). This results in differentiation - for instance, whilst Greenpeace tends to mobilise money from its largely docile support base, performs professional media-oriented stunts and focuses on global issues, FoE focuses more on locally-based campaigning, offers direct involvement for local people and campaigns locally to globally.[9]

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[7] Rosenthal et al (1985) found this in the New York women's movement.

[8] Bosso (1995:107) suggests that the word 'member' is a misnomer for many professional or semi-professional EMOs - as 'members' frequently the do little more than pay an annual subscription - preferring instead to use the term 'supporter'. It is also a misnomer because some EMOs do not have mass memberships

[9] Recently, there has been a trend in Greenpeace to involve 'active supporters' making it increasingly similar to FoE. FoE however concentrates more on local environmental campaigning by supporting non-FoE

Rootes (1999:155-73, 2001:45) suggests that EMOs are not competitive so much as they increasingly co-operate on the basis of an accepted division of labour. Diani & Donati (1999:2000) would argue that despite the existence of consensually agreed division of labour, EMOs continue to compete for financial resources via membership subscriptions. To do this, many groups offer, in the Olsonian sense, selective incentives – such as a monthly update, car stickers and free publications. They also exaggerate the benefits of being a member, downplay the constraints they face and seek to maintain a favourable public image.

Hannigan (1995:94) suggests this is why 'big' groups tend to turn their backs on local issues (as Scholsberg 1999:122 found in the US) in favour of drastic doomsday like, 'sexy', or winnable issues. This seems at least partially true. According to Weston (1989:205), the two main factors that FoE used to decide on campaign issues were funding availability and winnability.

Rawcliffe (1998:78) notes how traditional EMOs like Greenpeace and FoE appear to be increasingly motivated by self-investment and their activities are becoming curtailed by their cumbersome budgets (Jordan & Maloney 1997:18-25).[10] Certainly by 1992, ex-employees and ex-allies of Greenpeace said that:

> time and again ... Greenpeace had become mired in its own bureaucracy and had lost touch with the grassroots, that it had become a cumbersome sluggish organisation that decreased in effectiveness as it increased in size (Dale 1996:5).[11]

Dale also suggests that Greenpeace purposefully seeks to keep its image distinct from other EMOs that the media can much more easily ignore. Greenpeace's quest to fortify its public identity in this manner may be an important factor in explaining its tendency to work in isolation.

Local groups are often the eyes and ears of an organisation (FoE 2002a:3), but their campaigns are not always fully supported nationally. Consequently, local groups may feel that national groups

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community initiatives. Although mobilizing people into grassroots campaigning is important for FoE, it does not necessarily do this very effectively. Local FoE members account for only about 10% of FoE supporters. A 1998 study of local groups indicates that approximately 8,000 people are local group activists (Ritchie 1998).

[10] Rawcliffe shows how EMO budgets have increased, for example FoE's budget rose from £306,285 in 1985 to £3839,325 by 1995.

[11] This statement cannot be said with such conviction in 2004, because Greenpeace has reinvigorated its connection with the grassroots and now has a busy 'active supporters unit' (Torrance in interview 2003).

do not give them sufficient support, engendering a sense of suspicion of them (DeShalit, 2001). Alternatively, Cathles (2000:170) argues that it is the established EMOs which engage in 'regular monitoring and [are] in a good position to alert the local community'. Perhaps the latter is true, but with the qualifier that established EMOs only provide assistance when they are likely to make gains from their involvement. Although this is probably too harsh a judgement of FoE and Greenpeace in this country, Diani & Donati (1999:23) report that it is true for the Italian environmental movement in which national EMOs apparently only support local mobilizations against high-risk plants 'to gain visibility for themselves [rather] than promoting the struggles in the first place'.

Tilly's (1985) interpretation of RMT, notes that self-interested groups are likely to engage in impromptu game analysis, estimating the optimistic best, and pessimistic worst likely outcomes of competition and/or co-operation (Forder 1996), with the overriding objective of self-gain. For NIMBY groups, logic would suggest that the best tactic would be to compete with other local groups to ensure that the LULU they are campaigning against is built in their competitors' constituency and not their own. An underlying economic motive may be the likely deleterious effect on property prices. This is common in the early stages of local campaigning, as evident in the 1980s Kent-based anti-Channel Tunnel Rail Link campaigns (Rootes & Saunders 2001), in which groups protesting against Routes 3 and 4 were, to the dismay of campaigners against Route 1 and 2, promoting any alternatives to save their own locality. Similarly, in the early 1990s, the Greenwich Society promoted a bypass that would have increased total traffic volume throughout the borough, but remove congestion from their local patch (Connelly, interview June 2001). The immediate response to the late 1980s South Circular Assessment studies in London, which proposed a series of possible road schemes to relieve congestion, was outright hostility between groups representing different constituencies. The first meeting of the umbrella group ALARM (All London Against the Road Menace) was the scene of much bickering and nigh-on gang warfare (Shields, interview June 2001). There was also a small amount of NIMBY rivalry in anti-waste facility campaigns in Kent (Rootes 2003).

Sooner or later, NIMBY organisations usually begin to realise that there are wider issues that need to be articulated in order to win their campaign, and that their concern is only part of the broader picture. Rucht (1990:171) suggests that if NIMBY groups are initially unsuccessful, they begin, perhaps out of desperation, to question the need for the LULU *per se*. Issues like exclusion from consultation and decision-making (procedural rhetoric), the search for alternatives, and the wider relationship of the issue to other policies (global rhetoric) begin to be addressed (Gordon & Jasper 1996). At the extreme, activists may even commence campaigning for a new social order. For

instance, local anti-road action groups began to address the wider anti-car agenda by promoting green transport plans, whilst many anti-roads protestors began waging war against the capitalist system, just as local anti-incineration campaigners have begun addressing wider waste management issues and instigated local composting projects (Rootes 1999:298). In this kind of scenario, the rationale of protecting one's own constituency gives way to the more comprehensive rationale of addressing broader concerns, so reducing propensity for inter-group conflict and competition.

The transition from NIMBY to NIABY prevents local groups from competing and enables them to support one another instead. Rucht (1990:171) calls this transition the 'principle of generalization', and suggests that it is most likely when the conflict is lengthy, the activists involved are young and well-educated, protest groups and organisations are well inter-linked ,and when groups to which the NIMBY group is linked (interpersonally or interorganisationally) have a well developed ideology and much experience. Rucht (1990) claims that the 'principle of generalization' accurately reflects the campaign history of groups that were originally NIMBY but turned NIABY in nine case studies of anti-nuclear and airport construction campaigns in West Germany, France and Switzerland.

There is certainly a tendency to find that a lack of NIMBYism brings groups together (Johnson 2002) and that a local case of contention can result in the integration of NIMBY groups into the NIABY field (Robinson 1999). Local contentious issues are useful for bringing together groups from different ideological and strategic planes as groups either realise the benefits of cooperation, or feel too weak to fight the cause alone.

According to Tilly (1985), once groups realise they can benefit from interaction, decisions on whether to co-operate are dictated by patterns of gains or no-gains, resulting in a process of trust-benefit generation. This he terms 'rational interaction', the result being that 'egoistic parties ... recognise that co-operation suits their interests' (Tilly 1985:735). It becomes tactically and strategically preferential for organisations to interact with those others with which they have a symmetric relationship of trust and gain (Todeva & Knoke 2002:4).

The relationship between FoE and EF! is a classic example of a marred trust-benefit relationship. In the early 1990s, Andrew Lees, FoE's campaigns co-ordinator, was actively contacting local groups asking them to disengage or refrain from contact with EF!, fearing it would spoil FoE's reputation

and credibility (Doherty 1998).[12] EF! and other anti-roads groups were dismayed with FoE when it pulled out of the anti-roads protest at Twyford Down in 1992 after being threatened with an injunction (Lamb 1996:177) which would have crippled the organisation, forcing it to pull out or collapse. For EF!ers the one and only objective was to prevent the road being built at all costs. Lush (quoted in Wall 1999b:68), a very understanding protester, had the following view:

> [EF!ers proclaimed] "we're the best, FoE copped off and fucked off" ... yet when you look at it, they really tried to help the Twyford Down Association. They set up this extremely bizarre "we are the middle class, we are representative of middle England" and extremely media-obsessed camp. They were uncomfortable, but they were fucking there ... after three days the police cut through this very easy to cut chain and they got slapped with an injunction ... and as a company they have to make decisions ... unless they wanted to cease to be FOE.

Unfortunately for FoE, the majority of EF!ers were unsympathetic to the need for organisational maintenance, resulting in a chasm between the two organisations which deepened when FoE claimed the limelight for the victory of the East London River Crossing road campaign - which was really won by the Oxleas Alliance, a coalition including EF! and the Wildlife Trusts and sustained by local campaigners (Stewart in interview June 2001). [13] Torrance, founder member of EF! and Oxleas Alliance representative, reprimanded FoE for deviating from the planned strategy of shared victory and urged that caution should be exercised in future transactions (in interview, 2001). This has increased scepticism and distrust among rank and file EF!ers - many of whom were in the first instance wary of becoming involved in an alliance with competitive organisations like FoE, referring to them as '...namby pamby EMOs that are more worried about their image than saving wilderness' (EF! website 2004). On the other hand, the conservative Twyford Down Association (TDA) did not feel as if FoE had let them down, believing that all legal means had been exhausted and thanking it for continued campaigning by means of a tactical voting campaign after the injunction was served (Porritt 1996). By contrast, TDA regarded EF!ers as 'anarchists parachuting into the campaign', lacking both local knowledge and emotions (Bryant 1996).[14] FoE's emphasis on its organisational image was largely responsible for the rift.

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[12] Barkan [1986] found reformists had similar complaints about radicals in the southern civil rights movement.

[13] Similarly, in the 1980s, Greenpeace stole the limelight from FoE on whales, and the seal pelt issue from IFAW (Pearce 1991:25,28).

[14] There are many other similar examples of conflict between radical activists and local campaigners, including that which North (1998) found on the Save Our Solsbury roads protest and the case of Crystal Palace; there the local campaigners proclaimed that they could not condone any illegal protest activity (Rootes *et al* 2001). Yet on other protests, good relations were established with locals, as suggested by

There have been attempts to reconcile links between FoE and EF! – for instance Charles Secrett attended the 1995 EF! Summer Gathering, and relations at the 1995-6 Newbury Bypass protest were much more amenable. Yet, as Porritt admits (in Bryant 1996:303) 'no-one can ever pretend that so diverse a range of tactics and organisations can hold together without a certain amount of internal strife'. But, as Rootes (2000:43) declares 'if FoE has in recent years been anxious to repair its links with more radical and grassroots activists, this was not reflected in its reported repertoire of action'.

FoE has much more in common with Greenpeace than EF! and hence a greater inclination to co-operate, as Juniper, relayed:

> although it [Greenpeace] does direct action, it does it in ways which enable it to function ... like a national membership organisation with an office and everything ... to that extent we're able to work with them ... in a more upfront and open way than some other ... more grassroots and informal networks are able to relate to us (quoted in Seel 2000a).

It appears as if organisations with the same, or very similar organisational structures and ideologies are the most likely to result in joint gain, and therefore cooperate, especially when not competing. Diani (1995) found that this rang true for the environmental movement in Milan. Similarly, Schlosberg (1999:129) reports that networks of EMOs in the US are based on 'rhizomatic organising' – uniting around similarities – e.g. local people networking to solve a local problem, or groups in areas responding to similar circumstances. Although similar organisations tend to be the most likely candidates for cooperation, they are also more prone to competition as they have similar issue-foci and constituency bases. The circumstances that lead similar organisations to compete rather than cooperate require exploration.

4.4 Summary of network implications

In summary, the RM / organisational ecology approach suggests that organisations that are NIMBY, or which share niche space, will be likely to have competitive relationships with one another. Although pure NIMBY groups are likely to be egotistical and competitive by requesting that LULUs be placed in someone else's backyard rather than their own, links with other EMOs via umbrella groups can encourage them to embrace broader environmental issues. In their quest for improving their bank balance and public reputation, EMOs are predicted to carefully craft a

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Cathles 2000. Locals may have given their support in some cases out of desperation – in which case the perceived POS is potentially a more applicable theory than RMT.

favourable public image. EMOs are expected to interact with one another to discuss their niche boundaries and arrive at a mutually acceptable division of labour. During this process, they may turn their backs on local campaigns and local EMOs, leaving local campaigners feeling dissatisfied. Organisations with few monetary resources are expected to have relatively dense network links as a replacement for the scarcity of other resources.

4.5 Evaluating RMT

Generally, proponents of RMT find evidence that supports the theory, but social movements cannot be wholly explained by it (Dalton 1994:10). This is partly because RM is not a grand narrative for which supporting evidence must be found, but rather an analytical tool to assist understanding of particular movements. However, RM is lacking because of the disproportional emphasis given to instrumentally rational organisations (Kitschelt 1991:334-337). Via RM, social movements 'were quickly conceptualised in an insular way that privileged reform movements and formal organisations' (Buechler 2004:54). Not all social movement activity focuses on reform, neither is it restricted to the activities of formal organisations. Piven & Cloward (1977) for example emphasize the role of loosely organised protest and mass defiance in poor people's movements. 'In this view, resource mobilization's emphasis on formal organisation amounts to conceptual blinders that preclude analysts from considering other forms of protest' (Buechler 2004:56), and according to McAdam *et al* (2001:15):

> Read 20 or 30 years later, early RM models exaggerate the centrality of deliberate strategic decision to social movements. They downplay contingency, emotionality, plasticity and the interactive character of movement politics.

Crossley (2002:66-7) suggests that the idea of selfish rational movement activity upon which RM is based, is equally as derisory as CB theory has been alleged to be. Variables like solidarity, collective identity, consciousness and ideology are either ignored, or at the other extreme are incorporated under the broad umbrella of 'resources', stretching the concept to its limits. Selective incentives are infrequently provided by radical EMOs, yet these are furnished (at least during active protests) with healthy supporter levels. Furthermore, in a situation where a quick decision needs to made, it can be irrational to be instrumentally rational – it takes time to seek out all possible options (Turner 1981:12), and, at the end of the day, subjective decisions will always be made by activists who are inescapably social beings. This notion ties in with Simon's (1982) concept of 'bounded rationality', in which he provides examples of individuals' choosing courses of action that are 'good enough' rather than optimal. This is what he calls a tendency to 'satisfice'. It is, he suggests, the result of competing demands for time and attention and limits to individuals' cognitive abilities.

RMT was initially applied to movements of the 1960s and 1970s – which is the period during which organisational activities were regarded by newly emerging radical factions as unfashionable and ineffective and amorphous dissident sub-cultures were proliferating. Foss & Larkin (1986:18-20) suggest that this means that RM theorists were focussing only on the more legitimate aspects of agitation during this important sub-cultural period, and that the approach makes social movements appear more cohesive and orderly than they really are. As RM theorists focussed on at least internally institutionalised 'social movement' organisational behaviour (which is what others have referred to as interest group politics), they have described the emergence and trajectory of something quite different from other social movement theorists who regarded being non-institutional as an essential factor for being considered a social movement. Zald (1992:336) admits that the RM approach may 'warp the analysis of the more unbounded and fragile forms of organisations often found in social movements'. Yet, despite its many apparent weaknesses, there is sufficient strength in the approach for it to be applicable to those types of EMOs which have interest-group type structures, as the many examples provided above show. The approach deserves credit for asserting the rationality of collective action, and recognising that organisation underpins many social movements, and that organisation and rationality can produce positive outcomes. In short, RM was important in the realisation that social movements are part of 'politics' and not just outsider skirmishes to be marginalized. Its cost-benefit analogy has proved useful for frame analysts, the development of the POS approach, and more recent attempts to explain why people participate in high-cost activism, providing at the same time 'a recipe book for description of movement tactics, and dynamics and a dense set of inter-linked processes for analysis' (Zald 1991:353). Zald, in his more recent (1992) assessment of the RM regards it as almost being a master-theory. He welcomes stretching the concept of selective incentives and widening the umbrella of the term 'resources' in the name of avoiding 'hyper-rationality' (p.330). Even if the theory is broadened so as to reflect reality more closely, to fully explain movement activity requires consideration of the POS approach and NSM theory that will now be outlined in Chapters 5 and 6. Zald and McCarthy (1980:18) close their RM-based account of competition and conflict among SMOs stating that 'at some point, social movement analysis must join with cultural and linguistic analysis if it is to understand fully cooperation and conflict in its socially specific forms'.

CHAPTER 5

Political Pressure, Process and Opportunity

This chapter introduces political opportunity structures (POS) and political process theory. POS theory essentially argues that political environments can impact upon the development of movements, and upon the form that they take. In its simplest form, it argues that open states – states that are decentralized and that encourage participation – are likely to produce moderate movements that mobilize large numbers of protesters. Closed states – which are highly centralized and discourage political participation – are expected to be hostile terrain for movements, resulting in small, radical, or even violent movements. The strong version of POS theory (e.g. Kitschelt 1986, Kriesi 1995) argues that the characteristics of political structures are the principal determinants of the incidence and forms of social movements. Weaker versions of the POS approach – political process theory, especially in its later iterations (e.g. McAdam [2004] is an example) – merely assert that political structures and the relationships associated with them are *part* of the environment that social movements must negotiate, and are important among the *many factors* that shape the incidence and forms of social movements. The former approach is most problematic and is critiqued in this chapter. Whichever approach is taken, there is tendency to conflate structural and non-structural variables, and the effect that an organization's strategy, status and choice of issue has upon its actual opportunities for campaigning tends to be downplayed.

5.1 Macro POS Theory

POS, often merged with or described as an offshoot of RMT, is a loosely unified approach. It is weakly constructed around the notion that the political environment impacts movement emergence, strategy, form and success. Although it has precedents in the CB approach, and Lipsky (1970) suggested that variations in political systems should be considered when explaining protest, it was a concept by most accounts coined and christened by Eisinger (1973 – in Tarrow 1998, McAdam 1996, Burstein *et al* 1995) who defined it as 'the openings, weak spots, barriers and resources of the political system itself' (Eisinger 1973:11). Much ground was made exploring the concept cross-nationally in the 1980s. However, different authors have used the approach idiosyncratically, adding new variables fitting to the particular movement or polity under study.

In its most recent articulation, POS refers to the openness or closedness of the political context in which social movements mobilise. According to Diani & Eyerman (1992:4-12) it refers to the

presence or absence of political alliances, divisions within the elite, tolerance by the polity of protest, and the policy-making capacity of the state. The Diani & Eyerman definition provides a good example of a confused notion of what actually constitutes a political opportunity *structure* (*cf* Goodwin & Jasper 1999). In fact, as Rootes (1998) convincingly argues, none of these variables are structural in nature - they are temporary and volatile. Permanent characteristics of political institutional structure are what truly constitute a POS, such as the nature of governmental institutions – especially their degree of centralization, the way power is configured and the nature of the electoral system. The conditions mentioned by Diani & Eyerman, with the addition of the degree of electoral stability, are contingent political opportunities that occur within more permanent structural constraints.

Based upon structural and contingent types of political opportunities, it is possible to conceptualise idealized 'open' and 'closed' polities (Table 5.1). Real world polities fall some way between these extreme types. Idealized 'open' states have a decentralized structure, egalitarian ideology and proportional representation - allowing informal and formal access, and thereby absorbing pressure before it builds up, resulting in moderate social movements. In this kind of polity it is assumed that social movement activists regard negotiations and demonstrations as worthwhile as they will be likely to result in policy gains. As Kitschelt (1986:302) argues, those movements in a liberal egalitarian political culture are much less antagonistic, largely because they have less need to antagonize. By contrast, idealized closed states – which at the extreme are centralized and totalitarian - deny access, and activists therefore regard conventional forms of political participation as time-wasting activities. When protest does occur, it tends to sway towards 'more direct forms of struggle such as land occupation, factory seizures, store-house raids and insurrections' (Bordreau 1996:181) or go underground and be violent and sect-like.

The contingent/temporary features of a polity are less stable and vary more considerably over time, but also impact upon *opportunities for campaigning*. Tarrow (1983 in Burstein *et al* 1995:288) suggests that movements are more likely to be successful in gaining acceptance, or making 'material gains' (Gamson 1975) when a political regime is unstable, or has elite divisions. When a government and shadow government are in close competition, they are more likely to support the demands of social movements in an attempt to sway public demand in their favour (e.g. Maguire 1995). Heavy-handed policing and repression act as double-edged swords for social movements. For obvious reasons, they discourage social movement activity by increasing the costs for individual activists, yet could also serve as stimuli to protest by reinforcing the identity, solidarity and sense of injustice that movements need (Kriesi 1995:177-178, della Porta & Fillieule 2004:233). Koopmans (2004:72-3) suggests that whether or not repression intimidates or activates

movements is dependent upon the age, ideology and aims of SMOs. Della Porta (1995:80) sees protest policing as 'an important barometer of the political opportunities available for social movements'. Although perhaps over-generalising, she suggests that tolerant policing leads to diffuse movements that are characterised by multiple, loosely networked moderate organisations, but harsh policing to smaller, more radical groups inclined to be violent. Goldstein (1983:340) compared political repression in European countries and found that those with the most repressive regimes had created the most 'rigid, brutal and obstinate' resistance.

Table 5.1, Idealized Open and Closed Polities

TYPE OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY	INDICATOR OF OPENNESS	IDEALIZED OPEN POLITY	IDEALIZED CLOSED POLITY
STRUCTURAL / SEMI-PERMANENT	**Degree of centralization**	♦ Decentralized	♦ Centralized
		♦ Pluralistic	♦ Totalitarian
	Configuration of power	♦ Proportional Representation	♦ No proportional representation/ non-competitive
CONTINGENT / TEMPORARY *(ranked in order of durability)*	**Political culture** [1]	♦ Egalitarian	♦ Corrupt/inegalitarian
	Policy making capacity	♦ Strong	♦ Weak
	Elite divisions	♦ Divided	♦ Undivided
	Electoral stability	♦ Unstable	♦ Stable
	Policing / tolerance of protest	♦ Tolerant	♦ Repressive
	Alliances and counter-movements	♦ Elite Alliances	♦ No Alliances

Although it is not structural, policy-making capacity is included here because in a direct sense it determines a SMO's choices of strategies. A polity with little capacity for policy-making will be more likely to be regarded as ineffectual at bringing about change than one with a strong policy-making capacity. Challengers in a polity with weak policy-making capacity, especially those who are already sceptical about the value of reform politics, will be more likely to seek alternative targets for campaigning.

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[1] Political culture is usually considered to be a derivative of the political structure. However, in reality, a state can be corrupt or egalitarian regardless of political structures. It is included as a variable here for the sake of consistency with other authors' conceptions of POS.

The 'strong' POS approach

Kitschelt (1986) was the first to formulate a cross-national comparison of POS, comparing anti-nuclear movement protests in four Western liberal democracies, and explaining the variation in tactics and acceptance of the movements in terms of polity receptiveness and output capacity. Table 5.2 shows a summary of the presumed implications and effects of macro POS on protest according to Kriesi (1995:177-198). Kriesi selectively used ill-defined measures of openness resulting in arbitrary ranking of Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands and France in order of decreasing openness. For instance, Germany, which has qualified proportional representation is ranked as more open than the Netherlands, which has strict proportional representation. Openness seems to be defined mostly in terms of the degree of centralisation of the state, and the types of protest associated with these four polities appear to be very ad hoc.

Table 5.2, Cross National Comparison of Macro-POS

COUNTRY	OPENNESS	STRENGTH	ACCESS	CONFIGURATION OF POWER	PROTEST
Switzerland	Most Open	♦Weak State ♦Decentralised	♦Inclusive ♦Formal & informal participation	♦Proportional Representation	♦Large numbers of moderates ♦Absorbs discontent
Germany		♦Weak State ♦Decentralised	♦Formal participation	♦Proportional Representation - 5% threshold preventing radical challenge	♦Decentralised mobilisation ♦Relatively moderate ♦Violent & radical minority ♦Formal access for moderate
Netherlands		♦Strong State ♦Centralised	♦Informal participation	♦Proportional Representation	♦Centralised, but hybrid mobilization ♦Strong social movements moderate or non-violent radicalism
France	Most Closed	♦Strong State ♦Centralised	♦Exclusive ♦No access at all	♦Majority Representation (hard access)	♦Small numbers ♦Mostly radical

Source: based on Kriesi (1995:177-8)

Both of these attempts (Kitschelt 1986 and Kriesi 1995) to determine the effect of national POS upon movement activity are unclear about the extent to which each variable has an independent effect on protest, and whether or not each of these variables has equal weighting in each country. To make for a convincing cross-national comparison, the approach would need to single out the contribution each independent variable makes upon the configuration of protest. A weak state with low policy-making capacity for example, could just as easily spawn a radical movement as a strong

state, as activists could become apathetic about the chances of success of campaigning through conventional channels, and begin to take direct action instead. In Kitschelt's cross-national comparison, 'the suspicion ... arises that what are presented as theoretical and analytical propositions to be tested against empirical evidence are in fact empirical generalisations developed from knowledge of the cases concerned' (Rootes 1997:84). This is compounded by the impossibility of objectively defining what makes for an open or closed polity and the empirical difficulties of measuring the variables (Tarrow 1998:429). For example, how do we rank a country that is 'open' according to some variables and 'closed' according to others? And which variables have the most weight and why?

These cross-national accounts of POSs demonstrate the need to be consistent with regard to the variables considered. What is especially glaring is the strikingly different conception of the openness of the Germany polity in the two accounts (Kitschelt 1986 and Kriesi 1995). Kitschelt (1986:66) described the German polity as 'closed' because of its 'input structures' – a centripetal party system and weak legislature – and 'output structures' – 'jurisdictional and territorial fragmentation of the state', an autonomous judiciary and little control over the private sector. However, on the basis of more strictly structural characteristics – such as Germany's decentralised federal system that has points of access – Kriesi classified it perhaps more accurately as open. Perhaps the realisation that German anti-nuclear organisations lacked access coloured Kitschelt's interpretation. However, the real reason that German anti-nuclear organisations lacked access was because of the movement's challenging ideology and strategies, and the inhospitability of established political actors to challengers whom they regarded as unruly leftist extremists – contingent rather than structural factors. Additionally, Kriesi (1995:177-8) suggested that the French polity was 'closed' (Table 5.2), and that this gave rise to radical protest with few participants, but he conveniently overlooked the fact that France witnessed a large and well-supported anti-nuclear movement. The work of Kriesi and Kitschelt is indicative of the manifold problems associated with cross-national POS approaches. If it is so difficult to determine whether a political system is 'open', it is very difficult to say what the 'best' measures of openness might be.

The 'strong' POS approach has come under fire for its alleged political reductionism, and for ignoring cultural variables like collective identity and solidarity, and their role in shaping opportunities for social movements (Melucci 1985, Goodwin & Jasper 1999), and for failing to indicate why SMO strategies vary in a constant POS. Most importantly, it neglects the fact that the variety of political identities of SMOs impacts their behaviour that in turn influences strategies and status and how they are received by the polity. As Rootes (1997:93) suggests '[political opportunity]

systems may be relatively open or closed to different kinds of issues and or groups, and this makes global categorisation hazardous if not entirely arbitrary'. This supposition is supported by work by Rucht (1990) on anti-nuclear movements in USA, France and West Germany which shows that strategies used by these movements vary over time and are more the result of contingent rather than (semi-) permanent macro POS factors, and by Walsh (1981) who showed that differing tactics of groups are more likely to be determined by their ideology than by the configuration of POs they are presented with.

Further, the advocates of the strong version of POS theory make a series of unspoken but nonetheless false assumptions, conflations and over-generalisations. Firstly they assume that all movements depend on the POS to the same extent (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996:134). In reality, sub- and counter-cultural movements are likely to have more autonomous targets and be considerably less affected than those instrumentally oriented organisations or movements with a 'highly focused problem structure' (Kriesi 1995:193). What curtails one type of movement (for example a closed policy window) may be exactly the feature that spawns a different type (e.g. the rise of the UK's direct action movement). Secondly it assumes that policy change is the goal of all movements and therefore that the polity will be the target, making it inapplicable to many grassroots and local groups, who have multiple decentralised targets; Kriesi (2004:73) is one of a few scholars to recognise the importance of regional and local levels of governance as campaign targets. Thirdly, it conflates explanandums – making it unclear whether it is seeking to predict movement emergence, form or chances of success. And finally, it is over-generalised, ignoring cultural differences between countries. According to Gamson & Meyer:

> POS is in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement environment – political institutions, culture, crises of various sorts, political alliances and polity shifts ... used to explain so much, it may ultimately explain nothing at all (Gamson & Meyer 1996:273).

In summary, it seems that POS theorists (both 'weak' and 'strong') are unable to agree on which are the best variables for defining openness and closedness, making cross-national comparison, in particular, problematic. Theoretically, the main weakness of the POS approach is the way in which it has been repeatedly broadened to include new non-structural variables. Including a broad church of variables means that different scholars give preference to different variables and ultimately label the same polity as 'open' or 'closed' depending on the variables they use. For consistent comparative study, we would need to be clear about those aspects that are purely structural and to

account for non-structural variables. Non-structural variables are more volatile and tend to be contingent and conjunctural. To be sure, they do impact upon political opportunities, but do not form part of any polity's underlying political structures (hence the Tarrow's removal of the word 'structure' from the second edition of his book [1998], McAdams's [1996] use of the term 'political process').

5.2 Political Process and British Environmental Activism

Despite my critique of the strong approach to POS, I do have sympathy with the weak approach, which suggests that *political processes* (not necessarily 'opportunities' or 'structures') impact movements to variable degrees. It is clear that there are many factors contributing to the making of *opportunities for campaigning* that are not structural. For example, EF! blossomed in the UK when conventional campaigning appeared fruitless and direct action seemed the only viable course of action left. Although the political opportunity 'structure' of the state may have been relatively 'open', defeats at public inquiries and the determination of the government to promote road-building meant that, at least on the roads issue, channels for legal campaigning were 'closed'. This did not mean that legal avenues for campaigning were closed to all environmental groups on all issues. At around the same time, the government was relatively open to the campaigning efforts of the Wildlife and Countryside Link and this resulted in the strengthening of the Wildlife and Countryside Act (1990).

The concept of 'political process' is therefore useful for explaining some aspects of environmental activism in Britain. Here, the concept is not used for cross-national comparison, so this means important cultural differences between countries are not of concern. 'Openness' and 'closedness' are defined on the basis of the assessments of other scholars, so I cannot be accused of selectively choosing variables that fit the data as Kitschelt (1986) and Kriesi (1995) may have (unwittingly) done. I also seek to avoid giving the British polity a generic label such as 'open' or 'closed', recognizing that it can be 'closed' in some respects and 'open' in others, and also 'open' to some EMOs or issues whilst 'closed' to others. Furthermore, non-structural variables are not misrepresented as objectively structural, and I note that movement strategies can and do vary within supposedly 'open' and 'closed' states. Finally, the focus on radical groups that seek to bypass the state in their campaigning demonstrates my awareness that achieving changes in policy is not the central aim of all EMOs. Thus, the caveats appropriate to the cross-national and 'strong' POS approach are avoided.

In Britain the electoral system is relatively closed, but is balanced by a relatively open administrative system (Rootes 1992:171-192). The electoral system – especially the first-past-the-post ballot – has stifled the progress of Britain's Green Party, whilst the relative openness of the governmental structure to representations by EMOs has arguably impacted the shape and form of the wider movement (although this may be less true of other issues). In his argument on British exceptionalism[2], Rootes (1992) suggested that unconventional protest was largely absent from British environmentalism (as it was until just after the article was published) because the polity had broadly accepted environmentalism. That the POS in Britain has been quite open to moderate green groups since the 1980s is indeed widely recognised, being 'sufficient for them [EMOs] to remain well-ordered and non-disruptive' (Rawcliffe 1998:55), despite, in the main occupying a 'more pragmatic threshold' – balancing insider and outsider strategies according to the issue and the policy arena in question.

Although the polity is (at least relatively) 'open' to moderate (but not radical) EMOs, this does not automatically guarantee success for moderate EMOs. An open polity creates competition within the wider movement sector by increasing access for others. Olson (1993:23) and Jordan (1999), for example, present evidence of 'demosclerosis', i.e. the idea that the British policy arena has become so over-crowded and unresponsive to changing circumstances that it cannot effectively incorporate demands of pressure groups. For instance, the Organic Foods & Targets Bill proposed by FoE (2000) has been suppressed due to pressure from Government whips, and even when EMOs' Bills become law, they often lack adequate enforcement – as with the Road Traffic Reduction Act of 1997. Contrary to the aims of the Bill, the government has refused to set targets for traffic reduction, and it can be considered as little more than lip-service in the light of the pro-car Ten Year Transport Plan (DfT 2000). According to Porritt (1997:64):

> With the exception of Mrs Thatcher's short-lived "green period" in the late eighties ... there has not been an ounce of heavyweight political leadership on environmental issues for the last 25 years.

After 1990, in light of the British government's supposed embrace of environmentalism which failed to manifest itself in the implementation of new green policies, or the more effective enforcement of current environmental legislation, environmentalists became more skeptical of the integrity of Thatcher's pledge to the environment. By the time of the Rio Earth Summit (1992), a large swathe of the movement, including EMOs that only a few years previously had been regarded as radical –

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[2] By British exceptionalism, Rootes (1992) was referring to the (then) exceptionally moderate character of British EMOs in comparison to other Western democracies.

such as Greenpeace and FoE – 'had lost its critical voice, as states, corporations, and EMOs all appeared to share the same language, the same commitments and the same appeal to management as the way to solve environmental problems' (McNaughten & Urry 1988:65).[3] Undoubtedly, the 1992 recession helped the environment slide down the political agenda. This combination of ineffective policy change and incorporation of the environmental movement, led to a perception amongst die-hard activists and radical youth that the mainstream EMOs were impotent. Even activists within groups like FoE and Greenpeace were beginning to complain about a lack of action and commitment. Furthermore, a general disillusionment with politics had been steadily developing. Whereas in 1973, 49% of the public believed the system of governing Britain 'could be improved', that had risen to 75% by 1995 (MORI 1998).

This and other important events created a political environment ripe for the rise of radical environmentalism. The rights of young people had been infringed by several Thatcherite policies, including the removal of student grants, the implementation of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJA) (1994) and the elimination of unemployment benefits for 16-18 year olds (Robinson 1999:343). This created a pool of dissatisfied youth from which the personnel for direct action networks was largely drawn. It was also in the early 1990s that the government embarked upon its controversial UK-wide road expansion and 'improvement' program. This resulted in high levels of public campaigning, culminating in the defeat of objectors in 141 out of 146 public inquiries (Must in McKay 1996:128). Activists of all persuasions, witness to a democratic dead-end after losing well-fought public inquiries, were realizing the inefficacy of official channels for halting roads, and began to look for alternative means. Relatively high rates of unemployment, and an emerging DiY youth counter-culture in the aftermath of the anti-poll tax campaigns that set a precedent for direct action, contributed to a new and much more radical protest culture.

So much for British exceptionalism, which according to Wall (1999b:117) was a weak argument anyhow as the 1970s roads protests included direct action and 1980s peace movements and animal rights activism were at times militant. What this case does show, is the danger of predicting movement trajectories on the basis of permanent POS indicators alone and that the more volatile factors can have unexpected and sometimes drastic effects upon movements. As Rootes (2001a:1) suggests in his second and more convincing attempt to account for British exceptionalism, changes in the nature of British environmental protest are better explained by:

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[3] The language they all spoke was that of sustainable development, a term sufficiently flexible to allow for it to be twisted in favour of economic development by business and government (cf Sachs 1991, 1995).

> consideration of the legacies of other protest campaigns, more general changes in political culture, and by the contingent openness or closedness of governments to *particular issues* than by reference to political opportunity structures, *since the formal structures of the political system have remained relatively unchanged* (my emphasis).

The reduction of direct action in the environmental movement since 1997 can be explained by the Government's withdrawal from the roads development program, anticipation of the arrival in power of a potentially more environmentally conscious Labour Party, and, more recently, by the Labour Government's ability to defuse issues before they erupt (Rootes 2001). Support for this is found in the evidence that, by 1998, 54% of the public believed the system of governing Britain 'could be improved', down from 75% in 1995 (MORI 1998).

5.3 Network implications of political structures and processes

In Britain, the relative openness of the state to reformist groups has possibly reduced its ability to pass and enforce laws due to the process of 'demosclerosis'. This may have contributed to the rise of a younger generation of radical environmental activists and groups that are convinced of the inefficacy of reformist campaigning. These radical groups are likely to display a certain degree of antipathy towards reformist groups which they may consider to be time-wasting enterprises. A democratic dead-end, as witnessed by failed public inquiries in roads campaigning, can provide the impetus for new and more radical campaigning tactics. If previously reformist local protest fails in its campaigning through legal channels, local campaigners may seek support from more radical organizations in last-ditch efforts, and unexpected alliances between reformists and radicals may materialize. Doherty *et al* (2000) suggest that in the 1990s roads protests, political exclusion led to greater alliance building between radical environmentalists and conservative local groups partly out of desperation. Included in this alliance were Road Alert!, the ALARM-UK alliance and the Transport Activists Round Table which consisted of CPRE, FOE, Greenpeace, The Environment Council, Ramblers Association, the Wildlife Trusts and others - across the broadest possible spectrum of spatial and ideological divisions. Repressive laws can have the effect of producing new networks of disaffected protesters, as with travelers, ravers and anti-roads protesters during the campaign against the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill (1994). However, repression could also have the effect of increasing the political and social distance between radicals and reformists.

5.4 EMO Status, Issues and Strategy and Pressure Group Theory

I do not assume that POS, whether conceived broadly and inclusively as in 'strong' versions, or more narrowly and precisely as in weaker 'political process' versions, is the sole or even the principal determinant of movement strategies. I posit that a social movement organization's choices of issue, ideology and strategy moulds its status and identity, and in turn the status and identity of an SMO may impact its *actual opportunities for campaigning* more so than POS in the strict sense of *structure*. A supposedly 'open' state will, no matter how we measure 'openness', be likely to be closed to organizations that seek to seize its power, or to side step its authority. The radical environmental group EF!, for example, meets closed doors from states, which is in no small part a result (rather than cause) of its illegal action repertoire and anti-state ideology. In discussion of political processes and non-structural opportunities, pressure group literature becomes important for interpreting the configuration of opportunities based upon an SMO's identity and strategies as these determine its status and how the polity will receive it. The location of an EMO's strategy on the outsider-insider continuum is a central determinant in deriving *real opportunities for campaigning*. Dalton's (1994:171) study of EMOs in Western Europe, for instance, concluded that characteristics of EMOs such as external identity, ideologies and strategies were more influential in determining the variations within counties than macro-POS factors were at explaining variation between countries. Additionally, EF!'s lack of political acceptance across the globe is more consistent than would be suggested by the various patterns of political opportunities, whether structural or contingent, that different types of EMOs experience within a single country. The choice of issue/s, the action focus and the ideology of an EMO can influence its status, which in turn, has an effect on its campaigning opportunities, and even, as we shall see, upon its choice of allies. Snow & Benford's (1988) concept of framing is relevant here. A movement or organisation's *diagnosis* of the problem and choice of solution (*prognosis*) will determine their choice of political tactics, which will in turn define their perception of political opportunities, patterns of alliances and media response. The processes of *diagnosis* and *prognosis* shape the identities of SMOs, and how they will be received by the polity. Movement identity, a key variable in the NSM approach, is regarded by Dalton (1995) as crucial in determining the *campaigning opportunities* of SMOs.

At the simplest level, EMOs' choice of strategies and issues can be differentiated according to the extent to which they are 'insiders' or 'outsiders'. Insiders are viewed as legitimate, are widely consulted by the government and have access to the executive (Grant 1989). 'Outsider' was the label given to all other types of group status and strategy. The distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' (coined by Stewart [1957]) has been criticised by Whitely & Winyard (1987) for ignoring the differences between status and strategy – status can vary according to the strategy a group is

pursuing, and may also depend on the political salience of issues being addressed. For instance, Saunders (2000:74-5) showed how the status of Greenpeace and FoE varies according to the strategies used and the receptivity of the governmental department involved.

The contrasting views of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Exports Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) towards FoE are shown as an example in Table 5.3. In Example 1, FoE pursued an insider strategy, resulting in favourable treatment from the DTI. In Example 2, it deployed an outsider strategy, challenging the decision to fund the Ilusu Dam. The ECGD was put on the defensive and outwardly attacked FoE, branding it a liar and awarding it contingent outsider status. Depending on the target of any campaign, challengers are dependent on the receptivity of particular government departments or county / local councils as much as on grand nation-wide POS and this can vary according to the issue in hand. Regardless of how objectively 'open' the British polity is, the ECGD was closed to FoE on the Ilusu Dam issue, but the DTI was open to FoE on waste and recycling issues. Grant's (1989) distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' also ignores the fact that 'outsiders' lack of favourable status with government can be either by necessity, as they may lack the political skills or knowledge, or by choice.

Table 5.3, The Variable Status of FoE

	Example 1 : FoE AS A LEGITIMATE CONSULTEE	**Example 2 : FoE AS A TROUBLE-MAKER**
Department	**DTI**	**ECGD**
Quote from Minister	"FoE have an extremely important role to play in helping to shape policy on environmental issues. I value the contribution they are making to the debate on future waste and recycling measure legislation ... I am determined to build on the good communication links that exist between FoE and the DTI" **Consumer Affairs Minister Nigel Griffiths, 27 April 1998** (DTI website 2000)	"Far from being a secretive or clandestine process, as alleged by FoE, our approach to the Ilusu Dam project has from the outset been open and balanced. All the misinformation involved has flowed from FoE, who at no point have sought a meeting with me or my officials" **Minister for Trade, Brian Wilson, 2 July 1999** (ECGD website 2000)

By distinguishing between status, strategy and issue, and appending additional categories of 'thresholder' (to describe organisations using a mixture of insider and outsider strategies), and 'ideological outsider' for those groups that ideologically oppose the state, the problems associated with the 'insider/outsider' dichotomy are reduced, yet not avoided. As Smith (1996 cited in Jasper 1997:35) rightly suggests :

> The majority of social movements [and SMOs] possess *moderate* amounts of political and economic resources, enjoy *limited* access to political decision making, employ both

disruptive *and* institutional means of political influence, mobilize new carrier groups, while *simultaneously* collaborating with established political organisations, and vocalise a mix of conciliatory, persuasive and confrontational rhetoric.

However, an ideal-type insider group has a favourable status with the government, has access to the executive and works bureaucratically - in a manner which is amenable to the way in which the state itself functions. Its strategy would largely be comprised of negotiations and consultations with ministers and it would deal with small-scale issues already on the policy agenda. It is to this type of organisation that the government will be most open. At the opposite extreme, ideological outsiders would be met with a closed polity. They would be ideologically opposed to the state and therefore would have unfavourable status. Their strategy would bypass the state – they may be small groups with violent tendencies, or they may be seeking self-directed change. The issues of concern to them would be broad ranging and incompatible with modern bureaucratic polities (Table 5.4).

Table 5.4 : Network implications based on the status, strategy and issues of SMOs

DEGREE OF OPENNESS	TYPE OF CHALLENGER	STATUS	STRATEGY	ISSUES	NETWORK IMPLICATIONS
OPEN	**INSIDER**	• Legitimate • Access to executive • Bureaucratic • Professional	• Negotiates with ministers • Consultees	• Piece-meal • Small, incremental gains • Already on policy agenda	• Links with thresholders • Limited links with outsiders • Alienated from radical groups
	THRESHOLDER	• Semi-professional • Status of insider or outsider	• Uses insider and outsider strategies	• Issues often on Government's agenda	• Strategic ties at all levels • Most central due to flexible status
	OUTSIDER	• Not legitimate • OR, lacks skills/knowledge • Amateur	• Media, NVDA and public opinion	• New/controversial issues	• Links with all categories but less centralised
CLOSED	**IDEOLOGICAL OUTSIDER**	• Ideologically opposed to state	• Small, possibly violent • OR seeking self-directed change	• Radical social/political change	• Small alienated cliques

5.5 Implications of EMOs Strategies, Issues and Status for Environmental Movement Networks

Whilst in reality, organizations do not fit neatly into categorical boxes (as in Table 5.4) - for example they might vary their choices and scope of issues and strategies which could result in variable status - this approach is useful for showing that groups which face an open polity as 'insiders' (Grant, 1978, cited in Grant 1995:18-23) are likely to moderate their tactics. For such groups it becomes important to 'not jeopardize their relationship with government by attacking public policy openly' (Baggot, 1995:10). For this reason, ideological outsiders that regard the state as their adversary, and insiders who deem the state an ally and partner can be expected to dissociate themselves from each other. Rawcliffe (1998:17) notes that RSPB is an 'insider' EMO, making ties with radicals like EF! unlikely. Thresholders that have a variable degree of access to the government (depending on the issues or strategies being used) and are expected to have the most extensive networks due to their less constrained status, and their use of a wide range of strategies. Greenpeace, which uses mostly thresholder strategies denies links with Sea Shepherd – a radical splinter group – so as not further to impair its already controversial reputation and negatively affect its status (Pearce 1991:30-31). Although the presence of a more radical group may be beneficial to Greenpeace by making its demands appear more practical and compromising, groups will also be likely to be wary of the 'negative radical flank effect', in which counter-movements or the state stigmatise entire movements as deviant (Haines 1988:167). This is likely to have implications for the way in which more radical groups are received by the mainstream movement, as well as how the polity reacts to demands from the movement as a whole. Although political ecology/reformist and conservationist groups frequently downplay the extent of relations with more radical groups there is evidence that such links do exist. Seel & Plows (2000:119) note that 'Greenpeace ... sometimes gives 'under the counter' financial assistance to local EF! groups or particular issue campaigns'.

The effects of repression at a meso-level are similar to those at the macro-level. Groups opposing the state are more likely to be repressed by state forces, remain excluded from the public domain and become small, isolated and sect-like. This can further increase radicalism and strengthen injustice frames (della Porta 1995:204-5). Similarly exclusive networks - those with an outlandish ideology and high demands on members - are likely to remain alienated from the polity and experience fragmentation or repression (Jenkins 1995:23).

5.6 Summary

Comparative cross-national studies of POS are problematic due to their tendency to conflate structures and contingent political variables and the problems with prioritising and operationalising these concepts. The 'strong' approach to POS would predict that Britain's environmental movement would be moderate, given the relative ease with which such groups are able to make their representations heard. However, in reality, contingent political variables – such as a number of Thatcherite policies and the failure of the 'democratic' public inquiry procedure to produce results palatable to environmental campaigners – are more effective in explaining the birth of the direct action roads movement, especially given that formal political structures did not alter.

Macro non-structural political opportunity variables are important in shaping movements. In British environmentalism, the relative openness of the state to reformist groups has helped spawn a new generation of radicals dissatisfied with the apparent lack of progress of reform politics. Closed policy windows can encourage unexpected alliance building, and repressive laws can have the effect of stimulating new networks of the repressed and/or serve to increase the gap between radical and reformist EMOs. In addition to a consideration of how opportunities affect the trajectory of movement organisations, it is important to consider how the choice of tactics and issues of EMOs impacts the opportunities open to them. This approach allows different movements and movement organisations to have different tactical responses within a particular polity. It is clearly overly deterministic to assume that all protest in an open polity is moderate and all protest in a closed polity is radical. Whilst closure of political opportunities on a particular issue (such as roads) may be responsible for radical environmentalists' recourse to direct action, not all organisations reacted to closed opportunities in this same manner. CPRE for instance, whilst opposing many of the road proposals, remained non-antagonistic towards the government.

In order to preserve their reputation, insiders such as CPRE are especially likely to remain detached from ideological outsiders but are likely to have links with thresholders when these are campaigning on similar issues or using a conventional mix of campaigning activity. It is predicted that ideological outsiders, in seeking to remain ideologically pure, will be likely to avoid interaction with organisations seeking change through conventional political structures. Outsiders may seek to garner network links, but may be unable to do this effectively due to a lack of resources or of recognition by their contemporaries. Thresholders will have the most ties because they are likely to have variable political status depending on the issues on which they are campaigning, or the tactics they are using. Framing and activist cognition are important in the subjective dimension of political opportunities and are likely to play an important role in problem attribution, perceived

solutions and preferred tactics. In turn, the subjective dimension configures the *actual opportunities for campaigning* that an organisation has.

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CHAPTER 6

New Social Movements, Identity and Solidarity

This chapter is centred around New Social Movement theory (NSM) that developed in the late 1960s in Europe because the contemporary movements of the time had 'stretched the explanatory capacity of older theoretical perspectives' (Johnston *et al* 1994:3). As with other social movement theories, NSMT has little internal cohesion. Its scholars offer different reasons for movement emergence, assign different characteristics, and are unable to agree on an over-arching theory. This discussion of NSMs is infused with fragments of cultural studies. Melucci is amongst those who would be would be pleased to see culture taking a central stage (*cf* Martin 2002). Network implications appear at the end of the chapter, alongside a discussion about whether we can classify the environmental movement as a NSM. Reference will be made to points of convergence with other theories, setting the scene for Chapter 7 that outlines the case for their integration.

6.1 Macro NSM Theory

NSMT explains why 'new' identity-oriented movements formed in the 1960s, what their characteristics were, and the significance for contemporary movements (Johnston *et al* 1994:9). Essentially, it acts as a bridge between macro-structuralist and micro-theories of identity formation. Previous theoretical approaches (especially CB) were deemed inadequate for analysing 'new' protest manifestations, initially in the student movement and succeeded by the peace, civil rights, feminist, ecologist and self-help movements. It was noted that these movements had commonalities distinguishing them from traditionally studied labour movements (Table 6.1) (Offe 1985; Pakulski 1991, Larana & Gusfield 1992:6-9). As Habermas (1981:33) suggests, 'in short, the new conflicts are not sparked by problems of [labour and product] distribution, but concern for the grammar of forms of life'.

Table 6.1, NSM Characteristics

Ideology
♦ Anti-modernism/anti-'progress'[1]
Form
♦ Decentralised, non-hierarchical, participatory
♦ Not class-based
♦ Amorphous/fluid
♦ Direct participation
Purpose
♦ Resist colonisation of the life-world or manipulation of identity and needs
♦ Freedom of expression, communication and cultural reproduction
♦ Symbolic resistance
♦ Solidarity and autonomy as objectives in themselves

In reality, movements that have formed since the 1960s reflect the characteristics of NSMs to varying degrees. Rucht (1988) for instance compared the West German womens' and environmental movements, finding differences in recruitment fields, organisational infrastructures and action and mobilisation structures. Whilst both movements had similar political and ideological orientations in that they sought widespread public participation, a democratic society, and an improved quality of life and had a holistic world view, they differed drastically in other respects. The social base for the environmental movement was much more differentiated and diverse due to the influence of the mobilization potential of NIMBY type campaigns (one could suggest that this was due also to the low levels of demands placed upon supporters of environmental movement – when often all is required is a donation). Whilst the German women's movement had remained grass roots and organised through informal networks at regional and local levels as a result of distrust for hierarchical structures, the German green movement had developed many hierarchical and formal organisations, including large expert membership organisations that dominate the movement and a Green Party. Finally, whilst the women's movement sought a qualitative membership, emphasising values and demonstrating the locus of change through everyday behaviour, the environmental movement sought a more quantitative membership, using the weight of numbers of monetary supporters to help influence concrete policies. Rucht's use of these case studies serves well to remind us of the need to be wary of the differences between ideal-type NSMs and empirical reality.

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[1] By anti-progress, I mean expressing aversion to the illusion of 'progress' through ever-increasing consumption.

Rochon's (1990:118) empirical work on the peace movement - a supposed NSM - also demonstrates the gap between theory and practice. He shows how the peace movement chose to engage in political negotiations having the effect of suppressing the movement's broader cultural critique.

Macro-NSM theory sought to explain NSM's emergence, seeing them as symptoms and redressers of problems in post-industrial/programmed (Touraine), information (Melucci), late capitalistic (Habermas), or whatever epithet you prefer to ascribe to contemporary society[2]. Although each scholar implies slightly different things in their idiosyncratic interpretations, Ray (1996:59) usefully synthesises the approaches suggesting that they indicate a society with:

- Minimal class conflict
- A growing tertiary sector and 'new middle class'
- Expansion of cultural consumption and leisure
- New types of social protest

To complete the list I would add:

- The increasing importance of 'post-material' values
- Increasing state surveillance, domination of politics and lifestyles by corporate interests, and commodification of culture.

These structural changes are regarded as the cause of NSM emergence. The key theorists are Habermas (1986), Touraine (1981, 1984), Offe (1985) & Melucci (1989, 1996), who, despite disagreeing on details, present similar theoretical arguments. They document shifts in society that have implications for social control that NSMs react against. Even though they are not strictly NSM theorists, sociologists from Marcuse to Foucault and Althusser to Bourdieu make consistent claims that 'contemporary society is subjecting itself to even stricter control and surveillance in such a way that social life is nothing more than the system of signs of an unrelenting domination' (Touraine 1984:71). This well-documented trend is the cornerstone of much NSM theorising.

Social control, it is argued, has changed from being class based, broadening and deepening to expend influence over organisational systems, symbol formation and even interpersonal relations

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[2] For consistency, this type of society will be referred to as 'contemporary society'.

(Melucci 1980:218), invading the life-world of individuals and making society culturally impoverished (Habermas 1981, 1992). In the information society, goods are mass-produced, based on 'information systems and symbolic universes controlled by huge [branded] organisations' (Melucci 1994:109, Klein 2000, Edwards 2003). In the relentless push for profit, these systems and symbolic universes erode self-help systems whilst the state placates society through the welfare state, despite its inability to halt or reverse embedded problems including environmental destruction, poverty and military superfluity. The moral duties of the state go wanting because of the increasing plurality of sites of power. Melucci in particular identifies multi-nationals, health experts and the world media systems as sources of 'dominant' codes, whilst Offe, Habermas and Touraine hang onto neo-Marxist notions of class-based domination. Whatever the source of domination, new movements result, acting as magnets for the seeds of discontent the system cannot integrate. The discontented respond by forming new identities and alternative ways of organising for positive change, purposefully bypassing the state (Melucci 1984:829). A Voice of Ecological Resistance (*Do or Die* 2000:171) sees the conditions thus:

> Around us has grown a web of domination, a web of mediation that limits our experience, defining the boundaries of acceptable production and consumption. Domesticating authority takes many forms, some of which are difficult to recognise. Government and religion are some of the more obvious faces of authority. But technology, work, language with its conceptual limits, the ingrained habits of etiquette and propriety – these too are domesticating authorities which transform us from wild, playful unruly animals into bored unhappy producers and consumers.

These conditions, coupled with an increase in information, education and wealth, provide a pool of reflexive individuals for NSMs.

If it is easy to relate to the common-sense notions of macro-NSM theory in explaining the rise of so-called NSMs, it is equally straightforward to identify some shortcomings. The theory seems to assume that structural changes alone are adequate for the emergence of NSMs – ignoring the importance of resources, mobilisation processes, opportunities and organisation. These weaknesses are heightened by a general disregard of the relationship between cause and effect (Hannigan 1985:446-7, Bagguley 1992:28). Equally, NSM theorists are especially vague about what the features of a so-called post-industrial society are, naively assuming that all post-industrial societies create similar movements, ignoring domestic differences between countries and undermining important lessons from POS. Further, differences between organisations within movements, and between movements are ignored (Stammers 1996:21). A final criticism relates to it

being out-dated. Many of the NSMs that emerged in the 1960s have now become at least partly institutionalised (Scott 1990:90). It can also be argued that the 1960s NSM's critique of the welfare state gave the state a valid excuse to begin to dismantle it, which has created a newer cohort of social movements among the marginalized – with focuses such as AIDS and homelessness (Lentin 1996:6.2). The key debates from NSMT of concern to this research however, are centred around the process of (macro-level) collective identity formation, as a reaction against contemporary society. Thus, the discussion shifts now to the concept of identity.

6.2 Identity

> *'Tension between identity – putatively singular, unitary and integral – and identities – plural, crosscutting and divided is inescapable at both individual and collective levels'* (Calhoun 1994:7).

Essentially, identity is the basis for recognising others and recognising the self. It is permanent yet fluid, individual yet collective and a precursor to and outcome of social movement formation, yet also a barrier. There are three main ways in which identity is formed – biologically or psychologically, as a result of essentialist (micro) processes; as an interactional (meso) accomplishment, derived from shared definitions and meanings; and as a result of macro structures in society (Hunt *et al* 1994:187-190). There are also three main manifestations of identity – individual, collective and public that are of central concern to SMT (Johnston *et al* 1994). As Jasper (1997:87) surmises:

> Personal [individual] identities exist on the biographical level, collective identities are part of the movement culture, and movement [public] identities arise from the interaction between internal movement culture and the broader culture.

Table 6.2, Conceptualising Identity



Individual (micro), collective (meso) and public (macro) identities are each derived from the sum of processes at each of the three levels (Table 6.2). Therefore, 'individual identity' is a misnomer, because individuals only gain a functional identity through meso and macro processes despite having personal traits and biographies (Johnston *et al* 1994:12). Similarly, collective identity can only exist as a sum of individual identities, and public identities from the sum of all identities.

Individual identity is important for social movements in two main ways. The shifts in society associated with modernity and post-modernity are seen to have fostered an identity crisis for individuals that encourages social movement involvement as part of a quest to reassert self-identity (Rutherford 1990, Frosch 1991:6, Roseneil & Seymour 1999:3-7, Barglow 1994:5-19, Lasch 1980, Melucci 1994:113, 1995:32). Secondly, and more importantly in the context of this research, individual identity is important in terms of how it contributes to and is affected by social movement participation (Klandermans & De Weerd 1999).

According to Johnston *et al* it is (1994:12) important to note that 'individual identities are brought to movement participation and changed in the process'. Different types of SMOs affect self-identity to varying degrees. Chequebook organisations have negligible impact– the furthest participant's identity may be manipulated is through purchasing the tee shirt or affixing a car sticker (e.g. passive membership of FoE and WWF[3]). At the other extreme, cults of personal transformation have far-reaching effects on the individual, whose identity becomes absorbed by the group. Radical EMOs require a much greater degree of behavioural conformity and a more significantly revised self-identity that is partly a result of a consensually defined collective identity (*cf* Snow & McAdam 2000:55).

Melucci (1989:34) defines collective identity as an 'interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level)'. It allows SMOs to produce working definitions of themselves and define their territory and scope and 'determines the criteria by which members recognise themselves and are recognised' (Melucci 1996:32). It is a reflexive, dynamic and never-settled process, hence Melucci's (1995:50) insistence that it 'is *not a thing*, but a system of relations and representations'. Its final configuration is believed to be shaped by the framing of

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[3] These organisations do have activist or fundraising groups but the majority of 'subscribers' are just 'cheque-book'– i.e. they do nothing beyond making a direct debit donation.

opportunities and constraints (POS). Despite being a reflexive and non-static process, it allows for a degree of continuity and purpose.

Collective identity is often explicitly linked to movement culture, defined by Williams (2004:94) as 'the norms, beliefs, symbols, identities, stories and the like that produce solidarity, motivate participants and maintain collective actions'. Culture is incorporated into movements by 'a given set of rituals, practices and cultural artefacts', and may be defined in a language that is unique to the group (Melucci 1995b, 44-45, Polletta & Jasper 2001:284). It provides individuals with a sense of belonging, strengthened by ritualistic movement activity resulting in 'collective effervescence' (Durkheim 1984 reprint:152). A strong and binding communally negotiated collective identity fosters solidarity (Hunt & Benford 2004:439). Activist groups that build and support their collective identity from the bottom up tend to be more solidary than organisations that furnish activists with a pre-formed ideology that is filtered top-down. Instead of having a bureaucratic economy, radical EMOs have a "libidinal economy" (Goodwin *et al* 2000) of friendship, solidarity or love that shapes the dynamics of the group' (Doherty 2002:10). For the likes of Kebede *et al* (2000), collective identity and solidarity are synonymous.

Although some early writers on subcultures had been misled into believing that subcultures were based on the 'profoundly superficial level of appearances' (Hebdige 1979:17) which leads to the tendency to use a 'decorative sociology' mindset, at least some aspects of sub-cultural studies are useful in the study of modern social movements and are related to notions of collective identity. Especially useful is the concept of 'homology', which explicates the link between '[values], lifestyles ... subjective experiences and musical forms to express or reinforce ... focal concerns' (Hebdige 1979:135). For the hippy subculture, as with some radical environmentalists, there is homology between participants' alternative value system expressed by the ethos 'tune in, turn on, drop out' and aspects of the lifestyle such as drugs and music, which makes the subculture cohere as a way of life. Despite charges that sub-cultures are not real but merely constructs of socio-analysts, as 'catch-all terms for any aspect of social life in which young people, style and music interact' (Bennett 1999:599), some referents to the reality of sub-cultural behaviour can be teased out. Neal, a 'hippy traveller' interviewed by Muggleton (2000) remarked for example that one's clothes reflect lifestyle and values – and could therefore be regarded as identity-markers.

Public identity refers to movements' external image, and is manufactured as much, if not more, by the media than by movements themselves. It is useful to consider public identity at the meso level, because different SMOs within a movement have different public identities. SMOs' public identity is

a crucial factor in determining the contingent political opportunities they face (note the links with POS). It is also an important in determining levels of public support – an organisation with a positive public identity, is likely to attract more widespread support than one that receives negative press coverage and has been branded a terrorist force.

Part of the process of manufacturing a SMO's external image is concerned with marking boundaries around the organisation and defining its unique niche within the social movement field (RMT). For rank-and-file activists, the result, when collective identity is strong, is for them to be able to make 'we-them' distinctions between adherents and non-adherents, and between organisations. As Jenkins (1996:80) suggests;

> logically, *in*clusion entails *ex*clusion if only by default. To define criteria for membership, of any set of objects is, at the same time, also to create a boundary, everything beyond which does not belong.

Paradoxically, being open and inclusive to all, i.e. having weak defining boundaries has a negative effect on collective identity and solidarity.

Solidarity in social movements

Whilst some regard collective identity and solidarity as synonymous, it is more useful to see collective identity as a process, and solidarity as a possible outcome. Unlike collective identity, solidarity is a rather stable characteristic of social groups. A high degree of solidarity is the result of the individuals involved having committed a large proportion of their private resources to 'collectively mandated ends' (Hechter 1988:18).

Solidarity may be a positive thing for the activists involved, in terms of providing a sense of belonging, but the double-edged-sword analogy is applicable to solidarity in practice. According to Misztal (1996:34), it can lead to 'sectarian solidarity' that may have serious negative ramifications. She notes this because high levels of internal solidarity are often derived at the expense of developing intensely antagonistic relations with other groups through sharpening the 'we-them' distinction. At the extreme, this results in solidary groups regarding organisations with similar aims but ideologically conflicting tactics as the enemy within, hence making network relations unlikely.

> How people come to distinguish between those with whom they have solidarity and others to whom they have no such obligations is a complex process of classification that has serious

> consequences, and it is in this light that Sennet's (1998) description of 'we' as the 'dangerous pronoun' makes sense (Crow 2002:28).[4]

The paradox is thus: a greater degree of internal solidarity results in a proclivity for exclusivity.

6.3 Is the Environmental Movement an NSM?

If the environmental movement were an NSM (as Dalton 1994 suggests), it would have an ideology that reacts against colonisation of the life world or corporate power structures, be decentralised, emphasise culture, engage in symbolic resistance and regard solidarity and autonomy as satisfactory movement goals. Given the emphasis on collective identity, culture and solidarity in definitions of NSMs, the likely network outcome would be factioned solidary sects.

It is clear that the modern environmental movement cannot in its entirety be classified as an NSM as it includes highly professional interest groups and conservation organisations (that are not much like NSMs) as well as radical grassroots disorganisations (Jordan & Maloney 1997). Nevertheless, there is a degree of consensus that the latter 'fit this ideal [of the NSM] very well' (Doherty *et al* 2000, Wall 1999a:81).

Radical EMOs do have a tendency to have an anti-capitalist ideology (Doherty 2000:74) that Marangudakis (2001) suggests is an obstacle to making extensive movement alliances, amplified by withdrawal from the social praxis (from routine ways of life in capitalist society). Many ex-road protesters have taken up life-style activism – living communally in almost independent eco-villages, and participating in pagan rituals – a personal politics that represents resistance to modernity and preference for ancient traditions.

Many radical EMOs unsuccessfully attempt to be open and decentralised, hailing themselves as exemplars of participatory democracy. Inevitably, such bold attempts fail. In exposing the 'myth of consensus' in relation to RTS, Monbiot (2000 [viewed online]) writes:

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[4] Sennett (1998 chapter 8) notes how people seek community in response to the pressures of contemporary society (that he calls 'new capitalism'). A community, or 'we' is often defensive and is likely to involve 'a rejection of ... outsiders'. It is 'a false locution when used as a point of reference against the outside world' (p.137).

> The direct action movement insists that it is non-hierarchical – but this has never been true. Some people, inevitably, work harder than others, making things happen whether or not everyone else in the movement agrees. Consensus, often unwittingly, is manipulated or over-ridden, as people with a burning vision, with time and energy, drive the rest of the movement forward.

Similarly, Downey (1986:368) noted that in the New England Peace movement, consensus was only achieved 'by attrition' for those activists who stayed long enough.

Furthermore, the strong sub-cultural currents in radical environmentalist circles, along with, negative media coverage and radical tactics, mean that radical EMOs become alienating in comparison to mail order type 'membership', which, in just requiring a donation, demand much less commitment and are more likely to get public support. The RTS website jested about the presence of the FIT (Forward Intelligence Team) that photographed and randomly identity-checked meeting attendees –making new-comers feel unsafe and unwelcome. Radical EMOs are paranoid (sometimes justifiably) about infiltration by agents of social control, which hardly makes for a welcome greeting, especially for conventional-looking types. To be made welcome at EF! camps, RTS-type squatted social centres and some radical EMOs' meetings requires at least minimal sub-cultural capital,[5] as a key radical activist in Southwark told me in interview 'I think dreadlocks is a good start. But I mean, it's that ridiculous. If you went dressed up in certain [way] - maybe you need a certain type of personality as well' (Storm interview February 2001). As a Newbury bypass protester phrased it,

> the cultural vanguardism of the campaign was alienating people from getting involved ... although DiY culture has grown ... it has become more and more of a clique because there seems to be a certain style one must conform to (Anon 1996, *Do or Die*:29).

The exclusivity of such groups is heightened by their tendency to develop (as predicted by NSM theory) new identities, patent in the form of lifestyle - dress, speech and rituals unique to the movement, as activists seek to fulfil their need for identity. Reflexive negotiation of collective identity was apparent in the EF!/Voices of Ecological Resistance *Do or Die* (1993-2003) annual

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[5] This is a term appropriated by Thornton (1995) in the context of sub-cultural youth movements – but most especially the dance culture. It refers to being 'hip' and 'in the know' as well as conforming to certain lifestyle code, and is equally applicable to the environmentalist sub-culture.

publications, which acted as a forum for ideas on ideology, structure and tactics of the 'ecological resistance' movement, through which one can chart a constantly evolving identity.[6]

EF!ers share informal yet common life-style codes, for instance living in housing co-operatives or squats, rejecting car use, veganism, rejecting consumerism, and drumming, drugs, dress and dreads (Wall 1999b:92-93, Szerszynski 2002), the latter being a symbol of 'counter-hegemonic social resistance movements' (Kuumba & Ajanaku 1998:22). The Dongas at Twyford even developed their own symbolic language, a particular favourite being shouting 'ayayayaya' at the top of their voices to provide a source of moral support and solidarity in the face of eviction from protest sites, undermining confidence of police and security guards in the process (Plows in McKay 1996:138-139). Positive emotions and solidarity are further strengthened by rituals such as singing, dancing and consecrating sites of protests as sacred (Jaspers 1997:209, Szerzynsky 2002). Such rituals serve to strengthen the bonds between activists. Inevitably though, 'this also creates barriers [to entry] for "straight" people who feel they cannot become involved and maintain their existing responsibilities to work, home and family' (Doherty 2002:181).

Symbolism and expression are also widely used in the radical environmental movement, with two of the most historically prominent artistic expressions of resistance being on the roads protest sites of the M11 – Wanstonia Free State (*Aufheben* 1998) and M77 – Pollock Free State. Seel (1997) compares the art-work within the Pollock 'Free State' to the destruction caused by construction using the analogy of J.R.R Tolkein's spiritually enlightening Lothlorien versus the doom and gloom of Mordor. Throughout London, empty buildings are frequently squatted by activists to form social centres and eco-art galleries, a prime example being the 1998-1999 Cultures of Resistance and Cultures of Persistence exhibitions ...'an art gallery, a café, a bar, a squatted space near Tower Bridge, a place to gather and socialise, a coming together of artists, activists, musicians, sound systems, film-makers, chefs, performers and different aspects of a creative culture' (Cultures of Persistance 2000:1). Maffesoli (1996:77) suggests that such 'theatricality founds and reconfirms the [neo-tribal] community' and shows how activists, as Melucci suggested of NSMs, seek to control their own living conditions directly.

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[6] *Do or Die* was published for 10 consecutive years. The final issue was published in July 2003.

Fluidity is a characteristic of at least certain 'neo-tribes' within the environmental movement. Radical environmental activist communities for instance, tend to coalesce around a particular mobilization – for instance a roads protest, from whence activists disperse to join other protests of their choice, or remain in the area to manage other projects within the activist milieu. In the aftermath of the eco-activist southeast London protest camp on the site of the proposed Crystal Palace cinema multiplex, many activists moved on to other protest sites such as the Trident Ploughshares or anti-quarry protest camps in nearby Surrey. Yet some remained in the area on a more permanent basis and became involved in RTS activities, squatting, partying and other local protests focussing mostly on the issue of housing and liberating private spaces for public consumption.

Various attempts have been made by other scholars to discover the extent to which groups within the radical activist milieu fit the bill of NSM. What becomes evident from a reading of these discussions is that some groupings within radical activism are more closely related to the model than others. Habermas and Melucci's theories differ in their finer details and yet Clarke and Storr (respectively) both find examples of groupings within the eco-activist milieu that fit snugly with them. Storr (2002:193-194) notes how RTS had Melucci's NSM characteristics, seeing it as a reaction against information society and concerned with 'ownership, control and distribution of alternative information', to redress master codes and reveal underlying truths about cars, roads and capitalism. RTS uses the symbolism of the car as a means of attacking wider car culture and the 'insidious' capitalism (RTS website, 2002) it supports. It also exhibits signs of antagonism towards the corporate ownership of information resources (via hostility to professional journalism), is self-reflexive, has a planetary dimension (international networks and global issues) and displays the relationship between latency and visibility – being drawn from counter-cultural networks of squatters, travellers, hunt saboteurs and ravers. For Clarke (2000), the Luton-based Exodus Collective – which provides communal living space, workshops, parties and engages in environmental projects – is an almost-fitting example of resistance to Habermasian colonisation of the life-world. This he argues is because it is active in producing 'cultural moments of resistance', has created a discursive space, embodies total resistance to formal political institutions and has an egalitarian structure.

6.4 Implications for movement networks

Due to the intensity of communal decision-making, the ritualistic action often engaged in, and the resultant solidarity, the radical activist movement is likely to have intensive micro-level sub-

networks. Networking spaces such as social centres and radical bookshops are frequented by individual radical activists making solidarity more acute in radical circles (Diani 1997:138). These may be important for activists in terms of emotional support and identity formation (Gamson 1990), but are likely to limit interaction with the movement at large. The solidarity which emerges in 'neo-tribes' develops through interpersonal exchange is missing in those EMOs which mobilise by direct mail. Yet the solidarity generated in the former may have negative associations. It could, for instance, develop at the expense of antagonistic relations with EMOs. Passive membership of groups like FoE requires little behavioural conformity and identity transformation making cliquey behaviour an exceedingly unlikely outcome, especially because FoE aims to be the 'broad church' of the environmental movement (personal correspondence with Kenward, Capacity Building Coordinator for FoE, November 2002). At the polar opposite are green communal living type groups, which again are likely to be much less inviting towards the inquisitive individual, especially if he lacks subcultural credibility.

Waves of public mobilizations, interspersed by periods of latency are an indicator of the fluid and amorphous nature of NSMs. Latency does not signify a lack of activity, but rather involves 'the daily production of alternative frameworks of meaning, on which networks themselves are founded and live from day to day ... [and] potential for resistance or opposition is sewn into the very fabric of life' (Melucci 1989:70-71). A 'latent movement' is one that is hidden from public view whilst working behind the scenes forming new arguments or improving old ones, and honing its strategies. It can consists of both formal organisations and the wider activist milieu. 'Committed activists from previous waves of protest are regarded as the fertile seeds from which new waves of protest grow (Hetherington 1989:3). Wider sub-cultural networking remains active even when a particular political challenge has ended and movements themselves become latent (through victory or failure), providing the context for new waves of protest on related themes. McAdam (1989) for example, in his study of activists' post-Mississippi Freedom Summer Project (1964) biographies in the USA found that a sample of past activists were more likely to become involved in other related counter-cultural movements. McAdam (1986:754) concludes that 'activism by its very nature broadens the base of the activists' links to movement organisations and other activists'. Similarly, Bramwell (1994:59) demonstrated a huge crossover of supporters between the student and environmental movements as part of a wider counter-culture. In the early days of EF!, nearly all of the founder members (a group of twelve activists whom Wall (1999a) refers to as 'the first cohort') came from previously latent, or at least lower key green, peace and animal rights networks (Wall 1999a:103). This results in the extraction of resources and repertoires from the wider amorphous counter-culture (as with the NVDA protest repertoire for the anti-roads movement – Doherty *et al*

2000:9 & 17). Melucci (1994:128) suggests that the passage from latency to visibility is carried out by umbrella organisations that provide the finance and organisation, yet respect the autonomy of submerged groups – the exact same facility which ALARM-UK and Road Alert played in the anti-roads movement in the 1990s.

Diani (1995) found that in Milan, NSM theory was only useful to the extent of explaining sub-cultural ties and their role in remobilisation in subsequent waves of protest. For this research, greater attention is paid to the role of ideology, the extent to which exclusivity exists and impacts upon movement networks, and the role of umbrella organisations. Alone NSM theory cannot account for the actions of the more strategically- oriented factions of the environmental movement and neither can it wholly account for radical activism. Already this chapter has shown how NSM theory does not stand-alone. Collective movement identity is shaped by activists' perceptions of political opportunities and constraints just as the contingent political opportunities an SMO faces depend on the movement's external image. And, from RM, we learn that movements seek to shape their external image to fit into a niche.

6.5 Summary

'New' (i.e. post 1960s) social movements match the archetypal characteristics of NSMs to varying degrees (Rucht 1988). Thus, it is not an especially useful exercise to match contemporary movements to a list of characteristics. What is more useful to glean from NSM theory is the process by which a resistance to colonisation of the life world, or state domination, leads to a *process* whereby individuals seek out and affirm a collective identity, form an anti-state ideology and develop solidarity bonds with others. The implication for movement networks is that a strong ideology derived via those processes mentioned by Habermas and Melucci can cause clique-like behaviour and limit interaction with organisations that do not have such an all-encompassing ideology. Also important from NSM theory is the role of committed activists and umbrella groups in the passage from latency to visibility. This chapter has also sought to make links between the different theories. A movement organisation's culture and solidarity may be viewed as resources, just as a movement's public identity plays a very real role in defining its contingent political opportunities. The next chapter goes on to discuss how and why the movement theories introduced in Chapters 3,4,5 and 6 should be integrated.

CHAPTER 7

Integrating Social Movement Theory and Hypotheses for Explaining Movement Interactions

This chapter sets out the case for integrating SMT to make for rounded research on the environmental movement. Although hypotheses are outlined in relation to separate theories, it will be argued, using Habermas' (1986) realms of social action, that these cannot be easily separated in practice. A brief introduction to social network analysis (SNA) is included. The chapter ends with a review of the literature on social movements and networks.

7.1 Integrating SMT

Each theoretical approach underpinning the research has limitations, making strict adherence to a single 'theory' ineffective. Thus, della Porta & Diani (1999:3) recommend pulling concepts from multiple perspectives. In their undiluted form, SMTs cannot be properly integrated, as they are frequently based on different contexts, movements and definitions (Pakulski 1991). However, I have specifically contextualised them in relation to EMO interaction (Chapters 3-6). Other attempts to integrate movement theory conceive of the theory gap being between macro (structure) and micro (agency) and view the theories as predictors of movement emergence (e.g. Cohen 1985, Canel 1992). However, the theories have been adjusted to the meso-level for this research and applied to a specific topic, making for a unique and more compatible integration.

Generally, RMT and NSMT are seen as polar opposites. RMT focuses on the emergence of specific cases of insurgency and/or development of instrumentally-oriented SMOs, making it applicable to formal aspects of the movement, whilst NSMT concentrates on explaining symbolic challenges, collective identity and cultural challenges, allowing interpretation of radical and fluid lifestyle/culturally-oriented entities. Whatever their organisational form or ideological leaning, EMOs are directly or indirectly affected by a real and/or perceived POS.

The neat bifurcation between RMT and NSM and, correspondingly, between formal and fluid organisations is inaccurate and inadequate because many EMOs combine formal and informal organisational structure, and can only be explained by a mixture of concepts. Halfacree (1999) shows for example, how, despite attempts to maintain a fluid, welcoming and neo-tribal form, a This

Land is Ours (TLIO) protest camp on the Thamesbank in Wandsworth was forced to take a course of instrumental action because the locus of the challenge was best directed towards the planning system. Similarly, the radical NSM-type protest camp at Crystal Palace in southeast London had some very concrete aims, some of which were pursued through the Courts by particularly articulate and astute 'radical' protesters. Although cultural reproduction and freedom of expression are important within protest camps, these forms of movement activity are at least minimally instrumentally oriented. Hence my agreement with Dalton's (1994:10-11) comment in specific reference to the environmental movement that an identity-oriented (NSM) and RM approach are 'essentially complementary'.

Indeed, the two theories actually share a number of key variables. Social capital - the building blocks for NSMs - can be viewed as a resource. Whilst instrumental SMOs seek to build up and maintain financial resources, NSMOs seek to invoke solidarity to maintain affinity groupings. It is evident that social movement theorists have made this link because of the frequently cited exposition that symbolic and solidaristic incentives are selective incentives (e.g. Johnston *et al* 1994:18).

Another link between formal and NSM-type movement agents is that, over time, the focus shifts from the initial aim of seeking movement goals, to maintenance (whether collective identity or organisational). Even Melucci (1985:729) in his theory heavily biased towards NSMs made links. 'Action', of NSMs he wrote, 'has to be viewed as an interplay of aims, *resources* [RMT] and *obstacles* [POS], as a purposive orientation which is set up within a systematic field of *possibilities and limits* [POS]' (emphasis added).

For conciseness, only the main variables from each theory are shown in Figure 7. In particular, I want to draw attention to the three 'master variables' occurring at the interface of the theories. **Identity** is central to the NSM approach, and in the form of public/external identity is a crucial determinant of the POs that EMOs receive at the meso-level. Similarly, **ideology** formed through collective identity is crucial to NSMs, as it is to RMT theory – it at least partially determines choice of resources to be mobilized and the approach taken.[1] Finally **strategy** is key to RMT – based on the assumption that 'rational' SMOs chose the most cost-effective strategy for gaining their means. Strategy is nonetheless a crucial determinant of how SMOs will be received by the polity.

Figure 7.1, Theoretical Triangulation



Key

- Master variables representing overlap between theories.
- Variables from RMT
- Variables from POS
- Variables from NSM

Interpretation: The inner triangle seeks to represent the notion that there are three main theoretical influences on movement networks, butting them on each side. Movement networks are influenced by factors from NSM, POS and RM theories. Movement theory needs to be integrated in this context because the theories share variables with one another. The variables that are shared are represented by the light blue parallelograms . To recap from the main text: **identity** is central to both NSM theory and in configuring the political opportunities (not necessarily structural) that an SMO will face. **Ideology** formed through collective identity is crucial to NSMs, as it is to RMT theory – itat least partially determines choice of resources to be mobilized and the approach taken. And **strategy** is key to RMT (based on the assumption that 'rational' SMOs chose the most cost-effective strategy), just as it is important for determining how SMOs will be received by the polity. The whole triangle is built on the notion of organisational survival, which, although derived from resource mobilization theory, is the foundation upon which all movement activity must be built.

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[1] See Dalton's (1994) model of ideologically structured action for explaining the environmental movement.

There are three main reasons for integrating SMT for this research. Firstly, because there is natural overlap in the theories (Figure 7.1). Secondly, the environmental movement consists of radical EMOs to which NSMT can be best applied, and pressure groups for which RM is especially pertinent. As the movement consists of both of these types (and more), a combination of theories is required. And thirdly, in empirical reality, pressure groups and NSM-type groups do not exist as ideal types. Both use types of action *and* interaction traditionally associated with an approach that is apparently most apt at describing the other. For exploring this third juncture, Habermas' realms of social action are useful (1981:85-86) (*cf* Cohen 1985). These are chosen in preference to Weber's because they are seemingly more fitting for explaining environmental movement interaction.

Weber's (1971:78) *Zweckrational* action corresponds with Habermas' teleological action and involves seeking definable objective ends based on expectations via selection of the best means for success. Realising that it is possible to be 'rational' without being instrumentally rational, Weber accorded the label '*wertrational*' to action that involves behaving according to a religious or moral belief for the sake of that belief rather than success. In some ways it corresponds with the normatively guided behaviour of Habermas, where conceptions of what ought to be done are based on norms that might be of a religious or moral nature. *Traditional action* involves engaging in a long-term behaviour. By implication, it becomes rooted in norms, so becoming what Habermas calls 'normatively guided'. Affectual action is grounded in emotions and states of feeling, and although Habermas does not directly refer to emotions, his model need not be stripped from emotions. They can easily be conceived of as a driving force behind dramaturgical and communicative action (*cf* Jasper 1998, Goodwin *et al*, 2004). Habermas inexplicitly suggests this by claiming that dramaturgical and communicative action take place in the 'subjective world'. With the exception of emotions, Habermas' normative and teleological realms comprehensively cover Weber's. Goffman was the first to conceive of the dramaturgical realm (1974) that Habermas has since adopted. The real contribution of Habermas was coining the 'communicative realm' - the ultimate product of social movements.

According to Habermas, social action takes place in the objective, social and subjective 'worlds'. The objective world is 'the totality of entities about which true statements are possible'. The social world is 'a normative context that lays down which interactions belong to the totality of legitimate interpersonal relations. And all actors for whom the corresponding norms have force (by whom they are accepted as valid) belong to the same social world' (p.137-8). The subjective world is 'the totality of subjective experiences to which the actor has, in relation to others, a privileged access'

(p.140) so the actor selects whichever version of the self s/he wants to present (Habermas 1985:82-101).

Teleological action is confined to the objective world and involves a single actor engaging in purposive rationality, choosing the best strategy to reach a desired end. *Strategic action* is similar, but involves more than one actor competing or cooperating to reach a desired end. *Normative action* occurs in the objective and social worlds and consists of norm-oriented action seeking compliance to prevalent norms of a social world. Following Goffman, *dramaturgical action* encompasses all three 'worlds' but consists of presentation of the self towards an audience. *Communicative action* also involves the objective, social and subjective worlds, but requires two or more subjects sharing interpretations and reaching consensus (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1, Habermas' theory of social action

Type	Actors	World located in	Type of rationality[2]	Details
Teleological **Strategic**	Individual At least two	Objective	Purposive rationality	Choosing best strategy to reach desired end Competing or cooperating to receive desired end
Normative	Social group	Objective and Social (former interpreted by latter)	Norm-oriented rationality seeking social legitimacy	Norm compliance
Dramaturgical	Self to a group	Objective, Social and Subjective	Subjective-purposive rationality via self presentation	Action selected with view to audience
Communicative	At least two	Objective, Social and Subjective	Communicative rationality seeking consensus	Interpretation, negotiation and consensus. Raising validity claims and redeeming them.

(based on Habermas 1984:82-101).

Whilst RMT may be effective in theorising about teleological action based on success and goal achievement, it ignores other types of action (and by implication interaction) that are best expressed by other kinds of SMT. Although instrumental groups engage primarily in teleological action, normative, dramaturgical and communicative actions may play a part. Similarly, ideal-type NSM groups engage mostly in dramaturgical or communicative action, but where they are trying to impact a particular policy arena or seek to prevent a specific unwanted LULU, (e.g. CPP at Crystal Palace southeast London), an element of teleologically driven action is evident and strategic

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[2] Note that when merging SMT, it becomes possible to adopt a more generic use of the word 'rational', beyond the instrumental rationality that RMT scholars imply.

interaction may be deemed necessary. To say that RMT is the most effective analytical tool for formally constituted and internally institutionalised organisations like FoE and Greenpeace is at least partly accurate, but it needs to be recognised that some types of action traditionally associated with the NSM approach may also play a role in determining behaviour. Likewise, to say that the NSM approach is the preferred analytical tool for the study of the roads protest 'movement' or for 'unconventional and anti-establishment groups' (Dalton 1994:19) that emerged in the early 1990s in Britain is to ignore the teleological aspects of action underlying the whole movement – i.e. the predominant aim was to stop the roads programme from proceeding by direct intervention, or at least to stifle it by making it cost the authorities and construction contractors considerably more than they had budgeted for (Foreman 1975). Thus, NSM-type groups' interaction with the wider movement became at least partly teleological.

Based on Habermas' theory, we can identify four ideal-types of social *interaction.* These are:

1. *Strategic interaction* – actors co-operate or compete with one another because it helps goal achievement (Chapter 4). SMO goals include organisational maintenance and therefore organisations might compete for promotion of their brand name, or cooperate to achieve a goal and indirectly promote the brand. This is the type of action highlighted by RMT. When an organisation promotes its own strategic goals over the interests of the entire movement, conflict may be the result.

2. *Normative interaction* – actors interact with others that are part of the same social world with which they share norms or behaviours. Insiders for example share the same 'social world'. It is far from the norm for an insider group to approach a radical group, or vice versa (POS). If an organisation believes that another organisation regards its normal means of campaigning as misled or ineffective, cooperation between the two is unlikely. For radicals it is the norm to have some contempt for NGO-type SMOs (as part of their collective identity – NSM) and this could lead to conflict.

3. *Dramaturgical interaction* – actors co-operate for the purpose of expressing themselves or their organisational aims to an audience, or for the sake of the expressive act itself. This may include an organisation's attempt to improve its public image (this could be for strategic reasons), which in turn impacts how it is received by the polity. This makes pure dramaturgical action conceptually awkward, as this is also a strategic action (NSM, RM).

4. *Communicative interaction* - actors co-operate to arrive at universal truths derived from regular direct (or indirect) contact through consensus-based discussions. This type of

interaction most closely relates to SMT in terms of the collective identity of radical groups that meet regularly and seek consensus.

In reality, social interactions are infrequently expressed as pure types (types 1-4), and may be a mixture of any combination of these ideal-types. In total, interactions can be one of 13 types (Figure 7.2). Type 5 refers to strategic actors that devise their strategies in relation to norms, combining teleological and normative dimensions. The normative dimension occurs in most social settings because we are all social agents assuming roles drenched in norms (Blumer 1967). Everyone has values whether they work for a strategically oriented organisation or not, and decisions on who to co-operate with in the environmental movement are ultimately made by individuals or small groups of campaigners. Habermas himself admits that even the most formal organisations have at least some measure of normative and communicative rationality, even if communicative interaction does occur interorganisationally 'only with reservation' (Habermas 1987:310). Normative influences are almost impossible to avoid.

Figure 7.2, Theoretical realms of social movement action and interaction



The thirteen ideal types of social movement action and interaction are: 1. Pure teleological, 2. Pure normative, 3. Pure communicative, 4. Pure dramaturgical, 5. Teleological-normative, 6. Dramaturgical-normative, 7. Dramaturgical-communicative, 8. Communicative-teleological, 9. Teleological-normative-communicative, 10. Normative-dramaturgical-teleological, 11. Communicative--teleological-normative, 12. Communicative-dramaturgical-normative, 13. Teleological-normative-communicative-dramaturgical.

It is desirable to merge the strategic and normative realms because it allows actors to reach decisions based on shared understanding for mutual gain (Chriss 1995). In all social settings, norms will inevitably impact interactions. An important norm to mention here is Alvin Gouldner's (1960) universally applicable 'Norm of Reciprocity', whereby there is a tendency for 'the gratification of either party's needs [to be] contingent upon the alter's reaction and vice versa' (p.168), and the inevitable reaction that people feel that they should help and not injure those who help them. This norm is likely to be less persuasive in any debutante interactional setting, when actors may strategically weigh up whether or not to interact with compatriots. Theoretically, the norm of reciprocity is similar to Tilly's concept of 'strategic' interaction through the process of building up trust-benefit relations, again illustrating the difficulty of prising apart the strategic from the normative. Similarly, each of the other realms overlaps.

Type 13 for example, consists of the merging of all realms, involving elements of strategy, normatively-guided behaviour, dramaturgy and communicative action. The No New Oil coalition's conference of October 2003 is a good example of type 13, involving aspects of all three SM theories. Each organisation involved (Rising Tide, FoE, Platform, Columbia Solidarity Campaign) had a strategy in mind – to promote their individual organisations, seek new activists/supporters and help spread the campaign message. Norms determined whether or not each organisation felt it worthy to attend based on previous reciprocity or trust-benefit and whether or not the organisations involved could agree on the fundamental message and scope of the action. Dramaturgically, EMOs geared their public identity to the audience in hand (which could impact their POs) and the discussion workshops sought consensus. These fundamental foundations of social action can also be applied to competition or conflict between EMOs. A full explanation of environmental movement co-operation, competition and conflict therefore requires pulling together all of the apparently diverse yet both theoretically and empirically interrelated strands of SMT.

The case for integrating SMT is further supported by the need to expand sociological thought. Traditionally, sociology is seen as espousing a number of segregated theoretical and epistemological segments that are often needlessly at loggerheads. Theoretically, differences can be drawn between the rational/scientific approach, the political sphere and the expressionist tradition (Hamilton 2002), which in SMT are represented by RM, POS and NSM respectively. Instead of engaging in debates over which type of theory is the 'best' at explaining our social experiences, an integration of the fields squares the circle, making for an all encompassing exposition of the objective, social and subjective worlds and any of the interesting dynamics that

occur therein. It also makes it harder for a piece of sociological research to come under fire for following a single model without question.

7.2 Hypotheses

In the light of the preceding section, the central hypothesis is that EMO interactions are governed by influences from each of Habermas' realms. Although what follows is a list of hypotheses derived from consideration of each 'theory' in isolation, it is expected, that *a **combination** of movement theories will best explain the movement network*, despite a belief that more rationally-oriented EMOs more closely fit the RM predictions than fluid NSM organisations that more closely match the NSM hypothetical model.

RMT

A central question that can be asked is: 'why do strategically oriented EMOs ally themselves with some organisations more than others?'. RMT suggests that the following arguments would be supported:

Although RM is a general perspective on SMOs, it is best at explaining organisations that Jordan & Maloney (1997) refer to as 'protest businesses' (Dalton 1994 agrees). In the environmental movement, protest businesses are best represented by national organisations which are much more likely to be bureaucratic than regional, radical, and ad hoc local groups. In theory, protest businesses are concerned with organisational maintenance as much (if not more) than achieving organisational aims.[3] Thus:

1. *National environmental organisations prefer winnable issues and sideline local issues. Their tendency to seek promotion of their own organisation over and above the interests of the movement lead to conflict between them and the rest of the movement.*

In practice, EMOs face organisational constraints that make it impossible to support every possible campaign. In making strategic choices about which to support, it is logical for EMOs to chose issues which are most likely to improve supporter profile, or be successful.

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[3] Although Jordan and Maloney see FoE as an archetypal protest business, they seriously underestimate the role of local groups and FoE's attempts to involve grass-roots protesters purely for the sake of movement goals. However, FoE does want to be '*the environmental justice organisation*', suggesting that at least some of its efforts are directed towards securing a favourable public image. FoE is currently undergoing a three-year long process of restructuring, involving countless timely meetings, consuming resources that could have been used directly on campaigns (Chapter 11).

2. *Organisations with resource constraints will be likely to develop network links in the absence of other resources, whilst richer organisations will have more money and a larger profile, opening up more concrete opportunities for networking.*

There is some doubt over whether NIMBY organisations can be considered part of the movement when they do not have links with other EMOs (Chapter 2). However:

3. *Locally based anti-LULU campaigns often frequently begin as NIMBY, but over time capitalise on broader concerns, and develop a NIABY stance that corresponds with inter-movement co-operation.*

Based on organisational ecology, the concept of niche is used alongside the postulate that:

4. *Competition is likely between organisations with niche-overlap. As a result of the realisation that acquiring a niche may be beneficial, EMOs actively seek a niche formed partly through discussions with others to reduce duplication of effort, resulting in division of labour.*

Based on Tilly's (1985) strategic interaction:

5. *The propensity for inter-group co-operation is determined in part by the parties' previous balance in trust-benefit relations.*

Hypotheses 1-5 are derived from the literature on resource mobilization theory and organisational ecology as discussed in Chapter 4. Their applicability to interaction in London's environmental movement is discussed in Chapter 11. Some of these hypotheses fit the environmentalist milieu, but they are limited as they assume EMOs act strategically. Hence, we now take a look at the more normative (yet also partly strategic) implications for movement interaction.

Political opportunities

A central insight from the meso-PO approach is that:

6. *Insiders that regard the state as their ally have limited ties with radical groups who deem it their adversary, whereas thresholders' links are extensive because they have flexible status and strategy.*

7. *In the face of closed opportunities, dynamic protest and unexpected alliances may result as part of a last-ditch attempt to meet goals.*

Examples include the NIMBY/NOPE alliance that Robinson (1998) identified on the anti-M77 campaign in Pollock.

There is little doubt that because of their anti-state outlook, radicals encounter a more restricted set of campaigning opportunities. Therefore:

8. *Radical groups are more likely to be repressed by the state and as a result become small, and alienated.*

This is likely to stifle chances of movement integration. In some cases however, repression or closure of opportunities can stimulate protest and foster new alliances.

And finally:

9. *The lack apparent lack of progress of reformist environmental politics has led radicals to be overtly critical of reformists, leading to conflict between radicals and reformists.*

Hypotheses 6-9 are derived from the literature discussed in Chapter 5 on political pressure, process and opportunity. All but hypotheses 9 are discussed in relation to the findings of this research in Chapter 12. Hypotheses 9 is discussed in Chapter 13 alongside an analysis of activist and organisational identities, and ideological clashes.

NSM

The focus of NSMs, is not so much on the aim (i.e teleologically guided) as on the doing (the dramaturgical and communicative). Supposed 'NSMs' are lived-out exemplars of new lifestyles with a cultural emphasis and a strong collective identity resulting from communicative interaction derived from face-to-face discussions. As a result:

10. *Radical EMOs require participants to give up a greater proportion of individual resources for the cause than conservationist and reformist EMOs, resulting in stronger collective identity and solidarity. However, this solidarity may be generated at the expense of hostile relations with other EMOs.*

Activists that develop a strong sense of 'we-ness' within their group, often do so by making contrasts with other EMOs and highlighting how their 'we' is preferable to others, making similar organisations more enemy than friend.

Many NSMs develop new identities. This may give the movement a 'spectacular' appearance, and contrary to the participatory-oriented aims of an NSM-type organisation, there is potential for the membership to become exclusive. This can make NSM-type organisations rather isolated and actually reduce co-operation with others. Especially, it is likely to reduce the numbers of activists

with multiple organisational affiliations. The same can be said in terms of the amount of effort that direct activists put into their campaigns compared to 'part-timers' – something that caused a fair deal of hostility on the Wandsworth occupation (Halfacree 1999). Hence:

11. Radical EMOs' spectacular image has made their approach alienating, helping to drive them underground and make them more sect-like.

In a somewhat contradictory assertion to his notion that social movements are fluid entities, Melucci goes on to claim that umbrella organisations – in an organised fashion – help to bring latent movement networks into the realm of the visible. It should be included therefore that:

12. Umbrella organisations are crucial in facilitating the passage from latency to visibility.

Hypotheses 10-12 are drawn from the review of literature on new social movements, identity and solidarity as presented in Chapter 6. The relationship between the findings of this research and these hypotheses is laid out in Chapter 13. Chapter 13 also discusses the relationship between the findings and hypothesis 9.

Of course, it is not expected that a single set of hypotheses from one theory amounts to a total explanation of the interaction in environmental movement networks. Each theory is required to interpret the reality of the movement network. Thus, a theory-attribute based network approach is used to assess the relevance of each of these hypotheses.

7.3 An Introduction to the Network Perspective

The network perspective stems from the work of Radcliffe-Brown who was interested in 'social structure' and introduced metaphors like 'fabric' and 'web' of social life (Scott 2000:5). Wolfe (1978) argues that it came into further prominence in the 1960s due to a trend in social theory towards an interest in relations and processes rather than 'things', and advances in ethnography, mathematics and data processing. However, the approach has been slow off the starting blocks, at least in part because of its 'strangeness and mathematical complexity' (Wellman 1988:48,Wolfe 1978:59-60). Fortunately, some concise yet comprehensive texts offer the novice a way into social network analysis (SNA)[4], and several software packages exist that compute complex algorithms with ease.

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[4] In order of complexity with the most introductory first, Knoke & Kuklinski (1982), Scott (2000), Wasserman & Faust (1999).

Essentially, the network paradigm and SNA emerged as a result of three merging research traditions – sociometry, anthropology and the Harvard School. It began with sociometric analysts who studied interaction between small groups (e.g. Moreno 1934) and was developed at Harvard during the 1930s to explore interpersonal relations and clique formation. Ethnographers (including Bott and Barnes), largely interested in 'connections', paved the way by introducing sociograms – network diagrams of kin-relationships.

Bott (1955, 1957) and Barnes (1954) used the network concept in a metaphorical way (i.e. not looking beyond ego-networks in small social settings). Although Barnes (1954) acknowledged that social life could be conceived as a 'total network' of relations (p.43), his study looked exclusively at 'extensive' ego-friendship networks on a Norwegian island. Although her key point was that close- and loose-knit networks explained intra household role segregation, Bott studied egocentric networks of married couples, finding that social mobility, personalities and neighbourhood composition were amongst factors affecting relationship patterns. Both looked at networks of individual actors and considered how 'dispersed' they were, contrasting significantly with the 'structural' approach that followed.

Until Granovetter (1973) popularised the approach with his acclaimed 'strength of weak ties' thesis, much network research continued to focus on egocentric networking patterns rather than regarding network structure as the backbone of social action. This involves looking beyond the immediately obvious patterns of relations in any network at the underlying structure of relations and building explanatory theories (Leinhardt 1977, Mitchell 1969). According to Nadel (1965:17), a pioneer of the approach:

> For Barnes [and Bott] the important thing is dispersal of the relationships and the open-ended character of the network; for me it is coherence and closure, that is, its equivalence with a system.

Hence, the notions of structure and interrelationships between actors were regarded as central to any explanation of social behaviour because:

> A behaves in a certain way towards B so that B responds in a certain way ...[and] roles ... materialize only in an interaction setting, consequently, the behavioural characteristics we have in mind when talking about roles will always include, besides the actor's own mode of behaviour, that of others towards him (Nadel 1965:23-24).

Instead of inferring status groups from attributes like disposable income the sociological eye is instead directed to the importance of subgroups.

Wellman (1988:20) suggests that a network approach has 'five paradigmic characteristics' which he claims gives the approach its 'underlying intellectual unity':

1. Interpreting social behaviour in terms of structural constraints. Norms are the result of structural location rather than the cause of structural location.
2. Focussing on relations, not attributes.
3. Interpreting behavioural effects of networks.
4. Regarding social structure as a network of networks.
5. Using new analytic methods.

Why use a network approach in the study of environmental movement interaction?

Conceptions of macro-POS can be viewed in terms of balance theory (Cartright & Harary 1956) that looks at the configuration of relationships as a determinant of likely further relationships. The idea that an insider conservationist group will avoid contact with a radical ideological outsider group to preserve its relationship with government is exactly what a network perspective would predict. It is the position of the insider group within society and politics that prevents it from engaging in relations with groups having completely differing ideologies.

Wellman (1988) sees RM as a structural-analytical way of emphasising competitive and collaborative relations that can be enhanced by network methodology. The idea of a structural niche as espoused by structural sociologists has very strong connotations within organisational ecology that focuses upon competition and collaboration. The network approach also prevents over-emphasis on individual organisations or protest events at the expense of the movement dimension (Diani 2002a).

A network approach is crucial in research that seeks to determine the existence or nature of a collective identity – a notion implicitly prevalent in much NSM theorising. As Somers suggests:

> there is no reason to assume a priori that people with similar attributes will share common experiences of social life, let alone be moved to common forms and meanings of social action unless they share similar narrative *identities* and relational settings (1994:635).

Hence networks of relations can configure a collective identity. Thus it is a method especially suited to theoretical triangulation, helping explain aspects of RM, POS and NSM.

One does not have to agree with all of the tenets of the structural approach to use network methodology to good effect. I agree with Doherty (2002) and Jasper (1997) who both point the

finger at the network approach for its apparent ignorance of actors' attributes. Attributes *can* be used to discover patterns and make predictions about social behaviour, even though the approach has problems. What proponents of the network paradigm seem to forget in their attempts to create their own methodological niche is that no method is perfect. The term 'method bashing' would be appropriate to conceptualise this process. The rivalry developing between a categorical and relational approach to sociology is beginning to compare with the sparring between quantitative and qualitative 'schools' and between CB, RM and NSM theorists. Within the network approach however, there *is* scope for analysing relations between groups of actors according to attributes other than structural equivalence (Rank & Wald 2000). The central difference between the network approach and standard sociological methodology is that additional attributes can be used as tools for explaining patterning of relations rather than falsely assuming that attributes and categories correspond (*cf* Degenne & Forse 2001, chapter 1).

In practice, few social movement network studies are truly structural in pure and deterministic form. When scholars attempt to be structural, they frequently have to invoke attributes to make sense of patterns, or else end up describing a reified version of reality. I prefer to conceive of homophily, attributes and behaviour as determinants of relational structures rather than vice versa (McPherson & Popielarz 1992, McPherson *et al* 2001). Galaskiewicz (1979:84-5) for instance, attributes patterns in the money-exchange network between voluntary organisations in Tower Town (a pseudonym) to organisations' auspices. In his moral support network, value homophily leads to organizational proximity and organisations' scope of activities determines links in the information network. In contrast, the structural approach suggests that relations are mysteriously pre-given and are the source rather than outcome of behavioural conformity or shared viewpoints amongst structurally equivalent actors. For example, Ansell (2003), in his clique analysis of 70 EMOs in the San Francisco Bay Area suggests that network closure dampens enthusiasm for collaboration with local government structures (p.142). It could more convincingly be argued that a preference to bypass the state leads to counter-cultural networks that develop strong collective identities and become cliquey by virtue of their beliefs. Broadbent (2003:206) agrees that networks are 'not the primary causal weight', for that would be reductionist. Instead,

> the task is to discern how networks and roles interact with material and cultural factors ... the only way to grasp the interaction of social, material and cultural factors is to shatter their pots and combine their shards into new explanatory mosaics.

Thus, an attribute-based network approach also reinforces the notion of theoretical triangulation.

7.4 Social movements and social networks

Scholars have taken five main approaches to tackling social movement networking:

1. The relationship between micro-networks and participation (Freeman 1983, Diani 2004, McPherson & Popielarz 1992, Gould 1993, Ray *et al* 2003, Passy 2003, Ferdenaz & McAdam 1989, Goodwin & Jasper 1995).
2. Describing general movement network characteristics (Melucci 1996, Lawson 1983, Gerlach 1983 & 2000, Kebede 2001).
3. Qualitative descriptions of conflict and collaboration between movement factions (Scholsberg 1999, Van Aelst & Algrave 2001, Rucht 1989, Griggs & Howarth 2002, Downey 1986, Barkan 1986).
4. Positional (Diani 1995, Garrido & Havavais 2003, Kenis & Knoke 2002, Starr 2000, Ansell 1997,) and relational approaches (Galaskiewicz 1979, Rosenthal et al 1985, Schaffer Caniglia 2000, Osa 2001 & 2003, Franzosi 1999) to interorganisational or multiple-membership ties.
5. And an appraisal of SMO coalition forms (Schaffer 2000, Jones et al 2001, Klandermans 1989, Staggenborg 1986, Meyer & Hathaway 1993).

This review critiques positional and relational approaches to interorganisational and multiple-membership ties (4). Most authors within this field claim to be taking a structural approach that aligns itself with the central tenets of the network approach outlined above. In practice, few scholars are able to convincingly show that network structures are, as Kenis & Knoke (2002:277, 290) suggest, more important sources of SMO behaviour than attributes. This perhaps indicates limitations to its applicability and explanatory potential. In any case, non-structural approaches are preferable because they are less deterministic and allow structure to be a *result* of behaviour rather its sole determinant.

Positional approaches

Positional approaches are based on structural equivalence where actors A and B have identical configurations of relationships and are placed into 'blocks' on that basis (Burt 1983a). Therefore, if Greenpeace and FoE have the same configuration of relationships with other organisations they would be purely structurally equivalent without necessarily having relationships with one another. Pure structural equivalence rarely occurs in real data (Everett 2002a). Thus, analysts dilute the criteria for equivalence based on an arbitrarily selected value, or qualitative interpretation of a hierarchical clustering diagram for which 'no objective standard can be invoked as to the value of alpha at which clustering should be halted' (Knoke & Kuklinski 1982:64). Clustering is usually

calculated using an algorithm called CONCOR, which produces clusters of actors based on structural equivalence. It does this by correlating actors' configurations of relationships within a network against each other. Two actors with an identical pattern of relations would get a score of one, and two with a completely different pattern receive a score of minus one. This matrix is called a structural equivalence matrix. As ones and minus ones rarely occur in real data, as actors have similar but not identical configuration of relationships, and some overlap in the patterning of the relations, CONCOR is used to identify similarities. This is done by continuing to correlate the correlations until the matrix presents itself in a neat one / minus one pattern. This shows the first layer of clusters. The process is repeated indefinitely until you get a configuration of clusters that fits in with some preconceived notion of the social structure of the network in question. It is standard practice to then see if the blocks identified through cluster analysis are related to each other using a cut-off density of the researcher's choice (Schwartz 1977). This means that analysts can select a standard of 'structural equivalence' that conveniently supports their theories regarding network partitions. Diani (1992b:124-6), for example, admits in his analysis of 20 Italian EMOs that he halted the aggregation process at a level at which organisational characteristics and belief systems showed some significance in the resulting blocks. Where data is incomplete, or network boundaries are misconceived, reality can be dangerously misinterpreted.[5] Further, it is unhelpful for certain types of research because actors within blocks need not have relations with one another, just a similar profile of ties towards others. Thus, blocks are not cohesive subgroups, and actors within them need not even be aware of one another's existence. The theory claims that this kind of network approach, which is most consistent with Nadel's (1965) conception of structure, is all-explanatory but in practice, it often explains little. The work of Garrido & Harrison (2003) and Diani (2003a, 2002b,1995) is illustrative.

Garrido & Harrison (2003) explore the Internet hyper-link networks of the Zapatista movement, attempting to uncover its 'structure' and show evidence that it was a catalyst for the formation of broader NGO networks. Although stressing the apparent importance of teasing out movement 'structures', their analysis amounts to little more than looking at network characteristics of individual organisations and dubiously defined subgroups. Their hyper-link matrix of 392 web domain hyperlinks was first 'blocked' into structurally equivalent subgroups for which degree, closeness and betweenness centrality were calculated. This results in blocks that are 'not as cohesive as the labels [accorded them] might make them out to be' (p.14) – for instance women's rights groups are

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[5] See White, Boorman & Breiger (1976) for a step-by-step guide to block modelling structurally equivalent positions and Sailer (1978) for a description and critique of the approach, Burt (1983a) for a comparison with cohesiveness.

scattered throughout the blocks and the 'Zapatista information' subgroup includes groups as diverse as Amazon Watch and Oil Watch. Although they cannot be accused of watering down structural equivalence to neatly fit reality, they end up according labels to relational subgroups that do not properly correlate with individual organisation's issue/action focus, and thereby reify the issue and action basis of the network. Also, the most 'central' subgroups are central only because they contain the largest number of organisations, and it is not surprising that Zapatista 'support' and 'information' subgroups are 'closest' to other nodes in the networks given that the network was snowballed from Zapatista networks. Furthermore, they problematically assume that 'a map of the communication network is roughly isomorphic to the structure of relationships among the users' (p.9). Just because hyperlinks exist does not mean that they are used – this is analogous to saying that just because there is a road linking two communities that the communities are tightly networked – there may be strong cultural, class or race differences that prevent effective networking. Consideration of actual relationships and organisational attributes would therefore enhance the analysis.

Diani's (2002b) block modelling of 124 Glaswegian ethnic/minority, community, social exclusion and environmental NGOs is also illustrative of how block modelling by structural equivalence can yield block configurations that do not cohere with the action and issues of the organisations. Although most EMOs were in the same block (perhaps by virtue of the value of alpha at which clustering was halted), the 'social exclusion' block included the RSPB, ethnic/minority NGOs were distributed evenly throughout the three blocks and the leftovers were conveniently labelled with the catch-all phrase of 'community action'. If he had statistically tested the effect of variables such as ideology or issue basis on the block model configuration, it is likely that these would be insignificant because of the range of groups within each block.

Diani's earlier *Green Networks* (1995) study has parallels with this research as he also analyses relations between ideological divisions of the (Milanese) environmental movement (excluding radicals), uses (a different set of) hypotheses derived from SMT and seeks to evaluate the explanatory potential of SMT with regard to movement interaction. Diani uses a mixture of positional and relational analysis on visible and latent movement networks. The focus of this discussion is on visible interorganisational ties and the positional analysis that informs the bulk of his findings.

Structural equivalence is used to identify the 'logic' behind the alliance structure of 42 EMOs. Using an undefined and most probably arbitrary definition of structural equivalence, five positional blocks

were identified. Block 1 consisted *mostly* of major organisations (including WWF), Block 2 *mostly* of local groups, Block 3 was defined by adhesion to a specific local campaign, Block 4 was *mostly* animal rights groups and Block 5 was a 'residual position', consisting of the debris from the rest of the network (p.117-118). Like Garrido & Harrison's (2003) blocks, these are not totally consistent with their labels nor rigorously defined. Using standard statistical modelling, he proceeds to show that the key factors influencing these network positions are degree of formal organisation (levels of membership and having an office) and a focus on urban issues (traffic, urban planning and protecting buildings) (p.119).

Although his preliminary relational analysis suggested that organisations with similar characteristics tend to choose each other as partners (p.103), positional analysis contradicts this by indicating no polarisation between political ecologists and conservationists despite their different ideologies. However, it is not surprising that the positional analysis yields these results. The equivalence blocks need not necessarily be robust and are very unlikely to be strictly equivalent. The fact that each of the five groups contains conservation *and* political ecology groups (i.e. Block 1 - major organisations - includes political ecology and conservation groups including WWF, Block 2 contains local political ecology and conservation groups, Block 5 contains a mixture of 'residual' organisations etc.) means that 'framing' is hardly likely to significantly contribute to this configuration of blocks that each contain a mix of ideologies within them. The reason Diani finds so little support for his hypotheses is largely because the methodology is ill-suited for his purpose. Interrelations between conservationists and political ecologists may have been better calculated by a simple count of ties that conservationists extend towards political ecologists and vice versa and to see if there is bias over and above chance expectations in this outcome. The same could have been done for cooperation between new middle class-based SMOs and according to organisation's perceptions of their POS[6] - other hypotheses for which he finds no support. Diani preferred to place organisations into spurious 'equivalence' blocks and statistically test the effect of framing and other SMT variables on network positions.

Diani (2003a) explores the relationship between network position, influence and SMO properties of 42 EMOs in Milan, finding that the most central organisations have greater links with media and public institutions. Brokerage organisations do not have such a significant public profile, but are crucial for maintaining links between political ecologists and conservationists (Rucht 1989, Diani

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[6] Although Diani (1995:15) suggests that an organisation's perception of its POS is important, he does not allow for the fact that different groups face different opportunities depending on their choice of strategies and target.

1995). This approach is not structural because Diani explains it in terms of organisational attributes. Central organisations he argues, have more resources, work on a wide range of issues and are generally older – factors that could improve an organisation's public profile in the absence of network links. Indeed, the public could perceive of an EMO as a movement leader by virtue of its age, resource balance and issue-focus without it being a leader in network terms (e.g. Greenpeace).

Relational approaches

Relational approaches are not based on structural equivalence, but on the actual patterning of relations including notions of centrality, brokerage, cohesive subgroups and cliques. Thus, the problems of reifying the action/issue basis of networks, mislabelling blocks and the subjective nature of non-pure structural equivalence are avoided. Two contrasting studies are briefly outlined and critiqued.

Osa looks at the historical networking patterns between a small number of organisations working in the post-Stalinist contention in Poland (1954-1959) (Osa 2001), and three protest waves culminating in the mobilization of Solidarity (1976-1980) (Osa 2003). Using a non-structural approach based on Tilly's (1978) concept of 'Catnet', she categorises network relations by social characteristics (e.g. youth/elderly) and ideological commitment (e.g. socialism/Catholicism). The networks are based on overlapping memberships of individual members. Simple sociograms are presented and superimposed on protest event analysis graphs showing that networks with greater membership overlaps, more brokers and high network centralization, result in peaks of protest (2003), and that perceptions of positive POs increase as networks develop (2001). Multiple memberships are regarded as equivalent to interorganisational links, a notion that is especially problematic given the prevalence of latent membership in formally organised SMOs. However, the small numbers of SMOs in Poland as a result of state repression allowed for analysis of the entire social movement field, something rarely achieved in network studies. However, there is little exploration of the reasons for interaction between movements with different ideological beliefs, nor a consideration of conflict and competition.

Rosenthal *et al* (1995) attempted to describe the network of 19th century women's reform movements based on the overlapping memberships of women who are influential in at least one such SMO. Clearly multiple membership and interorganisational links are not the same thing and it is especially likely, given these women are highly involved in at least one organisation, that they would have little energy left to give to other organisations they were party to, making it a poor

replacement for interorganisational linkages. Given the historical focus of the data, it is impossible for them to supplement their concern about not being able to 'say exactly how much resource sharing or what kind of ideological affinity existed between two organisations that were linked to each other' (p.1026) with qualitative data. In addition, Rosenthal *et al* ignored the local to national dimension by listing branches under the title of their mother organisation. However, their analysis does usefully show that women's rights organisations are central in the network, and that organisations tend to be clustered (using cohesion rather than structural equivalence) according to issues, leading to the suggestion that clustering can be used to identify the centres of separate movements within the network. Emirbayer & Goodwin (1994:1426) claim that this research is 'structurally determinist' because of the lack of focus on how the networks developed with regard to actor's beliefs, values and normative commitments.

7.5 Evaluation

Thus, this research looks for factors that are likely to affect EMOs' networking patterns as predicted by SMT (see hypotheses) and discusses the extent to which they appear to have impacted current configurations of *relationships* (not *positions*). Network relations are not seen as answers in themselves, but as patterns requiring interpretation. Interorganisational linkages are used rather than multiple memberships to avoid the problems that Osa's work faces (see Chapter 10 for a further critique of the theoretical and empirical relevance of studying multiple-memberships). To avoid structural determinism, the emphasis is on seeking to explain network patterns found using counts of ties that organisations of a particular type extend to others of a particular type. This approach allows for behaviour to influence network relations as much as network relations govern behaviour. Like collective identity formation, interaction and behaviour is a two-way iterative process. To varying degrees, EMOs behave strategically, normatively, dramaturgically *and* communicatively, hence the need to use theoretical triangulation. Although interactions may shape norms, strategic, normative, dramaturgical and communicative action can shape interaction. For example, the fact that Greenpeace is strategically cautious in its collaborative ventures (to maintain a brand image) cannot be described as an outcome of its relations, but is instead a cause of them.

CHAPTER 8

Methodology for Answering Research Questions

This chapter begins with details of how the sample was identified, and then goes on to outline the methodology used to address the hypotheses set out in Chapter 7. It describes means of identifying EMOs, and the qualitative and quantitative methods used. The combination of research methods was chosen to mirror the nature of the theoretical hypotheses. The chapter ends with a consideration of the ethical implications.

8.1 Identifying the Sample

London was chosen as the spatial boundary of the network. It was chosen because London has the highest concentration of national EMOs in the UK (Rootes & Miller 2000) and a variety of local groups (Rootes *et al* 2001), making it an ideal site for study of the interaction between local and national EMOs. London is also an important site for national protests, given that it plays host to national government, international financial institutions, foreign embassies and the headquarters of many pariah companies. Given the highly urban nature of London and the pressures for development within the capital, it was almost certain that there would be high levels of environmental grievances. These facts made it certain that the research would find an environmentalist milieu worthy of research. London's environmentalism contrasts significantly with environmentalism in semi-rural Canterbury, which, as was showed in previous research (Rootes et al 2001), has a virtually dormant environmental movement. Because of its complex mix of national and local protests, London is usually disregarded as a case-study site. This provided an opportunity to undertake a unique piece of academic research.

As local environmentalism is rife in London, a sample consisting of two smaller localities was selected to ensure that the sample size did not become too unwieldy. Nearly 100 local EMOs were identified in southeast London (the boroughs of Greenwich, Lewisham and Southwark) and just under 150 in northwest London (the boroughs of Hillingdon, Ealing and Hounslow). Between them, these localities make up less than a quarter of the landmass of Greater London. Assuming that these densities of local EMOs are representative of London's local environmentalism as a whole, there are approximately 1,000 local EMOs within Greater London. The reasons for selecting these localities are given in Chapter 2 (p.24-6).

To draw up the sample, an extensive list of EMOs derived from the TEA project was used as a starting-point. Additional EMOs were identified from databases, internet searches, local studies libraries and informal telephone discussions with activists. The London editions of the *Yellow Pages* and Button's (1990) *Green Pages* were also used alongside various other

environmentalist directories (Appendix 1). One of the problems with identifying EMOs from databases such as these, and especially from the internet, is that the contact details of groups are frequently outdated. It is also the case that many local or anti-LULU EMOs have a very short life span, meaning that some organisations that have actually folded were included in the sample. An additional problem is that newly formed EMOs are much less likely to have their details posted on these databases. For example, I was unaware of the existence of the Environmental Direct Action Group (EDAG) at the time of sending out the majority of the questionnaires, but sent it an electronic copy once I had identified it via a posting outlining one of their actions on the Indymedia website. A relatively wide range of groups were included in the sample including organisations I believed might be NIMBY, and anarchist groups, single-issue groups, residents associations and animal rights organisations (see Appendix 4). The first three questions of the questionnaire were designed to tell if these organisations really were part of the environmental movement by asking them if they considered themselves to be part of the movement, had a main aim that involved protecting or preserving the environment, and were part of a network of EMOs (the questionnaire is shown in Appendix 2). Having concern about the environment (i.e. a main aim) and being part of a network of other EMOs were considered to be the key factors in determining environmental movement membership. It was an interesting exercise to compare this with organisations' own ideas about whether or not they were part of the movement (see Chapter 9).

8.2 Addressing the Research Questions

Research involved quantitative and qualitative techniques to reduce limitations of each, and address different hypotheses. Quantitative techniques, generally regarded as objective, structured and reliable, can be narrow, artificial and lacking in validity. Qualitative research is seen as subjective, unstructured and unreliable, yet provides rich data and is usually considered to be more valid than quantitative techniques (Silverman 1997). Methodological triangulation is justified in this research by the nature of three-fold theoretical research questions. Quantitative data was necessary to map out networks, whilst qualitative data was used for discovering collective identities, and activists' views and experiences of interaction. By employing these methods, an acceptable data set was drawn given that radical EMOs are less amenable to quantitative than qualitative research (Kriesi 1992, della Porta 1992:188). Where different methods address the same questions, findings have strengthened validity and reliability. Indeed, triangulation is always the safest methodological bet, as Blee & Taylor (2003:111) suggest: 'triangulation both increases the amount of detail about a topic and counteracts threats to validity associated with any one of the single methods'.

Frequently, methodological triangulation involves using preliminary qualitative research to inform a quantitative follow up. This methodological sequence is justified in situations where

little is known about the topic. However, previous academic and activist experience of the environmental movement has allowed me to employ my methodology the other way around – qualitative research followed quantitative. This allowed selection of interesting organisations and radical groups that did not respond to the questionnaire (*cf* McAdam 2002).

Quantitative research

A postal questionnaire (Appendix 2) was sent to 440 EMOs to discover collaborative, information-passing and competitive networks, and organisational characteristics. The first few questions aimed to discover the extent to which each of the organisations that replied was part of the 'movement' according to the definition given in Chapter 2. Q5-10 sought details about the type of group, its spatial dimensions, campaigning activity, ideology/discourse and perceptions of relationships with various structures of governance.

Question 7 asked 'which of the following activities has your group engaged in within the last twelve months?' This helped distinguish between radical and reformist groups based on the assumption that these types of EMOs frequently have radical ideologies, but the latter use institutionalised strategies to bring about piecemeal change to which the former never (or rarely) concede (Chapter 2). This question also allowed comparison between the activities groups engage and their perception of their relationship with government.

To ease analysis, the twenty-five types of campaigning activity listed as categorical response options in the questionnaire have been classified based on Rootes' (1997) categories of protest as conventional, demonstrative, confrontational and attacks on property. Rootes (2003) additionally had the category of violence but found that reports of it were so rare, that it barely merited its inclusion. I assume that violence in environmentalist's repertoires is rare, and that groups engaging in it would prefer not to own up. To enable testing of assumptions that pressure group theory makes, the categories have been relabelled insider, thresholder and outsider (Table 8.1).

Questions 8-9 asked respondents what they believed were the underlying causes and solutions to environmental problems, giving an indication of whether the organisations have a conservationist, reformist or radical mindset (Table 2.5).

Question 10 asked specifically about EMO's relationships with local, regional and national government. Five possible types of relationship were postulated:

1. **Positive** - the government/council frequently seeks the EMO's advice.
2. **Ambivalent** - the government/council is friendly, but the EMO generally initiates contact.

3. **Contingent** - the receptiveness of the government/council is dependent on the issue(s) or department(s) involved.
4. **Negative** - an EMO unsuccessfully attempts to influence the government/council, or has become blacklisted.
5. **No relationship** - the absence of a relationship with government/council either because the EMO prefers alternative campaign targets or does not work at that level (e.g. local amenity societies are unlikely to have a relationship with national government because much of their work seeks to influence the local council instead).

The answers to this question are used as indicators of organisations' perceptions of their potential political opportunities

Table 8.1 Campaigning activity and category of protest

CATEGORY OF PROTEST	ACTIVITIES
Insider	Petitions, leafleting, press conferences, letter writing, researching and reporting, education and training, government consultee, LA21 involvement, procedural complaints, litigation, public meetings
Thresholder	Media stunts, marches, rallies, demonstrations, cultural performances and/or a mixture of insider and outsider activities
Outsider	Boycotts, disruption of events, blockades/occupations Ethical shoplifting, ecotage, adbusting
Miscellanous	Social events, practical conservation

Questions 11-13 asked for network data. For each of these questions, respondents were asked to list the *five most important EMOs with which they have various types of network ties*. This approach was chosen because listing all EMOs that I supposed were in the network would have made the questionnaire lengthy and a deterrent to answering. Diani (2002a) makes a convincing argument that this approach gets to the crux of the matter by forcing respondents to tease out which are the most important network links rather than drain their brains for extensive comprehensive listings of mostly weak and insignificant ties. Listing the whole movement field and asking respondents to tick actors with which they have links has been shown to yield 'never more than 50% concordance' between clique structure yielded from questionnaires and actual behavioural cliques (Bernard *et al* cited in Anheier 1987:567). The approach taken here should help narrow the gap between cognition and behaviour.

The network questions asked for ties in respect of information provided to, information received from and collaboration. It was seen as important to differentiate between the receiving and providing of information to enable the identification of agenda setters (information providers).

The questionnaire was posted in January 2002 with prepaid response envelopes to ease respondents' replies. A covering letter outlining the rationale for the research and a leaflet (Appendix 3) were included. A mailed reminder enclosing a second copy of the questionnaire was posted in March 2003. In April 2003, a third reminder was emailed including the questionnaire as an attachment. Table 8.2 shows the response rates.

Table 8.2 Questionnaire response rates

SPHERE OF OPERATION	NUMBER SENT	POSTAL RETURNS	EMAIL RETURNS	TOTAL RETURNS	RESPONSE RATE
Southeast London	96	36	1	37	38.5%
Northwest London	132	51	3	54	41%
Regional	64	40	2	42	65.6%
National	148	15	1	16	10.8%
Total	440	142	7	149	**32%**

This compares with an average response rate of 50% for organisational questionnaires (Klandermans & Smith 2002) and Ansell's (2003) response rate for a similar survey of US EMOs at 40%. There are various reasons for the low response rates. One potential respondent from the Tidy Blackheath Group replied explaining she was offended by the political nature of the questionnaire. This was no loss as Tidy Blackheath was just one of many local EMOs to have folded during the time-lapse between the TEA project and this research. Seven letters came back from kindly citizens who replied along the lines of 'we've lived here for the past 12 years and have no idea what this organisation is'.

Other organisations considered they did not come within the research's remit. The London Sustainability Exchange stated that they are:

> neither a pure environmental organisation nor particularly linked into the activist network. As a sustainable development organisation we try to work across all sectors and focus equally on social and economic issues as much as environmental ones. As such we are hesitant about being included in a study which might create confusion as to our role and the area we work in (Wilson, Knowledge Officer, London Sustainability Exchange, February 2003).

Despite my reply asking them to use questions 1-4 of the questionnaire to judge their suitability for inclusion, they declined to reply. Similarly, Transport 2000 could not be persuaded. Other organisations replied to the email reminder, apologising for not replying sooner and showing interest in the study, yet still failed to complete and return the questionnaire. This is because campaigning pressures and deadlines take priority over external research. Scott (Vice Chair of SAGE) may speak for many:

> Would I have completed it if it just arrived on the doormat? Probably it would have been opened, put to one side, read a few days later, then forgotten for a month or so.
> The problem was, that once activists and campaigners had put it aside for a while, the deadline for returning the questionnaire had passed and the questionnaire was likely to have been relegated to the recycling bin. The same could have happened to the reminder copy that also included a deadline.

As expected, radical organisations showed a strong reluctance to answer the questionnaire. EDAG did not complete it because they only received the email version and were deterred because it was addressed to multiple addresses, all of whose names appeared on the header of the mail, thus, as they saw it, infringing confidentiality.

Network Analysis Procedures

Network data was analysed for those organisations that provided network data. If they replied 'no' to question three of the questionnaire which asked 'Is your organisation part of a *network* of environmental organisations? *i.e. is your organisation in regular contact with at least one other organisations that you consider to be part of the environmental movement*?' there were asked to return the questionnaire with no further questions asked. One hundred and fourteen organisations answered this question in the affirmative (also see table 10.1 p.154).

Four different types of networks were analysed based on collaboration between organisations and the providing, receiving and mutual exchange of information. For all networks (see below for details), the data were dichotomised except in the presentation of degrees where the assigned score reflecting tie strength (in terms of frequency of contact) was not dichotomised. The scores are: 6 - daily, 5 - weekly, 4 - monthly, 3 -quarterly, 2 -six-monthly and 1 - annually. Measures of degrees are therefore reflective of the frequency as well as the quantity of ties.

For all data, the same procedure in UCINet (Borgatti & Everett 2001) was followed. The first step taken was to carry out a component-analysis. A component is essentially a disconnected sub-section of a network and in social network analysis, components need to be analysed separately. The output of a component analysis from UCInet lists the main component (the largest group of actors that each have links to at least one other), followed by a list of smaller

components. These are listed in order of size, meaning that component 2 will always be the second largest, and component 3 the third largest component and so on. Both technical and theoretical reasons made it necessary to carry this out as a preliminary exercise. The definition of the environmental movement used here insists that to be part of it, organisations must have network links (Chapter 2). I assume that the absence of links means that organisations are not part of the movement proper. If a bunch of several organisations form a separate component from the main network, this indicates at least marginality but perhaps detachment from the network concerned. If qualitative research suggested that it was correct to do so, these organisations were excluded from the analysis.[1]

UCInet was then used to 'Extract' organisations that were not part of the main component, providing clues for movement boundary demarcation. Next, the indegrees (Freeman 1978) were calculated to give an impression of centrality. Actors were then partitioned according to questionnaire attributes (sphere of operation, balance of activities, relationships with local, national and regional government and ideology) rather than structural position. Counts of entries in the partition were tabulated, showing the extent to which each category of group extends ties towards other groups in the same and other categories (Appendix 5).[2] The density figures themselves were not used because of problems encountered when comparing different sized networks/blocks.[3] To see the proportion of ties that each block extends towards other groups, the simple arithmetic count of ties within blocks and towards others was calculated as a percentage. These results are translated into three-dimensional graphs to allow for proportions of ties to be easily visualised.

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[1] The latter is a dangerous assumption because the questionnaire only asks for the **top five** environmental organisations for each network question. This means that for large organisations with many links, we get a qualitative impression of their most favoured ties or allies. For smaller organisations that only have five ties it is more of a ranking exercise. Other organisations may prefer to work in isolation, and so to chose five links may effectively be like scraping the debris from the bottom of the barrel. This weakness admitted, what we see reflected in these networks are essentially the strongest and most important ties between environmental organisations.

[2] The Network Properties>Density function in UCInet was used to produce this result.

[3] Friedkin (1981) showed how comparing the density between networks (and by implication blocks) of different sizes was problematic. Density as a measure of cohesion he said was inaccurate because it 'belies the degree of connectivity' (p.45) and it doesn't equate well with structural cohesion in terms of the number of triads. For instance, a network with 20 actors and a density of 0.004 has an average of 0.05 pairs joined, compared to a network of 60 actors with the same density and an average of 0.77 pairs joined. Small increases in low densities are more significant than much larger increases in higher densities.

Finally, inbreeding scores were calculated for each partition using Skvoretz & Agneessens' (2003) SPSS Syntax Inbreeding programme.[4] 'Inbreeding bias' is 'when people [or organisations] tend to associate (over and above chance expectations) with others like themselves on the dimensions [observed]' (Skvoretz 1991:275). The concept of inbreeding expands upon Blau's (1977) distributional theory of social structure. Blau argued that inbreeding occurs along social dimensions of interest. The absence of inbreeding is as important as its presence because it is associated with seizing the opportunity to associate with others outside immediate social groupings. Thus, thresholders are more likely to seize on such opportunities and have low inbreeding. Within the total population, just as 'increasing heterogeneity increases the probability of intergroup relations' (Blau 1977:80), so does a homogenous population mean that intergroup relations are less likely and 'inbreeding bias' estimates are likely to be higher.

The Networks

Six configurations of the environmental movement network in London were analysed. These are the collaboration, information provided, information received, information exchange and the local collaboration networks for southeast London and northwest London. Some comparisons are also made with some collaboration data collected in southeast London as part of an earlier project. How these data were derived and the assumptions or alterations that were made to the data to make it suitable for social network analysis data are outlined below.

1. Collaboration Network

This network was derived from the question 'please list the 5 most important environmental organisations in a specified geographical area with which your organisation collaborates on campaigns or other environment activity.' National and regional groups had the opportunity to list their 5 most important contacts at national and regional level and in the northwest (Hounslow, Ealing and Hillingdon boroughs) and southeast areas (Greenwich, Southwark and Lambeth boroughs. Groups in the northwest and southeast areas were only asked about contacts within their own locality and at national and regional level (i.e. those in the southeast were not asked for their top 5 collaborative ties in the northwest and vice versa). The responses of all organisations were included to form one large collaboration network. It was assumed that this data implied symmetry because of the nature of the type of tie – collaboration implies the

[4] For the equation for calculating differential inbreeding which is they type used here as it usefully 'allows each group to have its own inbreeding bias' (Skvoretz 1991:282 see especially 283-284).

participation of both parties concerned - and it was therefore analysed as a symmetric relation.[5] In total, there are 225 nodes in this network.

2. Information Provided Network

This network was the result of the question 'please list the 5 most important organisations (in each of the local, regional and national domains, as per the collaboration network) to which your organisation provides information or advice'. Again as with the collaboration network, the national, regional and local networks were amalgamated and treated as a single entity. This data was treated as asymmetric because 'providing' information or advice is a one-way relation.[6] In total, the main component of this network has 128 nodes.

3. Information Received Network

This network is similar to the total information received network, and is based on the question that asked environmental organisations about the 5 most important organisations that have *provided* them with information or advice in each spatial domain. As this network had over 250 actors the data has been modified for much of the analysis so as to remove all nodes that exist but which were not respondents of the questionnaire. The main component consisting of respondents only has 88 nodes.

4. An Information Exchange Network

Figure 8.1, Summing and Dichotomising the Information-based Matrices

Information Provided Network					Information Received Network					Sum of Networks					Information Exchange Network			
1	0	0	1		1	0	1	0		2	0	1	1		1	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	+	1	1	0	0	=	1	1	0	0	>1	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	1		1	0	0	0		2	0	0	1	=	1	0	0	0
1	1	0	0		1	1	0	1		2	2	0	0		1	1	0	0

This network has 38 nodes and consists only of those organisations that answered the questionnaire and provided data on both information-based questions (provided and received). It sums the matrices for those respondents to the information exchange and information

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[5] This symmetrical relationship assumes that if FoE chooses Greenpeace as a top 5 important collaborator that Greenpeace would in return chose FoE – i.e. that there is symmetry in choices of partner between initiators and receivers of ties. This is not entirely unproblematic. However, collaboration is a two-way venture and analysing the network in this manner compensates for missing data. In this network, the emphasis is shifted towards the *presence* of collaborative ties more so than their i*mportance*.

[6] In this manner, the integrity of the 'top 5 most important ties' is preserved.

received networks and is dichotomised for relations greater than 1 (the process is shown in Figure 8.1), so that only actors that both receive information and provide information to each other remain in the network.

5 and 6. Local collaboration networks

These two networks aggregate responses to the question on collaboration from organisations in southeast London and northwest London as 2 separate networks. Again, the data is treated as being symmetrical because of the nature of the verb in question (collaboration). Seventy-eight organisations are in network for the northwest London collaboration network. After component analysis, 54 organisations remained. The southeast London network had 48 organisations in it, but after component analysis, only 15 remained. For presentation purposes, the components will not be singled out for the southeast network in the presentation of network diagrams. This is because it is useful to show how fragmented the southeast London environmental movement network has become since the decline of an active high profile campaign at Crystal Palace Park.

Displaying networks

As the same sociogram can appear drastically different depending on where actors are placed and which method is used (Lauman & Pappi 1976:120, Blythe *et al* 1995 cited in McGrath *et al* 2002, McGrath *et al* 2002), care has been taken in the presentation of network diagrams. Blythe *et* al's advice is heeded and actors are positioned according to Euclidean distances.

Qualitative Research

Eleven groups were selected for further study by choosing a group of each type from each locality (Table 8.3). Participant observation was carried out in one local conservationist, one regional radical, and one national reformist organisation to gain rapport and witness how they function. I spent one, sometimes two days a week for 23 weeks volunteering at national FoE. For the most part, this involved encouraging national campaigners to take local groups training needs and days of action into account in their five-year plans. I also relabelled the FoE map of local groups after working out which were still active, helped to edit the local groups magazine, updated data bases of local group activity on the basis of newsletters that had been sent in, and occasionally became a general fact-finder, scouring the web for facts and figures to help with campaigns. I attended only about eight EDAG meetings, but actively contributed to strategising discussions on the email list, and helped with the groundwork for actions for three months. I participated in, and helped to organise three direct actions (including the wedding as referred to in Table 13.3). My participation was restricted to the legal, but still crucial aspects of these campaigns (such as holding banners and passing around leaflets). I also organised for thousands of EDAG leaflets to be printed (at the University's Print Unit) as the group were

impressed with the quick turn around times and highly reasonable cost. Gunnersbury Triangle nature reserve has volunteer days on Tuesdays and I was a regular attendee between May and August 2003. My volunteering there involved path maintenance, watering (it was an exceedingly dry summer), bramble pruning, sawing off dead branches of trees, removing pondweed from the lake and other similar manual tasks. On the last day of my volunteering, it was teaming with rain making practical conservation tasks difficult, so I volunteered myself for delivering hundreds of soggy leaflets to homes in the local streets.

In-depth interviews were conducted with key campaigners and/or organisational leaders in all eleven groups to determine activist careers, prior network links/movement participation and perspective on interorganisational interactions. Two key campaigns were studied in-depth. Activists were interviewed (full list of interviewees is in Appendix 6), and email discussion lists and campaign archives analysed. Climate change and aviation were chosen because of their central importance for London's activists and because an array of organisational types have been involved. This approach was chosen because ethnographic data is crucial to ensure correct interpretation of network analysis results and it is always useful to nest quantitative research findings within real life case studies (e.g. Sampson 1975).

Table 8.3 The eleven study groups

	CONSERVATIONISTS	REFORMISTS	RADICALS
SOUTHEAST	Plumstead Common Group	Greenwich FoE	56a
NORTHWEST	***Chiswick Wildlife Trust**	Ealing FoE	
REGIONAL	London Wildlife Trust	London FoE	***LARC /EDAG**
NATIONAL	CPRE	***FoE**	
		Greenpeace	

(*Participant observation was carried out in those organisations marked in **bold**)

To my knowledge, no radical EMOs exist in northwest London, however there is a local Greenpeace group in northwest London that is embedded into radical networks.[7] Neither is there a national direct action network hub that was readily accessible to study. Short descriptions of each of the groups chosen for in-depth study and two campaign case studies are given in Chapter 9 to ground the analytical discussion (Chapters 11, 12, 13).

[7] However, on balance I regard Greenpeace as a reformist organisation because of the nature of its carefully calculated campaigning strategy and the range of insider techniques it uses along side its professional radical direct actions.

Overcoming potential movement hostility to the research process

Researchers into social movements have commented on the hostility of (especially radical) SMOs towards academic research (e.g. Diani 1992b, Knoke 1990). Kriesi (1992:194) for example comments on his research on the Swiss anti-nuclear movement, where activists spread propaganda about what they supposed to be the hidden agenda of the research process;

> those who collaborate with the team of sociologists ... for this 'study' or with similar studies should not be surprised by the possible consequences! ... Socio-, anthropo_ and other – ologists are nothing but the servile handymen of those in power. A world that is about to destroy the prison of society takes the same position with respect to them as with respect to all the handymen in power'.

Furthermore, his research into the youth movement in Zurich resulted in a raided office and 10 case-questionnaires lost to theft.

My previous research experience in the field – the interviewing of 30 environmental activists from a variety of ideological persuasions in southeast London and Canterbury District – has been much less dramatic, with respondents generally being helpful and favourable towards the research. Yet, scepticism was raised from the radical end of the spectrum, as expressed by this radical activist :

> I hope that they [the funding body] aren't paying you so that they find out loads of information about how to squash it [the environmental/direct action movement]. Have you asked them? You ought to really go and ask them because if they do that to you you'd be really pissed off ... you need to go and talk to them and say "right, we've put our trust in you here, the people that we communicate with put their trust in us". I'm a great believer in going to the people at the top and asking them outright (Bongo interview, June 2001).

Similarly, the local representative of the South London Collective[8], who claimed during an informal telephone interview to also be a pioneering member of the White Overalls Movement Building Libertarian Effective Struggles (WOMBLES)[9] failed to turn up at an agreed meeting time and place, and declined subsequent contact.

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[8] Reclaim the Streets (RTS) in south London evolved into the South London Collective and were organisers of a series of events at the anti-capitalist demonstrations in London on May 1st 2001.

[9] The WOMBLES have modelled themselves on their Italian counterparts, Ya Basta! who wear white overalls at international anti-globo/capitalist demonstrations. The white overalls are symbolic of the arbitrary distinction between blue-overall (working class) and white-collars workers. At demonstrations where police brutality is expected, the WOMBLES come prepared for combat with padded overalls and

The first step taken to reduce researcher-informant hostility was to ensure participants of confidentiality and secure storage of data, and to inform them of the research objectives - emphasising those aspects which informants themselves may regard as beneficial. In the case of this research, the positive contribution that the study hopes to bring to the process of sustainability was highlighted. I made a point of mentioning that I am an environmental activist myself and seek to make constructive suggestions for improving EMO networking.

The Third Space

As an (albeit low-key) environmental activist, I am able to share identification, understanding and advocacy with most factions of the environmental movement that helped in gaining trust of potential respondents. Knowing about current environmentalist concerns and campaigns through subscribing to various environmental magazines including *The Ecologist*, *Resurgence* and *SchNEWS* and being involved in FoE's local group network helped immensely in facilitating healthy interviewer-interviewee relationships and prevented me from appearing as a 'rootless stranger' (Rubin & Rubin 1995:116). Pure social scientists and applied scientists on the other hand, it is argued, 'stand no chance of getting direct overt access to primary sources of data from social movements' (Kriesi 1992:201 see also Gorden 1980:8). Yet, whilst it is helpful to be able to side with the movement, it is equally important not to become too attached to the research objects and to maintain a state of 'conscious partiality' (Kuumba & Ajanaku 1998), thereby retaining the ability to view the movement critically (Routledge 1996). Numerous commentators have warned of the difficulty of remaining objective when studying a research object with which the researcher has sympathy, yet for gaining access and improving rapport with respondents in the context of a carefully managed research design, the advantages out-weigh the disadvantages. Feminist researchers have frequently and successfully used such an approach to study the women's movement (e.g. Oakley 1981).

Access

Although care was taken to choose interview respondents with relevant experience, expressive capacity and interest in the research (della Porta 1992), a compromise was made depending on which activists were willing and able to spare time.

For this research, EDAG initially met me with some hostility. One activist was unabashed enough to admit at my first meeting: 'I hate sociologists'. At that same meeting, I was honest

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gas masks for self-defence. Ya Basta! and the WOMBLES are better known for their playful tactics than for violence (Chesters 2001), although the media tends to misinterpret them as violent rioters.

about the purpose of my presence, but made it clear I was willing and able to help with actions rather than being a passive observer. Because EDAG has amongst its participants individuals who have been exposed as being leaders of Blair's anarchist circus and for instigating violent outbursts at May Day demonstrations, the group was, understandably concerned about infiltration. At least one EDAGer was tangentially involved in organising the London June 18 (J18) anti-capitalist protests of 1999 and had his photograph plastered over tabloids and broadsheets alike (Atkinson 1999, Vidal 1999, 2001, O'Sullivan 2000).

Requests for interviews were met with some hostility and in the end I managed to persuade three EDAGers of the virtues of my academic research (this is a significantly high figure considering that meetings attract five or less activists). One interviewee I emailed asking for an interview replied saying:

> I carried on thinking about this after our initial contacts and reached a view that it's not in the interests of the 'movement' to do this.

When I asked for reasons why, the reply came back saying:

> A lot of time and energy is put in by state and business organisations trying to discredit, divide, undermine, demoralise etc. activists. Some of this is quite subtle disinfo, news manipulation, mind games etc ... The bodies will use research for their own ends, think they are building a picture. It doesn't matter that theses/articles don't identify people and groups, any exposition is grist to their mill and I don't want to devote time to supplying intelligence (personal correspondence with anonymous activist, December 2003). [10]

At the group meeting after this email exchange, which was posted on the e-mail strategy list for contemplation, EDAGers were generally happy for me to go ahead with the study provided I had some input into the functioning of the group, despite prevailing concern about research being misused.

Lichterman's (2002:125) statement that ...'in the past decade more and more movement groups have worried about surveillance; [and therefore] groups may wonder whether the researcher is really a spy' forewarned me of the interrogation I was likely to receive on entering radical networks. At the first meeting I attended, the group questioned me extensively about my own activist career and the purposes of research before making a consensus agreement that I could observe and participate. I became active in several events and actions because passive

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[10] A good example of the kind of infiltration activists are wary of was the FBI's counter-intelligence programme against the new left (1961-1971). The programme aimed to create a negative public image of organisations, breakdown the internal organisation and create dissension between groups by supplying information to officials, sending anonymous letters and using the media and informants. It contributed to factionalism and disintegration of various US new left groups (Cunningham 2003).

observation and relatively fast-moving direct action networks are not especially consonant. Besides, I was keen to avoid the mistake made by Lofland (1977 cited in Blee & Taylor 2002:98) who was rapidly banished from a SMO when activists discovered he was more concerned with book-writing than supporting them.

Of more concern was gaining access to national groups such as FoE and Greenpeace, which both declined interviews during my MSc research. Brenda Pollock, the Southeast regional co-ordinator replied to an interview request that :

> we do get a lot of requests from students for this sort of interview and much as we'd like to help, most of the time, unless the work is going to *directly* benefit one of our campaigns we have to refuse (personal correspondence, 10/07/00).

Similarly, Greenpeace supporter services wrote that 'we have had to take a policy decision to decline all [such] requests' (personal correspondence, 12/07/00). Also in 2000 however, TEA project researchers were able to gain access to respondents in both organisations. As this research is closely related to the TEA project, the prestige of the TEA project was used to encourage them to concede. Since July 2000, I have become increasingly involved with FoE at a local level, and now have well-established contacts with certain members of national staff. To gain access to national FoE, I volunteered to take part unpaid work in the Local Campaigns Department. This provided me with inside information about how the organisation works with its local groups and also allowed me to have face-to-face contact with staff members and thereby secure interview respondents. For TEA research, I had previously contacted Torrance from Greenpeace, who was willing and able to help again. I attended Greenpeace's direct action training in the summer of 2003, where I met Cat Dorey (northwest London networker) who also provided an interview.

Improving the reliability and validity of the research instruments

To make the quantifiable questionnaire a reliable research instrument, the questions were carefully worded to reduce ambiguity as much as possible, bearing in mind that poorly worded questions produce impoverished and inconsistent answers (Kvale 1996). Care was taken to make the questionnaire format user-friendly. For the question asking about types of protest activity that organisations engage in, the category answers were carefully ordered with the most radical and illegal types towards the end of the list so that respondents were not put off by their inclusion. However, many radical organisations will prefer actions of this type to remain covert (Klandermans & Smith 2002:24).

> Consider that some may view you as an academic, so you are part of the system. Do you expect most groups to answer honestly about potentially criminal activity? ... Some groups

> may become suspicious, especially when you consider that you are gathering intelligence on how one group interacts with another ...(Scott, Email correspondence January 2003).

The questionnaire was comprehensively pre-tested and piloted beforehand. Seventeen pilot questionnaires were sent out to local environmental activists in Kent (all but one responded – the response rate was high because respondents were personal acquaintances). Activists were asked to fill in the form and to comment on its user-friendliness. Generally the response was positive, although modifications were made on the basis of suggestions given (Appendix 7).

The qualitative interview has many well-documented weaknesses, which can be minimised but not eradicated. Respondents for example have a tendency to show themselves in a favourable light - they rationalise their actions, unconsciously repress negative experiences and project themselves in a socially acceptable fashion (Kahn & Cannel 1967). There are also problems with language as it is often an over-simplification of reality and emotions. However, being in the 'third space' is useful also in the interviewing process – Kahn & Cannel (1967:11) noted that to have 'shared vocabulary and experience ... [with the respondent] ... defines the maximum content of communication in the interview'. My awareness of the colloquialisms of environmentalists helped to maximise the potential of the interview process. Also, previous research has shown that responses given in an interview are congruent with the perceived background of the researcher - e.g. black respondents report more racial conflict to black interviewers and downplay it to white respondents. As I have dreadlocks - a key cultural identifier in the radical environmental movement - radical activists may have felt more at ease during interviews and thereby painted a more accurate and detailed picture than they would to a researcher whom they perceived to be neutral.

The qualitative interview technique was enhanced by following general textbook tips, such as leaving controversial questions to the end to avoid having to restore rapport after offending a respondent (Whyte 1982). Bias from rewarding or scolding of attitudes was avoided (yet no doubt not eliminated) and I sought to be receptive and unsurprised at responses. Interviews were kept on tack by appropriate use of probing, whilst the interview was also used to discover answers to questions which had not previously been thought of. Interview reliability was improved by having background knowledge of the subject area and by being attentive to iron out incongruence.

Access to a sample of groups for participation was easy to arrange and all three groups were keen to have additional support. The subjective and interpretative nature of this research method (Cohen & Mannion 1994) was counteracted using supportive quantitative and qualitative data, yet the technique of participation is gaining increasing credence as 'a powerful

strategy to advance both science and practice' (Whyte 1991:7) in its own right. It was especially useful in the building-up of rapport with radical subjects and extracting information about their counter-culture. Douglas (1976, in Waddington 1994:106) claims that 'the most truthful, reliable, complete and simple way of getting that sort of [subjective and realistic] information is to share the experience'. Derek Wall's (1999a, 1999b) participation in EF! for example provided him with a rich insight into the group which could have been observed only by an insider.

Perhaps the single most striking shortcoming of the research is that it takes a mere 'snap-shot' of the interactions between EMOs, not allowing for changes over time. It is common, especially for grassroots single-issue groups, to expire once they have won or lost a particular campaign. Local groups have a volatile tendency and have been subject to collapse once key activists become 'burnt-out'. In 1994, David (1997) identified 55 active local EMOs in the Canterbury District Environmental Network yet only half (28) of them were still active only six years later (Rootes *et al* 2001). This causes problems when attempting to identify and contact group representatives as details on community databases and the internet are often out-dated. It further questions the reliability of the research - carrying out the same research even six months later may yield vastly differing results due to the prevalence both of attrition and emergence of new groups in response to contemporary/salient issues in local activist circles. Whilst there is no means to counteract this shortcoming, it is important to note my awareness that local groups are often transitory and short-lived, and to use this to inform analysis of the data and a consideration in follow-up studies.

Ethical considerations

Although the research was relatively uncontroversial and raises few ethical concerns as it was overt and respondents were not asked explicitly personal or embarrassing questions, it was important to consider ethics. Some radical EMOs wish, for obvious strategic reasons, to remain undercover and consequently sought assurance of the fidelity of the research. Therefore the British Sociological Association's Statement of Ethical Practice (2001) was strictly adhered to. Participants only joined the research after giving informed consent to become involved. All participants were briefed on the nature and purpose of the research. The sensitivities and right to privacy of all informants were respected (Annas *et al* 1977 in Davidson Reynolds 1982). Interviews were only recorded with participants' prior consent. Confidentially was ensured, and all participants are referred to by pseudonyms where they have requested this. EDAG for example asked to be called this rather than its proper name. Participants were given the opportunity to refuse provision of information at any stage and verbatim interview quotes are only used with consent. An interview permission form was used so that interviewees could specify their preferences regarding pseudonyms and use of quotes in the research (Appendix 8).

CHAPTER 9

Key Environmental Organisations and Campaigns in London's Environmental Movement

This chapter describes London's environmental movement in more detail. It provides background to the case study organisations and two key campaigns from the milieu for which networking patterns are analysed in the chapters that follow.

9.1 National EMOs

Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE) (Conservationist)

According to its literature, CPRE 'talks sense on the countryside and its future' (CPRE 2003a). It seeks to preserve and protect the countryside by preventing urban sprawl, supporting rural communities and their services and preventing developments that harm the 'beauty and tranquillity' of the countryside.

CPRE has been working 'to safeguard the landscapes and the communities which make England what it is' for over 75 years (CPRE 2003b). It began after the First World War, when England was being reconstructed with vigour, suburbanisation was taking root, ribbon developments were occurring and advertisements were crawling out of towns and cities onto rural road sides. CPRE under the lead of well-known planners like Abercrombie and Williams Ellis initially sought to redress suburbanisation's adverse effects on the countryside (CPRE, 2000:3 cf Williams Ellis [1928] 1996). Building upon this, in 1940-1960, it began actively opposing motorway and power station developments. By 1968, it changed its name from the Council for the *Preservation* of Rural England, to Council for the *Protection* of Rural England, to reflect the more proactive role it was taking in countryside protection, having been a key figure in the establishment of the 1968 Countryside Act (CPRE 2000:5).

By the 1990s CPRE was demonstrating broader commitment to sustainability (CPRE 1993), setting out how the planning system its founders installed could bring about its achievement. It also began to use more modern methods of campaigning, including working closely with the press and public engagement. This change of focus is reflected in its 2003 name change from *Council* for the Protection of Rural England, to *Campaign* to Protect Rural England.

CPRE's strength lies in its strong relationship with government ministers and intricate knowledge of the planning system. In 2000, CPRE took a lead role in campaigning alongside 10 other environment/planning organisations to reform the planning laws with the aim of giving Third Parties (i.e. the aggrieved public) the right to appeal against planning inquiry decisions (CPRE et al 2002, FoE 2002a).[1] This campaign was followed in 2002 with a successful attempt to prevent fast tracking of the planning system for large infrastructural projects.[2] CPRE has also been active in the recent campaign against airport expansion with most of its effort centred influencing policy via the White Paper consultation. This is part of a broader transport campaign that seeks to encourage pubic transport alternatives, 20mph zones and questions the need for short-distance car travel (CPRE 2003a:14)

CPRE's work on rural policy involves reviewing the Common Agricultural Policy, promoting locally grown food and farmers' markets, strengthening rural communities by promoting local services such as post offices and taking a role in nature conservation by promoting national parks and valuing trees, woodlands and hedgerows (CPRE 2003a:8). Its Sprawl Patrol campaign has the key objectives of encouraging urban regeneration over building on greenfield sites and on making more effective use of land and improving the designs of developments (CPRE 2003a:10). A final key campaign area for CPRE is protecting natural resources, which primarily incorporates mineral extraction and energy use.

CPRE consists of a national office, with a network of 43 county branches and 200 district groups that function as autonomous entities. County branches and local groups are responsible for screening local planning applications, campaigning against them if appropriate, and promoting positive solutions.

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[1] The planning system is biased in favour of developers. Although planning inspectors can recommend that development can go ahead, developers can appeal to the Secretary of State. However, should the planning inspector grant outline or full planning permission, objecting members of the public, local authorities, interest groups and statutory agencies have no opportunity for appeal even if they have a strong case.

[2] The government proposed in a Green Paper (a consultation document) to remove the rights of local people to attend public inquiries to question the need for large-scale developments such as airports and motorways and to abolish County Structure Plans – these are two key planning processes which CPRE uses as a means of halting abuse to the countryside. Whilst the former was revoked, CPRE is dismayed to see that County Structure Plans have been scrapped (CPRE 2003a:3).

Although it is tempting to classify CPRE as 'reformist' because it seeks policy gains via lobbying and takes part in reformist coalitions, CPRE is regarded here as a conservation organisation. In practice, EMOs tend to not match ideal types, and CPRE is the only London based national organisation with a conservationist ideology. However, it does have an over-arching emphasis on the countryside, claiming that it 'is the only independent organisation concerned with the care and improvement of the whole of England's *countryside*' (CPRE 1993, emphasis added). Although CPRE looks beyond conservation management towards rural lifestyles and tranquillity making it perhaps more preservationist than conservationist, it fits the categorisation of 'national conservationist organisation' more healthily than other national London-based EMOs.

Friends of the Earth, England, Wales and Northern Ireland (FoE) (Reformist)

Seeking to be 'the environmental justice organisation', FoE's mission statement states that:

> 'Friends of the Earth will work with others to create a sustainable global community where protection of the environment and meeting people's needs go hand in hand. We strive for societies where people have decided to build the conditions for everyone to enjoy a dignified existence and good livelihood while not impinging on the rights of others to achieve a good life. The sustainable societies we are seeking will conserve all life on our diverse planet and improve conditions of people now and for future generations' (FoE 2002,8).

David Brower, founder of FoE US, established FoE in the UK in 1971. Its first action involved dumping hundreds of non-returnable bottles on Schweppes' doorstep and was a public relations success. Starting from a small office (less than a quarter the size of the basement in their current six floor building) with six desks, FoE now has a staff of 160 (in 2000 there were 130 staff [Rootes 2002:23]). FoE has always emphasized careful research, and this has helped build its reputation as a well-informed organisation and encouraged an increasingly professional team of staff.

FoE's main themes for 2003-2008 are environmental justice, sustainable economies, environmental limits and accountability/participation. The environmental justice theme promotes environmental justice aiming to make it central to the way the public and decision makers view environmental issues. It incorporates a campaign for 'climate justice', seeking an equitable climate change treaty, and 'action for justice', working with community groups suffering from injustices. The aim of the sustainable economies theme is to develop a sustainable economics agenda at both technical and public levels. This incorporates an attempt to 'curb the power of

the supermarkets' by ensuring they are made accountable for their social and environmental impacts and promoting local alternatives, and to 'derail the WTO' by challenging its legitimacy, preventing its expansion and halting the liberalisation of its services. Other aspects of new economics include 'corporate accountability' that involves highlighting socially and environmentally damaging corporate practices and seeking to introduce a new regulatory framework, and 'reducing resource use', which will expose the impacts of UK resource consumption on the environment, oppose unsustainable waste disposal and promote zero waste policies. Accountability/participation seeks to improve the quality and quantity of grassroots campaigning in and outside FoE.

Ultimately, it is the Board of Directors that decides on formal FoE policy and the board is mostly influenced by senior staff. The Board has a maximum of 17 members, 10 of whom are elected by local groups (Rootes 2002:23). Campaigns are organised on the basis of the themes noted above, and team leaders organise their staff. De Zylva heads the England team, coordinating 12 Regional Campaigns Coordinators who seek a regional presence and stakeholder partnerships to allow for participation in strategic planning at the regional level. The aim is to create between them an integrated sustainability agenda. Since 2002, there has been a concerted effort to involve local groups more effectively in strategic planning and a new capacity building team has been created to support local campaigning networks (FoE 2002c). Currently FoE has 193 local groups that work on national FoE campaigns and their own local issues (see G&LFoE below).

Brower began the FoE strategy of waging political battles to protect the environment back in 1970. Traditionally FoE worked at creating a climate of opinion to mobilise the public into influencing those decision makers whose actions have the most impact upon the environment (political parties, government, international fora and businesses). The structure of the organisation allows this to occur at the national, international, regional and local levels (FoEI web site, 2000) under their motto of 'Thinking Globally, Acting Locally' (Lamb 1996:50-51). However, there is an increasing trend for FoE to appeal directly to decision makers rather than merely using public opinion as a vehicle for achieving this. The parliamentary team engage in tactical lobbying of MPs, and FoE frequently drafts bills with the hope of instigating important milestones in environmental legislation (examples include the Warm Homes Act [1990], Road Traffic Reduction Act [1997], Doorstep Recycling Act [2003] and their recent GM Liability Bill). As well as highlighting environmental destruction and social injustices via the media, FoE also proposes feasible solutions to environmental problems. FoE works with businesses, but takes a cautious approach. In the main it establishes relationships with ethical companies - working with the best to pressurise the rest (Juniper, 2000).

Greenpeace UK (Reformist/radical)

Greenpeace is probably Britain's most well known EMO. Its principles are bearing witness, non-violence, direct action and internationality (Torrance 2003). Greenpeace (International) began its life in 1971 when committed anti-nuclear activists hired a barely sea-worthy boat in an attempt to bear witness and physically obstruct atomic tests off the coast of Amchitka, Alaska (Greenpeace, 2003). Since then, Greenpeace has developed almost beyond recognition. The UK branch of Greenpeace International was established in 1977 and initially prioritised its aims of bearing witness and direct action over research and lobbying. Over time, Greenpeace has become more committed to careful research, which now informs its policies and campaigns, establishing in the Greenpeace Science Unit at the University of London in 1986, and more recently the Greenpeace Research Laboratories at the University of Exeter.

Unlike FoE, which has a broad agenda for encouraging sustainability that encompasses environmental, economic and social themes, Greenpeace tends to focus on a few key global issues at a time. Currently the main campaigns of Greenpeace UK are climate change/renewable energy, ancient forests, PVC, GM food, nuclear power and protection of the oceans.

Greenpeace's organisational structure is similar to that of a business enterprise. Campaign teams are centrally coordinated, with top down management - from Greenpeace International, to the director, to the campaign team leaders, to local groups and 'active supporters'. Greenpeace local groups are now considerably more involved in Greenpeace campaigning and helping to get the Greenpeace message out into the street than they have been in the past. Prior to 1995, Greenpeace local groups were confined to fundraising and distributing Greenpeace literature. This has changed considerably as Greenpeace began to realise the potential of local groups in helping bring home campaign messages. For instance in 2003, local groups were involved in the Scary Dairy campaign that focused on Sainsbury's stores. This involved dressing up as cows, drawing attention to GM animal feed, giving out free organic milk and asking customers to sign a postcard asking the store to stop selling GM-contaminated milk (Greenpeace 2004a). In addition to local groups, Greenpeace has an active supporters network, which contains activists who may or may not be affiliated with a local group. Active supporters put themselves forward, usually via the Greenpeace website to help with lobbying, legal and media skills. They receive the monthly *Network* magazine that includes details of recent Greenpeace campaigning activities. Most campaign stories are followed by a 'Get Active suggestion', for instance the April 2004 issue amongst other things, gives a small briefing on

climate change and the new Yes2Wind coalition that has formed to promote wind power. It asks active supporters to request a resource pack to help the campaign, or to go immediately to the website to find out what they can do locally (Shoraka 2004).

Greenpeace's famous media stunts are carefully planned and coordinated by employed campaigners. If there is an outward appearance of fewer such stunts, it is because of the increasing emphasis placed on solutions-based campaigning (as evident in *Greenpeace Business* [2004a] - the bi-monthly publication Greenpeace produces for a business audience). Increasingly though, the organisation is tapping into activist energy via its activist supporter network. Throughout the range of Greenpeace's campaign issues, activists are frequently encouraged to engage in reformist style actions such as meeting with their MPs, and writing to directors of polluting businesses. National campaigners also engage in conventional style campaigning, alongside the less frequent but more attention-grabbing stunts that the organisation is famous for. According to Rootes (2002:29) Greenpeace - although rarely invited to formal consultative meetings as a result of its critical stance towards them - now has increasingly frequent meetings with government ministers and civil servants. Greenpeace is also increasingly working with businesses. Its most recent business partnership has been with N-Power, encouraging this energy company to invest in renewables and construct an offshore wind farm, Greenpeace is now able to recommend and advertise N-Power's wind-generated 'Juice' electricity to its supporters as a carbon-dioxide free energy source. This type of action is indicative of Greenpeace's post-1990 turn towards solutions-based campaigning.

Although Doherty (2002) includes Greenpeace in his radically skewed definition of the 'green movement' because of its focus on direct action, for this research it is regarded as a reform organisation. Although Greenpeace uses direct action, it does so to:

> Attract media attention in order to put pressure on governments and corporations to change their practice ... Greenpeace, despite employing superficially similar direct action tactics [to radicals] is quite pragmatic, a professional campaigning organisation that employs instrumentally efficient means and whose agenda falls squarely within the ambit of reform environmentalism (Rootes 2003a:619).

In a reformist style, Greenpeace's direct actions are 'backed up by sophisticated political lobbying and scientific inquiry' (Brown & May 1991:5).

9.2 Regional EMOs

London Wildlife Trust (LWT) (Conservationist)

Although the field of action for conservation organisations usually centres on practical projects and seeking changes in legislation (Chapter 2), LWT has always been involved in fighting controversial planning applications. To an extent, this reflects the nature of the urban environment, which means it acts in a very different manner to its counterpart in Kent. The overarching aim of LWT is 'to sustain and enhance London's wildlife habitats' (LWT leaflet, 2003). Although it engages in reformist strategies, it is clear that these are deployed in the interest of protecting sites that are important for wildlife.

LWT was established in 1981. The first campaign it became involved in sought to prevent gravel extraction at the wildlife rich sites of Walthamstow Marshes and Frays Farm Meadows. A practical project was embarked upon later that year and two acres of land were reclaimed from the rear of Kings Cross Station to create what is now the Trust's flagship reserve at Camley Street. Gunnersbury Triangle in Chiswick was saved by local people and LWT in 1984. In 1984, LWT was commissioned by the GLC to carry out a comprehensive survey of London's Wildlife. LWT also played its role in the Oxleas Wood Campaign (early 1990s) and was part of the losing army in the battle to prevent the construction of Heathrow Airport's 5th Terminal. In 2001, a GLA survey contract to re-survey London's wildlife sites was embarked upon, making LWT essentially an insider from a conservationist perspective at regional level. According to Gaines, (Director of the Trust for five years before his recent secondment):

> what is undeniable is that the Trust has grown from a small committed group of people struggling to bring the capital's natural environment to the attention of all Londoners to a thriving and diverse organisation involved in all aspects of nature conservation (Gaines, 2003 p.9).

Currently LWT's main campaigns are limited due to a lapse in funding. However, LWT was concerned with the siting and conservation effects of the UK Olympics bid and has recently embarked on a campaign to raise awareness of the wildlife value of so-called 'brownfield sites'. (LWT, 2002:5). It is also focusing upon the Stratford Development, housing expansion in the Thames Gateway area and a review of planning laws. LWT uses mostly insider strategies, engages in practical conservation and supports local reserves. It opposes development on important wildlife sites, but has been working to make development more sustainable in certain areas, rather than opposing it point blank.

The Trust is managed by a Council of Management responsible for setting policy, staffing and budgeting. Central Office is managed by a Director responsible for the 30 members of staff and volunteers that work there. The main role of the Central Office is to ensure open communication channels between the Council, local groups, reserves and national office. It is also responsible for providing an overarching strategic perspective on London's nature conservation issues, raising funds, maintaining membership databases, producing information, literature and an education programme. Local groups are made up of local volunteers and work on behalf of LWT on a local (usually borough) level engaging in activities such as fundraising, promotion, reserve management and local planning issues. In total, LWT manages 57 nature reserves, six of which are staffed, but most are manned by dedicated volunteers (Hartley 1997:1). The Hillingdon Group of the LWT for example, is responsible for looking after the Ickenham area, Gutteridge Wood and Yeading Brook Meadows.

London Friends of the Earth (LFoE) (Reformist)

LFoE is one of nine regional FoE 'offices' and is based in the national FoE office. The other regions have separate offices. Regional FoE groups are run by Regional Campaign Coordinators (RCCs) who coordinate campaigns that affect London as a region, monitor policy developments at the regional government level and play a local groups support function. RCCs also help newly established local groups and offer them training, advice and on-site support. LFoE has been constructive in developing London-wide networks of anti-GM campaigners in order to input this discontent into regional governance. London FoE consists of just the Regional Campaigns coordinator, Jenny Bates, with some support from national campaign staff, the capacity building team and local groups. Bates is responsible for 28 local FoE groups.

Between 1997 and 2003, LFoE was coordinated by de Zylva, who in 1998-2000 worked extensively with a community in Enfield on toxic land, culminating in the publication of a new FoE briefing entitled *Safe as Houses*. LFoE has also been heavily involved in aviation campaigning and for the past year under the helm of Jenny Bates has turned most of its attention to the Thames Gateway bridge proposals.

It uses a very conventional form of campaigning activity, arguably more staid than national FoE. It has close links with the London Sustainability Exchange, and London 21 Sustainability Network. The campaign against the Thames Gateway Bridge has included a counter-

consultation, a number of formal submissions to Transport for London and the GLA and a great deal of carefully written media work.

Environmental Direct Action Group (EDAG) (Radical)

EDAG is a small but active group of radical environmentalists who campaign 'against the root causes of climate change', which for them means government power structures and large corporations. It is the London node of a national climate change campaigning network established in Oxford since 2000 and is comprised largely of activists who were previously active in Reclaim the Streets, which ceased in the summer of 2002.

EDAG's political statement claims that it:

> ... is an international network of groups and individuals committed to a grassroots approach to fighting for climate justice ... We believe that social and economic equity between and within countries lies at the heart of all solutions to climate change. These must include:
>
> - a just transition to renewable energy sources ...
> - Repayment of the ecological debt of the north to the south ...
> - Equal access to and responsibility for common global resources amongst all peoples ...
>
> (EDAG Email list May 2003).

EDAG is organised through weekly meetings, e-mails and some telephoning. Most strategising is carried out via email and at weekly meetings. Group decisions are made on a consensus basis and there is no leader. Naturally, certain individuals fall into roles, including one activist who is particularly adept at leaflet design and another who most often writes up reports of actions to be placed on the Indymedia website. The group engages in a range of actions from DiY FoE style street campaigning, to Greenpeace style banner hanging, through to office occupations and disruption of conferences (see 'climate change campaigning' section, below).

9.3 Local EMOs

Plumstead Common Environment Group (PCEG) (Conservationist southeast)

PCEG was formed in the Spring of 1991 by a small group of local people concerned that their environment was suffering from a lack of care. Plumstead Common is in inner southeast London in the Borough of Greenwich. A ravine that is now a beautiful nature reserve used to be

a hot spot for fly tipping until local residents took it upon themselves to clear the area and transform it. The group have also restored a highly polluted pond in the heart of the common that has since become a successful breeding site for ducks and moorhens.

More recently, PCEG turned its attention to trying to prevent dog defecation, litter and graffiti on the common. To raise attention, offending faeces were marked with flags on a 'dog poo day' in 1999, alarming dog walkers and residents to the extent of spoilage. This was followed by a highly successful pooper-scooper display. Since then the amount of defecation has been seriously reduced, aided by Greenwich Borough Council's 'clear it up' logos painted on the main paths through the common. Volunteers not only engage in the usual conservation tasks, but have on occasions been involved in mass litter clearance, sometimes removing an entire van load of litter at a time. Their graffiti removal technique involves repeatedly painting over the areas polluted until offenders give up. They also keep a watchful eye on planning applications affecting the common, and successfully campaigned against a mobile phone mast in 2001. The group has a very close relationship with Greenwich Borough Council and frequently spurs it into taking positive action to assist with the management and conservation of the common.

Greenwich & Lewisham Friends of the Earth (G&LFoE) (Reformist southeast)

As a local FoE group, G&LFoE is bound by the Partnership Agreement that lays out expectations of local groups. They should campaign on at least one national FoE campaign, but may campaign at an international, national, regional or local level depending on members' interests and opportunities. They are expected to have a public profile raised through the media, posters and leaflets or attendance at stalls and events. All actions they carry out should be lawful, reflect the overall FoE policy and be non-party political. Local group members should be encouraged to attend training events, conferences and consultation events and at minimum have a treasurer and coordinator. Group members should be contactable by phone/email and local group meetings are to be welcoming and open to all. In return, FoE provides public liability insurance, a range of support material, and invites groups to participate in strategy and policy-making. Additionally, FoE provides a Local Group's Support Fund, training opportunities, access to information and updates on campaigns via national campaigners, local campaigning networks and publications (e.g. the bi-monthly *Change Your World* local groups' magazine). When local groups sign up to the agreement under these conditions, they are then granted the legal right to use the name 'Friends of the Earth' (FoE 2002d).

Much of G&LFoE's efforts for the past couple of years have involved working to prevent construction of the Thames Gateway road bridge. This is also the remit of London FoE and

Bates is the coordinator of the regional and Greenwich based campaign. The group has also taken part in Stop Esso days of action. In 1999, G&LFoE was heavily involved in opposing plans for the millennium dome site and the 'sustainable millennium village', which made a mockery of sustainability (Bates interview, February 2001, *cf* Gordon 1994). As a result of her in-depth research and analysis into the issues surrounding the Greenwich Peninsular development, Bates became FoE spokesperson on the issue. Since then, she has made an increasingly positive impact, culminating in her appointment as London RCC. Greenwich FoE, typical of most FoE groups engages in lobbying, stalls, FoE-designed days of action and fundraising.

56a InfoShop (56a) (Radical southeast)

According to its mission statement, 56a is:

> A .. 100% DIY-run space in London ... a resource for local people, campaign groups and projects as well as selling books, zines, music and clothing. We have a radical archive of international info, a seed trading project and we share the space with Fareshares wholefood coop and a DIY bicycle repair workshop. Stop by for a read, to check squatters' bulletin board, or for a cuppa (56a website 2004).

It is located in south east London, close to the Elephant and Castle and is part of a network of similar 'Infoshops' that have been set up throughout Europe to disseminate information and ideas to as many potential activists as possible in the shortest possible amount of time. Publications are sold on a range of issues from Anarchism to women's rights and direct action (examples of magazines include *Aufheben, Class War, EF! Action Update*). The infoshop also sells collective identity markers such as badges, posters and T-shirts, as well as record, tapes and CDs from the 'underground' such as techno-trance and punk music.

It was established in 1991 when it began sharing the space with Fareshares Food Co-op. It is now 13 years old - a long time to hold on to a squatted building, and throughout those 13 years, has been open at least two days of the week. Recently however, the space has become institutionalised and the volunteer workers have signed a lease with Southwark Council and managed to secure a reduced rent and rates bill at £50 per week based on the good reputation of the food co-op. It was a totally DIY space, but is now subjected to rules and regulations, including the meeting of specific health and safety requirements. The volunteer workers at 56a are not sure that the council knows what really goes on in the infoshop part of the venture (anonymous interviewee, January 2004). The Infoshop is being updated, and is going to be setting up a small computer area providing access to email and internet – ever more important means for keeping in touch with other activists and finding out about actions.

The Infoshop is a networking space, box address for radical campaigning groups, host of squat and guerrilla gardening information, a radical book shop, leaflet / notice board place, home of the Eroding Empire gigs and actions list, food coop and bicycle workshop. The radical archive contains a wealth of information – both contemporary and historic. Volunteers almost obsessively obtain and file campaign information on subjects that fit the general ethos of the Info-shop – which is basically anything anti-authoritarian or 'progressive'. Anarchism, drugs, magic, occultism, the dole, health, industrial struggles, organic gardening, critical mass and the anti-roads protests are among subjects commanding for space in the small but well organised reference library.

The Infoshop is part of the wider London Social Centres Network (LSCN) which includes LARC (the meeting place of EDAG) and four other communally ran and mostly squatted autonomous spaces. Many radical, non-hierarchical groups working for social change (ranging from queer rights to anarchy) have used 56a as a meeting space, postal box or general resource. Currently those groups and organisations involved include Active Distribution - an anarchist magazine and book distributor and London Counter Information (LCI) – a resource for those interested in campaigning against exploitation, oppression and injustice in any shape or form. Food not Bombs, and Contraflow (similar to LCI) are amongst organisations using the space as a postal box (56a website).

56a clearly has a radical ideology and carries out actions that are within the sphere of action or anarchists. Its mission statement emphasises its role in informing *local people*, although activists visit the Infoshop from all over London and often from other European countries and beyond.

Chiswick Wildlife Trust (CWT) (Conservationist northeast)

Unlike most LWT branches, CWT focuses on one nature reserve and does not monitor local planning proposals unless they are likely to have a direct effect upon the reserve. The group manages Gunnersbury Triangle Nature Reserve, Chiswick (northwest Londn), a triangular shaped reserve wedged between a road, and two train tracks (the Piccadilly Line and a National Rail line). In total, the reserve covers six acres and is a patchwork of habitats - wild woodland, wetlands, pond and meadow. It is one of the LWT's Key Sites, and as such has a paid warden throughout the summer months of the year.

CWT was established in 1984 when a group of local people vigorously campaigned to save what was then a piece of waste ground. LWT helped in the campaign and the result was the site's designation as a nature reserve. It was a landmark case, being the first time a local council was forced to refuse planning permission due to newly founded nature reserve status.

CWT is a steering committee, giving it managerial control of the reserve, but is at the dictates of LWT, who are trying to keep a tighter rein on local groups. The Committee meets bi-monthly in a local public house and has an annual AGM at which committee members are elected. The committee includes a chair, borough representative, events manager and voluntary warden.

CWT and its summer warden work according to the Management Plan to create and maintain a bio-diverse haven. Volunteers engage in practical conservation work every Tuesday and occasional Sundays. Pond clearance, bramble pruning, removal of invasive or non-native species, path maintenance, tree pruning/felling and wildlife monitoring are amongst the necessary tasks required to fulfil the demands of the plan. Besides general maintenance of the Triangle, the group organises a number of events to raise the profile of the reserve and to generate community interest, with the hope of gaining more volunteers. In the Summer of 2003, the group ran a bird song evening, a butterfly and insect trail, a summer picnic and a guided walk focusing on mushrooms and other fungi (LWT leaflet 2003). Numerous visits from local school children were supervised. CWT also write press releases to get local news coverage and leaflet the local community to raise awareness.

The Skoda garage adjacent to the forecourt of the reserve placed a planning application for a four-storey office block with wooden 'environmental screening', which was approved in the winter of 2001. The property has since changed ownership but the group is monitoring this carefully with the aim of minimising any likely effect upon the reserve and seeking to obtain Section 106 money (mitigation money) of around £150,000 (LWT & CWG, 2002).

Hillingdon Friends of the Earth (Reformist northeast)

At the start of its life, HFoE engaged in campaigns against whaling and used Greenpeace campaign materials to help spread its message. It also used to show Greenpeace footage at its meetings to enthuse newcomers. In the early 1980s, the group was very active and relatively youthful, but over time, membership has dropped and the stalwarts have aged (Sweeting interview,February 2004).

The group was involved in a supportive capacity in the campaign against the third runway at Heathrow airport. Although members were encouraged to respond to the consultation and send a pre-printed FoE postcard to their MPs, the main role HFoE played was to provide a £200 donation to West London FoE to pay for a new combined phone, fax and answer machine (HFoE, 2003). The group also showed its colours at the Community Procession against a Third Runway at Heathrow held in June 2003 alongside FoE local groups from Ealing, Hounslow, Richmond & Twickenham, West London FoE and Green Party members.

Monthly public meetings used to consist of talks from key speakers until the numbers attending meetings dwindled to seven or fewer. The group regularly get involved in Hillingdon Wildlife Week, an annual event to promote wildlife in the borough. In the summer of 2003, they arranged a public speaker to talk about the natural history and ecology of snakes, and organised a life-size snakes and ladders game based on an ecology quiz at Ickenham's Festival Gala. The group has also been working on producing a recycling directory which is to be posted on Hillingdon Borough Council's website.

9.4 Key Environmental Campaigns in London in 2002-3

Climate Change Campaigning

Climate change has been chosen as a campaign issue for study because of its significance as a major global environmental issue (*cf* Goldsmith 2001, Evans 2003). The Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), suggests that climate change poses an unprecedented threat to the environment, that it is exaggerated by human activities, and that a 5.8°C rise in global temperature and an associated 1m level sea rise can be expected by 2100 (IPCC 2001).[3]

The purpose of this section, is not to discuss the degree of scientific consensus regarding climate change and its causes and consequences, but rather to consider how EMOs have responded to the issue. EMOs from all the spatial and ideological divisions set out for the movement have played a role. The discussion begins with a brief précis of international policy making on climate change as this provides useful contextual information for understanding the

[3] Whilst some scientists doubt that climate change is the result of human activities, the IPCC's estimates may be conservative. The Hadley Centre – (Britain's number one climate modelling centre at the UK Meterological Office) predicts that climate change is likely to reach more significant proportions than the IPPC, predicting that temperatures will rise globally by 8°C by 2100 (Spowers, 2002).

campaign responses. After discussing general climate change campaigning, a case study of the campaign against the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan pipeline is outlined.

International policy-making

Annual international ministerial meetings entitled Conference(s) of the Parties to the Climate Convention Meeting (COP) have been held since 1995 to make progress on implementing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), signed by over 150 nations at the Rio Earth Summit (1992). Essentially the Convention amounts to a suggestion that parties to it should make a voluntary reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 (Carter 2001:232-235).

At the first conference in Berlin (COP1), Spring 1995, 116 nations agreed that climate change was the most pressing environmental policy topic and required partnership to achieve the Convention's objectives. The second conference (COP2), a year and a quarter later began to work on a protocol to ensure nations fulfilled commitments. The Kyoto Protocol was christened at COP3 in 1997 and legally binding targets for emissions reductions and implementation timescales were agreed.[4] Global reduction targets were set at approximately five percent by 2010, with Britain committed to a 12.5% reduction (although Britain seeks to surpass this with an independent target of 20%). The Protocol had in place a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), allowing developed countries to receive credit for developing low greenhouse gas-producing projects in developing countries and Joint Implementation (JI) allowing countries to count forests and carbon sinks against emissions (UNEP & UNFCC 2001 and UNEP & UNFCC undated).

By 2000, it was apparent to EMOs like FoE and radical grassroots protesters that the negotiations were failing to bring about concrete agreements and that targets were either too weak, or over-diluted by the CDM, JI and other emissions trading clauses. During COP6 (2000) at The Hague, negotiations collapsed midway through the agenda due to vociferous demands made by the industrial lobby and the US government that its emission reductions be lessened as its forests act as carbon sinks. According to a Rising Tide briefing (2000a), 'COP6 looked more like a trade fair than an intergovernmental conference looking at ways to solve one of the world's most pressing environmental problems', as industrialists sought ways of profiteering

[4] NB. The legally binding targets were conditional on their being a minimum number of nations ratifying the protocol. To come into force enough industrialised countries needed to ratify to account for a total of 55% of their emissions. As Russia has now ratified, the protocol is now legally binding.

from the 'carbon economy'. Since COP4, GM-giant Monsanto has been a lobbyist at conventions and has repeatedly presented evidence demonstrating that agricultural carbon sinks and the use of herbicides could allow the US to meet up to 30% of its CO2 targets, by preventing the release of carbon through ploughing (Rising Tide and ASEED 2000). Despite some of the economic gains that could be made by companies like Monsanto and other carbon entrepreneurs, the US became hung up on the economic losses that Kyoto would entail. Shortly before Bush rejected Kyoto, the Chairman and CEO of the US company Imperial Oil told a journalist:

> Kyoto is an economic entity. It has nothing to do with the environment. It has to do with world trade. This is a wealth transfer scheme between developed and developing nations. And it's been couched and clothed in some kind of environmental movement. That's the dumbest-assed thing I've heard in a long time (quoted in Greenpeace 2002).

Unsurprisingly, in March 2001, Bush announced - under pressure from industry and oil companies (especially Esso) - that he would not ratify Kyoto. This has rendered it virtually toothless to deal with climate change given that the US produces a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions.

The most recent Conference to the Parties (COP9) was held in Milan in December 2003, by which time most of the rules on the operation of the protocol had been agreed. COP9 focussed upon detailing which types of forestry projects are allowed to be counted as emission reduction credits under the CDM, with NGOs ineffectively seeking assurance that GM plantations be ruled out.

The other main issue discussed was the logistics of the Special Climate Change Fund, which provides money for developing countries to help address climate change. In particular, the US was unfavourable to providing such finance and has hampered the economic viability of the pact. The part of the COP9 agenda that received the most media attention concerned whether or not Russia would ratify the protocol. Until June 2004, Russia had still not ratified,[5] leading to consternation among campaigners that the agreement would not come into force, because to do so it needs to be ratified by enough industrialised countries to account for a total of 55% of their emissions. Without Russia on board, the figure would have been only 44% (Osborn &

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[5] Mr Putin's advisor on Kyoto, Andrei Illarionov claimed that Kyoto would have 'deadly economic consequences' for Russia and that it was 'a death treaty, no matter how strange that seems, because its main purpose is to stifle economic growth and economic activity in countries which assume its responsibilities' (Osborn & Castle 2004).

Castle 2004). FoE campaigners from Russia claim that it was playing a political game, seeking further concessions from the EU. Although Russia has now ratified, it appears as if each round of COP negotiations results in a weakening of the Protocol. Furthermore, it seems likely that of the industrialised countries that have ratified the treaty, only Sweden will meet its reduction targets (IMC 2003).

Campaign Responses

Thus, there is a general feeling amongst environmental campaigners that these negotiations are resulting in little, if any progress in preventing or halting climate change. For some organisations (EDAG), this renders the Kyoto agreement a sinking ship whilst others see securing an international agreement on climate-changing emissions – no matter how weak - as an essential stepping-stone towards achieving more stringent targets (e.g. FoE, Greenpeace, CCC). Drawing on the arguments made by climatologists and the IPCC, a wide range of EMOs – whether or not they believe in incremental reformist change - argues the case for a rapid and significant reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases.

Since 1997, COP discussions have been visited by protests, rallies, marches and media stunts highlighting the need for urgent action.[6] COP6 at The Hague saw the first International EDAG festival as eco-anarchists engaged in direct action – from marching, to pieing.[7] The EDAG network originated in the Netherlands and was at first a response to this conference. Shortly afterwards, it spread to Britain via ties between radical activists. Marshall (a key figure in the British 1990s anti-roads movement) and Hamilton were the impetus behind the UK 'branch' of the network, which had a small but dynamic London counterpart by 2002. Also at COP6, FoE campaigners created a mock dyke to draw media attention to the flooding issues associated with climate change (Rising Tide 2000b). London activists drawn from RTS (some of whom were to become EDAGers), joined in with solidarity actions in London attempting to alert the City of London to the causes of climate change. This included a festival style protest with a sound system and the Rhythms of Resistance Samba Band. In addition, the DETR offices were occupied in opposition to the government's road building programme and to make links between increased traffic and climate change (Rising Tide 2000c).

The Campaign Against Climate Change (CCC) was established in all but name in the aftermath of COP6 in The Hague. Inspired by his participation in the Hague protests, appalled by

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[6] Reimann (2000) discusses the 1997 protests in Kyoto.

[7] This involves choosing a politically motivated target and administering a custard pie to their face.

America's attempts to weaken Kyoto and dismayed with FoE's lack of follow-up activity, Thornhill on his return to London began a one-man fortnight-long vigil outside the US Embassy. This was followed by a weekly vigil supported by the Green Party and some local FoE activists. Describing himself as a 'sixties child', Phil had in mind to create a CND-style protest organisation. At the time of Bush's inauguration, CCC staged a demonstration as a plea to him to take Kyoto more seriously, including a symbolic media action with 'Uncle Sam' setting fire to a globe. When Bush announced that he intended to reverse a US decision on the capping of power station emissions, CCC mobilised 20 activists who sported Bush heads and carried placards saying 'Global Village Idiot' (Thornhill interview, June 2003).

On the day Bush announced his country's exit from Kyoto, 60 activists turned up outside the US Embassy for CCC's '[Bush is a] Dirty Rat' day of action. Since then, activists from a range of backgrounds including local and national FoE and Greenpeace supporters, Globalise Resistance activists, Green Party members and EDAGers have remained actively involved in the weekly vigils. Given Russia's central role in the implementation of Kyoto, a 'Tell Putin to ratify Kyoto' rally was organised by CCC when Putin visited the UK in winter 2003. This was supported by a FoE action asking armchair activists to send an email to persuade the Russian leader of the urgent need to ratify (FoE 2003a,b). An additional important event in November 2003 was a street party and demonstration designed to give Bush a special unwelcome to Britain (CCC website). In addition, annual Kyoto Marches are held involving a long march from Exxon Mobil's Headquarters to the US Embassy, with a rally en route.

Stop Esso, like CCC, is a response to Bush pulling out of Kyoto. It draws attention to the relationship between Bush and Exxon Mobil (called Esso in Britain). Its key campaign briefing (2001) points out that Esso provided over $1,086,080 to the Republicans in the 2000 election, funds and partakes in extravagantly expensive anti-environmental 'fronts' to discredit climate change science (including until recently the Global Climate Coalition), dismisses the potential of renewable energy, and actively lobbied Bush to withdraw from Kyoto. The coalition consists of Greenpeace, FoE and student environmentalist network People & Planet. For the first two years, local activists in the branches of these organisations engaged in national days of actions, holding Esso petrol station pickets around the country. These involved activists standing outside their local petrol station armed with placards and sometimes tiger costumes, handing out informative leaflets and trying to persuade potential Esso clientele to purchase petrol elsewhere. Recently, Stop Esso has turned some of its attention towards the lingering environmental

effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill,[8] by lobbying CEO Lee Raymond and encouraging supporters to write to him asking the company to pay fair mitigation costs (Stop Esso website 2004).

At the most recent COP in Milan, the protests were much less significant than they had been in Bonn three year's prior (posting on IMC Website 2003). FoE Italy organised a march and rally with the theme 'Stop CO2, Stop the Fossil Fuel Economy' and a student environmentalist network hung a banner proclaiming 'Stop Global War(m)'. A critical mass[9] was held attracting a huge 2,000 cyclists and FoE International staged one of its annual 'Treetanic' award ceremonies, which attempt to expose industrial-scale timber plantations seeking to unjustly profit from the Kyoto Protocol. The winner was PLANTAR, a Brazilian company specialising in charcoal production for the steel industry and barbecues with little if any concern for the environment (FoEI 2003). Although FoE ENWI was not present, some of its campaigners and activists were. London and Oxford EDAGers joined in the festivities.

In solidarity with Milan-based protestors, EDAG staged a street theatre show at the London UN offices entitled 'What's the Big Deal [about Kyoto]'. The aim of the play was to show how carbon-traders, business interests and compromising NGOs hide under the UN's cloak of respectability, giving the public the false impression that they can rest assured that commendable efforts are being taken to ensure climate change is kept at bay. The play highlighted how the Kyoto agreement works against the interests of refugees and other poor people from southern countries who suffer the worst consequences of climate change. Leaflets detailing radical activist concerns about the inefficacy of Kyoto entitled 'Why Kyoto is Pants' were distributed to UN workers and passers-by willing to accept them.

In its tradition of bearing witness, Greenpeace began climate campaigning activity on the eve of the Kyoto agreement by reporting the apparent retreat of ice witnessed during its voyages to the Arctic and Antarctic and seeking the views of native peoples. Starting in 1997, Greenpeace has vociferously campaigned against the opening up of new frontiers for oil exploration, especially near the poles and in the North Sea. In the late 1990s, Greenpeace campaigned heavily against

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[8] Only 3-4% of the Exxon Valdez oil spill has been cleared up, much oil remains beneath the surface and only 7% of species have recovered. Commercial fishermen's income remains lower than in 1989 (FoEI 1999).

[9] A critical mass is an event where a large number of cyclists, skate borders and roller skaters converge at a given meeting point and more slowly about the streets, blocking traffic and spreading a political message.

BP's plans to turn the remote arctic Northstar Island into a fossil fuel factory. As well as conventional campaigning activity, this campaign involved the setting up of an ice camp to monitor the progress of the development (Greenpeace 2000). Alongside direct action and bearing witness, Greenpeace has been involved in some serious research and lobbying. Greenpeace campaigners have purchased shares in companies like BP so that they can attend AGMs and stakeholder meetings to raise environmental issues. Greenpeace has also been involved in COPs since the late 1990s. Greenpeace's *Carbon Logic* (Hare 1997), shows how burning existing fossil fuel reserves could lead to dangerous climate change without opening up new frontiers. This research is the logic behind many Greenpeace climate campaigns, and has been endorsed by a recently formed coalition consisting of FoE, Rising Tide, EDAG and Platform, which is both entitled and makes the demand for 'No New Oil'.

Aside from these responses to Kyoto, campaigners have been involved in solutions-based campaigning by promoting renewable energy. Greenpeace helped launch a tidal power scheme, engaged in a partnership with Npower to help deliver 100% wind-generated power (called Juice) to consumers (Dorey in interview, October 2003) and with the Peabody Trust installed solar panels to Londoners homes (Greenpeace website 2004). In 2003 a Yes2Wind coalition was established to counteract misleading comments of local anti-wind farm groups (one group is quoted as claiming they cause epileptic fits and grass-fires). The pro-wind power website, supported by Greenpeace, FoE and WWF, acts as a forum for the spread of pro-wind farm claims. Via the site, local people can meet up with others who have been affected by wind farms, hear their views, arrange a visit to wind farms and make up their own minds about the effects (Yes2Wind website 2004). Aside from promoting renewables, FoE has been pro-active in solutions campaigning by creating a Green Energy league table and encouraging people to chose greener suppliers (FoE 2004a). FoE has also been involved in campaigning for the closure or conversion of the UK's remaining sixteen coal-fired power stations (Carbon Dinosaurs). These produce over one third more CO_2 than gas-fired alternatives and fail to meet EU efficiency standards (FoE 2003c).

Whilst CPRE does not prioritise climate change as a campaign issue nor have a policy statement on it, it is paying the issue increasing attention. Although there is no mention of climate change in its transport (CPRE 2003c) or new roads (CPRE 2003d) policy statements, its energy statement notes that climate change poses a large threat to the countryside and wider environment. According to CPRE, solutions to climate change should be through appropriately sited renewable energy developments, management of energy demand, an increase in energy efficiency and reducing the need to travel. CPRE opposes inappropriate energy projects on

planning grounds, but also encourages individuals to reduce their own energy impacts and travel less (CPRE 2003e).

In 2002, Greenpeace produced a report on the 'double standards of UK energy exports'. Despite international agreement at COP7 that Export Credit Agencies should play a role in the transfer of climate friendly energy, the Export Credit Guarantees Department (ECGD) has provided 193 guarantees of support to 140 fossil fuel projects in thirty-eight countries including Zimbabwe, China and Turkey, effectively offsetting gains made by Kyoto. As of June 2002, the ECGD had not provided even a penny of assistance to renewable energy projects (Greenpeace 2002). The Baku-Ceyhan-Campaign (BCC) provides an excellent case study example of a recently ECGD-funded fossil fuel project, demonstrating the weakness of COP agreements and the type of campaign response such a development can spawn.

The Baku Ceyhan Campaign

This was a campaign against a BP-managed oil pipeline project, and although there were human rights and conservation issues at stake, the campaign was largely motivated by the umbrella concern of climate change. As Rau stated, 'this project will supply new oil to Western economies which should be cutting their fuel consumption, and fuelling the oil addiction of countries which refuse to sign the Kyoto climate treaty' (FoE Press Release 2002).

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline - totalling 1,087miles in length - will export crude oil from Azerbaijani oil fields in the Caspian Sea region, through Georgia to a new export terminal at Ceyhan on the Turkish Mediterranean coast. One million barrels of oil from the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil field in Azerbaijan will travel through it daily (Muttitt & Marriot 2002). Sixty-six percent of the investment for the project has been raised by loans from international lending institutions. In Spring 2003, despite a lack of secure funds, an inadequate social and environmental impact assessment and a threat to Turkey's accession to the EU, construction of the pipeline began.

The main reasons for opposing the development are because of its climate change implications, local pollution, habitat destruction, exacerbation of territorial conflicts, human rights issues and the potential for corruption (BCC 2001, Mathiason 2002, Lustgarten 2002). In terms of climate change, BCC (2001) claim that the oil from the pipeline would annually produce more CO2 than all the road transport in California, or two and half times the gains the UK would make by meeting its 12.5% Kyoto emissions reduction.

The official BCC coalition consisted of FoE (International), The Kurdish Human Rights Project (working to protect the human rights of people in Kurdish regions), Platform (an environmental journalism organisation interested in promoting social and environmental rights through information and creative arts), The Corner House (a radical offshoot of *The Ecologist* magazine), Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale (a Rome-based environmental NGO that focuses on the role of international financial institutions) and CEE Bankwatch (an Eastern European organisation working to minimise the social and environmental impacts of international development finance). In practice, BCC acted as two separate bodies - sometimes as a separate organisation – it had its own office, campaigners and constitution – but at other times it acted as an umbrella organisation. Although not a part of the formal coalition, the EDAG network played a role in the campaign.

Most of the campaign was focussed on lobbying to prevent UK and European banks (including the UK Department for International Development [DFID], the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] and the World Bank's International Finance Corporation [IFC]) from providing £2.3 million in public money that the pipeline's construction was dependent upon. The direct action element of the campaign however was somewhat more diverse and sought to cause havoc at as many of BP's events as possible.

In response to a BCC call to lobby the EBRD, nine hundred people commented on the adverse effects of the pipeline. Affiliated organisations also asked their supporters to lobby Secretary of State for International Development (Hilary Benn), asking him to prevent the funding of climate change inducing developments and to invest in green energy instead (FoE 2002e,f). BCC claimed that the project violated every World Bank safeguard policy and EC Directives on 'at least 173 counts'. FoE collected as many as 4,000 letters objecting to the use of public money for the pipeline, made a section of pipeline out of them and presented it to DFID (*CYW*, 2003).

By mid-June 2003, a 120-day EBRD consultation period for informing the pipeline funding decision was underway. Campaigners viewed this a last chance to stop the pipeline. Monthly BCC demonstrations were held outside the Bank from July onwards. FoE organised the July protest and invited local group members and campaigners to come with a ready-made section of pipeline to join the EBRD offices with the BP offices and thereby raise public awareness of the funding issues. National EDAG staged theirs in August and BCC's was in September. The latter demonstration involved handing in signed letters from Turkish and Georgian people who would be negatively affected by the pipeline. This coincided with a FoE-organised mass fax

action to the EBRD president to arrive at 12 noon on the same day as the protest. The prewritten letter said something similar to this: 'I am faxing you to say no to funding the BRC pipeline because of conflict, local economies, human rights, militarised corridor, undermine local people's rights ... tell BP 'No". The demonstration included chanting, music and dancing and was visited by a range of activists with various ideological leanings (excluding conservationists).

EDAGers attempted to maintain a frequent presence by appearing almost every Thursday at the EBRD offices (the stifling hot summer, the EF! summer gathering, and activist burn-out meant that this did not happen as regularly as planned). A gas-masked penguin was seen handing out leaflets at one of these demonstrations. An attempted occupation of the World Bank offices by EDAG was unsuccessful due to relatively heavy-handed security, but a successful demonstration was held outside. In October 2003 five activists from EDAG succeeded in occupying the ECGD director's (Vivian Brown's) office for the best part of a morning, barricading themselves in whilst forcefully informing the staff about the pipeline's problems. An accompanying banner was hung using the ECGD acronym: 'Exporting Corruption, Guaranteeing Destruction' (EDAG 2003a).

October 2003 witnessed a 'Climate Trasher's Critical Mass' involving a dozen activists cycling around the streets of London causing transport mayhem and trying to raise awareness of the BTC pipeline and climate change. The journey incorporated visits to EBRD, IFC, ECGD, BP, private banks and construction companies involved in BTC pipeline project and the fossil fuel industry. Shortly afterwards, despite these actions and a letter writing campaign to Benn (Secretary of State for International Development), asking him to influence the decision in the favour of the campaigners, the EBRD (in October 2003) and IFC (in November 2003) announced at board meetings that they would provide funding (FoE 2003d).

By winter 2003, attention shifted to private banks as the EBRD and IFC funding only contributed 10% of the required sum. The BP-led consortium was in discussions with private banks including Barclays, HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland and Standard Chartered. The campaign began an intensive letter writing campaign (although by this stage it seemed as if many campaigners believed that the construction of the pipeline was a foregone conclusion). Under pressure from campaigners, Barclays refused to loan any money for the project, but Natwest remained a committed partner. As of July 2004, it seems inevitable that the pipeline will go ahead as funding deals have been secured and construction work has begun.

In addition to challenging international and British financial institutions, EDAG engaged in a multitude of direct action stunts targeting BP, largely because of their leading and pioneering role in the BTC Company. Just a few actions are listed here to give a flavour. In June, activists staged a greeting for BP at the National Portrait Gallery that BP sponsors. A leaflet was passed to attendees attempting to give 'a more accurate portrait' of BP to prevent the public from regarding them as philanthropic art supporters.

The action involved activists wearing helios (BP logo) sunglasses and holding empty picture frames in front of their faces. Artists entering the awards were politely asked to refrain from attending future BP sponsored events and for help and support with a fossil free portrait award planned for summer 2004. At similar BP sponsored events, EDAG managed to unfurl their large 'BP Sponsors Climate Change' banner in the dinosaur hall of the Natural History Museum and outside the Tate Britain.

In April 2004, after hanging a huge banner from the Royal Festival Hall – hosts to BP's AGM - rebranding it 'the Oil Festival Hall' (OFH) activists from EDAG and the wider human rights and environmental subculture held a protest outside BP's AGM. This included handing out leaflets to BP shareholders, workers of the OFH and members of the public with a chronicle of some of BP's social and environmental abuses. The party and protest element seen at many radical environmentalist demonstrations was present, and speeches by key campaigners were interjected with protest music. The BP AGM of the previous year saw a slightly larger festival that included a mock weather forecast show predicting more temperamental weather patterns, the usual speeches, music and dancing and the handing out of a highly convincing spoof BP annual report to delegates and members of the public (EDAG 2003b).

The context of climate change campaigning is important in relation to aviation, which is increasingly being recognised by campaigners and policy-makers as a significant contributor to climate change. Major EMOs have alleged that 'air travel is the fastest growing source of greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide' (AEF *et* al 2000:1). Research by FoE shows that, if the government goes ahead with its plans for airport expansion, greenhouse gas emissions from aircraft will increase by 350% from 1990 levels by 2030, counteracting any positive effect in reducing emissions gained from increasing fuel tax, the climate change levy and Government promotion of renewables (FoE 2002g). If the government's plans for runway expansion go ahead, this could 'totally destroy the Government's commitment to a 60% cut in carbon dioxide emissions by 2050' (FoE 2003e).

Aviation Campaigning in London

Setting the context

In July 2002, the government published its Regional Airport Studies consultation that assumed air travel demand will continue to grow and is best met by providing more runway capacity. It suggested that between 2000 and 2020 the number of people passing through British airports will increase from 180 million annually to 400 million (DfT 2002). To achieve this, a new airport the size of Stansted airport would need to be built annually for the next 30 years (Airport Watch 2002). A second edition of the consultation document was produced in the autumn of 2003, after campaigners (especially from Cliffe and Stansted) successfully argued that Gatwick should be considered as an option for development after 2019. Gatwick was not included in the first consultation because of a legal agreement prohibiting expansion until 2019 that was secured by a campaign in the 1950s.

The *Southeast Regional Air Services Studies* (SERAS)[10] predicts that air travel in the Southeast will increase from 117 billion passengers a year in 2000 to 300 billion in 2030, and therefore that four new runways are required. The options for expansion included a third runway at Heathrow, a second at Gatwick, a second at Stansted, a new London airport (Cliffe in Kent, or an artificial island in the Thames estuary) with a supporting role to be played by Luton, Manston, Southampton and London City airports. BAA's preferred sites for new runways are Stansted (two), Gatwick (one) and Heathrow (one).

Responses to SERAS

EMOs across spatial and ideological divides are united in concern over large-scale airport expansion. CPRE is quoted as saying that 'the main pressure for new runways arises in the Southeast and East of England ... but ... we consider that no site can be found for a new runway, let alone a new airport, which would be acceptable on environmental grounds' (Airport Watch 2002:3). Even the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution warned about the contribution that such increases in air traffic would make to global warming, and English Nature recommended an approach which 'dampens demand and sets environmental limits on airports' (Airport Watch 2002:4).

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[10] Not to be confused with the Labour Environment Campaign (SERA) who played a role in drawing to public attention some of the weaknesses of the economic arguments made in the SERAS report (CPRE & SERA, 2003), nor with the Southeast Regional Assembly (SERA) which also supported the case for no airport expansion in the Southeast.

The first national anti-aviation event was a conference entitled *Airport Expansion: Options, Alternatives and Opportunities for Change*, in September 2002, organised by the London Green Party and Airport Watch - a (then) newly formed coalition consisting of CPRE, FoE, AEF, NSCA and Transport 2000 set up to coordinate anti-aviation expansion groups. Its aims were two-fold:

> One ... was to ensure local protest groups weren't NIMBY - that they were perfectly entitled to fight for their own backyard, but not to put it in somebody else's. And secondly, [to] link them in with the national organisations, and make arguments against airport expansion ... (Stewart interview, February 2001).

The overall purpose of the conference was to 'examine the options put forward by the Government ... to identify and agree ... alternatives ... and to explore the potential for some joint or coordinated national campaigns' (Lucas, 2002). Besides setting the scene for cooperation between groups campaigning against different runway/airport options, the conference laid out weaknesses of the consultation, concerns about planning laws, and raised climate change and air pollution issues.

West London FoE made an extensive 71-page response to the consultation, commenting on sustainable development implications, noise, the environment (air pollution, climate change, habitat loss) and economics, and concluding that the solution lies with managing demand for flights by removing tax breaks and placing VAT on fuel (Ferriday 2003).[11] The figures for predicted demand were derived from a prediction model called SPASM, which Airport Watch groups asked to be rerun to assess the effects that removal of subsidies would have upon demand. The model indicated that no new runways would be needed if the airline industry paid its fair share of tax and if more environmentally friendly modes of transport were promoted (Airport Watch 2002, Stewart 2003).

During the consultation period, FoE ran a campaign entitled Brace Yourself, encouraging armchair activists[12] to put pressure on the Transport Secretary (Darling) via MPs and by signing a pre-written letter raising concerns about the predict and provide approach, and draw attention to the need for removal of subsidies and tax breaks and recommend replacing short haul flights

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[11] Although the response focused especially on their local airport a Heathrow, although many of the points raised were relevant to the overall consultation and a broad approach was taken where possible.

[12] These are people who sign up to Campaign Express, which involves receiving a small pack with a short briefing about the issues, pre-written letters/postcards to sign and post, and ideas for quick and simple actions three times a year.

with high speed rail. The Freedom to Fly coalition – the campaign's adversary – makes claims that everyone has the right to cheap flights and lays out a case for the economic importance of aviation. In the light of this, FoE also asked armchair activists to sign a pre-printed letter to Richard Branson, who was alerted to the fact that people are aware of the heavy subsidies the aviation industry receives at the expense of people and the environment. During the consultation period, with a view to influencing people who may have been swayed by Freedom to Fly, Airport Watch issued an informative leaflet entitled *The Plane Truth ... Myths Busted* which presents evidence contrary to that produced by the aviation industry's stooges. For instance, the re-run of the SPASM model showed that if the aviation industry were taxed modestly, a new runway at Stansted would have an economic *disbenefit* of £400 million.

For CPRE, the main concern was that airport expansion would 'shatter the tranquillity of the countryside' (CPRE 2003f). Similar to its famous illustrated map comparing 'areas of tranquillity' in the 1960s to the 1990s, CPRE drew up maps showing the areas that would be affected by flight paths and aircraft stacks in 2000 compared to 2030. CPRE's consultants (TRL) showed that by 2030 606,300 people in Britain would be seriously affected by aircraft – double current numbers. It asked the government to draw up more effective sound contours, adopt the WHO's guidelines for acceptable noise levels, and extend restrictions on night flights. In addition, CPRE in its consultation submission raised issues of air pollution, climate change, development resulting in loss of wildlife and countryside, widening of roads and ribbon development and set out the case for removal of tax exemptions.

The White Paper

The Future of Air Transport White Paper (2003) sets out the government's recommendations for air transport for the next 30 years, but has no statutory influence in decisions about which runways should or should not be built – the choice of which plans to proceed with is in the hands of developers and depends on the planning procedure (DfT 2003:2-3).

The White Paper falls short of the optimistic expectations of EMOs. It sees emissions trading as the way of solving aviation's contribution to greenhouse gases and suggests that airport noise can be reduced by a series of ad hoc measures such as promoting research on low-noise aviation, and for legislation to be implemented only when parliamentary time is available. In the southeast, the government recommends making 'the best use of the existing runways at the major southeast airports', including a second runway at Stansted to be built as soon as possible and be operating by 2012, and further development at Heathrow 'provided that strict

environmental conditions are met'[13] between 2015-2020. In other UK regions, the government favours an extra runway at Birmingham and Edinburgh and encouraging regional airports to make full use of their current runways (DfT 2003:6-7). In contrast, most campaign organisations feel that the solution lies in managing demand for aircraft via removal of subsidies and tax breaks.

White Paper Responses

Nationally, a second Airport Watch conference was held to discuss post White Paper campaigning. Stewart's opening discussion concluded that the focus of campaigning needed shifting from targeting the government, towards the airlines and airport operators. Over the coming months, policy arguments on high-speed rail alternatives, climate change, noise and air pollution and economics will be further developed by a collaborative effort of national and local conservation, reformist and radical environmental and community organisations (Stewart 2004).

The campaign to Stop Stansted Expansion (SSE) has gone into 5th gear, trying to influence BAA, organising weekly public meetings and getting press coverage to alert local people. A conventional mix of lobbying, influencing the planning process and taking the campaign to the city to question the dubious financial status of the airport is underway (Carol 2004). As an act of solidarity with communities threatened with airport expansion, London EF! occupied the offices of BAA for most of a morning in January 2004 and staged a demonstration, brandishing a 'No More Airport Expansion' banner and handing out leaflets to alert the public to aviation's environmental implications.

In March 2004, judicial review proceedings were instigated against the British government by local campaigners to challenge the green light it gave to airport expansion. Supported by local authorities, campaigners argued that key information was excluded from consultation documents, especially regarding the possibility of new airports on the Isle of Sheppey and at Thames Reach. Stansted campaigners also launched a judicial review, but theirs was focused on the way the specificity of the White Paper will unfairly influence the planning process, and on the government's inadequate assessment of environmental impacts (Clark 2004). Besides

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[13] At the time of writing, EU pollution standards, which come into force in 2009, are being exceeded at Heathrow. For further development of this airport to take place, air pollution needs to be reduced. This seems unlikely given the extra numbers of cars that will be attracted to Heathrow Terminal 5. However, the government is confident that via improvements in automobile and aircraft technologies, these targets may be met between 2015 and 2020.

these conventional means of campaigning, discussions have taken place regarding the possibility of engaging in direct action or at least collaborating with direct activists.

Despite Stansted having 'drawn the short straw', campaigners there are still keen to foster network links with other campaign groups. For example they joined Heathrow campaigners in their demonstration about night flights on 27th February 2004, at which protesters dressed up in night time attire to make a mockery of the DfT's night flight "consultation" and to request their right to a decent night's sleep (HACAN 2004).

Currently EMOs are working to compose a direct action pledge along the lines of Oxleas Woods Campaign's 'Beat the Bulldozer Pledge', with the aim of getting thousands of people to sign up to promise that they will engage in direct action if airport expansion goes ahead at Stansted, with the ultimate aim of stopping the development.

Heathrow Airport Campaigns

Heathrow airport's 5th terminal (T5) is currently being built despite a well organised campaign with a universalistic discourse, articulate arguments, appropriate campaigning strategies, and strategic networking between a range of community, noise, health and environmental organisations. This case study is important because the environmentalist network that developed is still largely intact and has to some extent been strengthened by the Third Runway proposal that followed. Further, it illustrates the process whereby campaigners become disillusioned with the public inquiry system and begin to see direct action as a feasible alternative.

According to British Airways, the purpose of T5 is to modernise the airport and allow for its future growth. It will accommodate approximately thirty million passengers and covers 260 acres of land – expanding the size of the airport by almost 25%. T5 alone would be one of the three largest airports in Europe second only to Heathrow Terminals 1-4 and Zurich (Aitken 2002). Although BAA describe the site as an 'ideal location' due to the fact that it will occupy the site of a disused sludge works, it is on previously designated greenbelt land, had protected hedgerows, rare bog plants and was an important habitat for endangered water voles, wildfowl and waders. It was one of London's few shallow water regions in the Thames Valley that had thus far avoided drainage.

The campaign was run largely by local organisations alongside FoE (national, London, West London and local groups) HACAN and the Green Party. Local residents' associations, HACAN and West London FoE were the main inquiry objectors. The inquiry commenced in May 1995, lasting a record-breaking three years and ten months and finally ended after sitting for 525 days, in March 1999. Most of HACAN and FoE's energy was absorbed into the planning inquiry. Shortly before the inquiry decision was announced, four EDAGers occupied BAA's boardroom to raise the profile of the issue and make links with climate change. After the release of the White Paper, some of the same activists repeated the action as London EF!.

T5 was given the go ahead by Transport Secretary Byers in November 2001. This was no real surprise given that the government regards aviation as crucial for the economic prosperity of Britain and especially London. Byers suggests 'for London to compete as a world player and for it to remain a major financial centre, Terminal 5 will help it stay competitive' (quoted in Aitken 2001).

At the inquiry, BAA promised that a third runway would not be required, despite T5 accommodating an extra 30 million passengers. Hence, when the third runway was put forward as a possible option for meeting aircraft demand in the Regional Aircraft Summaries Assessment, some campaigners were shocked, whilst for others it was just another of a long string of broken promises by BAA. The inspector at the planning inquiry for Terminal 4 for example was 'strongly of the opinion that all possible steps should be taken to satisfy those living around Heathrow that this is the last major expansion' (Glidewell, WLFoE website 2004). BAA agreed, stating that 'there are multiple risks associated with a 5th terminal ... They add up to a total risk which is completely unacceptable' (BAA, February 1983, ibid). Heathrow residents who have lived near the runway for at least two decades were waiting with bated breath in anticipation of an announcement for a third runway, and although most were unsurprised, it was regarded as an audacious move by BAA and served to fuel campaigner's anger. Given the government's recommendations for a third runway at Heathrow, the White Paper is now giving an amber light for a 6th terminal: 'we... suggest that the operator should carry out further work on proposals for terminal capacity' (DfT, 2003). BAA too has admitted that if it has a 3rd runway at Heathrow, a 6th terminal will be 'required' (CPRE, 2003g).

For FoE, the decision to go ahead with T5 shows that 'the only aviation strategy the Government has is constant expansion and more public subsidy. It's no wonder that people have little faith in the decision making process and the public inquiry system' (FoE quoted in Aitken 2001). In October 2003, there was direct action at the construction site of T5, which was

a direct response to the democratic deficit of planning inquiries reminiscent of the direct action roads protests. In the Autumn of 2003, eight activists, calling themselves Hounslow Against New Terminals (HANT) managed to outsmart security, enter the construction site and scale one of the 22 cranes to erect a banner spelling out a demand for 'No Airport Expansion'. They kept a presence on site for over 100 hours after which they were brought before Uxbridge magistrate's court for charges of obstructing persons engaged in lawful activity and fined costs of £55.

HANT activists' court hearing was heartily supported by local residents and EMOs. Ferriday (West London FoE) told the local press how he would:

> like to place on record our admiration for the courageous young people who were prepared to take considerable personal risks on behalf of all those who feel that this government does not care about the environment and residents who live near Heathrow (quoted in Sharp, 2003).

After having been lied to, subjected to a drawn-out and intensely fought public inquiry and feeling as if their public rights had been battered, Heathrow campaigners after a cursory pit stop were subjected to a second battle in the war against the expansion of Heathrow airport. The time had come to fight the Third Runway.

> Runway three is coming to London Airport. Just a few months after T5 was given the go-ahead with assurances of few flight movements particularly at night and no need for an extra runway. Already the T5 gladiatorial protestors are oiling their rusty swords of dissent and dusting off their mountain of facts and figures. These are people who lost to T5 and gained nothing whatsoever for the public. It took them seven years to lose (Page, 2002).

The consultation document suggested that a possible third runway at Heathrow would follow the route of the M4 corridor to the north of the Heathrow villages of Harmondsworth and Sipson, providing for an extra 175,000 air traffic movements annually (one every two minutes). HACAN drew up detailed maps showing that such a runway would affect swathes of Brentford, Chiswick, Hammersmith and Kensington with noise and air pollution. It would be a short take off runway, resulting in the demolition of between 260 and 480 homes in the Heathrow village of Harmondsworth (McDonnell 2002a).

The campaign was kick started by the publication of the government's consultation and the SERAS which followed it. It was a joint campaign between local residents' associations, supported by local MPs, local authorities, West London FoE and HACAN. The No Third Runway

Action Group (NoTRAG) was an important local Hillingdon Borough Council financed umbrella group.

Shortly after SERAS was issued, HACAN alerted the community to the loss of homes and increased noise and air pollution a third runway would cause. Leaflets containing this information were handed out at railway and tube stations throughout the September of 2002. During the course of the consultation, which took place in a London hotel, protesters posed for the local press with an eight-foot high aeroplane-winged shark that was, they claimed, 'flying out of control' and held a counter-consultation in the same hotel (*Chronicle*, 2004). In October, a demonstration and lobby of parliament was held, organised jointly by HACAN and the NoTRAG. Also in October 2002, HACAN arranged for an open topped bus to travel along a section of the flight path with a sound system playing recorded aircraft noise to give the community 'a taste of what was to come' between the songs of a jazz band (Raymond 2002:7). This was followed by a rally addressed by local politicians at Turnham Green and an opportunity for local people to sign a petition.

July 2003 saw at least a thousand people march along the route of the proposed runway followed by a rally in a local park. Speakers from FoE, HACAN, NoTRAG and local churches addressed the rally (Grant 2003). In the same month, HACAN protesters dressed up in gas masks and boiler suits to stress the high levels of pollution and draw attention to the likelihood that a third runway would cause EU pollution levels to be exceeded. In September 2003, HACAN protesters staged a media stunt by arriving at a House of Commons in an 'amphibious Duck vehicle' to draw attention to the adverse impacts that a third runway would have on surface and ground water and the associated increased flooding risk (*Hillingdon Times*, 2003).

Post White Paper (December 2003), Heathrow campaigners are working with their local authorities to ensure that pollution levels are monitored independently and not by BAA or its consultants - given that the future for a third runway is dependent upon reduced air pollution levels by 2015. Efforts are being made to link up with European airport protest groups to try to achieve an EU ban on night flights. The other main concern for Heathrow campaigners is that, given that the White Paper seeks maximum use of existing runways, runway alternation will come to an end. Currently residents get a week of morning flights (7am-3pm), followed by a week of afternoon/early evening flights (3pm-7am with some night time landings) with the associated noise intrusion (Stewart 2004).

CHAPTER 10

Defining and Delineating London's Environmental Movement:

A Clear Cut Case of Blurred Boundaries

This chapter explores the boundary problem in relation to London's environmental movement and presents some basic SNA measures. Component analysis results are presented and these help find acceptable boundaries for movements by identifying the marginal or disconnected. Included are in-degrees of actors in the four main networks because this shows which actors are key to the direction and scope of the movement. The chapter ends with a discussion of the configuration of cohesive subgroups within the movement so as to discover whether we can justifiably talk of sub-movements.

10.1 Delineating London's Environmental Movement

Many EMOs in London claim to be part of the movement without having links with others. Others claim to be part of a network but lack explicit ties. Some have a concern to protect the environment, but the environment isn't necessarily their primary concern. Where then do we draw the boundaries, and how literally should we take the network dimension of social movements that Diani (1992a) insists upon?

Drawing boundaries is a necessary preliminary task in studies of any movement because it is important that the researcher's conception of a particular movement is in tune with common definitions and the definitions of those involved in the movement. It is also necessary for practical reasons. In an ideal world it would be interesting to map the entire social movement terrain. However, research budgets, staffing concerns and time constraints mean that researchers need to be practical and select smaller but meaningful segments of the field to study. Besides, the ever-changing nature of the social movement field would make such a mega task virtually impossible. Therefore, researchers need to carefully select a specific social movement for study and, given that many movements are interrelated, be quite strict about where the reality of what they are studying begins and ends.

In practical terms, activists often regard boundary demarcation as a time-wasting exercise. Activists' primary concerns are to bring about environmental improvements and for them this often

means collaborating with community groups, churches, elderly peoples' groups and more frequently anti-war and human rights organisations. For Torrance (Greenpeace):

> I don't think it's about building a wall around the environmental movement ... it's more like a Venn diagram of interlaced circles ... a kind of natural ecological system ...There are relations with the peace movement, animal rights, environment, human rights, development movement etc. ... it's unhealthy and not constructive to think who's in and who's out ... There are many organisations – League Against Cruel Sports, Hunt Saboteurs Association, IFAW, CND, Oxfam etc. who all have shared interests with us. Are they environmental organisations ...? I don't think it really matters ... Why not have just one social change movement? (interview June 2003).

All of the SMOs listed by Torrance, in at least some strands of their work, are fighting the same cause and therefore in real-world terms could be conceived of as part of a movement much broader than environmental. However, because I do not have the resources to investigate relations between all kinds of civic groups and EMOs (*cf* Diani 2002b) and because my primary interest is in the latter, I have to draw boundaries, notwithstanding that it is impossible to have a problem-free delineation of any movement because movements have a multitude of cross-cutting and linked themes that do not stand like a castle on a hillock, separated from related interests by a moat.

Essentially, the difficulty of delineating the environmental movement in London has four main foundations: finding a theoretically apt definition of a movement (Chapter 2); measuring it empirically; distinguishing it from related 'movements' (e.g. DiY culture, anti-globalisation and anti-corporate movements); and measuring the extent to which its ideological and spatial and issue-based divisions constitute a single movement.

Table 10.1 tabulates aims of EMOs by their responses to the three boundary demarcation questions. With reference to the row entitled 'amenities', of the 149 organisations that returned questionnaires, 34 were concerned with protecting or enhancing local amenities. Of that 34, 29 perceived their organisation to be part of the movement, 26 had environmental protection/preservation as a main aim, and 28 regarded their organisation as part of a network of likeminded organisations.

Table 10.1: Boundary demarcation data by organisational aim type

Aim of Organisation	Part of the environmental movement	Main aim to protect or preserve the environment	Part of a network of EMOs?	No. of groups with aim
	YES	YES	YES	
Air Pollution	2	2	2	2
Amenities	29	26	28	34
Anarchy	1	1	1	1
Animal Rights	1	1	1	1
Class	1	1	1	3
Building Conservation / Urban Landscapes	3	3	3	3
Countryside Protection / Conservation	25	26	24	29
Energy	1	1	0	1
Food / Farming / Gardens	6	6	4	6
Forests	1	1	1	1
Land Rights	1	0	0	1
Multi-issue	26	26	25	31
Networking	1	1	1	2
Single Species	9	8	8	12
Transport	13	10	11	14
Waste	3	2	3	3
Not Relevant	0	2	1	5
TOTALS YES	123	117	***114**	
NO	26	32	35	149

(* Network analysis was carried out on the 114 organisations that provided network data).

The data shows a very high correspondence between boundary demarcation criteria (having an aim that involves environmental protection/enhancement or preservation, and being part of a network) and EMO's own perception of whether or not they are a part of the movement. In total, nine organisations consider themselves to be part of the environmental movement, yet claim too

that their organisation is *not* part of a network of EMOs. These include one countryside protection organisation, two working on food, farming or gardens, one working to protect a single species and another two that are transport organisations. There is no one category of organisational aims that stands out as being particularly marginal to the movement. In total, of the 99 organisations that feel they belong to the movement, 96 had a main aim that involved the environment and 91 felt they were part of a network. This shows that organisations can feel part of a movement without being networked into it (although only eight fall into this category).

Despite high correspondence between boundary measures there are important anomalies. Although I was initially unsure if it was right to include residents' associations as part of the movement, most gave survey answers that indicate their strong place in the (local) environmental movement. Residents associations in urban areas appear to have a strong input into local decision-making concerning the environment. Harmondsworth & Sipson and Longford Residents Associations, located close to Heathrow airport, both noted their primary concern for the environment - usually because of their concern that the airport will expand and subsume their villages. Whilst approximately three-quarters of amenity and residents associations considered themselves as having a main aim to protect or preserve the environment, 81% perceived themselves to be part of the environmental movement and part of a network.

Similarly, I was unsure whether to include transport organisations within the survey population. Transport organisations include anti-airport expansion and road groups, or those campaigning for improvements in public transport, cycle lanes and walking conditions. In particular, I was unsure about including the Ramblers Association (RA) and its local groups and general commuters' associations. In 2001, Hanton (veteran transport campaigner) told me:

> I don't really think they're [part of the movement] ... they don't actually have the campaigners who campaign on anything apart from keeping footpaths open (interview, April 2001).

Only Hillingdon RA responded, and answered all three questions in the affirmative, noting countryside protection alongside improving access to rights of way as key concerns. Sweeting, co-ordinator of the Hillingdon Commuters' Association (and HFoE), claimed that although she is motivated by environmental concerns, the majority of the Association's members join for the instrumental purpose of seeking improvement in their journeys to work. According to Pitcher, organiser of the Kent Division of the London and South Eastern branch of Rail Future:

> Rail Future is on the edge of the environmental movement. Be assured that I am in it for the right reasons but others are because their commuter train to London is always late, and others still have barely graduated from train spotting. Yet others welcome new airports

> because they usually promise new railway stations as crumbs! (personal correspondence January 2003).

The answers received from organisations are very much dependent upon the person who answered the questionnaire. For instance if Pitcher had answered a questionnaire about the place of Rail Future in the environmental movement, he would have most probably given an affirmative response to the boundary demarcation questions. However, should one of his commuter friends be responsible, the answers may have instead been outright 'nos'. Even for Ferriday of West London FoE, 'railways aren't a particular environmental issue as far as we are concerned [but] roads are' (interview June 2003).

Another interesting anomaly was the refusal of London Sustainability Exchange (LSx) to answer the questionnaire. Judging by its name, and information on its website, I assumed it would be part of the movement. As mentioned in Chapter 8, LSx was concerned that its participation would give a misleading representation of its ambit. Its work is as oriented towards addressing economic and social issues so much as environmental ones and it feels that it is not especially embedded into London's 'activist' networks.[1] I found it interesting to note that Starr (2000) also regards the sustainability movement as a separate entity from the environmental movement. Chris Church of the Community Development Foundation would argue the same too, because of the tendency of the two types of environmentalism to work in relative isolation from each other (personal correspondence August 2003).

Questionnaires were sent to local history societies, but no responses were received from this type of organisation, despite reminders, possibly because of the emphasis given to the word 'activist' on the covering letter. My perception of these as part of the movement were at least partially correct. Cowdell (chair of PCEG), commented that:

> ...I find that they are also concerned about the environment as well, interestingly, and some of them have joined our group, so there is an awful lot of cross fertilization if you like (interview September 2003).

This raises issues of movement overlap between local history and local environmental concerns. The notion of movement overlap will now be discussed in more depth.

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[1] The word 'activist' may have contributed to the low response rate for the questionnaire. As Condor explained (interview with Adams 2000), CPRE campaigners 'do not like the word 'activist'. They hate it. It's something to do with Greenpeace and CND and things'. CPRE 'campaigners' may not be alone in their aversion to being labelled 'activists'.

Unsurprisingly, given the Iraqi crisis, which was critical at the time of the questionnaire distribution, a completed questionnaire was not received from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), although I did obtain an informal telephone interview with the press officer (Nick Schoon, February 2003). He informed me that he 'most definitely' regards CND as part of the environmental movement because of the emphasis on the environmental risks of nuclear fuel, the processing of plutonium and the ecological crisis that would undoubtedly result from nuclear war. He also claimed that CND works closely with the environmental movement – most especially Greenpeace. This is what makes the answer from Christian CND (CCND) appear particularly anomalous. Although (as the only peace/anti-nuclear organisation to respond) CCND saw CND as part of the environmental movement, and one of its main aims is to protect the environment, the representative did not perceive CCND to be networked with other EMOs – even though its parent organisation with which it shares an office claimed to be an EMO.[2]

The case of CND is interesting, not only because of the peculiar response I received from CCND – which may be a function of the respondent misunderstanding the question[3] – but also because it exemplifies the problem of movement overlap. Many would suggest that CND has a better fit with the peace rather than the environmental movement. My contention is that it fits both equally as well. Indeed, we could almost say the same of Greenpeace – it campaigns against militarisation and originally formed to protest against atomic bomb tests, yet many commentators regard Greenpeace as one of the guiding forces of the international environmental movement.

Even FoE has added its voice to the anti-war movement, setting out in 2001 a comprehensive briefing concluding:

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[2] Much may depend on the subject's understanding of the word 'network' – for example they may view it as something formal rather than informal.

[3] I am aware that this is a general problem with the validity of survey responses. There are other examples in my data set that show that respondents have not understood the questions as I intended them to. Another example is the case of a Peckham-based organisation called Opposition to the Destruction of Open Green Spaces, which the respondent claims is not part of a network of EMOs – i.e. is not in regular contact with at least one other environmental organisation, and yet the respondent who filled the questionnaire in is also Secretary of the Peckham Society that he does see as part of the movement and which is networked with the wider movement. In my eyes, but obviously not in his, the sharing of key personnel between EMOs in this manner comprises a network link.

> FoE strongly condemns the looming war against Iraq and deplores the humanitarian and environmental impacts that will result from such a war. Given the likely impacts, FoE believes that the proponents of war against Iraq have failed to justify military action.

FoE makes links between the war, climate and oil and suggest that it is no coincidence that Iraq holds the second largest proven oil reserves of any nation (FoE briefing 2001). EDAG too notes how tightly the issues are interwoven by using the slogan 'no fuel for war, no war for fuel' at its October 2003 conference. Similarly, in 2003, Greenpeace produced a document called the *Tiger in the Tanks*, making explicit the links between oil and war and providing fervour to Stop Esso. In particular it points out how Exxon Mobil has a long-term interest in securing Iraqi oil.

Movements are not mutually exclusive entities. Consider the following quotes taken from the visions or aims of movements labelled other than environmental:

1. 'More equitable development based on the perspectives, analysis and development priorities of women and men affected by those policies ... and ultimately small-scale community-determined solutions that promote economic self-reliance as well as economic and social justice'
2. 'Long term ecological sustainability and local and national self-reliance in order to reverse the devastating environmental, social, and cultural impact of exclusively market-driven development schemes'

Both quotes are taken from Starr's (2000:49, 53) book on the 'anti-corporate' movement, but more specifically the first refers to the international anti-globalisation organisation Enough (which has its roots in environmentalism), whilst the second is a quote from The Asia Pacific Centre for Justice and Peace. Yet just a short dip into any book on green thought (e.g. Eckersley 1992, Bookchin 1996, Dobson 1990, Hay 2003) would indicate small-scale self-reliance as a cornerstone of green thought. This point indicates the difficulty of meaningfully segregating movements with common ideologies into separate movements. Both Starr (2000) and Klein (2000) show that at least certain segments - most notably the more radical elements - of the environmental movement can convincingly be regarded as an integral part of the anti-corporate movement.[4] Indeed it is hard not to notice the instrumental role that road protesters played in RTS, which was the mainstay of some of the earlier Carnivals Against Capitalism. Also Starr (2000:159) mentions how 'it is becoming

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[4] Starr (2000:160) shows network links (based on campaign data) between environmentalism, anti-free trade movement, the sustainable development movement, campaigns for sovereignty, the labour movement, land reform movement and explicit anti-consumerism. We can she suggests see a 'unity of determinations' among these organisations.

increasingly hard to distinguish between environmental and human rights organising'. Plows (2000) also notes how the world views of direct action activists in Britain involve the interweaving of social, economic and environmental issues. See also Castells' (1997:149-151) attempt to identify the components of the anti-globalisation movement, unified by discontent with neo-liberalism.

We face a similar difficulty when trying to distinguish between the animal rights and environmental movements. Rootes (2000) excluded animal rights groups from his longitudinal study of British environmental activism as they were peripheral in the networks making their relationship to the environmental movement questionable. Rootes' (2003) analysis of the co-occurrences of protest events between animal rights and EMOs shows very little co-operation between the two. EMOs seldom list animal rights organisations as important sources of information, advice or collaboration.

This cannot explain why League Against Cruel Sports (LACS) answered the boundary questions with a 'yes'. Another thing I would question about the fine line between animal rights and environmentalism, is where you draw the line between the rights of survival of a species, which may be conceived of in terms of animal rights, and conservation of a species which is always regarded as a conservation effort. Greenpeace is again a good example of the link between animal rights and environmental issues. As Eyerman and Jamison suggest:

> Nature, according to Greenpeace cosmology, provides positive values for humanity, but it also contains values in its own right: the defence of animal rights is, of course, a central ingredient of the belief system of Greenpeace. ...There seems to be a tension in the organization between those who see undefended animal species primarily as a kind of metaphor for undefended humankind...and those who have a more intrinsic fascination with seals and whales (1989:110).

In the past animal rights have been central to Greenpeace campaigns, especially anti-whaling and seal cub campaigning. Furthermore, many environmental activists are vegetarians, which highlights that there is a clear link between the two 'movements'. PETA's (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) 'so you think you can be a meat-eating environmentalist' leaflet has helped strengthen the links between the two.

10.2 Component analysis:

This section presents component analysis results as these help in the identification of movement boundaries because they identify groups of actors that are disconnected from the main network. A component is a subsection of a 'graph' in which every node is connected to at least one other (see the section on network analysis procedures [Chapter 8.2] for more detail).

The *collaboration network* has 17 components. Seven had three or more members and are worth commenting on. The nine disconnected dyads (pairs of organisations connected only to each other but not to the rest of the network) are too insignificant to mention. The main component had 178 members and includes a variety of conservation and reformist organisations. This analysis is consistent with Rootes and Miller's (2001) network findings that inform their suggestion of excluding AWOs (animal welfare organisations) from the environmental movement.

AWOs form a separate detached component from environmental concerns. Component 7 consists of the International Federation for Animal Welfare (IFAW), LACS and the Royal Society for the Protection of Animals (RSPCA) only. These groups do not have amongst their top five most important collaborative ties any other organisation that is linked in with the main component of 178 EMOs.[5] Component 2 which has also been deleted from the main component consists mainly of AWOs, namely: The Ape Alliance, British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND), Born Free Foundation, the Environmental Investigation Agency, Friends of Conservation, the Orang-utan Foundation, Save the Rhino, Sustainable Tourism Initiative, Tusk Trust, the UK Rhino group and 'Zoos'. Other excluded components consist mostly of very localised (perhaps NIMBY) concerns such as residents groups and friends of parks groups.[6] This suggests that AWOs should be omitted from the movement because of their lack of links. However, the low response rate and focus on the top five collaborative links may mean that less important or subterranean links are ignored. In any case, the story is different in the information-based networks.

In the *information-provided network*, animal rights groups are more integrated. All of those AWOs that were in components other than the largest (main) component in the collaboration network are part of the main component in this network. Eleven components were singled out when the *information-provided network* was submitted to a component analysis. Five of these components had three or more members and are worth mention. Component 1 consists of a small selection of three groups affiliated to the Civic Trust, but unnamed by the Civic Trust in its questionnaire response because it considered itself constrained by the Data Protection Act. It may well be that the actual organisations - had they been named - could have formed a part of the main component. The main component has 214 actors from a variety of organisational types tackling a range of

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[5] This figure is higher than the total number of survey responses because some EMOs chose actors that were not respondents in response to the network questions.

[6] That is not to suggest that residents associations and Friends of Parks groups are generally detached from the network. Some of these types of organisations are well enmeshed into London's environmental movement.

issues (including AWOs and CND). Component 3 consists of four Ealing-based allotment societies that provide information to each other, but do not have information- providing links with the main component. Component 4 is, like in the *collaboration network* a set of Friends of Parks groups that reflect mainly local concerns and have an inward focus towards their own area often with little concern with broader environmental issues and therefore little need to be provided with advice from other organisations. PCEG and CWT are examples of these kinds of groups. Although these two organisations are linked into the main networks, they have only few contacts with other EMOs.

Both PCEG and CWT have few links with other organisations, but have highly committed volunteers some of whom have specialist conservationist knowledge. This means that they do not have to look to other organisations for advice on practical conservation matters. For instance PCEG member and ex-Environmental Trust employee Rob Poole designed the nature conservation pond project that the group worked on. He then got a position as Parks Officer at Greenwich Council and is currently working in Environmental Enforcement at the Council. In addition, PCEG has a supporter member who is the director of Groundwork South East (Cowdell interview, September 2003). CWT have amongst them volunteers who are either in the process of, or have completed a Certificate in Conservation and Ecology at Birkbeck University College London. Due to their focus upon a relatively small piece of ground (a single reserve, park or common) groups like these, especially when they have internal expertise, are quite likely to be self-sufficient.

Component 5, the final significant component (besides the main one) in the *information-provided* network consists of some local Greenwich concerns - the Creekside Forum, Greenwich Conservation Group and Greenwich Environment Forum. These three local organisations are all organised (at least to an extent) by a well-known local environmentalist, who according to Cowdell (interview September 2003) tends to run them as talking shops.

Eight components were found in the *information-received network.* Again AWOs, except for the most radical ones, remain a part of the main component. As Rootes (2001) shows, radical AWOs are most likely to be linked to the main network via radical EMOs, and as very few radical EMOs responded to the questionnaire, this is not a surprising result. Four of the eight components had three or more members. Component 1 was those same Civic Trust-affiliated organisations that were part of component 1 in the *information-provided network.* The main component consists of 271 organisations, wide ranging in their remits and forms. Component 3 is an anarchistic and

radical animal welfare subgroup consisting of the Animal Liberation Front, *Aufheben*[7], the *Green Anarchist* and London Animal Action. Component 4 consists of transport-focused organisations CAPITAL (London's transport campaign), London Transport Users Committee, the Rail Users Committee and Windsor Lines Passengers Association. Given the responses of Rail Future and Hillingdon Commuters Association as discussed above, it is hardly surprising that transport organisations are singled out as a separate component.

The *information-exchange network* had just one component with three or more members and this component constitutes the main network. It includes 41 actors, none of them AWOs and only one is a Friends of Park-type group (Bedford Park Society). This network includes a range of environmental amenity, conservation, reformist and radical organisations.

One important point that arises from this discussion is to consider how strict we should be about the network dimension between EMOs for them to be conceived of as part of the same movement. If we consider the collaboration network, AWOs by a network-based definition of a social movement would be viewed as distinct from the environmental movement. Using an information/resources provision or receiving network, AWOs become part of the web of relations of environmentalism (that is at least if the researcher is satisfied that there is a shared concern- i.e. that caring for animals is part of caring for the environment at large or if the majority of environmentalists are concerned about animal welfare as well as the environment).

How literally should we take the network dimension as part of our definition of the environmental movement? What kind of links do they have to be? It would appear for instance without a thorough reading of Diani's (1992a) definition of what a social movement is, that organisations are expected to engage in collective action to be part of a movement – therefore logic would suggest that they all must be part of the collaboration network to be party to it. However, Diani's definition is much looser than this, and arguably too loose.

Diani (1992a) suggests that a movement is made up of a network of organisations and individuals with a collective identity that engages in collective action using semi or non-institutional channels. The way in which Diani defines collective action is interesting. He is not (at least in an early version

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[7] *Aufheben* is an anti-capitalist journal that has been produced in the UK since Autumn 1992. Its founders were inspired by involvement in the anti-poll tax and anti-Gulf war campaigns.

of his definition) suggesting that every organisation has to have a collaborative network link to at least one other organisation in a network to be part of a movement. The suggestion is that collective action is two or more individuals engaging in a protest activity and that these individuals be linked to others in the network who need *not* be participating in that same action. The links between organisations can be informal or highly structured, frequent or infrequent, intense or cursory. These links he suggests mostly involve the sharing of information, expertise and materials and are what leads movements to develop 'broader senses of meaning' (1992b:8).

However, if the links are infrequent, brief and relaxed, they may amount to nothing more than a friendship between two people who may not share interests, and will not necessarily give the movement a sense of unity through shared meanings. The link may be just a brief consultation of a web page, which could constitute a network link sufficient to tie people with a similar concern, but engaging in a completely non-compatible form of action, into the movement. Such cursory treatment of 'information-received' is a very weak network dimension to insist on. This problem is mostly avoided in this research because the question asked for the top five important providers of information – however a group with few information providing sources that looks at FoE's website just once a year is likely to list this as an important source. Such interaction is informal, it may be infrequent, but it definitely involves an information link between organisations. It is a misleading measure because most people who are subscribed members of organisations experience the information they receive as members in a similar fashion as White (CPRE Senior Development Officer, interview, October 2003):

> Well, as a fairly typical member of these organisations, I don't read the stuff properly and possibly for not until about six months later.

Information from other organisations tends to get stockpiled, whilst the work demands of their own organisations and routines of everyday life are prioritised.

If network links can consist of a simple exchange of information between two organisations, this means that a member of the Wildlife Trusts receiving a magazine from the Butterfly Conservation Society would count. However, when activists receive information from other organisations, they do not necessarily find it particularly informative or useful. According to Waugh (Volunteer Coordinator, LWT, interview, June 2003), much of the information she looks at from other organisations is 'fairly glib ... and designed for a public audience and not of much use.' Similarly, Robertshaw (voluntary warden CWT), mostly finds that the monthly glossy magazines she receives unhelpful to her conservation work:

> Mostly because we are at a stage where if we need information, we need specific information. And these magazines are for a public audience ... they don't tell you how to do butterfly transects ... because that would be deadly boring for the public (interview, February 2004).

Diani's (1992a) suggestion that the network dimension of a movement can be informal and irregular is too weak, and his idea of collective action needs strengthening – collaborative networks bind a movement together much more than information does. Besides, information often flows only one way and has no effect. If it is stock-piled, is ignored or is too basic, it is clearly not leading to the development of 'broader senses of meaning' (Diani 1992a:8).

The importance of organisations and individuals being linked through collaboration rather than providing information to or receiving information from other organisations is well illustrated by the example of FoE's Campaign Express calls to action for signed-up 'arm-chair activists'. These small Packs contain a concise briefing of a problem, a pre-printed postcard to sign and some instructions to individuals on further actions. In July 2003, the Campaign Express was based on the aviation campaign Brace Yourself (see Chapter 9).

By Diani's definition, individuals receiving the information would clearly be seen as part of the network of FoE if some of them engaged in some kind of collective action (not necessarily the Campaign Express action), and therefore as part of the movement because they had been sent information. However, suggesting that they have to engage in the action to be part of the movement makes a more cogent case. Not everyone who receives the information will take part in the action. To be a movement its components must *share* in at least some actions and events rather than just sit on information. Although engagement in collective action is part of Diani's definition, he does not insist on a collaborative network. Collaborative interaction should be more important than informal networking in definitions of a movement. At the very least I think that we should insist that there is collaboration, or at least two-way sharing of information to be part of a movement.

Diani's suggestion that overlapping memberships are a network link (1995:4) is a weak assertion for similar reasons. This would mean that we have to conceive of the RSPCA as part of the environmental movement (again if we see animal and environmental concerns as being shared in any way) if a member of staff was also a supporter of Greenpeace. For similar reasons, this is too weak a basis on which to ground a theoretical definition of social movements. Although some activists may have a holistic view, many may see their campaigning interests as separate concerns.

Since 1992, Diani has sharpened up his definition (2002b, 2003b, Diani & Lindsey 2003), becoming much more prescriptive about how a movement should be defined and the type of network links it must have. In terms of interaction, social movements he suggests 'consist of *innumerable exchanges* between individuals and/or organisations, which involve *discussing ideas*, *exchanging information*, *pooling resources*, *sharing emotions*, *engaging together in acts of defiance and social criticism*' (2002:3). He does not specify whether or not all these types of interactions must be present to qualify as a social movement but, as I do, emphasises that we must focus on collaborative links that he calls 'collective efforts'. Movements he says, engage in conflict (problematically excluding many 'cultural conflicts', and solutions-based campaigning by insisting on a specifiable opponent), collective action, be networked and have a collective identity (2002:4).

Diani (2002b) measures 'collective efforts' by organisations' co-attendance at public campaigning events. He arbitrarily selected a figure of attendance at three such events out of 26 in his study of the Glaswegian NGO-field to qualify as engagement in collective efforts. This is a poor measure because such events are not always collectively organised and can be organised centrally by a single organisations. Thus, organisations could be party to the same event, but have no joint role in organising it, be ideologically opposed to each other, or even, if the event is large, not see one another. Public campaigning events chosen by Diani included, for example, an Asian Youth Festival, a City Council Cultural Diversity Meeting, an Open Space Event on Fighting Police and Racism, and an Open Space Event on Council's Equality Policy. Attendance at any three of these events would, for Diani indicate a 'collective effort'. He assumes that this measure tells us that collaboration is sustained beyond short-term coalitions that he does not view as part of a social movement dynamic because they apparently lack collective identity. However, even if coalitions are short term, they sow the seeds for collaboration on other projects and indicate long-term collaboration to a greater extent than attendance at one-day events. For instance the BCC coalition has created network links that have endured and resulted in the No New Oil Coalition, and the BCC coalition is a project of the Ilusu Dam Campaign.

In his 2002(b) paper, Diani measures collective identity by multiple memberships that he argues 'provide an indicator, no matter how rough of whether core activists perceive two organisations as compatible and close to the point of sharing their individual commitments between them' (2002b:14). Multiple memberships he claims are 'channels for the circulation of information [and] resources'. (Diani 2004:348). However, memberships may be short-lived and often entail little more than paying a subscription and receiving a newsletter, a much less significant form of movement

interaction than coalitions. Individuals may have multiple interests that need not be totally compatible with one another. 'Bloggs' might be a member of an ethnic rights group and an environmental group, but this does not signify a collective identity in any sense. It certainly does not result in an 'interactive and shared definition' to problems and solutions because the issues are very distinct. Formal coalitions according to Diani (2003:303) do not have a collective identity, do not lead to connections between activists in the longer term, nor apparently 'concatenate in broader systems of solidarities and mutual obligations.' Yet they clearly do this to a greater extent than most multiple memberships do. To use multiple memberships as an indicator of collective identity, they must at least be *active* memberships on the same or related issues. In this latter sense, multiple memberships are important and can be indicators of collective identity (Chapter 13).

For the purposes of defining the environmental movement in London, the collaboration network is the most convincing measure of its reality. It is certainly more meaningful than participation in one-day events and (most cases of) multiple memberships and perhaps cursory information-passing links. Therefore, amongst other conclusions I have drawn on the basis of the collaboration network, AWOs, some transport groups, and all truly NIMBY groups should be omitted from the movement.

10.3 Central actors in London's Environmental Movement

Centrality of actors is measured using the network measures of 'degree' and 'in-degree', depending on whether the network analysed was symmetric or asymmetric. 'Degree' is the simplest measure of centrality used in network analysis. Simply put, it is a count of the number of ties that an organisation has with others in a network. In this research, the collaborative network and the information exchange networks are symmetric because these social relations are two-way ventures, and the ties are undirected. In the information-received and –provided networks, the data are asymmetric. This means that the direction of the tie becomes important. Instead of a two-way undirected link between A and B as with symmetric data, asymmetric data distinguishes whether the link was extended from A to B, or B to A. With asymmetric relational data, it is possible to distinguish between the 'in-degree' and 'out-degree' of actors. The 'in-degree' is a measure of centrality as it indicates the extent to which other actors in the network extend ties to a particular actor. The out-degree reflects the efforts of ego to extend links towards others in the network. UCInet calculates these measures with speed and ease.

Given the urban nature of the groups studied, it is perhaps surprising that LWT is the most frequent collaborative partner, with a degree in the collaboration network of 23 (Table 10.2), followed by

HACAN, the Women's Environmental Network (WEN) and FoE. Given that 95 of the 225 nodes in the collaboration network have conservationist interests, this result is not as surprising as it may appear. Despite resource shortages, LWT is uniquely positioned to be of assistance to London based conservation organisations and Friends of Parks groups. Its collaborative partners include its own branches (including Chiswick and Hillingdon) and a variety of northwest London (West London Ramblers, Hillingdon Natural History Society), southeast London (Friends of One Tree Hill, Friends of Peckham Rye Park), regional (London Natural History Society, London Natural History Museum) and national (BTCV and Plantlife) conservation interests. It is its accessibility, well known reputation and central role in coordinating Biodiversity Action Plans across London that make it a central actor.

Table 10.2, Degree Scores for the Collaboration Network

Rank	Name of Organisation	Degree
1	LWT	23
2	HACAN Clearskies	15
3	Womens' Environmental Network	15
4	FoE	14
5	Campaign for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE)	12
6	London FoE	12
7	Campaign Against Climate Change	11
8	Civic Trust	11
9	Groundwork Southwark	10
10	London Community Recycling Network	10

- These scores were calculated using a symmetric model because collaboration is a two-way venture.
- The degrees for both Greenpeace and the Ramblers' Association in the collaboration network are 7.
- If *every* organisation in the network voted the same single organisation as one of its top links, it would have an unvalued degree of 224, given that there are 225 nodes in the collaboration network and it cannot vote for itself. However, these scores are valued – 6 for daily, 5 for weekly, 4 for monthly, 3 for quarterly, 2 for six-monthly and 1 for annually. The absolute maximum degree score – i.e. for an organisation that every other actor in the network claimed was a *daily* collaborative partner is 1,344. For a monthly collaborative partner voted by every other organisation the maximum possible score is 896. For an annual collaborative partner it is 224.

The oft-quoted observation that Greenpeace has a tendency to work in isolation as part of its public relations / branding policy is supported by the relatively low degree of Greenpeace in this network

(see text at bottom of Table 10.2).[8] This score remains low despite Greenpeace's recent tendency to, become involved in coalition-building and collaborative events to a greater extent. Examples include Greenpeace's involvement in the Yes to Wind and Stop Esso Coalitions. It is because of the prominence of campaigns at Heathrow Airport that HACAN is one of the most central actors, despite being a fairly localised concern. Collaborative networking is clearly at its peak during critical campaigns.

Although information-based networks are not especially good indicators of environmental movement boundaries, they are still useful for asserting the relative importance of EMOs within the environmental movement. An organisation that has a relatively high degree in the information-received network is one that is frequently listed by other EMOs as an important source of information. Centrality in the information-provided network also gives a measure of the perceived importance of EMOs by their contemporaries. An organisation with a high in-degree in the information-provided network is indicative of an organisation that is regarded as being important enough to be 'kept in the know'.

The higher the degree score of an organisation in the information-received network, the greater the chance that the organisation is producing common senses of meanings, and possibly even setting the agenda for the environmental movement. Table 10.3 shows FoE to be the most central actor in terms of the count and frequency of organisations claiming to receive its information. This indicates that FoE continues to be the agenda-setter for much of the movement (as Greenberg [1985] stated), at least to a greater extent than any other single organisation. Because the information that FoE provides to actors is potentially received by every actor in the network through various path-lengths, and because of the relatively high in-degree, it is more likely that FoE's policy line on issues is transmitted throughout the network than others' are.[9]

Receiving of information happens more frequently and intensely than collaboration (Table 10.3). The top ten in-degrees vary between 63 and 24 in the information-received network compared to a range of 15 to 10 in the collaboration network. The scores are considerably higher even though the maximum possible score is considerably lower (see text at bottom of Table 10.3).

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[8] Rootes & Miller (2000) show that Greenpeace is often nominated by other green groups as an important organisation for providing assistance and that Greenpeace often provides this assistance without drawing attention to or seeking publicity for it

[9] FoE produces a series of briefings for environmental and community groups to use, and these are readily available on their new website: http://community.foe.uk.

Table 10.3, In-degree Scores in the Information-received Network

Rank	Name of Organisation	In-Degree
1	FoE	63
2	LWT	56
3	London Forum of Amenity Societies	36
4	Civic Trust	34
5	HACAN Clear Skies	34
6	CPRE	33
7	Transport 2000	33
8	British Trust for Conservation Volunteers	32
9	RSPB[10]	29
10	English Heritage	24

- This data was calculated using the asymmetric model because the receiving information is a one way relation
- Other well-known EMOs scores: London FoE 16, the Green Party 20, Greenpeace 17, National Trust 16 and Ramblers Association six.
- There are 88 nodes in this network, making the maximum possible unvalued in-degree score 87. The highest possible valued in-degree score is 522. (NB. These are valued scores).

It is interesting that in the information provided network, Greenpeace is one of the 'Top 10' (it has the same in-degree score in the information-received network, but organisations on average score lower in this network) (Table 10.4). Again FoE and LWT are amongst the most central actors, although CPRE has joint highest centrality with FoE. These three organisations have much higher scores than their contemporaries and are seen by local, regional and national groups as the most important organisations for passing information to. The scores of FoE and CPRE are high because of their own prolific local and regional networks and because both organisations have an accessible public image and are multi-issue, so are likely to be seen as important sinks of information by specialist organisations. Greenpeace is probably less accessible, but it is clearly seen as an important organisation for keeping 'in the know'. Local groups are most likely to nominate national groups as these are perceived as being more 'important' *per se*. Local concerns are important to FoE and local groups are often willing to pass on information about local case studies with the hope of helping improve the general environment. Pearce for example, mentioned that Longford Residents' Association provided information for FoE 'on certain fields ... important hedgerows and

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[10] Despite clear instructions to respondents to list *only* organisations that are in London, many still included the RSPB in their top five most important links, even though it is located in Bedfordshire.

things like that, that are really ancient and are going to be destroyed because of Terminal 5' (Pearce [LRA], interview, January 2004).

Table 10.4, In-degree scores in the information-provided network

Rank	Name of Organisation	In-Degree
1	CPRE	28
2	FoE	28
3	LWT	27
4	Transport 2000	18
5	RSPB	17
6	Ealing Wildlife Network	15
7	Greenpeace	15
8	BTCV	14
9	Groundwork London	14
10	London Forum of Amenity Societies	14

- This was calculated using an asymmetric model because provision of information is a one-way relation
- There are 128 nodes in this network, making the maximum possible unvalued in-degree score 87. The highest possible valued in-degree score is 762. (NB. These are valued scores)

Table 10.5, Degree Scores in the Information Exchange Network

Rank	Name of Organisation	Degree
1	LWT	18
2	Campaign for the Protection of Rural England	15
3	FoE	13
4	Civic Trust	12
5	HACAN	12
6	London Forum of Amenity Societies	11
7	Aviation Environment Federation	11
8	Woodlands Farm Trust	11
9	West London FoE	8
10	London FoE	8

- This was calculated using a symmetric model because information exchange is a two-way relation.
- Greenpeace is in 13th position with an in-degree of six – the same as WEN Wildlife and Countryside Link and London Natural History Society. The Ramblers Association has an in-degree of four.
- There are 38 nodes in this network, making the maximum possible unvalued in-degree score 37. The highest possible valued in-degree score is 288. (NB these are valued scores).

In the exchange of information, the key players in the Heathrow conflict (HACAN, London FoE and FoE) remain in the top 10. Obviously when a campaign is being run, information flow needs to go both ways between partners. The London Forum of Amenity Societies (LFAS) is very central in the provision, reception and exchange of information (Table 10.5).

10.4 Cohesive Subgroup Analysis of the Collaboration Network

To identify possible sub-movements, a cohesive subgroups analysis[11] (Frank 1995) was carried out on the collaboration network according to the instructions provided by Everett (2002b).[12] This process is useful for uncovering factions (as many have done with Sampson's 1977 Monastic dispute data). Structural equivalence was not used because of its tendency to reify the action/issue basis of networks (Chapter 7). Additionally, preliminary exploration with structural equivalence yielded uninformative results because of the sheer number of nodes in the network and the high number of organisations that are structurally equivalent only by virtue of their small number of network links. It is also difficult to present a structural analysis clustering permutation of over 200 actors.

Twenty-eight cliques were found. As the majority were small, with EMOs often in two or more cliques and pairs of actors frequently appearing in the same cliques, a clique overlap analysis was used for analysing the subgroup structure at a higher level (Figure 10.1).

The cluster diagram indicates that the most cohesive subgroup (with the highest level of XXXs) has cliques 6,7,9 and 10 at its core. All of these cliques share three members. The members are:

- Clique 6: AEF, CPRE, FoE, and HACAN
- Clique 7: AEF, CPRE, HACAN and London FoE
- Clique 9: AEF, FoE, HACAN and West London FoE
- Clique 10: AEF, HACAN, West London FoE, London FoE

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[11] A cohesive sub-group is a group of actors with especially close relations to each other and considerably fewer relations with the rest of a network.

[12] This was carried on the collaboration network only, because the process assumes a symmetric data set, and the information exchange network (the only other symmetric network) has too few members to make it possible to carry out a convincing analysis.

Clique 8 has a high influence in this subgroup, although slightly less so than the core listed above. Clique 8 has AEF, CPRE, London FoE and Transport 2000 as members. Between them, these cliques form a cohesive subgroup. Its cohesiveness is no doubt the result of the frequent collaboration that occurs between these groups. This is what would be expected given the current state of anxiety in the northwest of London over the future for Heathrow airport. All of the organisations within this cohesive subgroup have been campaigning against airport expansion and are high profile EMOs. Although several local residents groups who campaign on airport issues completed the questionnaire and are linked to these groups, they are not part of the central cluster.

Figure 10.1, Clustered clique by clique overlap

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JOHNSON'S HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Input dataset:                    C:\Program Files\ucinet
5\DataFiles\PhD_stuff\ILEAN DATA\Collaborate_ALL\Clique-by-cliqueOverlap
Method:                           AVERAGE
Type of Data:                     Similarities

HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING

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3.0000    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXX . XXX . . . . . . . .
2.6667    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXX XXX . . . . . . . .
2.0222    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXX . . . . . . . .
2.0000    XXX . . . . . XXXXX . . . . . XXXXXXXXX XXX XXX XXX . .
1.6667    XXX . . . . . XXXXX . . . . . XXXXXXXXX XXX XXX XXXXX .
1.4000    XXX . . . . . XXXXX . . . . . XXXXXXXXX XXX XXXXXXXXX .
1.2056    XXX . . . . . XXXXX . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX .
1.1333    XXX . . . . . XXXXXXX . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX .
1.0000    XXXXXXXXX . . XXXXXXX XXX XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX .
0.6190    XXXXXXXXX . . XXXXXXX XXX XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX
0.5714    XXXXXXXXX . . XXXXXXXXXXX XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX
0.3229    XXXXXXXXX . . XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX
0.1714    XXXXXXXXX . XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX
0.0874    XXXXXXXXX . XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.0204    XXXXXXXXX . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.0000    XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Clustering permutation saved as dataset hicluspermutation

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Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  14 Aug 03 11:21:46
Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Analytic Technologies
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Cliques 1 and 2 also form a subgroup with both of these cliques sharing two members. This cohesive subgroup is dominated by organisations with an interest in the River Thames. The organisations within this subgroup are the British Trust for Conservation Volunteers (BTCV), LWT, Thames 21 and the Thames Explorer Trust.

A third notable cohesive subgroup consists of cliques 13, 14 and 15. Again each of these cliques share two members. This subgroup contains climate change campaigners including Stop Esso, CCC, FoE, Greenpeace and People and Planet. Another subgroup in which two cliques share at least two identical actors consists of FoE at different levels of its operation - FoE, London FoE, West London FoE and Hillingdon FoE.

A final noteworthy subgroup consists of four cliques – again each sharing two actors and consisting mostly of transport organisations but there is an interesting mix along with wildlife and countryside organisations. These are: CAPITAL, CPRE, Transport 2000, HACAN, Ramblers, RSPB and the Wildlife and Countryside Link.

This indicates that the environmental movement in London is most likely to be factionalised according to the issues involved rather than on the bases of action or ideology. This could amount to a division of labour rather than a permanent rift between organisations, not withstanding that multi-issue groups like CPRE and FoE campaign on more than one issue, so reducing the scope for factionalism.

10.5 Summary

This chapter has outlined the importance of defining movement boundaries, and shown that this is a difficult task. It seeks a theoretically apt definition that coheres with activists' own perceptions of which organisations constitute 'their' movement. Here it was shown that there is a high correspondence between environmental activist perception of what the movement is and their answers to questions asking about their organisation's embeddedness in a network of EMOs and whether or not their organisation had a main aim that was environmentally oriented. However, there were some anomalous cases, including sustainability-based organisations that regard themselves as having a larger remit than 'environmental', transport organisations that are sometimes motivated by commuter frustration and residents associations that do not always have recourse to the environment.

In terms of movement overlap, the difficulty of disentangling the environmental movement from anti-nuclear, peace, animal rights, anti-consumer and anarchist/anti-capitalist concerns, was demonstrated. In practice, animal rights groups should not be seen as part of the movement because they do not partake in environmental campaigns (hence their detachment from the collaboration network). Therefore, Diani's (1992a) definition of a social movement needs to be strengthened so that it suggests that collaborative rather than just informal links are required to make an organisation part of a movement. AWOs are part of the information based networks, but the information they receive from EMOs may be merely stockpiled, too basic, or of no use to their campaigns and therefore would not allow for 'broader senses meanings' (Diani 1992a:8) to be developed.

That the most central actor in the collaboration network is a conservation organisation shows that even in a highly urban setting, the natural environment is not neglected by activists. What the centrality indicators show is that conservation and reformist type organisations are both highly important to the movement. FoE has fairly high degrees, but is below HACAN, which dominates the movement because of the critical campaigns at Heathrow airport. The FoE 'family' play a significant role in the movement, making FoE at all levels an important agenda-setter.

If we can talk of sub-movements on the basis of cohesive subgroup analysis, these sub-movements are not ideologically or strategically factioned, but are split on an issue basis. To talk of sub-movements, we could refer to an 'anti-aviation movement', the 'River Thames movement' and the 'Climate Change movement'. Perhaps too, we could call the FoE-family a 'movement', as it does consist of more than one organisation, FoE group's have a shared identity and concern as well as being part of a collaboration network. Had this been a national survey of environmental groups, or if more radical organisations had answered the questionnaire, we may have been able to identify a 'direct action movement'. The chapters that follow will apply network analysis and interview quotes to the theoretical hypotheses set out in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 11

The Role of Resources in Relationships

This chapter draws on the theory outlined in Chapter 4. It explores whether it is true that national groups tend to marginalize local groups in their networking as a consequence of prioritising their own organisational maintenance. This is explored using a partition of groups within each network (collaboration, information provided, information received and information exchange) according to their sphere of operation. This enables us to see the number of ties that national groups have with local, regional and other national groups to determine whether there is any bias in the types of organisations selected. The notion of bias in selecting groups is further explored using a differential inbreeding model. The findings are supported with interview quotes and data collected from participant observation. The chapter also discusses other aspects of RMT such as the effect of resource constraints on organisational network links, examples of conflict and competition between organisations and trust-benefit relations.

11.1 Do national groups turn their backs on local groups?

This first section of Chapter 11 seeks to address hypothesis 1 from Chapter 7. It asks whether it is true that national organisations have a tendency turn their backs on local groups in their quest to promote their own organisation, preferring instead to chose winnable issues. It also explores the extent to which organisational maintenance breeds conflict within the movement. This section is tackled in four subsections. Firstly, network data is explored to see the extent to which national groups nominate local groups as important collaborators or information-sharing partners. Secondly, evidence is presented which suggests that national EMOs do make a conscious effort to involve local EMOs in their campaigning regardless of the relatively low numbers of ties they extend towards them. Thirdly, there is a discussion of how national and regional EMOs select their choices of issues, and finally the role of organisational maintenance in creating conflicts between EMOs is explored.

Network data on ties between local, regional and national EMOs

RMT suggests that EMOs work primarily for self-gain and thus national groups frequently side-line local groups as a side effect of selecting sexy or winnable issues (Hannigan 1995:94, deShalit

2001). A scan of the DL list[1] compiled for national EMOs shows that they have more links with other national groups than regional and local groups. As each organisation was given the opportunity to list five organisations with which they have links at each spatial level (local, national and regional), it would be expected that there be the same number of links directed towards each of these spatial dimensions. However, frequently national EMOs named just one, two or even no local and regional EMOs, showing that they have a clear bias towards the providing and receiving of information between themselves, and collaborating with one another over local and regional groups.[2] In the information received and provided and collaboration networks, there are 50 plus linked pairs of national organisations. National group ties with regional and local groups though are much fewer – with 17 or fewer pairs. This clearly shows a tendency for national groups to work together and share information with one another to a much greater extent than they do with their local and regional counterparts (Table 11.1).

Table 11.1 Pairs of ties in DL list by the sphere of operation

NETWORK	NO. PAIRS IN NATIONAL DLS			
	Southeast	Northwest	Regional	National
Collaboration	12	8	11	62
Received-Information	12	8	12	67
Provided-Information	17	9	13	55

[1] A DL list is a text-based format for entering network data in UCINet. Essentially it is a list of organisations and the network links that they mention. For instance if CPRE lists FoE, Greenpeace, Wildlife and Countryside Link and WWF as four out of five top links, the following partnerships would be listed:

```
CPRE FoE
CPRE Greenpeace
CPRE WildlifeCountrysideLink
CPRE WWF
```

The same would be done for each organisation's elected choices. UCINet converts data inputted in this format into a socio-matrix (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman 1999).

[2] It may be that the lists of local collaborators or information providers / receivers are too numerous or too difficult to rank. Anheier (1987:579), for example, warns of the bias that 'power and size differentials' are likely to yield as 'smaller organisations tend to be well aware of informal and cooperative relations with larger organisations, but not vice versa'.

It was a useful exercise to partition the main component of each network by the EMOs' scale of operation. In the collaboration network, 170 organisations were in the main component and had a known or easily ascribed sphere of operation. This included 37 southeast, 53 northwest, 27 regional and 53 national organisations. Of the 75 collaborative ties (roughly 2 ties per organisation) mentioned by southeast London groups, 36 (48%) were directed towards other southeast London groups, 14 towards regional groups (19%) and 25 towards national groups (33%) (Figure 11.1). In support of the theory that national groups turn their backs upon local groups, it can be seen that collaborative ties between national groups amount to 54% of their collaborative ties (compared to 25% for local groups – 15% southeast, 10% northwest). This inbreeding (Skovertz 1991) is common too amongst other blocks, with each having most ties linked to others with the same geographical sphere of operation. The northwest block shows a high level of independence, with 73% of the collaborative ties of such groups being directed towards others in the northwest.

Figure 11.1, Collaboration Network by Sphere of Operation



This is probably a function of the well-developed and internally supportive networks that have evolved between conservation organisations and EMO branches in the northwest. Ealing Wildlife Network brings together a conglomeration of concerned conservationist interests, perhaps making

it unnecessary to call upon national groups for assistance.[3] FoE too is very well networked in the northwest of London. Ealing and Hillingdon FoE are part of the membership of the well-organised West London FoE (which I considered as being a northwest group rather than a regional one) that is both influential and well connected to London FoE, which in turn gets its support from national FoE. Such high independence of a local environmental movement may also be the outcome of the long and sustained campaigns against expansion of Heathrow Airport. The links between these organisations are also tight because of the brokerage role played by a particular key activist, Ferriday of West London FoE who suggests that:

> ... they are all very close because I am active in all of them ... there would be a link any way because ... a lot of members of West London FoE are members of AEF ... (interview June 2003).

Ferriday works part time for the AEF and FoE on aviation issues, coordinates West London FoE, is an active member of Ealing FoE and helps coordinate the Wildlife Network. His extensive knowledge on aviation issues filters through the network at national, regional and local levels and helps bind the movement.

Local campaigning groups have most ties with other local groups, and this is more prominent when there is a contentious local issue at stake. A survey of local FoE groups in 1998 showed that 89% of them were involved in coalitions or fora, including most prominently Local Agenda 21 and Transport coalitions. Throughout 1998, 76% of them had claimed to work with other community groups and over half of these collaborations were with local specific single-issue campaign groups (Richie, 1998, unpaged).

Days of action of coalitions that consist of national organisations that have branches increases the propensity for cooperation between local organisations. Stop Esso days of action for example; have witnessed the coming together of a variety of local organisations. As Dorey (Greenpeace marine campaigner and northwest London area networker) claimed (interview January 2004):

> the last time we went out and did an action against Esso, we got people from four different Greenpeace groups, two FoE groups and a People & Planet group.

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[3] Ealing Wildife Network consists of the Brent and River Canal Society, Ealing Allotments and Gardens Society, Ealing Wildlife Trust, Friends of Litten Local Nature Reserve, Ealing Badger Group, London Bat Group, Hounslow & Ealing Conservation Volunteers, Northolt & Greenford Country Park Society, Ealing Watch Group, West London Organic Wildlife Gardeners Association and Ealing WWF.

It is only regional groups that have a greater proportion of ties with groups at other spatial levels. They especially have strong collaborative ties with national organisations (Figure 11.1).

Local groups in the southeast and northwest have fewer top five important collaborative ties with regional groups than with national groups. If the problematic relationship between LWT and its satellite organisation CWT based at Gunnersbury Triangle is any guide to the type of relationships between regional and local organisations this is an unsurprising finding. At Gunnersbury Triangle nature reserve there has been conflict between the regional body of LWT who are the management committee for the site and CWT that forms the steering committee. The aim of LWT is to gain tighter control of its steering groups[4] and to manage the reserve centrally and thereby reduce the power of local volunteers. Conflict has occurred because many of the volunteers have been committed to the site for at least 15 years and know the reserve intimately whereas staff have less knowledge and experience and are therefore perceived as inept. This perception is strengthened by the fact that there is a relatively high turnover of staff (due to lapses in funding) and different staff members are posted each year. According to one warden:

> Support from LWT has been limited and is on the whole disappointing. It may be that the staff are stretched, but there is a lack of expertise and management skill. An organisation offering low salaries is bound to recruit young staff with limited experience, often staying in post for a short time which leads to a lack of continuity in addition to the above short-comings (Rear, CWT volunteer warden, interview, February 2004).

A paid member of LWT staff was posted at the Triangle throughout the summer months to manage the reserve and the result was conflict between locals and regional staff. The paid warden came from a countryside management background, whereas the volunteer warden had an intimate knowledge of local ecology, having been a committed naturalist for the past 25 years. At least twice these differences in background and levels of experience created conflicts. The first conflict related to what local volunteers perceived to be inappropriate strimming of brambles and the other to using a brush-clearing machine in an area of sensitive habitat. The management plan states a clear policy of not strimming back brambles because this allows them to produce more fruit to encourage birds. Trimming is preferred only if brambles become dangerous to volunteers and visitors.

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[4] According to Roberts and Robertshaw (CWT volunteer wardens, interview February 2004), LWT have been gesturing about bringing local groups under tighter control for years. Due to lack of people power, in practice there has been little change except for CWT's changed 'label' from a management committee to a steering group.

However, under the orders of the summer warden, a volunteer trimmed a stretch of bramble down to the roots. The volunteer warden was unhappy about this infringement of the policy. Secondly, the brush-clearing machine was used by the summer warden in an area very close to the nesting site of harriers. It was believed that this frightened the potential breeders away from their usual nesting site. LWT had asked the summer warden to do this, and he carried out the deed without first checking the management plan which states that the pathway near the nesting site should remain quiet.

London FoE similarly may not be perceived as an important collaborator for local groups, including FoE local groups because it has a small budget, low manpower and a multitude of tasks to work on. Bates is working on the Thames Gateway Bridge campaign, attempting to set up regional networks of campaigners to input into regional government decision making procedures, as well as ensuring that local groups within London are functioning as effectively as they ought to be and promoting FoE's policies to the GLA. In interview, she compared London FoE to the Simon Wolfe Charitable Foundation which is a small locally based organisation that has two full time campaigners associated with it, and drew the conclusion that:

> ... even though it [Thames Gateway Bridge] is the main campaign that I am doing, the reality is that they have probably got more time and money than I have, because in reality it is only me! You know, with a tiny budget and some local groups if I am lucky ...(London FoE coordinator, interview, February 2001).

There are also some interesting trends in the partitioned matrix for the information-provided network. The majority of ties towards which southeast, regional and national organisations provide information and resources are national groups. Local groups in the southeast are especially likely to filter their information on to national groups. This shows that they have a non-NIMBY nature, and may reflect a general trend for them to see national EMOs as the most important players in the movement. Again, northwest EMOs show a strong tendency to work independently with 45% of their ties directed towards others like them (Figure 11.2).

Figure 11.2, Information-provided network by Sphere of Operation



If the top five most important choices to which local and regional organisations provide information is an indication of the overall importance of the organisation to which they are providing it, there is slightly less tendency for this to happen in the information-received network (Figure 11.3). For local organisations in the southeast, a slightly higher proportion of important ties from which information is received are regional (39%) than national (36%). For northwest organisations, the scales weigh in equal balance between regional and national organisations (31% each). This indicates that regional groups play an important role in providing information to local groups, and that local groups see this as a credible and important source. Regional groups, however, rate information received from local southeast groups as unimportant. The most important sources from which regional groups receive information are northwest and national organisations (38% of ties a piece). This again is likely to be a result of northwest groups' integration into regional networks via London FoE and a function of the current Heathrow-based campaigns which is a regional issue. Again, northwest groups show a reasonable level of independence, with 39% of their most important sources of information being other northwest organisations. However, most national organisations are too fully stretched maintaining their own local networks to be of help to local branches of other organisations. As Ferriday (West London FoE) suggests:

> We mainly link up to FoE nationally or we link up to other groups locally rather than with their national groups, so there wouldn't be much of that [links between Ealing FoE and other national groups]. Other local groups would speak to their own national group (interview June 2003).

However, the story is somewhat different if we consider information sent out by e-mail because of the small amount of time and energy involved in contacting people in this manner. Local groups

signed up to FoE's activist mail outs include branches of other organisations such as Mid Devon Green Party, North Dorset Green Party and other smaller interests like East London Gardening Centre and Totnes Genetics group.[5]

Figure 11.3, Information-received network Partitioned by Sphere of Operation



Many activists find FoE email alerts and websites useful sources of information. Thornhill (in interview, June 2003) commented on how email postings from FoE are crucial for keeping informed. Sobey (NoTRAG committee member, interview February 2004) commented that although FoE's information is not usually new to him, its accessible style and the ease of accessing information from the internet is especially useful.

Over two thirds of national organisations' most important sources of information are other national EMOs. Given that most national organisations are careful to source credible information, and that national organisations are much more likely to have the resources to employ professional staff, this is not surprising (Figure 11.3).

There is a higher tendency for national EMOs to be involved in the mutual exchange of information with other organisations - there are more than twice as many links (11 compared to a maximum of five) as in other blocks in the exchange of information between national organisations (Figure 11.4).

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[5] Part of my participant observation in FoE London office included organising a database of activists signed up to various campaign update lists. In the main these were local group members, but activists from a wide range of other (mostly reformist) organisations had signed up also. NB these links may not register as the top five most important links.

This is likely to be a result of a number of factors. National organisations are likely to have more full-time staff and greater financial resources which make it easier to maintain relations with other organisations. In regional organisations like LWT, staff posts are usually dependent upon the success of bids for funding. Where these are unsuccessful, members of staff are often made redundant, resulting in quite a high turnover of staff and little continuity in terms of campaigning effort and maintaining links with other organisations (Waugh [LWT] interview June 2003). As national organisations effectively spearhead the movement, it is important for them to keep in contact with other national organisations.

Figure 11.4, Information Exchange Network Partitioned by Sphere of Operation



Inbreeding

Southeast groups have a 39% bias towards that engagement being made with another group in the southeast over and above groups elsewhere. For groups in the northwest of London, the figure is substantially higher at 69%. Regional and national groups have a notably lower 'inbreeding bias' [6](8% and 20% respectively). The high figure for the northwest can be explained by the existence of a high profile local campaign that dominates the local environmental movement. Local groups are most likely to co-operate with each other frequently when there is a current campaign running and local campaigners are focussing upon the same issues (Table 11.2).

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[6] Inbreeding bias is explained in Chapter 8.

Table 11.2, 'Inbreeding Biases' According to Sphere of Operation of EMOs[7]

	Collaboration Network	Information-provided network	Information-received network	Information Exchange Network
Southeast	39%	22%	10%	9%
Northwest	69%	38%	27%	0%
Regional	8%	17%	0%	0%
National	20%	11%	44%	51%

In the collaboration network, the 'inbreeding bias' for regional groups is low at just 8%. This could be explained by the fact that regional groups tend to have more of a role as information providers or receivers rather than as collaborative partners. Most of the top 5 information providers for local organisations in the southeast of London are regional organisations. Although northwest groups provide much information to each other and appear mutually supportive, regional groups are just as important, whereas collaborative ties between regional and local levels are much lower and less significant. Where a single organisation with local and regional chapters exists, regional groups have a strong tendency to be the intermediaries between local groups and their national counterparts. Hence CWT collaborates relatively frequently with LWT (although less frequently than volunteers would like), but not with the national body. In the same way, local FoE groups in Northwest London (Ealing and Hillingdon FoE) are more likely to collaborate with West London FoE, a semi-regional body, or regional 'London FoE' than they are with national FoE. Their joint role as information providers and go-betweens amidst local and national organisations means that they have fewer resources left to filter into actual collaborative campaigns. With the exception of LWT, regional groups have a general lack of collaborative partnerships.

In the information-provided network, the 'inbreeding biases' are still highest for northwest groups, although at 38% the figure is considerably lower than the bias for collaboration. Local EMOs in northwest London share a smaller proportion of their ties in the provision of information with other northwest organisations than in the collaboration network. This is because they are more likely to

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[7] See appendix 9 for goodness of fit scores for inbreeding biases.

collaborate with other local concerns but may wish to share information more widely. The same pattern is seen in local southeast London groups for which the bias for the information-provided network is 22% versus 39% in the collaboration network.

For national groups, the 11% 'inbreeding bias' in information provision is the lowest bias for national groups. This indicates that national groups are more likely to provide information to lower-level (regional or local) groups than they are to receive information from them, be involved in an information exchange, or collaborate with them. National groups like FoE are very efficient at sending out information en-masse with minimal input. For instance local group activists and general dip-in activists are signed up to a variety of Majordomo e-mail alert lists (as with renewables/energy, waste, pesticides/food and chemicals lists). As FoE are regarded by most activists as a credible source of information, many sign up to receive e-mail updates. This flow of information is unlikely to work in reverse – FoE is less likely to sign up to the email discussion list of Greenwich Cyclists, because the group is relatively small and has a small remit and FoE campaigners are at pains to reduce email and postal mail in-box capacities and information overload. FoE campaigners favour other credible and reputable national organisations with particular specialisms as sources of information. Thus, whilst I was helping out with some work for the FoE GM Campaigner Claire Oxborrow, she asked me to search for information on the 114 signatories to a pro-GM letter to the Prime Minister to find out if they had pecuniary interests in the biotechnology industry. She recommended that the search be carried out through the website of the Genetics Engineering Network – a website she frequently turns to for information on GM foods. For aviation campaigning, the AEF is an important source of information for FoE, so much so that its research has saved FoE from having to do the groundwork itself (de Zylva, Head of England Team, FoE, interview, January 2004). Apparently, the AEF know 'more about aviation than any other organisation on earth' (Stewart, chair or HACAN, interview, January 2004). On the Baku Ceyhan Campaign, Cornerhouse were an invaluable source of information on international financial institutions (IFIs) and Platform a wealth of knowledge on oil issues.

Biases for receiving information and exchanging information amongst national groups are 44% and 50% - indicating that around half of these kinds of ties from national groups are directed towards other national groups. Other 'inbreeding biases' regarding sphere of operation in the information exchange network (for regional, northwest and southeast groups) are very low (regional is 9%), or missing. All types of groups except national ones exchange information across geographical spheres of operation, whereas national groups have quite a high tendency to exchange information amongst themselves.

National EMOs do make a conscious effort to support local EMOs

Although the network data shows that national groups' most important network links are mainly with other national groups, we should not automatically assume that organisations like Greenpeace and FoE turn their backs on local groups. Cudworth's (2003:93) assessment of Greenpeace as fostering 'little if any local activism' is clearly misled. Neither is Diani & Donati's (1999:23) finding in relation to the Italian environmental movement - that national EMOs only support local initiatives to gain visibility - a fair assessment of British national EMOs. Both FoE and Greenpeace make a conscious effort to involve grassroots supporters and make their kinds of activism accessible to local people and community groups. FoE Regional Campaigns Co-ordinators work to involve local FoE groups and other local community campaigning groups and offer support and advice for them. Part of FoE's ethos is to encourage 'people participating actively as citizens and organising, mobilizing and inspiring people to become active citizens' (FoE 2003). Greenpeace on the other hand is more concerned with providing people with the know-how, experience and confidence to take what they learn from Greenpeace and apply it to other campaigns independently of Greenpeace. This was the particular aim of Greenpeace's Incinerator Busters campaign that ran from summer of 2001 to 2002 (see chapter 12). The Basingstoke incinerator action in 2002 was the first, and to my knowledge, only time that the actions team worked with local non-Greenpeace groups. It was arranged by Mark Strutt (toxics campaigner) and Miranda Holmes (temporary incineration campaigner) and consisted of three people from SAGE and two or three people from other local incinerator groups (personal communication with Scott, 2003). However, Greenpeace will only support local campaigns like this when there is a very tight link with its national priority themes.

According to Torrance (Greenpeace Networker), his job is all about:

> coordinating and managing a network of volunteers who want to, or at least say to us that they want to actively participate in Greenpeace campaigns. Perhaps we train them up in NVDA, we involve them in our direct actions ... There are a whole range of activities out there ... from people receiving a newsletter we produce each month called *Network*, to getting people letter writing, to people participating in Greenpeace campaigns, and ultimately to feel that they themselves could set up a local opposition group to any incinerator plan or whatever. And I think that Greenpeace is one of those organisations out there which is just a real conduit for people ... a kind of wake up call (interview July 2003).

For instance, Dorey started off her activist career as a Greenpeace local supporter and went on from there to become increasingly involved in local group work and Greenpeace direct actions.

From there she developed the know-how and confidence to set up EDAG and is currently north London Greenpeace Area Networker and oceans campaigner. North London Greenpeace activists also set up an organisation called London Against Incineration, which was successful in stopping plans for expansion of incinerators in the North of London 'and there are countless examples of that ...' (Torrance interview, July 2003). FoE has had a similar impact on the activism of Phil Thornhill who now, almost independently runs CCC:

> my whole roots of campaigning are as a local FoE group person, so that is absolutely important yeah, if I hadn't have been in a local FoE group, I would never have been doing anything remotely like this (Thornhill interview, June 2003).

For local group actions, both FoE and Greenpeace campaigns follow a DiY-pack model. Although FoE groups can also campaign off their own backs choosing their own issues and methods (so long as they do not bring the name FoE into disrepute), most FoE local groups are involved in rolling the national campaigns out at a local level and, in a similar manner to Greenpeace local groups, receive posters, briefings and instructions for these campaigns from the national office.

FoE is also supportive of other community groups. One of FoE's strategic aims for 2003-8 is to 'support and develop non-Friends of the Earth community groups so that they can be effective in campaigns that support and reinforce our Strategic Aims and Objectives' (FoE 2003). This is the ethos behind FoE's new Community Website, which was launched in June 2003. It was the result of consultation with local group members and piloted by 100 local activists. It provides briefings, resources, campaign ideas, postings and the facility for non-FoE local activists to share thoughts, ideas and plans of actions. The idea of the website is to make local groups increasingly more independent, to encouraging networking between them – some of which have considerable expertise on specific issues – and to stimulate local campaigning across communities (Nichols, 2003). The website has around 1,500 unique users per month, with an average engagement time of 20 minutes (compared to 10 minutes for FoE's main website). Besides informing them about the resources available through 'Community', enquiring non-FoE activists are also sent a copy of FoE's campaigning handbook '*How to Win*' (Sartori, Local Groups Development Officer, FoE, interview, November 2003).

Because local FoE groups campaign on a range of issues, local ad hoc environmental campaigns often latch on to FoE, sometimes without the slightest consideration of seeking help from Greenpeace. FoE was very active nationally, locally and regionally in the campaigns against airport

expansion, but Greenpeace was notably absent. I asked Pearce from Longford Residents Association about this:

> **CS** I don't suppose you ever thought to yourselves 'Where's Greenpeace'?
>
> **RP** I think Greenpeace deal with worldwide issues and I think that groups can't do everything and you have to leave certain things to certain experts... I don't think that anybody thinks that because a big organisation like that weren't at the inquiry that they should be ...
>
> **CS** If Friends of the Earth hadn't been there ... do you think you might have thought ... 'where are Friends of the Earth?'
>
> **RP** Oh yes, but I would have been very shocked actually if they weren't there because it is such a major issue ... (Pearce interview, January 2004).

FoE's support for community campaigning organisations has become so entrenched as part of its remit, that it is now par for the course that there be a FoE presence on major local environmental campaigns. The same cannot be said of Greenpeace whose support for local initiatives, although expanding, remains tightly controlled. Whilst Pearce accepts that Greenpeace's remit is working on international high profile issues, some are less pleased with Greenpeace's apparent lack of support for grassroots initiatives. Coleman (EDAG activist) received an email informing him that:

> "Greenpeace as an organisation doesn't get involved in local issues" and I couldn't believe it ... It was a local community who wanted some help and wrote to Greenpeace. Greenpeace ... wrote back to them and said "don't worry, we will pass it on to some local groups, maybe FoE" they said and may be some other local groups in London, but I just thought, that is not good. That isn't a good way to be moving forward (interview November 2003).

Although Greenpeace and FoE both use local support to bolster their organisations, FoE clearly has a much larger presence at the community level and to a greater extent regards the contribution of grassroots campaigners as crucial for achieving the kind of sustainable society it envisages.

Greenpeace does however consider the views of its local group members when planning actions (Dorey interview, January 2004):

> ... every action we do on the street they ask us to send back a feedback form ... [there is] constant feedback with the Supporters Unit and they ... meet with the campaigners to listen to the ideas they have got and then they say "I don't think it's going to work, or we need to do this" ...

Many local activists form a pool of labour for high profile Greenpeace actions and play a more integral role than often assumed.

Local FoE groups now contribute substantially to FoE's planning and policies. The waste team has a Waste Advisory Group consisting of four local experts (including Scott from SAGE) that meets bi-annually to discuss FoE's waste policy.[8] The voluntary work I undertook at FoE (September 2003-February 2004) consisted mostly of analysing FoE's 5-year plan and chasing up campaigners to schedule days of action, training and targets for local group involvement. As an example, between 2004-2008, the 'Curb the Power of Supermarkets' campaign will involve local groups in the following ways:

- Several days of action.
- Fighting supermarket mergers (if proposed).
- Surveying supermarkets for data on food miles and local produce.
- Encouraging MPs to support the EDM for a Code of Practice and a Retail Regulator.
- At least 2 training days
- Writing to MPs for support for the Planning Bill at report stage.
- Raising awareness of supermarket over-packaging and pushing for legislation.

The aim is to create, by 2005, a wide alliance of national and local organisations (not just FoE groups) campaigning to reduce supermarkets' dominance and impact. By Spring 2006 there are expected to be 200 diverse local and national groups working on this issue in addition to a list of 'DIY activists' willing to take action (FoE 2003).

As with FoE, CPRE sees its local groups as a vital part of its campaigning:

> CPRE comes very much from local groups as much as nationally, so the groups have always had a ... profile in developing and influencing policy. Any agreements we get from local groups are on the basis of negotiation, and some compromise and hoping that good sense prevails .... We don't have any sense of signed agreement on delivery of service or anything like that (White, interview October 2003).

Much of CPRE's work involves writing guidance that local groups put into action (Schofield, Head of Regions at CPRE, interview, October 2003).

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[8] A small but vocal minority of participants of the Waste Advisory Group have raised an objection to FoE's campaigning shift from incineration to 'Reduce Resource Use'. During January 2004, FoE had only 1 live incineration campaign to support. Watson sees that the debate within local councils and nationally has shifted to a recognition of the need to reduce the amount of waste produced at source. FoE will continue to support local incineration campaigns, but this will be done at a national rather than local level by waging arguments about how incineration should not receive subsidies and seeking ways of making recycling more economically attractive (Watson, Waste Campaigner FoE, interview, January 2004).

National and regional EMOs' choice of issues

FoE, Greenpeace and CPRE try to encourage local community campaigning, inside and outside their own branches and all three organisations have actively campaigned, or pledged to do so on aviation.[9] However, they still have organisational constraints that make it impossible to support every campaign arising. As Weston (1989:105) suggested, there is always some consideration of which campaigns are winnable in terms of policy breakthroughs and winning the hearts and minds of potential supporters. FoE's 5-Year Plan states that:

> we must choose the right number of campaigns that will increase our chances of having some significant "victories" (this is not likely to be achieved by a large number of lightly-resourced campaigns) (FoE 2003:33),

implying that resources are best placed in a few carefully selected winnable campaigns. According to Sartori ([FoE] interview, November 2004), the decision on whether or not to support an issue is based on:

> ... how winnable a campaign is [and] whether it could be ... taken up as a national thing [and] if it is fitting in with out 5-year plan and our campaign.

Rau (climate/corporates campaigner, FoE) is more specific about the characteristics a campaign should have to be worthy of FoE support. His criteria include having a UK based company involved so that there is an accessible campaign target:

> because then we can hit the AGMs, we can hit the institutional investors as well ... we have got a lot more opportunities to influence. We have got more offices ... to hit as well ...

Recently FoE has joined a coalition with Bankwatch, Pacific Environment and Sakhalin Environment Watch to campaign against expansion of Shell's Sakhalin II oil and gas project in the Russian Far East. In addition to having a UK company to target, the area is host to a variety of endangered wildlife and will be likely to attract more public sympathy than the Baku Ceyhan campaign that was dominated by human rights issues.

> A lot of our supporters want biodiversity, that is what they are concerned about so they would be more interested in the campaign if we have got some fluffy animals down there ... (Rau interview, January 2004).

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[9] John Stewart has been in contact with Steven Tindale from Greenpeace and Greenpeace has pledged to bring some of its expertise in direct action to the campaign.

Radical EMOs that attended the COP9 UNFCC discussion in Milan in December 2003, may have been dismayed to see that FoE were not present. Again this was a carefully considered strategic decision by FoE on several practical and logistical grounds:

> One was how significant are the negotiations going to be? Are they going to be newsworthy? Is there anything that is going to happen that we can make a difference to? ... Had the Russians ratified, or declared that they were going to ratify before Milan ... there might have been some big decisions made at Milan, in which case we would have gone. Second reason ... was 'was there a strong local group that would have been able to have a handle of logistics?' and FoE Italy aren't very strong actually, although FoE Milan are quite strong. And thirdly it is quite a long way ... you have to get people over the Alps, and without elephants, we couldn't have got enough people over the Alps (Rau, interview January 2004).

National FoE has also been reluctant to give much backing to the Campaign Against Climate Change. FoE's Senior Climate Campaigner Higman was loath to get too deeply involved because of concerns that the campaign may be misdirected, or that campaigning resources might be better placed elsewhere:

> **PT** He just kept whimpering on about Twyford Down and how it wouldn't work and so on
> **CS** How was this related to Twyford Down?
> **PT** It was the fact that it was something that FoE was involved in that didn't succeed ... it was a bad experience as a FoE campaign (Thornhill [CCC], interview June 2003).

FoE's inevitable selectivity about which campaigns to support can make the organisation appear somewhat fickle to outside organisations. Hanton (transport campaigner, interview, April 2001) noted for example that FoE:

> ...come in and out of the transport scene. They're rather maverick actually, and there's a lot of rivalry between them and other people because they're very keen on expanding Friends of the Earth.

Some activists appreciate that it is impossible for FoE to support every campaign initiative. Whilst pleased with his relationship with FoE, Ferriday is 'not always pleased with the amount of help they

can give', and appreciates that '... they just don't have the time to respond to the campaigns of every group in the country' (Ferriday [WLFoE] interview, June 2003).[10]

With aviation however, there was no doubt about the need to support local interests, Rau (FoE) goes so far as to suggest that the campaign exists 'purely because of demand for local groups', but it is also conceived of as a winnable campaign - 'we beat them on roads and we can win again' (Juniper, Director of FoE, 2004) - and relates to FoE's broader concerns about over-development in London, road congestion and climate change. However, it is still impossible to support every local campaign issue that arises. When he was London Groups Coordinator, de Zylva limited himself to supporting no more than three local campaigns at once, 'otherwise it is like trying to keep too many plates spinning' (de Zylva interview, January 2004).

For CPRE, choices of which local interests to pursue are calculated using a Gateway Test which involves:

> the capacity to do it, whether there are other organisations that are better placed to do it than we are, whether or not we have the time or resources, and whether it is a CPRE priority based on our mission statement which is quite specifically to do with the English Countryside (Schofield, interview, October 2003).

CPRE goes against NIMBY wishes of branches or members if the siting of a LULU in their backyard is seen to be the most acceptable site from a broad policy perspective (White, interview October 2003). Greenpeace tends not to get involved in local campaigns unless they are a part of a corporate campaigning package (e.g. Incinerator Busters). For LWT, the issue is always dependent on:

> what the local impacts will be, although there aren't a huge number of planning applications on metropolitan sites ... it will always be dependent on our funding and whether it is in our remit ... but we will certainly try to support any other local groups that do want to put in their own planning objections against proposals in their own area (Waugh, interview June 2003).

However, it appears that requests for help from national organisations are relatively infrequent. Whilst sitting opposite Sartori (the first point of contact for FoE's 193 local groups) for 24 consecutive weeks as a FoE volunteer, her phone rang only 4-6 times in an office day, and not all

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[10] Robertshaw [CWT[made a similar comment about the lack of support from LWT – she has an appreciation that there is a limit to what one relatively resource-poor organisations can do.

calls were from local group members seeking help.[11] Most local group calls are from newly established groups still finding their feet or are requests for mailings to national group members who live in the locality of a local group (Sartori, interview, November 2003).

Similarly for CPRE ' ... the demands that come in for that kind of campaign support aren't that great. It is usually information specifically that people want' (Schofield, interview, October 2003). CPRE routinely sends out planning guidance notes to local people but provides little additional support.

Organisational maintenance and conflict between EMOs

Most instances of conflict between EMOs appear to stem from organisations attempting to promote their own corporate image. For instance, being the subject of a predator prey relationship, LWT is now very cautious in its relations with the RSPB:

> We worked on a strategy with RSPB ... The trouble with working with the RSPB is that people very rarely realised that we were part of the project. They slapped their logo all over it ... [and] to be honest it does cause a little bit of bad feeling amongst other organisations. And I know a lot of people say that they won't work with the RSPB any more (Waugh in interview June 2003).

EMOs have similar problems with the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) that has a tendency to hijack campaigns (Wally January 2001, Thornhill June 2003, Coleman November 2003 interviews) for its own organisational maintenance.[12] For radical activists it appears as if the aim of SWP is not to stop injustice, but to promote the SWP at any cost. SWP banners and copies of the *Socialist Worker* magazine present in large numbers at most anti-war and anti-globalisation/capitalism protests (Thomas 2003).

In the words of Coleman (EDAG):

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[11] Sartori attributes this partly to the community website, where local groups can now download briefings, application forms for the local groups support fund and so on, rather than have to phone or email her and wait for a postal or email response. Apparently the phone used to ring much more frequently.

[12] Similar problems with SWP can be traced back in time across countries and movements. Staggenborg (1986:378) noted how the US Women's National Abortion Action Council 'which apparently hoped to use the abortion issue to mobilize potential recruits to the SWP' was successfully established, but 'due to the involvement of the SWP many autonomous feminist groups boycotted the coalition'.

> ... I mean personally it annoys me that they sell newspapers at events, I mean it just makes it into a sort of 'get your anti-war T-shirt here' and I always find it a little bit hard to grasp that these events are being used as a means of making money on T-shirts or newspapers (interview September 2003).

At any protest they turn up to, SWP protesters bring a truck-load of placards that have the SWP or Globalise Resistance (GR) logo plastered prominently over them. According to Freeman ([FoE] interview, February 2004):

> ... in actual fact, the placards are brilliant, they say exactly what the crowd wants to say and they are very clever about it. What's wrong is that it makes it look like the whole thing is Socialist Worker, and they are only a small part of it and that's OK if they come as a small part [but] it is supposed to be a rainbow coalition ... groups of people with all sorts of ideas ... But they make the whole thing look like it's theirs and the people outside ... think "ah, just what we thought, just a bunch of socialists." And it's also the kind of way that they latch onto a campaign when it looks like it is going to get big...

Rau ([FoE] interview January 2004) agrees:

> They are always very good at turning up with placards at any event and they do it very effectively ... I guess it is a bit unfortunate the way they can hijack an event because it might alter public perceptions of events, I mean they are incredibly effective at branding events as their own when they obviously aren't. It's a very simple device to just get a load of placards produced, but time and time they do it and they do it very effectively. And I think that is often to the detriment of the host organisations ...

Apparently aware of its poor image amongst activists, the SWP has created 'fronts' – spin-offs of its former self to capitalise on contemporary growing concerns and keep the Party alive. The SWP has an infamous reputation in activist circles for jumping on new movements, using them as platforms to recruit from, dominating and weakening them, and then moving on to another issue or movement to repeat the process. The second most recent front organisation of the SWP (before the Stop the War Coalition) is Globalise Resistance, set up on the back of the grassroots anti-capitalist movement, specifically designed to co-ordinate resistance to the G8 summit in Genoa, 2001. It is now nicknamed 'monopolise resistance' by its critics (*SchNEWS* 2001).

In some ways it is ironic that the SWP/GR emphasis on organisational maintenance has made it a relatively resource rich organisation that is able to operate more smoothly and in some ways more effectively than the anti-capitalist movement at large. GR's biggest achievement was to organise

transport and plan actions for the Genoa G8 demonstrations. Because it had generated funds through the selling of the much disliked *Socialist Worker* newspaper, it was able to organise and pay for coaches to ship hundreds of protesters to the demonstration and to stage public meetings and a large follow-up conference. These are activities that the wider anti-capitalist movement lacked the resources, organisation, manpower and energy to carry out.

It might be that the radical ecology wing of the environmental movement is correct in its assertion that the SWP is genuinely ineffective because of its emphasis on reform and party politics. However, it seems that the animosity towards the SWP is strengthened by envy over its organisational capacity. 'Disorganisations' are inevitably slower to organise effectively because this clashes with consensus decision-making and autonomy. Hostility between the grassroots and the SWP for control of the movement is the net result.

SchNEWS (2001) effectively sums up the feelings of anti-capitalist movement towards SWP and its front organisations:

> ...The SWP do not share the view of the movement they now claim to be a part of and want to 'lead'. They vote for the government. They oppose 'confrontational' direct action. They vastly over-estimate the extent to which the Labour Party and trade unions represent ordinary people, consistently arguing for anti-capitalists to moderate their activities to suit the prejudices of 'Labour Party activities'.[13] They want to take us back to the days of ineffective walk-to-Hyde-Park-and-listen-to-a-Labour-MP politics that the direct action movement in the country was born as a reaction against.

Greenpeace is reputed to be campaigner on its own so as to preserve its carefully managed public identity and to prevent branding conflicts like those that have happened between RSPB and LWT, and radical activists and SWP. A survey in 1999 showed that Greenpeace collaborates and shares information with FoE only 'rarely' and exchanges information but never collaborates with CPRE and WWF (Rootes 2000). Only four years ago, Vincent (in interview with Adams, 2000) commented on how 'Greenpeace is fairly independent and doesn't often work easily with other groups'. However, it is apparent that over the last five years, Greenpeace has become increasingly involved in coalitions:

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[13] SWP is less pro-Labour than it used to be, given its key role in the Socialist Alliance and the Respect coalitions. However, according to *Schnews* (2001) the SWP party line is to vote socialist where you can, but to otherwise vote Labour. SWP has recommended the forging of links between the anti-capitalist movement and Labour Party supporters.

... there is definitely a lot more, I've only been involved a little while but it just seems that more and more coalitions are building up (Dorey [Greenpeace] interview, January 2004).

... I think more and more it is true to say that we work with other organisations (Torrance [Greenpeace] interview, July 2003).

Recently, Greenpeace has been involved in the Stop the War Coalition, Stop Esso and Yes2 Wind. It is working closely with the Whale & Dolphin Conservation Society on oceans and Timbnet on issues of wood procurement (although these latter two collaborations are not official coalitions). Stop Esso and Yes2Wind however, are both Greenpeace initiatives. Stop Esso is coordinated from an office at Greenpeace's headquarters at Canonbury Villas and apparently:

> Cindy Baxter ... [the co-ordinator] is paid by Greenpeace. The money comes from Greenpeace. As I understand it they have a donor who is specifically interested in Stop Esso. So Greenpeace essentially drive ... the Stop Esso coalition because they have got the money and ... 'he who pays the piper calls the tune'. Because they have got the money they tend to be the ones who generally develop joint materials. We have triple branded materials. But they generally pay the design costs and we will pay for print runs and stuff. We and People & Planet approve copy, but in practice it is quite difficult to object to something (Rau [FoE] interview, January 2004).

Similarly:

> Yes2Wind is basically a Greenpeace initiative and website. And they generally put up most of the resources for it, they developed it. Bryony [FoE renewables campaigner] had quite a lot of input in it, and they did use a FoE wind booklet, our kind of key resource ... but essentially it is Greenpeace-inspired and Greenpeace-developed (Rau interview, January 2004).

Although Greenpeace is increasingly involved in coalition work, it has a tendency to prefer to take the reins and be in control of the coalitions it is involved in, perhaps with its brand image in mind.

Is hypothesis 1 falsified?

Of all organisations studied, this hypothesis is probably best supported by the example of Greenpeace, with has tended to ignore local campaigns with the exception of its recent (and only) venture into the realm of local environmental politics with its Incinerator Busters campaign. Although Greenpeace may have a tendency to seek to promote its brand image, and to sideline local issues and focus instead on a small number of potentially winnable campaigns, this does not mean that Greenpeace totally ignores local activists. In fact it provides direct action training, resources, and avenues for environmental movement involvement. Neither does Greenpeace's

emphasis on organisational maintenance cause a great deal of conflict, but this is probably due to its tendency to campaign alone or be in control of coalitions. However, where a certain organisation's attempt to promote itself comes at the expense of other organisations, conflict is likely, as seen with the scuffles between LWT and the RSPB, and most EMOs and the SWP.

That most of the ties which national groups listed in questionnaire responses were directed towards other national EMOs may appear indicative that they turn their backs on local organisations. This is not necessarily the case. Closer to the truth is recognition that national organisations, like their local counterparts, have resource constraints. They have to deploy their resources in the most effective manner. It is thus more effective for them to invest heavily in a few key campaigns than devote scant resources to many. To varying degrees, before choosing which campaigns to support, this involves an assessment of campaign winnability, the relationship to organisational aims, knowledge/resource availability, the number of constituents affected, or the visibility of the issue and whether or not another organisation is better placed to carry it out. There is inevitably some sidelining, but most local EMO interviewees were content with their relationship to national organisations and aware of the implications of resource constraints.

11.2 Resource Constraints

This section addresses hypotheses 2 as set out in Chapter 7. This hypotheses suggests that organisations with a healthy balance of resources will have greater opportunities for networking, but that organisations with few resources will seek network links to make up for the absence of other resources. Before directly addressing the hypotheses, this section shows how small groups with few resources can be envious or organisations like Greenpeace that are by comparison rich enterprises. Although Greenpeace is relatively wealthy, this does not necessarily manifest itself in support for smaller or struggling EMOs.

At the beginning of the 1990s Greenpeace was criticised for becoming bureaucratic, top down and rich. It is true, Greenpeace does have a lot of money and this is a real source of angst for some radical campaigners who see things like investment, property and organisational bureaucracies as being a part of the capitalist system and therefore a part of the problem. In the words of Torrance:

> Greenpeace obviously has millions and millions. We spend just over a million pounds on campaigns a year and some people might think that it's not being spent appropriately or it's too much, or 'why can't we have it?' ... the 9/11 Campaign ... in about a whole year ... of campaigning they spent about £15,000 ... Greenpeace might spend that easily on one action (Torrance interview, July 2003).

Despite its wealth, Greenpeace apparently made little effort to redistribute its resources to direct activists during the height of the anti-roads campaign.[14] In a Robin-Hood-style, direct activists covertly helped themselves:

> The only help we ever got [from national environment groups] was when our Mick's girlfriend used to work for Greenpeace and she'd accidentally leave the key to the warehouse out for us, because ... we needed gear badly (Bongo, Pirate TV, interview June 2001).

The greater the resources an organisation has, the more bureaucratic and inflexible it becomes and its freedom to engage in collaborative ventures can take second place to formal organisational procedures. For instance within FoE, being professional and relatively resource-rich means needing to place:

> more emphasis on ... design of materials ... having a much more rigid set of procedures in place, so it does stifle individual flexibility ... to use ... initiative, and God, it's a pain in the arse ... it can make the whole organisation work a lot slower and be a lot more ponderous and seem a lot more faceless and bureaucratic. There are a hell of a lot of procedures which frustrate the hell out of me (Rau interview, June 2003).

In reality, national campaigners may be interested in engaging with other organisations or taking a specific campaign focus, but the slow process of approval may make them appear uninterested. FoE for instance is half-way through a process of reorganisation that is expected to take up to three years and has involved 'hundreds of hours worth of discussion and hundreds of papers written' (Freeman, FoE Post room and Volunteers Coordinator and EDAGer, interview, March 2004). The time spent on this process of restructuring could have been better invested in supporting local campaign initiatives and building links with other EMOs, and as Freeman suggests: 'How about changing the world instead?'. One of the aims of the restructuring process is to improve networking and collaboration, but this does show how being resource rich and bureaucratic can work against flexible and dynamic networking. For radical activists, flexibility and dynamism are present, but networking with the wider environmental movement remains trivial.

To test della Porta & Diani's (1999:88) assertion that local grassroots organisations have more ties to compensate for their lack of other resources, the average number of ties for national, regional, and local groups has been calculated on the basis of the DL lists. Local organisations could list a maximum of 60 organisations and national organisations 75 others with which they have network

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[14] With the exception of some small 'under the counter' donations (Seel 2000).

links (with multiplex links counted more than once).[15] By weighting the ties of national organisations to make them equivalent to the maximum number of ties that local EMOs could list,[16] southeast EMOs listed on average 5.39 ties, northwest listed 5.5, regional 5.75, and national EMOs an average of 11.73. Thus it appears that resource-poor organisations have fewer ties than resource rich ones, suggesting perhaps that the presence of resources, although it stifles flexibility, facilitates networking, whereas a lack of resources hampers it.

Is it the lack of resources that makes radical groups isolated and cliquey? Chapter 13 argues that it is the result of their anti-state ideology, strong collective identity and sectarian solidarity. Radical groups, including EDAG do sometimes have resources. The meeting place of EDAG is privately owned (not quite like the real estate of Greenpeace) and (in theory) has open doors to all, but EDAG itself remains fairly cliquey and isolated. For EDAG, issues concerning money are not a justified critique of FoE or Greenpeace as 'there are some people in EDAG who are incredibly well connected and getting money is no problem for them' (Torrance [Greenpeace], interview July 2003). Thornhill (CCC) supports this contention:

> they've got that meeting place, and you've got the whole infrastructure behind that and a lot of money somewhere they've got, although they won't admit it (Thornhill, interview, June 2003).

Most direct action groups however are low on resources, especially money, and, where this is the case, criticism of groups like Greenpeace and FoE for being too rich have greater credibility and less hypocrisy. However, part of the beauty of direct action networks is that the absence of money leads to greater ingenuity in campaigning. Having more money can mean more drug use/abuse and internal squabbles. For the M11 campaign:

> if it had more money it would have just got spent on dope, and E and alcohol or whatever. And I know campaigns that I have been involved in, briefly or for a long time, like Pollock ...

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[15] I.e. there are 3 network relations (information provided, information received and collaboration) to local, regional and national groups with a maximum of 5 organisations listed for each spatial dimension. National organisations could list local organisations from the southeast and the northwest, whereas local EMOs were only given the opportunity to list network relations to others in the same locale.

[16] National and regional organisations could list a maximum of 20 organisations – 5 each of local (southeast), local (northwest), regional and national. Local groups could only list 15 because they were not asked about their links to local groups in a different locality. Thus, southeast groups listed 5 each of local (southeast), regional and national organisations. To make them equal to local group scores, the total number of regional and national ties were multiplied by 0.75.

> or Twyford Down, or Oxleas Wood, whenever we've had a bit of money is when problems have occurred. It's when trying to be inventive and resourceful ... becomes very problematic (Torrance [Greenpeace], interview, July 2003).

56a Infoshop was low on network links because of an increasing trend for protests and parties to be arranged via the internet and because between the summer of 2003 and spring of 2004 it lacked electricity due to impending changes in its lease agreement, making it, especially during the winter, an awkward place for its usual radical group meetings or run of the mill networking ('Dave', 56a visitor, interview September 2003). Clearly in this case, a temporary lack of resources reduced the scope for networking.

Is hypothesis 2 falsified?

A wealth of resources does not necessarily lead to wide and inclusive networks. Although Greenpeace has an enormous stockpile of wealth compared to other EMOs, it is a relatively marginal actor in all networks. Although 56a Infoshop is lacking in both resources and network links, a lack of resources need not necessarily lead to reduced networking capabilities. LWT, is currently in a financial lull[17] but is the most central organisation in the collaboration and information exchange networks, falling close behind FoE in information provision. CPRE is also in the 'top ten' of central actors in each network and yet its networking abilities, especially at the regional level, are constrained by a lack of funding (Schofield [CPRE] interview, October 2003) (Tables 10.2-10.5). Overall, the data does not support this hypothesis.

11.3 Do NIMBY groups generalize via links with other EMOs?

The third hypothesis presented in Chapter 7 is addressed here. This suggests that although anti-LULU campaigns often begin as NIMBY, that over time, they capitalise on broader concerns, and develop a NIABY stance that corresponds with inter-movement co-operation. There are indeed

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[17] LWT has in the past been routinely funded by the ALG (Association of London Grants) to the sum of £125,000 per year. In June 2003, its support was withdrawn partly because the new grant application process required organisations to apply for funding rather whereas in the past applications were renewed from the previous year. This fact was poorly communicated to EMOs. Apparently the money had still been set-aside for LWT in July, but by December, no money was available. This could mean that there is no ALG money available for LWT until 2007.

many examples of anti-LULU groups developing into broader-ranging EMOs as Rucht (1990:171) would predict. As a result of their anti-roads campaigning:

> people began to realise that there are wider issues, wider anti-car and anti-roads stuff. I think its great .... it changes the hearts and minds of the people involved (Stewart [HACAN], interview February 2001).

Similarly, Hanton (veteran transport campaigner) began environmental campaigning in a NIMBY fashion when his home village was threatened by the proposed widening of the South Circular in the late 1980s. He says:

> what happened was that I did ALERT at first, then I did Transport 2000, then I did the Pedestrians' Association, and then I did the London Cycling Campaign, or something like that and I'm still doing them all anyway (interview, April 2001).

Other examples of generalization include Guildford Action Against Incineration which started off as a 'we don't want an incinerator campaign' but on winning the campaign has began influencing its local plan and regional waste strategy (de Zylva [FoE] interview, January 2004).

Had the process of generalization successfully occurred in anti-airport expansion campaigns, local campaign groups would have extensive network links with the wider environmental movement and argue along similar lines to FoE that:

> While we oppose a third runway and associated developments at Heathrow, we do not just say 'put it somewhere else'. We are opposed to the provision of any extra runways in the southeast and, indeed, the rest of the country' (West London FoE 2003).

This discourse has not filtered down to local campaigners who still argue that the 'solution' is to build an airport on an artificial island in the Thames Estuary. According to de Zylva:

> A lot of people in the Heathrow area thought that the solution was to build a new airport in the Thames Estuary. This clearly is not a viable solution because it does not address wider pollution and climate change concerns and would be a costly and logistical nightmare. Even if it was built, there would continue to be growth pressures involved (interview January 2004).

Harmondsworth & Sipson Residents' Association (HSRA) is amongst organisations that regard an estuarine airport as the way forward:

> as far as the estuarial airport is concerned, [for] Harmondsworth and Sipson Residents' Association, that is formal policy to support an ... airport where ... there is no real major environmental disaster (Sobey [NoTRAG, HSRA] interview, February 2004).

Clearly Sobey has less awareness of the climate change and growth pressures that are exacerbated by airport development regardless of location than FoE. To gauge levels of local

concern about climate change, I asked Sobey 'to what extent are local people concerned about broader issues like climate change?' The response was:

> It dominates their lives. The whole thing is a dominating feature of life around here ... I am certain the aviation industry has a huge share in causing the problem. If you are here in the morning ... [on] a clear day ...[you can see that] all the cloud formation has actually been caused by contrails of aircraft across the entire sky.

Sobey has a very localized perception of climate change and has yet to expand his rhetoric to a global one (Gordon & Jasper 1996).

Because HSRA is not the only RA to support an estuary airport, it became the formal policy of NoTRAG to tacitly support an offshore airport. In the words of Cannon (NoTRAG Chair):

> ...What we need to do is build a completely new airport, not destroy the communities around Heathrow. But we're not NIMBYs ... we would not support an extra runway anywhere (at another existing airport) (Ananova website 2003).

Stewart (HACAN), claims that local residents have *begun* a shift in their thoughts from NIMBY to general environmental concerns and issues of social equity that is reminiscent for him of the early anti-roads movement (Stewart, 2003). Whilst HACAN is primarily campaigning against the noise of aircraft, its newsletter *Take Off* is increasingly drawing attention to air pollution and climate change and this is having a slow, but noticeable effect on the views of its membership. Stewart cited in interview (January 2004), an example of:

> a mum with two kids who is quite active in Hounslow and she joined because her family were being driven crazy by the noise and she said to me 'in the last two years as you think about things, it falls into place and you become part of a bigger picture'

Clearly from the evidence presented with regard to the views of NoTRAG and HSRA, this scale-shift is not complete. The apparent inability of local people to grasp the case for opposing all new airport developments resulted in an internal struggle in Airport Watch. The ensuing result was a compromise:

> Where there was a little bit of discussion and debate was on whether we should be promoting an offshore airport that affected nobody, or apparently affected nobody, and I think we came up with a very .. tortured compromise. The Trade Unions would have been very proud of us with all the clauses we put in! But essentially what we felt was that if we were going to make the arguments against airport expansion as such, we would work on demand management, we couldn't do that and promote a new airport somewhere off the coast. So there was an agreement that we weren't promoting that. The compromise was, that if the government is

> seriously looking at options, it ought to be looked at as an option... Everybody was able to sign up to [that] including big green groups like Friends of the Earth because you are not committing yourself to anything with disastrous environmental effects (Stewart [HACAN], interview January 2004).

Emphasis on seeking an estuarine solution only 'if needs must', meant that explicit NIMBY rivalry was minimised though not absent. The *Future of Air Transport* consultation actually encouraged NIMBYism by asking respondents to state which option they preferred, which they disfavoured and why, without providing opportunities to challenge underlying principles of airport growth. Indeed, it is surprising that there has not been more open hostility between groups, given that some of the campaigning has been obliquely NIMBY. In response to the first consultation document, campaigners from Heathrow and Stansted claimed that Gatwick should be included as an option, which it subsequently was. Essex, Kent and Medway Councils challenged the government in the High Court, arguing that it was unlawful to exclude Gatwick. This can hardly have fostered comradeship between Gatwick campaigners and anti-airport campaigners elsewhere. Also the legal avenues explored after the White Paper was issued, involved putting more onus on government to consider Cliffe in the Thames Estuary and the Isle of Sheppey as possible airport locations. Although this was apparently designed to undermine the legality of the White Paper as a policy instrument, and not as a direct assault upon Kent campaigners, Cliffe campaigners could have easily been offended.

On the FoE aviation discussion list (October 2002), a Stansted campaigner argued that Cliffe was a more viable alternative because economic arguments are stronger than environmental ones. He also argued that as it is such low lying land it might force the government into taking climate change seriously. De Zylva (from FoE) argued in retaliation that Cliffe is a low employment area as well as Stansted, that Cliffe is not a preferred site of the airline operators as that is not where their existing operations are concentrated and that aviation will only act on climate change when the government gets serious on the issue. The Stansted campaigner replied that:

> while I agree as much as anyone with the 'no expansion' scenario, I think it is likely to be a case of what we can get rather than what we want. The best we can hope for is a compromise ... Incidentally, another advantage of Cliffe is that if it can take night-time operations we can ask for a complete shutdown of the other London airports at night.

De Zylva retorted with a strong anti-NIMBY argument:

> Friends of the Earth's aviation campaign recognizes that we're (probably) not going to win everything and that there will be new or expanded capacity somewhere. Our task though is

> not to make it easy for the Government to decide what to do and where to put its capacity. As a result we express no preferences, as that would be falling for the Government's 'divide and rule' game.

Such links between local anti-LULU campaigners and organisations like HACAN and FoE eventually results in the diffusion of concern for broader environmental issues, even though Heathrow Airport campaigners appear to be far from signing up to a NOPE philosophy on new airports.

Although links have been made with the broader environmental movement in airport campaigning because of its obvious overlap with wider environmental issues, some NIMBY campaigns fail to become integrated because of the nature of their campaigns. A good example of this is the Save Ealing's Streets Association, which is 'an alliance of groups wanting to prevent the tram coming through Ealing as this would result in cars being re-diverted through residential areas'. Up to 27,000 cars would need diverting as a result of the closure of parts of Uxbridge Road (SESA 2002). According to Ferriday,

> 900 people will go to a meeting to oppose trams, would you believe, but very few of those are ever involved in broader transport issues ... But of course these NIMBYs don't want traffic down their street but they all want to drive and park their car freely at will on those residential streets and they can't have it both ways and that is where I take issue with them (Ferriday [West London FoE, interview June 2003).

These types of local campaigns are single issue and unlikely to attract the support of national EMOs that would argue in favour of developing public transport infrastructure and deprioritising private motorcar use. This is perhaps why FoE was absent in the campaigns against the CTRL in the late 1980s, regarding high-speed rail as a preferable alternative to motorway and aviation developments.

Is hypothesis 3 falsified?

There are countless examples of the process of generalisation in campaigns against roads and waste facilities. The example of aviation campaigning however, shows that this may be a long and drawn out process. In aviation campaigning, rather than local group ties to national EMOs resulting in a NIABY attitude, the result has been a compromise of the national EMOs' NIABY stance by an agreement that the Thames Estuary airport is a solution. National EMOs continue to emphasise the climate change implications and development pressures that expanded aviation capacity will bring wherever new runways are placed, but local people are slow to grab the baton. NoTRAG are willing to use almost any ammunition they can find to prevent the construction of a third runway at

Heathrow airport (without stepping outside of the law because they are bound to their local council by their dependence on the financial support it gives them). NoTRAG's instrumental rationality, typical of NIMBY groups, may be preventing it from converting to a NIABY stance. Formally supporting an estuarine airport is seen as a means for preventing the destruction of the Heathrow villages. However, this goes hand in hand with a lack of concern for the broader development and climate implications this will have. HACAN, the aircraft noise organisation, has been gradually introducing its newsletter readers to the grand-scale environmental implications of aviation expansion so as not to offend its largely conservative supporter-base, and this is having a slowly noticeable effect. This suggests that relations between national and local EMOs need to be enduring for a NIABY scale-shift to occur.

11.4 Competition, niches and division of labour

This section addresses hypothesis 4 as presented in Chapter 7. This hypothesis suggests that competition is most likely between organisations with a high degree of niche overlap. It also claims that, in order to avoid competition, EMOs purposefully seek a niche via discussion with other EMOs to reduce duplication of effort, resulting in a planned division of labour. Firstly, questionnaire data on competitive relationships are explored, followed by exposition of qualitative data on competition. Secondly, the practice of division of labour in London's environmental movement is explored.

Competition and niches

Very few survey respondents admitted to competition with others. The questionnaire asked for organisation's five most important competitors. Only five national, one regional and two local organisations claimed to have competitive relations with others giving a total of 20 competitive relationships:

(the first organisation mentioned listed the second as a competitor)

1. London Federation of City Farms / Groundwork
2. League Against Cruel Sports (LACS) / IFAW
3. LACS / RSPCA
4. LACS / Hunt Saboteurs
5. Ramblers Association / National Trust
6. Ramblers Association / Youth Hostels Association
7. Ramblers Association / Living Streets
8. Ramblers Association / Transport 2000
9. Women's Environmental Network / FoE

10. Women's Environmental Network / Greenpeace,
11. Street Tree / Groundwork
12. Street Tree / Tree Council
13. Street Tree / NUFU
14. London FoE / Greenpeace
15. London FoE / CPRE
16. London FoE / Transport 2000
17. London FoE RSNC
18. Groundwork Southwark / SEA
19. Groundwork Southwark / Planet Earth
20. RSPB Bromley / BTO
21. RSPB Bromley / LWT
22. RSPB Bromley / National Trust.

Of these 22 competitive relationships, 15 did not have links in the collaborative, information-provided or information-received networks. This indicates that groups are most likely to have competitive relations with other groups with which they lack strong network relations. Seven of these competitive relations exist between organisations in which both parties are specialist organisations, or which fill a similar organisational niche – e.g. League Against Cruel Sports has a similar organisational remit to all three organisations it competes with, as with the Ramblers Association and Living Streets, and Bromley RSPB and the British Trust for Ornithology. However, this trend is only seen in a minority of competitive organisational situations, which indicates that organisational ecology dynamics (Hannan & Freeman 1979), whilst they might be at play, appear to not be crucial in determining which organisations compete, or at least instances of competition that organisational representatives disclose. [18]

Interviews were a much better arena for teasing out the truths about competition between EMOs. Schofield (CPRE Head of Regions) summed up the nature of competition between EMOs with the phrase:

> I think there is always competition by default between organisations for supporters and money and stuff (in interview October 2003).

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[18] Although it would have been more rigorous exercise to have listed all pairs of potentially competitive organisations and to have compared this with cases where competition actually exists, and so determine whether niche overlap led to competition, this approach could not be used because only eight of 114 organisations listed their competitive relationships in the questionnaire.

And yet there is a general reluctance to admit that such organisational-maintenance factors are at play.

Although organisational ecology dynamics do not appear to be at play on the face of the questionnaire data, the concept of niche overlap is at least partially useful in explaining the problematic relationship between CCC and EDAG. Both are specialist organisations working on climate change. They both operate within London, but seek to raise issues of national and international importance. There is also a fair deal of rancour between the organisations, which Marshall (EDAG) assumes may be the result of an element of competition:

> My view is that what CCC and Phil are doing is important and definitely within the line of what I would support. He is critical of governments and corporations, confrontational, protest based and keen to engage people in events and protest. He is more supportive of Kyoto than we might be, but I think it is fair enough to bang on about the US pulling out of Kyoto as this was a serious problem for making international progress. I don't think anything he does contradicts our political statement; indeed he is more on our side than NGOs like FoE which we openly work with. Are we critical of him because he is too close to us and we feel competition? (EDAG email list, March 2004).

An appraisal of the niches of FoE, CCC and EDAG based on scale of operation and issue orientation, shows considerably greater niche overlap between the CCC and EDAG than EDAG and FoE. CCC and EDAG have relatively small niches. Both have a single and similar issue focus (climate change) and carry out their campaigning/actions mostly in London. Their differences lie in ideologies and choice of tactics (see Chapter 13). The conflict between EDAG and CCC may be a function of their overlapping niches, but is also due to differences in political beliefs (Chapter 13) and a lack of reciprocity. EDAG has frequently attended CCC demonstrations, but has received little support in return. However, FoE's political beliefs differ even further from EDAG's than CCC's and yet EDAG's relationship with FoE is less problematic, despite ideological differences and an even more marked lack of reciprocity from FoE. This would suggest that EDAG's recalcitrance to work closely with CCC is likely to be a function of the high degree of niche overlap.

In interview, Thornhill (chair of CCC) expressed a reluctance to admit competition dynamics with EDAG, but admitted that:

> to some extent there is an element of competition almost with anybody, so it is a matter of degree. There are usually elements of both competition and collaboration. ...I would say that the biggest element of competition ... is between us and EDAG because EDAG is the only

other single issue group really on climate change unless you call Stop Esso one. And to some extent, we have common aims obviously, but we have different views ...and if you have those differences of view, you are bound to be competing to an extent to persuade people 'this is the best way to do it', so that is bound to happen (Thornhill interview June 2003).

In some ways, it seems ironic that a competitive relationship has been noted between EDAG and CCC as EDAG is opposed to the principle of competition, with some of its activists arguing vehemently against the idea of a competitive fossil-free National Portrait Award (to run alongside the BP sponsored National Portraits Award at Tate Britain).[19]

Thornhill is of the opinion that the lack of financial support that CCC receives from FoE is due to a perception that CCC is a rival organisation:

> I used to use their photocopying machine and then Roger [Higman] started complaining about the amount of photocopying I was doing and that sort of thing which I thought was petty ... I just kind of bit my lip ... Given that that has happened, there isn't much chance of getting any money quite frankly ... Given that we're potentially a rival organisation, I think ... there is that thing that immediately happens once you're not part of the family ...(Thornhill interview June 2003).

Similarly, CPRE felt threatened by FoE and the National Trust when they began to invest a lot of time and energy into campaigns to prevent the removal of the public's right to participate in planning inquiries. In response to an interview question about competition, White ([CPRE] interview October 2003) replied that:

> ... there is concern about FoE and the National Trust duplicating some of our areas. They are infringing on what we see as our speciality.

Not only does competition result from overlapping of niches in terms of issues, scale and type of tactics used, but also from impinging on the same support base. Waugh (LWT) expressed her concerns about RSPB seeking more London based supporters:

> I have heard through some of their [RSPB's] staff that they want to do more in London. And I thought 'Oh my God, no' they might start treading on our toes a bit in terms of supporter bases. But if they come to London and on the basis of their profile, members will go to them. I

> think they've already got something ridiculous like 27,000 members in London and we've got 6,000. They might take some of our members but it almost certainly would not be reciprocal (Waugh interview June 2003).

The wardens at Gunnersbury Triangle mentioned how they are desperately seeking new volunteers, and envisage competition with other organisations that seek volunteers who like an outdoor lifestyle:

> The only people that we are competing with are people with other interests ... I would imagine that if we didn't have allotments, then we would probably get more people along here, people with that specific interest of being outdoors during the day doing stuff. (Robertshaw [CWT] interview, February 2004).

If organisational ecology dynamics are as crucial in determining the nature of interorganisational relationships as the examples above suggest, much competition and perhaps even hostility between FoE and Greenpeace would be expected. These organisations work on a similar range of issues at local, regional, national and international level and are both mostly reformist (excepting Greenpeace direct action stunts). However, despite their high degree of niche overlap, which equals if not exceeds the overlap between CCC and EDAG, the competition that does exist is apparently fairly amicable.

> I think that there is definitely a sort of healthy competition between us and Greenpeace. There is this real feeling that they steal the limelight on quite a few of the campaigns that we have worked on. Not even because they've been better grounded, or had more of an impact than us (Sartori [FoE] interview, November 2003).

This data supports the notion that rather than wholly determining the extent of competition, organisational ecology dynamics contribute to it.

The biggest concern for FoE is not necessarily loss of members, or competition for press coverage (Hansen 1993), which is so common that the organisations have learnt to accept it, but rather a concern about a public misrepresentation of the FoE brand.

> We are very aware that they [Greenpeace] tend to, or certainly in the past were much more likely to be recognised by people in the street. We are the ones that aren't Greenpeace ... it is frequently joked about that ... FoE works for Greenpeace! One of the aims of our

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[19] Due to support from a majority of activists and the motivation and will power of Platform - EDAG's main collaborator for the event – the fossil-free portrait awards went ahead in June 2004.

> communication ...[was] to be recognised as FoE rather than just environmental campaigners or Greenpeace (Rau [FoE] interview, January 2004).

FoE's work to strengthen its brand name is partly a result of real or perceived competition as the following quote from its 5 year plan (2003-2008) indicates:

> There is a great deal of competition from other environmental campaigning organisations, other NGOs and the background noise of the consumer society in which we live, all of which want their messages and calls to action to be heard over the others. Friends of the Earth has to make its comparatively limited resources count, in every way possible, every time ... we have to present ourselves consistently in a way that is appealing and acceptable to a large number of different stakeholders. A strong brand and positioning are vital to achieving this ... We have a strong visual identity, and tone and style to our written communications which, help to pull everything together (FoE, 2003:35-6).

Part of FoE's strategic plan is to monitor public perceptions of the FoE brand and to undertake work to strengthen it accordingly (FoE 2003, strategic aim 6).

From a Greenpeace perspective, the competition between the two organisations is a healthy part of its organisational life; it amounts to little more than 'playful competition' and is seen by Torrance as an important cue for 'keeping both organisations on their toes' (Torrance [Greenpeace] interview, July 2003). Competition between FoE and Greenpeace perhaps remains benign because there is a recognition within each organisation that the other party brings overall benefits to the environmental movement and because there are variations in their strategies and foci that amount in practice to a healthy division of labour (*cf* Rootes 2002). Whereas FoE focuses on broad sustainability issues, democracy, the economy and human health and welfare,

> Greenpeace tends to rattle the cage of the status quo by [focusing on] black and white [issues] ... And so I think there's definitely a role for both of those organisations working in the way that they do ... There's also other ways in which we're different. We're a grassroots organisation ... Greenpeace is a more centralised organisation, which tends to operate on a global and international level and aim at the institutions that are sort of taking political decisions at an international and global scale. We tend to do much less of that, tend to focus more on the local side of it. So again, you know, there's another sort of dimension there to the differences ... it's a reinforcing strength, which we can both exploit (Juniper [FoE] interview with Seel, 2000).

A total of 22 competitive relations were given in questionnaire data, of which 7 were between organisational specialists that share a similar niche with one another, mostly on the basis of issues

(e.g. AWOs compete with other AWOs). Competition seems to occur on other dimensions of organisational niches besides those based on issues. LWT for example, was particularly concerned that the RSPB would begin recruiting members in London and steal from its much smaller supporter base. CWT felt little competition, but was in need of more voluntary help and assumed that allotments and other outdoor pursuits were absorbing the energy of 'outside types' that might otherwise volunteer in conservation.

Division of Labour

Sometimes environmental campaigners from different EMOs will liase to work out how best to use their campaign resources to prevent duplication of effort, and remain within their niche (McAdam 1988:715-6). Mike Childs, campaigns coordinator for FoE for example, liased with Mark Strutt, Toxics Campaigner at Greenpeace over plans for incineration campaigning. This liaison resulted in the decision that Greenpeace would do high profile stunts and FoE would concentrate on influencing decision makers (Watson [FoE] interview 2004). It is likely that both organisations would have followed these courses of action in any case, by playing to their fortes. What frequently appears to happen is that campaigns organically evolve as each plays to their strengths resulting in an effective but unplanned division of labour (Donati 1984:846). HSRA and others campaigning against airports provide a good example:

> **CS** The information you get, is it worked out so that HACAN will specialise on noise, and you might specialise in local impacts because you know the area?
>
> **BS** I'm not sure it is worked out in that way, but it certainly has evolved in that way ... our principal thing is that we don't want the airport knocking our houses down, so we concentrate on that side. HACAN of course concentrate on the over fly and the noise from aircraft, we do that as well, but not to the same extent that they do. And Rita Pearce's lot out there, they are so close to the runway that they are involved in various mitigation measures (Sobey [NoTRAG] interview, February 2004).

Stewart ([HACAN] interview, January 2004) and de Zylva ([FoE] interview January 2004) also noted how a division of labour was effectively at play in the campaign against the third runway. The AEF was useful at providing the background research because they 'know more about aeroplanes than any other organisation on Earth' (Stewart interview, January 2004) allowing FoE to spend more time engaging its local groups and generating media messages by leapfrogging the research stage, resulting in a competition free, symbiotic relationship. Other organisations like the National Trust were important for getting the message across in a mainstream manner to the government. Again, Stewart noted the spontaneity of the labour division:

CS Did that [division of labour] happen by coincidence or did you say 'right, you're good at research, and we're good at this ...'

JS No, it tended to just happen at the meetings we had, people just sort of volunteered to do things and you tend to volunteer to do things that you are comfortable with. It was organic rather than planned.

The BCC coalition resulted in a similar division of labour drawing on the strengths of member organisations:

> FoE brought to it a weight of numbers that was useful ... and certain tools like a website and our respectability ... that benefited the other members of the coalition. But there was a mass of experience ... Hildyard from the Corner House has tonnes of experience of working with international financial institutions, he's been doing it for a number of years. The guys at Platform have a wealth of knowledge on oil issues. ... [EDAG] are very good at office invasions ...But ... we had different expertise that we could all filter in. The knowledge of ... Platform meant that we at FoE were able to spend more time planning campaigns, unlike in other campaigns where we have had to do the groundwork first (Rau interview, January 2004).

Radical EMOs also seek to divide the labour between them, either on the basis of issue, or strategy (Chapter 13). London EF! is focusing on aviation, Bayer/GM and guerrilla gardening and is considering taking direct action at Stansted. Consequently, EDAG decided not to carry out direct action on aviation expansion, despite its links with climate change and the direct role that national EDAG is playing in formulating a direct action pledge.

Is hypothesis 4 falsified?

To avoid competition, it is said that organisations seek a niche and the result is a negotiated division of labour. However, this is not always the response of organisations to competition. FoE's response is not to specialise, but to generalise to attempt to become 'the organisation striving for environmental justice' (FoE 2002b:20). Generally, the environment is such an all-encompassing issue base that there is room for all of the organisations within it to survive and to be in a niche without making much effort to differentiate. Despite their many similarities, FoE and Greenpeace for example, have always had a different action focus and approach to issues. Although Greenpeace and FoE negotiated the approach they each took on incineration campaigning, the outcome would have been the same without negotiation, as they both tend to play to their strengths. During joint

campaigns, division of labour often occurs, but frequently it does so organically rather than on the basis of negotiations with others.

11.5 Trust benefit relations

This, the final substantial section of Chapter 11 explores the hypothesis that the propensity for inter-group co-operation is determined in part by the parties' previous balance in trust benefit relations (hypothesis 5 as outlined in Chapter 7). Firstly it correlates the information-provided and information-received networks to see if actors are reciprocal in the providing of information to organisations from which they receive it. It then presents quotes from interviews that support the idea that organisations that are not trusted are treated with caution in future interactions.

There is a strong correlation between the top five most important ties for the provision of information and the receiving of information indicating that organisations are more likely to provide information to organisations from which they receive it. A correlation of the information provided and information-received networks using the quadratic assignment procedure (QAP)[20] (Hubert & Schultz 1976, Krackhardt 1987) gives a Pearson's correlation of $R = 0.719$ ($p = 0.000$), a significant and very high correlation. This could be because the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner 1978) has been at play, or because such organisations through mutual exchange of information have learned to trust one another. The mutual benefit they receive from this trusting relationship may be what keeps the mutual exchange of information flowing.

There is also some evidence that organisations are less likely to cooperate with organisations that have previously let them down. For example, LWT have fallen out with RSPB over branding and wish never to co-operate with them again. Indeed, Waugh ([LWT] interview, June 2003) argues quite vehemently that '...we could have actually run the project better than the RSPB could any way.' If interorganisational relationships are to be sustained, it is useful if the benefits are shared between all participating organisations, otherwise this kind of frustration will result. Waugh goes on to say:

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[20] QAP is a means of correlating two matrices to see if there is similarity between two sets of network data, or to test a theoretical model. It allows for 2D matrices to be correlated against each other by permuting the rows and columns of a matrix and using those same permutations for the rows as for the columns, therefore preserving row and column interdependence and solving problems of dyadic interdependence that cannot be calculated or tested by standard statistical techniques (Simpson 2001).

> ... as an organisation we ... work ... in the partnership field pretty much in every thing that we do and with RSPB ... where we come into conflict with them, it has been despite our best efforts to try and work in partnership ... they don't understand the meaning of a partnership ... which will benefit both sides (interview, June 2003).

Besides fundamental differences in political beliefs (Chapter 13), the lack of reciprocity between CCC and EDAG has stifled productive collaboration. One EDAG participant stated in an email discussion how:

> There is a marked lack of reciprocity in our dealing with him [Thornhill] – we have given CCC and its events regular support in many ways and received little back ... (March 2004).

An expectation that an organisation will behave in a non-reciprocal manner can also hamper effective interorganisational networking. Marshall (national EDAG) for instance is wary of national EDAG becoming too heavily involved with Greenpeace. According to Dorey ([Greenpeace] interview, January 2004), Marshall used to:

> work for Greenpeace US and, I mean we have trouble with Greenpeace US, I mean every office is different ... And I think that because he had a bad time with Greenpeace in the US he has become a little bit negative, but he is usually supportive. He is not two-faced, you know, "all Greenpeace does is bad", and I think he sees its value, but it is not what he wants to do.

Is hypothesis 5 falsified?

EMOs often list their top choices of organisations from which information is received as their preferred parties for whom to provide information. Thus, if an organisation sends information to an EMO it deems important, it seems likely that this favour will be returned. This builds up trust between the two organisations and encourages further inter-group cooperation. Where there is a marked lack of reciprocity (i.e. between FoE and EDAG and CCC and EDAG) activists become wary of engaging in further collaborations and feel that their efforts are being taken for granted by their collaborator. Where a rift develops between two organisations, be it over branding or ideological clashes, this can taint a trust-benefit relation and encourage the organisations involved to avoid further collaboration. This was the case between the RSPB and LWT over branding. Similarly, Marshall from national EDAG has had a negative experience in his dealings with Greenpeace US and so is careful not to get too involved with Greenpeace UK for fear of similar repercussions.

11.6 Summary

National EMOs have a tendency to list other national organisations as their five most important collaborative links. Local groups, despite expected resource constraints and requests for help from national organisations, actually have a tendency to list other *local* organisations as their most important collaborators. This trend is especially noticeable when there is a current campaign. Overall it appears that local groups are relatively independent and seek help from national organisations much less frequently than expected. Where local groups are branches of a particular organisation, their first port of call for assistance is their own headquarters, and this information or advice can then be passed through the grassroots network to other local groups whether independent, or branches of other national EMOs. This constitutes subterranean networking that would not have been noticed had the research focused only on national organisations. Regional groups appear to play a brokerage role between national and local groups in the collaboration and information-based networks but have a much greater tendency to feature as information providers than collaborators.

The lack of top five important ties from national to local groups should not be read as a strategy dictated by organisational maintenance whereby national groups prioritise their own concerns above and beyond grassroots campaigns implied by RMT. To the contrary, there is evidence that Greenpeace, FoE and CPRE are increasingly trying to provide support directly and indirectly to grassroots campaigners. Whilst local groups do provide information to national organisations (especially so in the southeast), there is a tendency for national organisations to list other national organisations as their most *important* sources of information. This is likely to be part of a quest for credible information and may be a result of the rational organisational behaviour that RMT hypothesises. Inevitably there are constraints that make it impossible for a national organisation to lend its support to every possible initiative. Thus, most organisations appear to choose campaigns that closely fit their organisational aims and objectives, are within their resource capabilities, and have some chance of 'success'. Some organisations make a conscious effort to ensure that they are not replicating efforts of others, although much division of labour evolves organically. At a local level, duplication is often seen as an important campaign tactic that helps drive home to local decision makers how strongly local people feel about a particular policy or planning decision.

Whilst it is unfair on national organisations to read their apparent lack of cooperation with grassroots campaigners (as shown in the collaboration network) as the result of organisational maintenance, this is not to suggest that organisational maintenance dynamics are absent, or benign in their effects on networks. Animosity towards the SWP because of its tendency to brand

campaigns as its own to bolster its own membership is rife across the environmental movement. And whilst Greenpeace is increasingly working in coalitions, its tendency to be at the helm of these suggests that its concern about organisational image remains paramount.

Perhaps due to their greater resource base, or as a function of their relative longevity (as local organisations are much more prone to attrition and regional groups are mostly a relatively new phenomenon), most information exchange – where an organisation lists another as one of its top five providers of information and that organisation claims that the initiator is one of the top five organisations from which it receives information – occurs between national organisations. There is a strong correlation between the information-provided and information-received networks, suggesting that organisations are more likely to return information to those that have provided it. This could be because trust has developed between these two organisations. This also sows the seeds for possible future collaborative ventures.

Whilst the quantitative analysis suggests that competitive relations are few and far between, this is an underestimation of the extent of competition. In interview, respondents were far more willing to admit to the presence of competition. Even though much competition remains friendly, there is often competition between organisations when another steps into its niche, or shares a high proportion of niche space. This can be demonstrated by the competition that CPRE felt with FoE when the latter began campaigning on planning issues, and the competitive relationship between CCC and EDAG. The competition could equally be attributable to political process dynamics, as it is consistent with the thesis that groups with outsider status are more likely to compete with one another than with groups without access. However, this dynamic assumes that organisations are seeking insidership, something that EDAG specifically shuns and is inappropriate for CCC, which is instead seeking to influence the American polity.

RM dynamics appear to go some way towards explaining how and why EMOs network in the manner in which they do. However, RM focuses too much on individual organisations and assumes they take a coldly rational approach. FoE and Greenpeace are much more altruistic towards fellow environmentalists than they would be if they were obsessed with organisational maintenance. Even if EMO interaction was completely dictated by instrumental rationality, there would need to be a consideration of political processes and opportunities (Chapter 12), and collective identity and solidarity (Chapter 13).

CHAPTER 12

Network Effects of Political Strategies and Perceived Political Relationships

This chapter draws on the literature explored in Chapter 5, and considers the effects that EMOs' balance of activities measured on an 'insider-outsider' scale, and their perceived relationships with each of local, regional and national government have upon network links. It shows a modest correlation between the balance of activities that an EMO has and its perceived POS, suggesting that organisations with moderate tactics are much more likely to have a constructive relationship with the government. After presenting inbreeding statistics in a similar fashion to Chapter 11, the discussion turns to a consideration of the effects of critical campaigning times upon EMOs' networks. Often at critical campaign times, political opportunity windows are perceived of as closed and this makes unexpected alliance building more likely. Radical activists' perceptions of the polity as closed and the network effects of real or perceived repression are discussed.

12.1 Do insiders dissociate themselves from outsiders?

This first section of Chapter 12 addresses hypothesis 6 (as outlined in Chapter 7). This hypothesis suggests that organisations with a cosy relationship with the government will, as part of their strategy to remain in the government's favour, dissociate themselves from radical organisations that outwardly oppose the state. A corollary of this hypothesis is that thresholder organisations that use a range of insider and outsider activities will have the most extensive network links as they do not have to be so concerned about their relationship with the government, and may have an insider relationship on some issues, but an outsider one on others. This hypothesis is explored using data on the balance of activities of EMOs, followed by data on their views of their relationship with national, regional and local governance.

Balance of activities

EMOs' balance of activities was judged according to responses to the survey question asking 'which of the following activities has your organisation undertaken within the last 12 months?'. These were classified according to the overall balance of activity that an organisation carries out according to Table 8.1. All of the networks were partitioned according to the overall political nature of EMOs' activities as insiders, outsiders or thresholders and the number of ties in each block were counted and also converted into percentages (Appendix 5).

According to Chapter 6, we would expect thresholders to have ties traversing the insider-outsider spectrum, outsiders to have few ties to insiders, and vice versa. In practice, very few organisations that answered the questionnaire are pure outsiders in terms of their activities. Even radical organisations like EDAG, with its anarchistic element and ex-RTS crew, engage in occasional lobbying. This meant that the outsider block was exceedingly small and that we are unable to draw anything conclusive about the results that block displays. Of the three collaborative ties that outsider groups admitted to having to other EMOs, all were directed towards thresholder organisations. It may be that pure 'outsider' organisations are genuinely rare, therefore there will always be few ties to them. However it is likely that this is an artefact of radical outsiders' unwillingness to answer questionnaires or that non-radical outsider organisations are immature and obscure and thus unlikely to be discovered by a researcher. Where radical outsiders have answered the questionnaire, it may be that they are unwilling to list the names of other 'underground' EMOs to an academic for fear of infiltration. Certainly, at the first EDAG meeting I attended, there was concern that my research had links with a research programme on network links known to be being undertaken by the Forward Intelligence Team (Voices from the Ecological Resistance, 1998:290) (see Chapter 8).

Figure 12.1, Collaboration network by balance of activities



Of thresholders 140 ties, 86% were directed towards other thresholders. This is likely to be because thresholders have similar political viewpoints and strategies. Because they are not insiders, they are more likely to be in need of allies and, unlike some radicals, are pragmatic enough to cooperate. Again there is some distortion because 48 of the 66 organisations providing data for this question (72%) were thresholders. Even given the limited number of outsiders, collaborative ties exist between thresholders and outsiders and 12% of thresholders'

collaborative ties are directed to insiders. Thresholders therefore do have ties traversing a wide spectrum (Figure 12.1).

In all networks, insiders have most ties with thresholders. Insiders do not have outsiders amongst their top 5 collaborative links, but do have ties with outsiders in the information networks. In the information-provided network, the insider organisations surveyed have just one link to an outsider (Figure 12.2). In the information-received network (Figure 12.3), there are three links from insiders to outsiders, indicating that insiders are more likely to receive information from outsiders than provide it to them. However, it is surprising that outsiders' information is amongst the top five information sources for insiders given that generally insiders seek credible information over that from little known, embryonic or radical outsiders. Clearly, receiving or providing information to outsiders or radicals is much less likely to have an impact on the reputation of an insider, or thresholder organisation than being seen to engage in the more visible act of collaboration.

Figure 12.2, Information-provided network by balance of activities



Thresholders receive more information from insiders (as the top 5 important links) than they provide information to or collaborate with. There are 24 information-receiving links mentioned by thresholders who say that insiders are on their list of top five information providers (Figure 12.2). Insiders are rated highly by thresholders as sources of information possibly because they have privileged access to certain key pieces of information that they are able to pass through the movement. Bates ([FoE] interview February 2003) suggested that one of her most important sources of information was a mole in the DfT who was able to filter information to her. Insiders are more likely to access this kind of information.

In aviation campaigning, FoE frequently use the Aviation Environment Federation's (AEF's) information, which, in the words of de Zylva, is 'the technical brains behind the campaign' ([FoE] interview, January 2004). AEF is highly respected and specialises in insider techniques - 'the AEF is actually invited by the Government to sit on various steering committees and things like that' ([WLFoE] Ferriday interview, June 2003). This provides a classic example of an insider organisation providing thresholders with trustworthy information. FoE is a stickler for getting its facts right and is unlikely to rely on information from outsider or obscure sources. A key for reason London FoE and the Simon Wolfe Charitable Foundation's (SWCF) inhospitable relationship is the latter's misrepresentation of facts, something FoE desperately avoids. A dispute between Bates and SWCF started in the 1990s when:

> they put out a press release saying ... "Oxleas Wood will certainly be destroyed" and as far as I was concerned, Oxleas Wood could be under threat, but I certainly couldn't say what they had (interview, Bates November 2003).

In 2003, SWCF, without permission put FoE's logo on a leaflet citing distorted facts:

> We certainly don't support them financially, we don't ... endorse a whole organisation or anything they may do ... having disagreed with how they tend to word things. And this [leaflet] ... also had on it "Thames Gateway Bridge, Cost One Billion". Well, the actual estimated cost is £425 million ... I couldn't put round something that states something incorrectly like that. I have to be far more careful than that. Our reputation for accuracy, you know for trustworthiness, reliability, is absolutely paramount (Bates interview, November 2003).

As part of a quest for reliable information, perhaps it is not surprising that outsiders are not ranked by a single thresholder as a top choice of tie and that for outsiders the most important information providing links are thresholders. This suggests that there is some truth in the hypothesis that thresholders have the widest range of ties and act as bridges between insiders and outsiders in spreading information about the network (Figure 12.3).

Figure 12.3, Information-received network by balance of activities



Reciprocal sharing of information occurs mostly between thresholders, accounting for 28 of 34 information-based ties that thresholders reciprocated in the information-exchange network (Figure 12.4). Outsiders appear not to have important reciprocal information interactions – none of the respondent outsiders received information from those top 5 links that they had provided with information over the past 12 months. And again, thresholders appear more significant to insiders than other insiders, but this is likely to be an artefact of the disproportionate number in the sample.

Figure12.4, Information exchange network by balance of activities



Network effects of perceived relations with local, regional and national government

The networks here are partitioned according to the relationship that organisations claim to have with local, regional and national government. These relationships are categorised on the basis

of whether their relationship with each of these governmental bodies was constructive, ambivalent, contingent, negative or non-existent (Chapter 8).

Relations with Local Borough Councils

Organisations within the same borough have different perceptions of the openness of the objective POs at a local level, showing the importance of activist perception over objective 'structures' (Klandermans 1991:8). For instance, whilst G&LFoE has at best a contingent relationship with Greenwich Borough Council [GBC], PCEG has a positive one. On environmental issues, Bates, coordinator of G&LFoE, (interview February 2001) claims that 'to be frank, they [GBC] are barking up the wrong tree'. She argues that they deprioritise the environment by placing the economic agenda at the heart of decision-making. She gave the inappropriate development of Greenwich Peninsular (especially pointing out the unsustainability of siting a traffic-generating supermarket in the Millennium Village) as a case in point and suggested that the council view G&LFoE as a 'thorn in their side'. In contrast PCEG has a constructive relationship with GBC. Cowdell suggested that 'they are quite receptive to us, and they know us very well now and they do trust us, which is good to have', and that the group is considering engaging in a more formal partnership with them (Cowdell interview, September 2003).

In the Borough of Ealing (EBC), Local Agenda 21's Health and Pollution Group claimed that LA21 in Ealing amounted to 'words and not action' as annual pollution reports had not been produced by the council since 1997 (*Ealing & Acton Gazette*, 2000a). This group is clearly dismayed by their local authority's apparent lack of concern for the environment. Friends of Blondin Park however, have a very cosy relationship with the local council, having won an Ealing Council Green Award for 2 years running (*Ealing & Acton Gazette*, 2000b). EBC according to Ferriday (WLFoE) is only supportive of environmental issues to an extent:

> ... some individual councillors are quite receptive [to environmental concerns] but they'll only ever go so far. What they always come up against is some political or bureaucratic reason for not doing anything about it. And I think the council have become less interested recently (interview, June 2003).

The result for Ealing FoE is that their relationship with EBC is 'pretty poor now' (ibid).

Hillingdon Borough Council (HBC) (which has Heathrow Airport within its boundaries) is most supportive of the anti-airport expansion campaigns ... 'they came down hard on our side' (Sobey interview, February 2004). However, the relationship between HBC and civic society has not always been this cosy. In the 1980s, HBC was supportive of British Airways' application to build their headquarters on 230 acres of green belt land. The building is now a dominant blot on the landscape and some campaigners are convinced that it would make a 'perfect terminal 6

because it is exactly where the [third] runway would go ...' (Pearce [LRA] interview, January 2004).

Sixty-nine organisations that were respondents *and* in the main component of the collaboration network commented in the questionnaire on the relationship they have with their local authority. Fifteen claimed to have a constructive relationship, 20 ambivalent, 13 contingent and 11 had no relationship. Interestingly, not a single organisation claimed a negative relationship. Of the 23 ties initiated by EMOs with a constructive relationship to their LA, the majority (44%) were directed towards organisations that lack a relationship with their local governors and 35% towards organisations with an ambivalent relationship (Figure 12.5). This collaboration network mixes together the national, regional and local groups, which is why such a high proportion of groups are claiming no relationship with their local authority – most campaign at a higher level.

These results mix EMOs across London within different boroughs. Therefore it often matters little how potential allies get on with their local council because often collaboration with these parties will not have any bearing on how their own relationship with their local council pans out. Overall, it appears that how EMOs get on with their local borough councils makes little if any difference to their choice of allies, with the exception of organisations that campaign at a purely local level.

Although the relationship between NoTRAG and HBC is best classified as 'ambivalent' because of HBC's initial reluctance to support the campaign, it is indicative of how an EMO's positive relationship with local government can constrain its activities and network links. HBC has provided at least £50,000 for the anti-third runway campaign (Longhurst & Nadel 2002), including the funding of the NoTRAG road show that took to the streets after the SERAs report was released. Because NoTRAG is in the pocket of its local council, it:

> can't actually do anything illegal because if we do anything illegal, the council will cut off the money. At the same time, we appreciate the frustration of the people who want to take direct action, but we wouldn't at this stage want them on our committee, purely and simply on the grounds that NoTRAG is funded by the council (Sobey [NoTRAG] interview February 2004).

For those local residents who wanted to take a more direct action stance, this caused a rift in the organisation. According to Pearce:

> **RP** There were some people who really wanted to get up and be a bloody pain in the arse and do things that the airport won't like. But you see the group itself didn't want to, and it split up a bit in that way. I was prepared to be one of those that was militant, but I kept on the ground and I said to the others, 'if you've got anything you want done, like being really militant, I am there with you'. So I tried to keep on both sides a bit.

CS What do you mean by being militant then?

RP I mean if they wanted somebody to go and block the airport up, or drive really slowly around, or put posters up or, or just driving around the roads at 5mph for hours and hours in the morning ([LRA] interview, January 2004).

Although NoTRAG is somewhat constrained in what it can do within the coalition, this has not stopped individual NoTRAG members being highly supportive of direct action. Several NoTRAG members went to the court for the trial of the HANT crane protestors to demonstrate their support for the principle of the action. However, even if the local council did not fund NoTRAG, it would probably continue to use conventional insider techniques because this allows for the mediation of a contingency plan should the development go ahead:

> If, in the final analysis, we lose, we have got to work with those blighters across the road, we have got to get all sorts of different types of facilities and amenities for the people left … the association has always been careful to keep the lines of communication open with BAA and people like that … (Sobey interview, February 2004).

Figure 12.5, Collaboration network by relationship to local authorities



National and regional organisations often lack a relationship with their own local borough councils, but if they have local groups, they are able to impact upon local authorities via these rather than through a centrally coordinated effort. HFoE claims that national FoE are one of their top 5 collaborative partners, but national FoE itself has no contact with HBC either because of its more national focus or because it 'contracts' this kind of work out to its local branch. The highest figure in Figure 12.5 is 55% and this suggests that organisations lacking a relationship with their local council tend to favour organisations with a contingent relationship as

collaborative partners. National organisations may not have relationships with their local councils but may choose local groups as collaborative partners as part of a wider campaign strategy. For instance, in their anti-GM campaign, FoE called upon local FoE groups (that mostly have contingent relationships with their local councils) to engage with their local councils to persuade them to become GM-Free Zones (FoE 2003h).

In their Incineration Busters campaign (Summer 2001-Spring 2002) Greenpeace undertook a similar strategy. It produced postcards for on-street signing asking local councils for more emphasis to be placed on the reduction, recycling and composting of waste as an alternative to incineration. Groups of Incinerator Busters were formed throughout the country, consisting mostly of pre-established non-Greenpeace incinerator action groups. Resources and training were provided for local activists. After some long and thoughtful research, Greenpeace drew up a pro forma *Zero Waste* Strategy. All local activists had to do was to change the details – for example the total amount of waste produced by the local authority, the population size, the nature of local industry - and the result was a Zero Waste[1] Strategy applicable to each district or county where activists took part (Greenpeace 2001). The Zero Waste charter that emerged from the Strategy was the result of wider collaboration involving FoE, SERA, Communities Against Toxics and the UK Zero Waste Alliance. Nevertheless, the crucial importance of national to local ties and at least temporarily constructive relationships with local councils should not be ignored.

To date twelve local authorities have voted for the exclusion of GM crops in their area[2] (FoE 2003i). In England, one local authority (Bath and North East Somerset) and one county council (Essex) have adopted a Zero Waste policy (Green Party Website 2003). These successes are clearly the result of collaborative ties between (national) organisations that lack a relationship with their local council and local organisations that have at least a contingent relationship with them. Because of the general lack of a relationship with local government amongst the majority of the EMOs surveyed, these relations have not been analysed for the information-based networks.

Relations with the Greater London Authority

Fifty-seven EMOs provided answers to the question asking them to categorise their relationship with the Greater London Authority (GLA). Of these, nearly half (28) did not have a relationship

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[1] Zero Waste is the idea that all rubbish be ultimately reused, recycled or composted so that working landfill sites and incinerators along with their associated environmental problems become a thing of the past. The Green Party suggest a target of 2020 for Zero Waste to become a real-life strategy.

with regional government. Of the rest, mostly constructive (11 organisations) or ambivalent relationships (12 organisations) were recorded, with six admitting to a contingent relationship and none to a negative one. The highest proportion of ties from each block of initiators is directed towards organisations without any kind of relationship to the GLA. The relationship that organisations have with the GLA does not seem to impact upon choice of collaborative tie partners. Overall, there is very little engagement with regional government, despite the fact that the GLA has been established for nearly four years. According to Bates, this is because:

> sometimes it takes a while... you have to fundraise ... you can't just appoint staff ... so there is probably a time lag in getting these things sorted for a big organisation (Bates interview December 2003).

CPRE now has a new Head of Regions who is coordinating responses to the Regional Planning Guidance, however he has been in post for less than a year. There is an assumption that as regional policy matures, so will CPRE's input into the regional level:

> we try and reflect what's going on at government level. I think it's realistic to assume that the regional level of government is going to get stronger over time and therefore CPRE's regional levels will get stronger over time too (Barton in interview with Adams, 2000).

As with FoE, CPRE's regional campaigning is in its early days.

Although NoTRAG has the moral support of the GLA, the leader, Ray Paddyfoot, has signed a memorandum indicating that it supports the case for no further airport developments within London – it does not extend support beyond this. In any case, Sobey (NoTRAG) is rather sceptical about regional governance:

> it seems pointless to me having a regional government if every time they make a decision it is overruled by central government and that is what would happen in this instance and whenever a planning application is referred to the Secretary of State ... We might as well not pay Ken's money because there is not much point him being there! (Sobey interview, February 2004)

Besides a time lag, a realisation that regional governance is a relatively inane target may be responsible for the lack of engagement with the GLA. Cowdell shares this view. Mayor Livingstone voted through the proposals for the Thames Gateway bridge, yet he had said in the past:

> that he would be the first to lie underneath the bulldozer and when he got into power, he pushed for their to be another river crossing, not going through Oxleas Wood ... (Cowdell [PCEG] interview, September 2003).

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[2] These are Cornwall, Somerset, South Somerset, South Gloucestershire, Shropshire, Cumbria, Warwickshire, Rydale, South Hams, York, East Riding and the Lake District National Parks Authority

London FoE has a fairly ambivalent relationship with the GLA, and in particular seeks to influence two of its subsidiary bodies – Transport For London (TfL) and the London Development Agency (LDA), both of which are acting against the interests of sustainability. TfL are the proponents of the Thames Gateway Bridge, whereas LDA is promoting huge scale housing developments in the Thames Gateway Region (from southeast London, extending to the Isle of Sheppey and Faversham in Kent). The root of the problem according to Bates:

> Is ... [viewing] economic growth ... as the ultimate goal. It is not just seen as a means to better quality of life ... it's like we have to keep economic growth, and they see London as the engine of the UK economy ... (interview November 2003).

The result is that they see Bates as their 'new trouble maker at the moment' (ibid).

In contrast, LWT has a constructive relationship:

> We do have quite a lot of constructive engagement with the GLA certainly in that we have been major consultees in the London Biodiversity Strategy ... so we really have got a statutory role, but not any statutory powers to implement them ... That is useful because it means that we get to have a far stronger voice than we would have otherwise (Waugh interview, June 2003).

It does appear that English regional government is still finding its feet, even in London. According to de Zylva (interview, January 2004), even the GLA itself is not yet sure of its own powers or responsibilities. He interprets regional governance as a potential means of sidestepping important issues at Whitehall, or a way of speeding up poor environmental decisions. Much debate within FoE at present centres on how quickly regional assemblies can fast-track damaging infrastructure projects (as TfL and LDA appear to be doing in relation to the Thames Gateway bridge and housing developments).

The London Sustainability Exchange ran a workshop entitled 'London is Different' in November 2003 to discuss regionalisation of the work of London sustainability NGOs. It suggested that the difficulties lie in scale of London, its unique governance (Mayor, Assembly, 32 boroughs, the Corporation of London, the Regional Development Agency [covering national and regional concerns], a Government Office and various other emerging sub-regional governance structures [e.g. Thames Gateway] and sub-regional partnerships), its high density, high commuter numbers and the 'co-location' of the national and regional (LSx 2004). Co-location refers to the fact that 'many London actors see themselves as having a national or international identity without a correspondingly strong regional identity' (LSx 2003:1). One of the main challenges facing London EMO staff is to be able to make the distinction between national NGO work and regional-based campaigning. LSx are working hard to help London based regional campaigners

resolve some of the difficulties by arranging further workshops and networking opportunities and providing a maintained website. The organisations involved in London is Different are from a wide range of 'sustainability interests' including CPRE, English Heritage, FoE, London Environment Centre, LWT, The National Trust, Transport 2000 and the Woodland Trust.

The fact that most collaboration appears to take place between organisations that do not have a relationship to the GLA indicates that regional governance is only infrequently a target for campaigners. If this is the case, then patterns prevalent in the information-provided, information-received and information exchange networks are to some extent random/ad hoc (Figure 12.6).

Figure 12.6 Collaboration network by relationship to GLA



Figure 12.7 shows that whilst collaboration is highly biased towards organisations lacking a relationship to the GLA, information is spread about the network much more randomly, but provided mostly to those with an ambivalent relationship.

Figure 12.7, Information-provided network by relationship to GLA



For organisations with a constructive relationship to the GLA, in the collaboration and information-received networks, approximately one third of their top five important relations are with other groups with a constructive relationship. Organisations that are important to organisations with a constructive relationship for providing information to are mostly organisations with ambivalent or an absent relationships. This is likely to be because the provision of information has few ramifications on an organisations' profile of an organisation to the GLA.

Figure 12.8, Information-received network by relationship to GLA



For all types of GLA relationship, except ambivalent in all networks, the majority of ties are directed towards organisations that lack a relationship with the GLA (Figures 12.9).

Figure 12.9, Information exchange network by relationship to GLA



Relations with national government

Activists' perceptions of national government vary according to organisational type and issue focus. According to Dorey (interview January 2004):

> ... Blair is pretty good from a climate change point of view. [He is] really up for pushing wind power and ... when we did our No Nukes, Yes2Wind campaign, their White Paper changed completely, I mean it was not just us, but they decided that they could go with wind and that it was a viable alternative and that their stance on it was, we were quite surprised at how good it was,

but that on other issues including wood procurement (Greenpeace embarrassed the government by exposing their use of illegally harvested wood from Cameroon to rebuild their Cabinet offices) and GM foods, the government were 'really, really bad'.

In terms of aviation, the policy arena is viewed as relatively closed by campaigners because the White Paper has been published and the decisions are now in the hands of the aviation industry. In his opening address to the Post White Paper Airport Watch conference, Stewart told the audience that:

> I think something fairly significant has probably happened as to who we will be focussing on post White Paper. We were focussing on government and civil servants because they were drawing up the White Paper ... But Post White Paper I think is different because we

> know what the government has said, it feels it has done its bit. It is now saying it is up to the aviation industry and developers to come up with proposals ... And it seems to me that the key focuses now of our campaign needs to be on the developers and the banks and the construction companies (Stewart 2004).

Even prior to the release of the White Paper, anti-airport expansion campaigners were sceptical of the government's stance on aviation. Fawcett, (then) Minister for Transport, at the September 2001 Airport Watch Conference told campaigners that 'Blair is committed to sustainable development'. This comment was met with raucous laughter from the audience. Commitment to development without recourse to the environment, rather than sustainable development is how some activists interpret the situation, as Sobey ([NoTRAG] interview February 2004) suggests:

> Because I think the principal things that they go on ... is ... the economic effect ... in relation to UK Plc as it were and I don't think ... that takes into account people ...

The airport lobby have apparently convinced the government of the importance of aviation for the economic growth of the country; despite transport expert Professor Whitelegg successfully showing that the green alternatives (public transport) could bring a greater economic return and more employment (FoE 2003).

According to de Zylva (FoE):

> The government is supposed to have green ministers, but they rarely meet, have no weight and aren't reflecting green policies within their departments as they have to deliver on other, often contradictory policies. Nor are there enough green departments. It is ridiculous having a single department to focus on the environment, which in itself is not green enough. The Department for Trade and Industry, the Department for Transport and the Treasury have few if any environmental and sustainable development concerns and are probably the worst culprits in the government. They are completely ignoring the sustainable development agenda or at best they are seeing sustainable development as a negative anti-progress ideology, which it is not. Either that or they hijack sustainable development so that it ends up meaning all the unsustainable things we are doing now i.e. "sustainable development means building more runways" (interview, January 2004).

The drawn-out public inquiry for Terminal 5 was according to de Zylva, an excuse for speeding up the planning system. As it took so long, the government considered measures that could be taken to speed it up. This may lead to the insane situation that all development will go ahead, making a charade out of the idea that people have a voice and a say. Merely it will be to mollify people, or as FoE's planning campaign phrased it: 'here is your new airport, what colour would you like the gates?'. Stewart (HACAN) however, sees the Planning Bill as a potential campaign advantage because it opens doors to direct action by making people realise the inefficacy of the inquiry system that siphons off activist energy:

CS You must by now be very sceptical about how effective public inquiries can be

JS ... Yes is the answer... This is my own view, it is not HACAN's view and it is certainly not Airport Watch's view, I think this Planning Bill is a great idea because at long last it may wake people up to the fact that public inquiries are a con. Because in the past, in the roads and now in aviation, people have said "if we can just make our arguments at public inquiries, we'll get the right to employ a barrister and we will win" and that's what people thought with the roads protests, and it very rarely happens. It is simply a tool for the powers that be to get a substantial planning proposal through, they'll make one or two concessions, but it will go through. So in some ways, the Planning Bill, hopefully will wake people up – "don't put your faith in public inquiries" (Stewart interview, January 2004).

After having lost two public inquiries at Heathrow (Chapter 9), local campaigners have become aware of the shortcomings of the inquiry system in any case. Pearce's thoughts are this:

> I think that they are a waste of time because we didn't win either of them and we really did have a good case to put forward ... some of us do feel that we have wasted four years of our lives ([LRA] interview, January 2004).

Regarding climate change, Blair has clearly noted the severity of the issue as indicated by his recent speeches:

> The greatest threat to our environment today is climate change ... If there is one immediate issue that threatens global disaster, it is the changes in our atmosphere ... If we are to continue to grow, we must reduce the impact of growth on the environment. Some commentators estimate that we'll need a tenfold increase in the efficiency with which we use resources by 2050 only to stand still (Speech to the CBI/Green Alliance, October 2000 in FoE 2003d).

However, if aviation expansion goes ahead as set out in the government's aviation White Paper, any gains made by the UK government's strong renewable energy targets will be offset. It is clear from Blair's recent blunder over the link between climate change and increasing airport capacity (Appendix 10) that he has not yet taken on board the message from aviation campaigners, which is to attempt to reduce demand for air travel by removing tax breaks and subsidies.

From a radical climate change activist's point of view, the political situation is this:

> I do think that they [the government] should have higher morals and say "this is a disgrace", but I don't think they really can help the situation because they have to keep economic growth going and they have to keep business happy. Also to a certain extent they have to resort to ... lowest denominator politics where they have to stress policies that will help them to get re-elected, so if they were to come along and say "we're going to put a pound on every litre of petrol because we want to put the true economic cost into

> petrol", they wouldn't last very long really ... I think the things that Tony Blair and the government bring into place Margaret Thatcher would have been impressed with ...I think she would have struggled getting some of the stuff in that he has managed to do, because he does it all with a big smile (Coleman [EDAG] interview, November 2003).

Of the 59 organisations in the main component of the collaboration network that provided an indication of their relationship with national government, 6 claimed constructive ties 7 ambivalent, 11 contingent, 6 to have a negative relationship and 29 to have no relationship.

Although 80% of collaborative ties of organisations with a constructive relationship to the government are with organisations that have a contingent relationship, this is not as meaningful as it might appear, because the six organisations with constructive relations with the government have only a total of five ties directed to other organisations (one of them must have no ties at all and the others averaging only one tie each), four to contingent ones and one shared with another organisation with a constructive relationship to the government. What this does perhaps indicate however is the tendency for insider groups to work more in isolation – perhaps they have less need to collaborate because they are not, like thresholders, seeking to influence public opinion and generate a groundswell. They have a very well defined remit, and can probably manage this using their own expertise. However, CPRE, traditionally viewed as a classic example of an insider as 'Ministers never refuse to meet CPRE', works extensively with organisations with a contingent relationship to the government including FoE (especially on the Planning Campaign) and Transport 2000 (Conder [CPRE], interview with Adams, June 2000). However, CPRE is unlikely to be more outrageous than this in its campaign alliances because it is an insider almost to the extent of feeling awkward about criticising government schemes:

> You have to tread a very thin line when you have this type of relationship with the Government ... When we are overly critical of their schemes, such as the Deputy Prime Ministers' Sustainable Communities Plan, it doesn't go down too well (Redding [CPRE] interview, December 2003).

In this sense, CPRE is close to fitting Grant's (1987 cited in Grant 1995:18-25) concept of a 'prisoner group'.

Of the five collaborative ties that organisations with a constructive relationship with the government extend, none of these is to organisations with a negative relationship to the government. Stop Stansted Expansion (SSE), despite fighting a campaign at a critical campaign time, is an example of an organisation that has a constructive relationship with the government but is avoiding collaboration with EF! and EDAGers who have a negative relationship with it.

Stewart (HACAN) is attempting to reconcile the differences, but with little success, as SSE remain convinced of the efficacy of insider methods of campaigning. Stewart relayed how he:

> ... organised a small meeting ... Two or three representatives from Stansted, Gatwick and HACAN were invited to talk about direct action. And it was very useful, but there was a bit of a squabble afterwards because ... the people from Stansted ... are wealthy, they are well connected and I think there is still a feeling that they could, because of that ... win through conventional means. They feel that they are part of the establishment - clearly some of them are ... and they feel inclined to talk to people in the establishment on legal grounds, on economic grounds or what have you and they think they can probably win. And therefore, whilst they're not opposed to direct action in principle, they see it as a little bit below themselves (Stewart interview January 2004).

It was noted (Chapter 11) how CPRE felt threatened by FoE's involvement in the campaign to prevent dilution of planning laws. De Zylva of FoE has interpreted this clash between the organisations in terms of CPRE's political reputation rather than niche overlap. In interview, de Zylva suggested that:

> in government circles, CPRE is clearly the 'respected voice' and CPRE felt that FoE was rocking the boat a little by being straight-up and forward about the issues. CPRE felt that their cosy relationship with the government may be threatened by the FoE approach (interview January 2004).

FoE discussed the opportunities for campaigning with other NGOs, including CPRE. The aim of FoE was to work in collaboration to achieve a policy gain, not to compete.

Along similar lines to CPRE wanting to preserve its carefully modelled political reputation, EDAG tactfully decided not to be a formal part of the BCC coalition so as not to tar its credibility:

> Well, we discussed it within the campaign whether they should be officially part of the campaign and the decision was, that for both the coalition and for ... [EDAG] it would impose restrictions. ... [EDAG] wouldn't be able to behave in the ways they wanted to in terms of any dodgy stuff like office invasions or stuff that might ... run foul of the law. They wanted the freedom of not having to tell us every time they were going to do an action ... obviously because of the way ... [EDAG] works, it is on the spur of the moment and you can't cope with an approvals process on decision-making that takes ages. Partly for purely pragmatic reasons and I guess there is a whole thing about who might be liable for illegal actions (Rau [FoE] interview, January 2004).

In the same vein, whilst FoE had great sympathy and admiration for the anti-capitalist demonstration in Seattle in 1999 - reportedly 'Tony [Juniper] was really impressed by Seattle because it was such a broad range of people out in the streets' - it will not 'touch May Day [anti-capitalist demonstrations in London] with a barge pole' despite the fact that FoE has become:

> very interested in anti-capitalist/globalisation … issue. In fact that has been the basis of some of our big campaigns. I mean Friends of the Earth are of course very wary of throwing rocks at windows and getting lots of police out and any of that sort of thing, and as a big organisation, I think they have to be (Freeman [FoE/EDAG] interview, February 2004).

Prior to COP9 demonstrations that were attended by EDAG activists from London and Oxford, FoE Milan aired similar cautions. FoE ENWI posted the following warning from Milan to its climate change campaigners:

> The march [organised by FoE Italy] of course will not be the only event in Milan … But I want to say a word of caution: not all groups who might be mobilising in Italy are acceptable, some of them are extremists and we do not guarantee that any demonstration they participate in will be peaceful. Plus it is essential that we are careful of the profile and message we give (Laura Radiconcini, FoE Italy, December 2003).

Figure 12.10, Collaboration network by relationship to national government



Again, there are very few organisations with an ambivalent relationship with the national government – the 7 organisations only have 8 ties between them – these numbers are too low to draw any conclusions.

The 27 collaborative ties amongst the 11 organisations with a contingent relationship to the government shows that these organisations that have a flexible approach in their dealings with the government have extensive interorganisational linkages. Perhaps they have a greater need to collaborate because of their greater need to generate a groundswell or be persuasive. Organisations with a constructive relationship that engage mostly in insider strategies do not need much assistance because they may not be applying pressure so much as responding to a request from the government. Table 12.1 shows the results of an SPSS correlation confirming a fairly modest and statistically significant correlation between the type of strategies EMOs carry out and their perception of their relationship with national government. Insiders tend to have a more constructive or ambivalent relationship, whereas outsiders are likely to have a negative or non-existent one.

Table 12.1 Balance of activities correlated by relationship with national government

Correlations

		ACTIVITY	NATPOS
ACTIVITY	Pearson Correlation	1	.495**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000
	N	115	115
NATPOS	Pearson Correlation	.495**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.
	N	115	115

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

ACTIVITY was labelled as insider, thresholder or outsider on the basis of the balance of activities that an organisation claimed to have carried out in the past 12 months (based on respondents' answers to question 7 of the questionnaire).
NATPOS was labelled as constructive, ambivalent, contingent, negative or non-existent (based on respondents' answers to 10 of the questionnaire).

Organisations with a contingent relationship have most of their ties directed towards other organisations like themselves. This may be because the contingency of their relationship with the government is a result of their range of insider and outsider campaigning strategies. Organisations with a contingent relationship are likely to be multi-issue, and therefore have more scope for collaborating. For example, as a multi-issue organisation, FoE co-operates with Stop Esso, BCC and EDAG on climate change, WWF and Greenpeace on Yes2Wind and Greenpeace on GM (The Five Year Freeze). In addition, each campaign team has a multitude of additional linkages besides these informal coalitions. If it were a single-issue organisation, it would likely only co-operate with one of those groups of partners.

Whilst only six organisations claimed a negative relationship with the government, there are actually 11 ties between these organisations and groups with different configurations of relationships. This indicates that groups with a negative relationship with the government are more likely to co-operate with organisations other than those that have a positive and constructive relationship with the government. Most of the links that groups with a negative relationship to the government have are directed towards organisations that have a contingent one. It may be that contingent organisations make good allies when they are campaigning with organisations that have a negative relationship with the government on issues that the government is failing to address and when outsider strategies are required.

Amongst organisations lacking a relationship with the government, 68% of their collaborative connections are to other organisations like themselves. This is a meaningful percentage because there are 31 ties in this category – a little over one per organisation. This is largely because of their local focus – of the 66 organisations that claimed to have no relationship with the government, all but 16 were local. Others were internationally focused conservation organisations like Save the Rhino and Rainforest Concern and regional reformist or conservation organisations (London FoE and LWT), and radical information processing organisations (e.g. Green Anarchist, Platform).

There is a high degree of collaboration between organisations with a constructive and contingent relationship to government. This is likely to be at its highest when those with a contingent relationship are on favourable terms with a certain department, or are campaigning on relatively non-controversial issues. Similarly, the top sources of information for those with a constructive relationship are with those with a contingent one (38% of all ties they have) (Figure 12.11).

Figure 12.11, Information-provided by relationship to national government



Organisations with a constructive relationship to the government tend to provide information to others like themselves. In all networks, those with a constructive relationship to the government hardly choose those with a negative or non-existent relationship to the government.

For organisations with an ambivalent relationship to the government, none of the trends stand out as being exceptional with the exception of their relationships with organisations with a negative relationship to the government. Twenty-five percent of the collaborative ties that organisations with an ambivalent relationship to the government mentioned are directed towards organisations lacking government recognition, or preferring to campaign in different ways. Only nine percent of top ties these organisations have for receiving information are with organisations with a negative relationship to the government.

Those organisations with a contingent relationship to the government have a broad range of ties to different kinds of organisations across all networks, but bias towards others like themselves. Those with a negative relationship have in all networks the highest number of ties directed towards others like themselves, and as do those lacking a relationship with the government.

Figure 12.12, Information-received by relationship to national government



Figure 12.13, Information Exchange by relationship to national government



Inbreeding

As with the partition according to sphere of influence (Chapter 11), partitioned blocks were tested for their inbreeding biases (Table 12.2).

Table 12.2, Inbreeding biases - balance of activities[3]

	Collaboration Network	Information-provided Network	Information-received Network	Information Exchange Network
Insiders	0%	0%	5%	7%
Thresholders	0%	31%	0%	7%
Outsiders	0%	48%	0%	0%

These results indicate that there is no bias towards cooperation with organisations with a similar balance of campaigning or environmental activity in the collaboration network. Insiders, thresholders and outsiders appear to be just as happy to select collaborative partners from outside their own block as inside it, as do insiders in the provision of information, thresholders as receptors of information and outsiders in the exchange of information. Organisations with a constructive relationship to the government are generally willing to collaborate with organisations with an ambivalent or contingent relationship if it is in the interests of a particular campaign to do so. For instance, CPRE seeks to bring about change through influencing ministers and has a very constructive relationship with the government, but is willing to co-operate with FoE when the need arises.

It is in the information-provided network where biases are highest. Thresholders have a 31% bias towards selecting one of their own kind to which to provide information and outsiders have a 48% chance of being biased towards their own block. The high score for outsiders is unsurprising because of their tendency to want to remain either confidential in their pursuit of illegal activity, or their lack of resources to influentially contact other organisations but similarly disenfranchised ones.

In the information exchange network – where ties were only counted for pairs of actors who had both received and provided information to one another, the biases for insiders and thresholders are only 7%, showing only a slight preference for exchanging information within their own blocks. This would indicate, perhaps surprisingly, that insiders and outsiders engage in the sharing of information more than in the provision of information. This could be a function of

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5 Goodness of fit scores are shown in Appendix 9.

Granovetter's weak ties argument (1973). For example, as thresholders have mostly links with other thresholders, information soon becomes redundant – nothing new is gleaned. Therefore these links are not the most important in the *information exchange network* because it often leads to the same information. For example, because a small number of activists in EDAG are also active in London EF!, the same information is posted on both email alert lists, making this an unimportant information exchange.

Table 12.3, Inbreeding Biases – relationship to GLA[4]

	Collaboration Network	Information-provided Network	Information-received Network
Constructive	21.2%	5.3%	0%
Ambivalent	10.8%	0%	0%
Contingent	0%	0%	0%
Negative	N/A	0.4%	0%
None	0%	36.5%	8.6%

Generally, the inbreeding biases for each network based on organisation's relations with the GLA are very low (Table 12.3). This is possibly because few organisations are yet geared towards targeting the GLA. The highest bias is between organisations that have no relationship with the GLA in the information-provided network (36.5%). This bias is unsurprising given that most organisations sampled claimed to have no relationship to the GLA and therefore that sources of information that relate to working with the GLA, or the regional level in particular, are unlikely to be a priority concern for EMOs.

The second highest bias is between organisations that have a constructive relationship with the GLA in the collaboration network (21.2%). This is unsurprising because regionally based organisations like LWT, London FoE and London CPRE, are likely to meet up at regional assemblies and collaborate to achieve their desired aims. Bates often meets other environmental campaigners through her work that seeks to influence the GLA, and because they meet frequently, and are campaigning at the same (regional) level, collaboration between them is likely to be high.

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6 Goodness of fit scores are shown in Appendix 9.

Generally, biases in the information-provided network are higher than in the collaboration and information-provided networks when considering inbreeding according to relationships with national government (Table 12.4). The highest bias in the information-provided network is between organisations with a constructive relationship to the government, possibly because such organisations regard information from others like themselves as being 'important' and credible. There are biases also for organisations with a constructive relationship to the government in the receiving of information and in collaborating, but these are much lower.

Table 12.4, Inbreeding Biases – relationship to government[5]

	Collaboration Network	Information-provided Network	Information-received Network
Constructive	6.5%	36.9%	7.3%
Ambivalent	19.0%	20.2%	1.2%
Contingent	0%	13.3%	11.2%
Negative	0%	16.3%	0%
None	6.1%	34.9%	34.7%

In the collaboration network the highest inbreeding bias is between organisations that have an ambivalent relationship with government. This could be because organisations with an ambivalent relationship do not want to brand themselves as closely related to insider organisations, so that their more radical membership do not feel that they are losing their campaigning edge, and because they do not want to jeopardise the sometimes positive relationship that they have with government by aligning themselves too closely with radical groups and ideological outsiders. Organisations with (albeit variable) respect from government are not going to have small scale, newly formed, radical or insignificant organisations as their top five closest allies. Perhaps they see it better to play the game safe by sticking to the middle ground. FoE has a contingent relationship with the government, and has a wide range of network links. De Zylva regards this as a direct effect of FoE's stance midway on the scale between conservative insider and radical outsider (de Zylva [FoE] interview, January 2004).

The highest bias in the information-received network is between organisations without any relationship to the government. This means that organisations without a relationship to the government tend to list other organisations without a relationship to the government as their most important sources of information. It is tempting to explain this trend with reference to the radical environmental movement, as its organisations are more than likely to regard

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7 Goodness of fit scores are shown in Appendix 9

organisations with a similar anti-state ideology as being the most important sources of information because of their scepticism of hierarchical and bureaucratic organisations. However true this may be, it is not the correct explanation for these figures because so few radical EMOs provided valid answers to the questionnaires. It is no coincidence that beside radical groups, it is mostly local and regional organisations that lack a relationship with national government. It is likely that local groups prefer to consult other local groups as they have more specialist knowledge of local issues, especially when there is a critical campaign (Chapter 11 showed that local organisations have high inbreeding).

Is hypothesis 6 falsified?

It is true that thresholders have the broadest range of network links that stretch across the whole spectrum of EMOs. Whilst insiders may have few collaborative ties with radical groups, and indeed they have few network ties generally, this does not mean that they are not sympathetic towards them. NoTRAG is a local insider - having been funded by its local council - and although this means it cannot enter into a formal coalition with radical EMOs, nor engage in illegal activity itself because it would lose its funding, it supports them in principle. A number of NoTRAG supporters were present in a supportive role at the court hearing of the HANT T5 crane-scalers. CPRE, also an insider, although careful not to openly criticise government policy, offered tacit support to direct action protesters at the Nine Ladies protest camp in the Peak District.

12.2 Closed opportunities and dynamic protest

This section explores the hypothesis that closed political opportunities can create dynamic and unexpected alliances between EMOs that would, at non-critical times, usually dissociate from one another (hypothesis 7 as listed in chapter 7). In the past, key campaigns in a perceived or objectively closed polity have brought local, regional and national groups together across ideological divides. This happened with the Oxleas Wood Alliance and at Crystal Palace, suggesting that there should be a notable difference between local campaign networks at critical and normal times. It is therefore instructive to compare southeast London's network with northwest London's, and southeast London's network at two different times – when the Crystal Palace campaign was in full swing, to more recently when a critical campaign was absent.

Although southeast London currently hosts the campaign against the Thames Gateway Bridge, this campaign has not yet reached critical level. A critical level is reached when the decision to proceed with a LULU is made and construction appears imminent. According to Bates (LFoE), the Bridge campaign is at an early stage, unlike its 1990s predecessor at the height of the Oxleas Wood Campaign (interview, November 2003).

> Basically that [Oxleas Wood campaign] took a long time to build up. It is only when it gets serious. It was, you know, actually approved. I mean they had to get it revoked as far as I remember... it started off as local and it took ages I think before they really got people involved from ... the national organisations ... so I don't think hardly anybody was involved at the early stage then ...

In contrast, northwest London has been bombarded with application after application for expansion of Heathrow airport and local people have been subjected to numerous broken promises from BAA (Chapter 9). Government proposals to reduce the rights of the public to have their say in planning inquiries accompanied with a green light for a third runway at Heathrow providing pollution standards are met, make the situation comparatively more critical. The battle to save the Heathrow villages is part of a national campaign against aviation. National groups have been mobilised and some airport growth nationally appears inevitable. At the time of network data collection, it seemed that a third runway at Heathrow was the optimal solution for the government and the airline authorities to rising demand for air travel, and the campaign was at its peak. The White Paper was released 10 months after the network data was collected.

In northwest London's collaboration network, 24 out of 78 local EMOs that returned questionnaires were *not* in the main component, meaning that 69.2% *were* part of it. In the southeast however, only 31% of the organisations that returned completed questionnaires were part of the main component of the collaboration network. This stands in stark contrast to a similar survey carried out just two and a half years earlier when 72.1% of nodes with reference to the same geographical area were part of the main component. True, the response rate is much lower for the latter survey, but opportunities for responding to the questionnaire were virtually equal. Thus, the fragmentation of the network is quite stark.

Figure 12.14 shows southeast London's environmental movement network in January 2003. It shows all 8 components of the network. This can be compared to Figure 12.15, which shows the network in February 2001. In Figure 12.14, the green nodes represent those organisations that were active in the now ceased Crystal Palace Park campaign, which includes some key brokers. When these campaigning organisations ceased to exist, and the radical subculture associated with the campaign fell back into latency, the network became considerably more fragmented.

In Figure 12.14, the Crystal Palace Campaign, which did answer a questionnaire but claimed to no longer be part of a network of EMOs, is only tangentially linked to the network, being nominated as an important collaborator by only three local societies. In Figure 12.15, when the

Crystal Palace Campaign was most active, it was connected to many more organisations with broader remits, including Ridge Wildlife Group, a few societies, national FoE, Southwark FoE, LWT, RSPB, Southwark Open Spaces Society, Friends of Great North Wood and the Environment Office. The Environment Office was the bridge (and key broker) between these reformist and conservation interests and radical environmentalism and its DiY culture which features so prominently in the top right hand corner of the network diagram, but which is missing in the most recent network survey. This is because there is no longer a focal point in southeast London for radical protesters in the absence of the Big Willow Ecovillage.

Figure 12.14, Southeast London's environmental movement network, January 2003



Key

1 Bankside Open Spaces Trust
2 BTCV
3 Badair
4 BromleyRSPB
5 Crystal Palace Campagin
6 CPRE
7 Camberwell Society
8 Centre for Wildlife Gardening
9 Creekside Forum
10 Dog Kennel Hill Campagin
11 Dulwich Society
12 East Dulwich Society
13 Encams (previously Tidy Britain
14 Forum of Conservation and Amenity Societies
15 FoE
16 Federation of City Farms
17 Forum for Stable Currencies
18 Friends of Belaiv Park
19 Friends of Burgess Park
20 Friends of Dulwich Park
21 Friends of Greenwich Park
22 Friends of Jubilee Gardens
23 Greenwich Action to Stop Pollution
24 Greenwich Wildlife Advisory Group
25 Greenwich Conservation Group
26 Greenwich FoE
27 Greenwich Greenpeace
28 Greenwich Wildlife Trust
29 Groundwork
30 Groundwork London
31 Groundwork Southwark
32 London Wildlife Trust
33 Learning Through Landscapes
34 Lee Manor Society
35 People Against the River Crossing
36 PCEG
37 Peckham Society
38 RSPB
39 Roots and Shoots
40 Southwark FoE
41 Sustainable Energy Action
42 Southwark Social Investment

Forum
43 Vauxhall Society
44 Vision for Vauxhall
45 Walk First
46 Walworth Garden Farm
47 Waste Watch
48 Woodlands Farm Trust

Figure 12.15, Southeast London's environmental movement network, February 2001



Key

Key brokers[6]

Organisations campaigning at Crystal Palace

1. 56a
2. Alarm
3. Anti-Terrorism Act
4. Archway Alert
5. Association for Monetary Reform
6. BADAIR
7. Barrydale Allotments Association

[6] The top seven brokers, calculated using Freeman's betweenness (1979) all have scores over ten and are listed in Appendix 11. The eighth highest broker has a score lower than four. In January 2003, no EMO's brokerage score exceeds 8.

8. British Horse Society
9. Blackheath Society
10. Boycott UCI
11. Brixton Greenpeace
12. Brockley Society
13. Brockley Cross Action Group
14. Bromley Greenpeace
15. BTCV
16. Camberwell Society
17. CAST

.... (continued on next page)

18. Centre for Alternative Technology
19. Charlton Society
20. Chernobyl Children
21. Christian Ecology Link
22. Civic Trust
23. CND
24. Corporate Watch
25. Countryside Agency
26. Crystal Palace Campaign
27. Crystal Palace Foundation
28. Crystal Palace Protest
29. Cyclists Tourist Club
30. Dog Kennel Hill Society
31. Dulwich Society
32. East Dulwich Society
33. Ecotrip
34. Earth First!
35. Eltham Society
36. English Heritage
37. Environment Office
38. Fareshares
39. Friends of Burgess Park
40. Friends of Camberwell Park
41. Friends of Dawson's Hill
42. Friends of Dulwich Park
43. Federation of City Farms
44. Friends of Great North Wood
45. Flora and Fauna
46. Friends of Nunhead Cemetery
47. FoE
48. Forum for the Future
49. Friends of Peckham Rye Park
50. Friends of Beckenham Park
51. Greenwich Action Plan
52. Greenwich Action to Stop Pollution
53. Gene Concern
54. Georgian Group
55. Green Party
56. Green Anarchist
57. Green Lanes
58. Greenpeace
59. Greenwich Conservation Group
60. Greenwich Cyclists
61. Greenwich Environment Forum
62. Greenwich FoE
63. Greenwich Green Party
64. Greenwich Greenpeace
65. Greenwich Local History Society
66. Greenwich LA21
67. Greenwich Society
68. Greenwich Wildlife Advisory Group
69. Hastings Bypass Campaign
70. Hillyfields Action Group
71. Huntington Life Sciences Campaign
72. Justice?
73. Lambeth Cyclists
74. Lambeth Environment Forum
75. Lambeth Green Party
76. Lambethians Society
77. Lambeth Transport Users Group
78. Lambeth Walk First
79. Lambeth Local History Society
80. London Cycling Campaign
81. Legal Defence and Monitoring Group
82. Lee Manor Society
83. Lettsom Gardens Association
84. Lewisham Cyclists
85. Lewisham Environment Trust
86. Lewisham Green Party
87. Lewisham Pedestrians Association
88. Lewisham Wildlife Trust
89. London Forum of Amenity Societies
90. London Forum of Green Parties
91. Liberty
92. London Natural History Society
93. London Anarchy
94. London SCARE
95. London Walking Forum
96. London RSPB
97. London Wildlife Trust
98. May Day Collective
99. MedACT
100. Greenwich Sustainable Millenium Network
101. Minet Conservation Association
102. Monetary Justice
103. New Economics Foundation
104. Norwood Society
105. People Against the River Crossing
106. PCEG
107. Peace camps
108. Peckham Society
109. Pedestrians Association (now Living Streets)
110. Pirate TV
111. Plant Life
112. Primal Seeds
113. Quaggy Waterways Action Group
114. Residents Association [unspecified]
115. Rail Passengers and Commuters Association (SE)
116. Ridge Wildlife Group
117. Road Peace
118. Rockingham Estates Play Area
119. Royal Society for Nature Conservation
120. RSPB
121. RTS
122. SAVE
123. *SchNEWS*
124. South East London World Development Movement
125. South Greenwich Forum
126. Simon Wolfe Charitable Foundation
127. Siren Sound System
128. Socialist Alliance
129. Sounds of Dissent
130. South Bank Ramblers
131. South London Collective
132. South London Link
133. Southwark Cyclists
134. Southwark Open Spaces Society
135. spc.org
136. Stonehenge Campaign
137. Sustrans
138. Socialist Worker
139. Southwark Animal Rights
140. Southwark Environmental Forum
141. Southwark FoE
142. Southwark Green Party
143. Southwark Groundwork
144. Southwark Heritage Association
145. Southwark LA21
146. Southwark Park Rangers
147. Southwark Social Investment
148. Southwark Wildlife Trust
149. Sydenham CND
150. Sydenham Society
151. Sydenham UN Association
152. Transport for London
153. Tidy Blackheath
154. Tidy Britain (now ENCAMS)
155. Transport 2000
156. UN Association
157. Undercurrents
158. Urban 75
159. Victorian Society
160. World Development Movement
161. Wildlife Gardening Initiative
162. Wombles
163. Woodlands Farm Trust

In contrast to southeast London's current fragmented network, the campaign against Heathrow airport virtually dominates the network of EMOs in the northwest of London (Figure 12.16). HACAN is the most central organisation, followed by West London FoE. Should the campaigns

against airport expansion cease, or if the data had been collected at a less critical time, the likely picture would be a more fragmented network.

Figure 12.16, North west London's environmental movement network January 2003



It is at critical campaign times when sympathy for direct action if not formal coalition building with eco-activists increases. Local campaigners involved in NoTRAG – even though their actions were constrained by local borough council funding – were keen to show their support for the direct action crane occupiers on the site of Terminal 5. And although FoE and CPRE both have to consider their political reputation (CPRE especially so), both can see the virtues of direct action when it remains the only channel open to protesters. De Zylva told the *Telegraph* that:

> When the normal decision-making methods fail to deliver, it's time to get off your backside and do something about it. We are very sympathetic to people who take practical action to show up the absurdity of our planning laws (*Telegraph Weekend*, 28th February 2004).

Even CPRE has displayed sympathy towards direct action protesters campaigning to protect the Nine Ladies megalithic complex and nature conservation site in the Peak district from quarrying. A CPRE spokesperson is recorded as saying that:

> if it weren't for the eco-warriors, the quarrying would have already started … We applaud them for what they are doing. OK, they might not wash very much and they may look a bit strange, but we have had nothing but cordial relations with them (ibid).

At the time of writing, EF! and EDAG activists are preparing to join the campaign against the development at Stansted with some direct action stunts or possibly a camp. To demonstrate their solidarity with the cause, in December 2003, London EF! occupied the offices of BAA presenting them with a demand for 'no more airport expansion'. Although some Stansted campaigners display open hostility towards direct action, it is clear that at the very least that SSE is determined to win:

> I would just like to say that the White Paper decision has hardened our resolve ... 'Stop Stansted Expansion? Yes We Will!' and we certainly shall (Carol, January 2004).

Should their legal avenues of challenge fail, there seems to be enough determination to embrace a shift towards support for direct action if the need arises. In response to a question regarding the likelihood of Stansted campaigners winning the campaign using only conventional means, Stewart ([HACAN] in interview, January 2004) said:

> I think they can't ... they do need ... to work up their economic arguments and all that will help, but I think that unless there's direct action, or the threat of direct action, symbolic direct action, I think they still see Stansted not as an easy touch, but as somewhere that can eventually be rolled over.

If Stewart is right, direct action seems likely and an alliance between staid campaigners and radicals may well materialise. Indeed, the alliance that developed between eco-anarchists and local campaigners against Manchester airport's second runway looked equally unlikely at a similar stage of the campaign (Griggs & Howarth 2002).

At the time of writing, a no-airport expansion pledge is being drawn up by the organisations involved in Airport Watch with some additional input from national EDAG. Along similar lines to the Beat the Bulldozer pledge that was drawn up by the Oxleas Wood Alliance and drew the support of tens of thousands of people, the Airport Watch Pledge against airport expansion seeks to use the threat of direct action as a means for throwing airline operators off their feet. A recent draft of the pledge reads:

> Dear Minister of Transport/Prime Minister
>
> I am strongly opposed to the government's plans for airport expansion. I lend my support to the many others opposing this policy .... [and reasons are given] ... In the event that the government chooses to ignore this widespread and well informed opposition, and decides to implement its misguided expansion policy by force, I will take personal action to stop the construction projects, to protest against the companies supporting and funding the construction, or will actively support those taking such actions (Marshall 2004).

A similar pledge called the Green Gloves pledge - in which thousands pledged to remove GM crops or to support others doing so should they be grown in the UK - was viewed by protesters

as instrumental in Bayer's decision of April 2004 to withhold introduction of GM maize and involved the coming together of activists from radical, reformist and countryside organisations.

Is hypothesis 7 falsified?

There are many instances, especially in the anti-roads movement, where an exhaustion of conventional campaigning channels has resulted in recourse to direct action. Although this has not yet happened at Stansted airport, the campaigners there are still exploring legal institutional protest channels and have not yet reached a dead end. However, since the White Paper decision that gave the go-ahead for development of Stansted airport, campaigners have become ever more determined to win. Although direct action looks unlikely at present, it may well occur if conventional campaigning fails. London EF! is certainly keen to stage a direct action protest or camp.

In the campaign to prevent the building of a multiplex cinema on Crystal Palace Park, when construction appeared imminent, an alliance between radical and reformist organisations developed. Now that the threat of development has faded, the campaign has folded and the network of southeast London EMOs has become considerably more fragmented. Key brokerage organisations (linking radical, reformist and conservationist sections of the movement) were mostly those involved specifically in the fight against the entertainment park. The unexpected alliances that materialised during the course of the campaign no longer exist.

12.3 Network effects of repression

This section explores hypothesis 8 (as set out in Chapter 7) which suggests that radical groups become sectarian and detached in their networks as a result of state repression. Despite the likely alliance-building between eco-anarchists and local campaign groups at Stansted, radical activists are likely to remain relatively detached and secretive about their actions, many which may be against the law. Local campaigners for example did not know anything about the proposed scaling of the cranes at Heathrow airport's T5 construction site by HANT protesters until they witnessed them firsthand on their way to work that morning. This, alongside the spectacular nature of the actions they undertake, may contribute to making direct action protesters appear a breed apart from the rest of the movement and thereby reduce propensity for cooperation (Chapter 13).

Because of their perception of the political system, and the manner in which they view themselves (sometimes not unwarrantedly) as targets of infiltration, cooperation with reformists can be somewhat stymied. One activist for example is convinced that:

> [The police] constantly monitor my every move, they bug my phone, they photograph me, they always know where I am. I know them personally, I have for 10 years ('Dave', 56a visitor February 2004).

Others refuse to put their personal names to campaign letters or leaflets, preferring to use a pseudonym or the generic EDAG name instead. If fellow campaigners do not know who you are or where you come from, the networking potential is reduced. For instance, Bates will happily put her name and contact details to any press release that she writes on behalf of FoE. Fellow campaigners can then easily contact her, associate her arguments with her name and thereby use it as a foundation upon which to build networks. This is much harder to do with material produced by EDAG, as its activists remain mysterious black boxes, contactable only via EDAG's email address that is maintained by an anonymous activist.

There are several reasons why EDAG activists are paranoid. Some of its activists were previously involved in RTS, which had its offices raided, computers trashed and street parties invaded by police and the Forward Intelligence Team (FIT) in the late 1990s. According to Monbiot (1996), for at least a spell in 1996, the FIT:

> used a house opposite the London offices of Reclaim the Streets to watch activists' movements. Whenever anyone left on a bicycle, a car and a mountain bike would follow. When the campaign's minibus pulled out, four cars took off behind it. Six weeks ago, the Forward Intelligence Team raided the office and removed its computers.

As well as being involved in RTS prior to EDAG, one of the key campaigners was (only partially correctly) exposed as being an organiser of the J18 anti-capitalist demonstration back in 1999, which was represented in the media as a McDonalds-smashing 'Special Brew Crew' riot. His photograph and family history were plastered across national tabloids and broadsheets (Vidal 2000). Since then, he has been wary of putting his name to campaign materials. EDAGers have also on occasion found that planned office occupations have had to be cancelled because their target office was mysteriously boarded up and vacant on a normal working day (Coleman interview, November 2003). Recently, it has been revealed that a lawyer infiltrated an animal rights group and had tried to persuade activists to intensify their campaign in an attempt to make the group easier to marginalize and label as extremists (*Ecologist*, 2004:12). EDAG seeks to avoid this kind of infiltration.

Manifestations of paranoia include an unwillingness of activists to divulge their true identities, not being able to have full and open discussions at meetings for fear of bugging or spies, taking care to not expose too many details via email or the phone[7] and tacit monitoring of new recruits

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[7] These processes contribute to the marking of boundaries around radical organisations, so sharpening the 'we-them' distinction, making sectarian solidarity a likely outcome (see Chapter 13). For example, to

and activists. Specific information regarding actions that are potentially illegal, or need to be kept secret is spread via public phones, whereby an activist phones his/her colleague at home from a public phone box, gives them the phone number and arranges for them to call back at a specific time from another phone box.

Radical activists feel that the repression some of them witnessed as RTS protesters continues. At the BP AGM protest, the police intimidated protesters and passers-by by using Stop and Search and photographing and videoing every protester there. Official state repression of direct action groups appears to be strengthening year on year. The Anti-Social Behaviour Act has been introduced and this involves a tightening of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJA). The CJA (1994), which reduced the scope of legal protest, has been strengthened so that a senior policeman now has the right to disperse a 'public assembly' that consists of just two people (in 1994 this was 20 people). The charge of Aggravated Trespass, so frequently used to charge GM crop-trashers, has been modified so that it incorporates activities within as well as outside of buildings, making office occupations illegal. A new Civil Contingencies Bill has been introduced to facilitate effective remediation of terrorist attacks or floods, but the radical activist newsletter *SchNEWS* (2004) interprets it as a device for further repressing radical environmental protest, just as the Anti-Stalking Laws were introduced to supposedly prevent stalking, but were first used against protesters, and the Terrorism Laws were apparently designed to protect people from terrorists, but are now routinely used to search demonstrators (even at anti-war marches against bombs). The Civil Contingencies Bill allows for state powers to ban the movement of people or vehicles in an area, issue evacuation orders, seize, confiscate or destroy property, animal or plant life with or without compensation, ban 'assemblies of specified kinds, at specified places and specified times', shut down telephone lines and websites, and arrest people who do not cooperate with emergency powers.

FoE believes that it is able to back direct action site campaigns that it envisages happening on the airports issue because it has been involved in other direct action scenes as legal observers (e.g. Newbury) without being threatened with an injunction. FoE is currently discussing how it can support direct action and will probably focus on Stansted, Liverpool and Birmingham (de Zylva interview, January 2004). De Zylva stated that FoE is anticipating supporting the right to protest and legal NVDA. However, as a result of an onslaught of Acts that continue to restrict the legal realm of protest, FoE's ability to remain within the law in its support for direct action is lessening. FoE may find itself threatened with an injunction for something that in the past would have been perfectly legal. In short, the repression of direct action groups makes it increasingly

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avoid disclosing too much information to potential infiltrators, emails are often written in a coded language, so that only those party to the discussion in the meeting are able to comprehend the message.

difficult for law-abiding groups to cooperate with them without stepping over the ever-thinning line between legality and illegality.

Is hypothesis 8 falsified?

Perceived and real repression of radical EMOs has a dramatic effect on their network links. It causes radicals to be uneasy about welcoming new types of people and encourages the use of pseudonyms and code language that can stifle networking. Actual acts of repression make it increasingly difficult for others to collaborate with radicals without stepping outside the law. The Anti-Social Behaviour Act, for example, has tightened the Public Order Act and the Criminal Justice Act. Whilst FoE was able to act in the capacity of legal observer at the Newbury bypass demonstrations in 1995, such activity could now be regarded as an unlawful public assembly (even if there are only two activists present).

12.4 Summary

As predicted by theory, thresholders have the widest variety of ties across the insider-outsider continuum. Insiders and outsiders widely share information with and collaborate with thresholders. This however is partly an ecological effect because of the skew in the data towards thresholders (most respondents were thresholders). In all networks, insiders have most of their ties with thresholders. Insiders are more likely to receive 'important' information from outsiders than provide it to them, and generally insiders are regarded as important and thereby credible sources of information that even radical outsiders draw upon.

NoTRAG provides a textbook example of a local insider being constrained in its relations with outsiders due to fear that it will lose its income and status should it deviate from legal means or be associated with criminal activity. Similarly CPRE as a national insider is mostly wary about taking an aggressive stance in its campaigning and so was concerned with FoE's direct approach in the campaign to revoke the Planning Bill. Although CPRE has quite extensive network links, most organisations that have a constructive relationship with the government tend to work in relative isolation. This could be because they have tightly defined specialist tasks that they prefer to or have the professional skills to undertake in isolation, or because they perceive it as safer to work alone as they concerned about losing the status they have achieved. Thus, the finding that organisations with a constructive relationship to the government hardly ever chose those with a non-existent or negative relationship as top sources of information provision/reception or collaboration is congruent with the theory.

In contrast, organisations with a contingent relationship collaborate with one another to a much greater extent. This is because they have less need to be concerned about their reputation, which is flexible and issue/strategy-dependent or because their multi-issue focus makes them

more likely collaborative partners on a wider range of campaigns. FoE for instance has consultative status on waste issues and collaborates mostly with insider agencies, but has a radical agenda on 'corporates' with ideological (if not actual) links with the more radical anti-capitalist agenda. Where outsiders collaborate with organisations with a contingent relationship to government, this is likely to be on issues that, like these, the government is failing to address. Organisations with an ambivalent relationship to the government appear to sit on the fence, and are in a position to keep radicals relatively content whilst maintaining a semi-cosy relationship with the government.

Although the Blair government appears to be committed to meeting its targets of greenhouse gas emission reduction, regarding climate change as a threat as large as terrorism, the lack of integration between the DfT and DEFRA means that it is unlikely that these targets will be met, especially considering that proposals for airport expansion will offset gains made by renewables and emissions reductions in other industries. Although the government has sympathy for climate change campaigners, many activists currently interpret this sympathy as mere rhetoric. Hence, a broad-ranging climate campaign alliance ranging from EDAG to CPRE has evolved, mostly targeting large oil companies (especially Shell, BP and Exxon Mobil) and promoting renewables. Although radical groups are heavily involved in campaigning to prevent climate change, they are not part of an official alliance for fear of tarring the public and political image of more reformist groups.

Nationally, aviation policy seems to have reached a dead end. Now that the government's role in determining the future of aircraft travel in the UK is deemed complete, campaigners are working to influence the aviation industry, financiers and construction companies. Stansted has been given the green light and the campaign there has become critical. The proposed construction site is more than likely to bear witness to some kind of alliance, no matter how inhospitable at first, between insiders and radical outsiders. Network diagrams showed how critical campaigns, like those recently at Crystal Palace and Heathrow airport, tend to knit networks together more firmly, often resulting in unexpected alliances. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult for thresholder groups to support ideological outsiders and remain within the law given the restrictions that are imposed by the Criminal Justice Act, Anti-Social Behaviour Act, Terrorism Laws, Public Order Act and the Civil Contingencies Bill.

CHAPTER 13

Organisational and Collective Identities, Solidarity and Networks

This chapter explores organisational and collective identity and its impact upon networks. It draws mostly upon the literature outlined in Chapter 6. It begins by considering how EMOs' identity - defined by ideology and field of action – impacts on ties. Issues of ideological conflict are then addressed, particularly in relation to views over the efficacy of the Kyoto Protocol and the campaigning opportunities it presents.

Secondly, this chapter considers the effect of solidarity on movement networks. If organisations have a high level of interrelations with others like themselves this is indicative of high levels of sub-movement solidarity. However, it is not only the quantity of those ties, but also the quality of ties that are important in the process of solidarity building. Inter- and intra-group solidarity is stronger when the interaction is qualitative, subjective and emotionally binding (Tönnies [1887] 1955:221). High quality and quantity relations amongst sub-movements or within individual SMOs can come at the expense of less fruitful relations with the rest of the movement, resulting in sectarian solidarity. The chapter then explores activists' ideology through interview data, and its effects on movement strategies and interaction. The chapter ends with a discussion of the role of latent networks and umbrella organisations in the passage to visibility.

13.1 Network Analysis and Organisational Identity

Organisational identity – conservationist, reformist or radical – has been determined largely on the basis of questionnaire responses asking organisational representatives to attribute the cause and solutions to environmental problems. This was weighed alongside the balance of activity of EMOs, taking into account ideology and action (Chapter 2). An organisation is only classified as radical if it regards environmental problems as the result of systemic imbalance, sees that a solution lies in dramatic alteration to the structure of society *and* engages in radical action - involving alternative lifestyles (e.g. squatting or ecovillages), practical projects, direct action or logistical support for purely these kinds of activities (e.g. alternative media, legal advice) as opposed to lobbying, petitioning and other reformist strategies. Reformist and conservationist organisations are distinguished on the basis of the extent to which they focus on wildlife and/or the countryside; if nature concerns are missing, or are a relatively small part of a broader environmental outlook, organisations are classified as reformist. Here, the networks are

partitioned according to the organisational identity of organisations allowing us to see the proportion of ties that conservationist, reformists and radicals extend towards one another.

Thus, this data is not only useful for exploring extent to which conservationists, reformists and radicals form collective identities (hypothesis 10), but also for determining the extent to which hypothesis 9 (as outlined in Chapter 7) resonates with reality. Hypothesis 9 suggested that the apparent lack of progress of reformist strategies would lead to radicals being overly critical of the reformist approach, thus causing conflict between radicals and reformists. Hypothesis 9 is addressed also by a discussion of ideological conflict based on interview data, focusing especially on the Kyoto protocol.

Partitioning network data by organisational identity[1]

The main component of the collaboration network consisted of 51 conservationist, 78 reformist and six radical organisations. The majority of 'important' collaborative ventures are with reformists, regardless of initiators' organisational identity. Radicals listed only seven ties, with four directed towards reformist organisations and three shared with other radicals. There is a notable absence of collaboration between conservationist and radical organisations (Figure 13.1).

The prevalence of reformist organisations in collaborative ventures is probably due to their presence on a broader range of issues, or specialism on a single issue which allows all their resources to be deployed to that effect. The radical environmental movement consists of smaller organisations, usually having fewer resources, a higher degree of issue and action specialism, and a more effective division of labour. For example the Wombles, Peoples Global Action, London Rising Tide, London Indymedia and London Genetix Engineering Network activists are phoenixes from the ashes of the RTS and they all have differing foci or means of action.[2] These groups appear to consist of small numbers of busy and committed activists and the labour is very much divided according to issue or preferred tactics. For instance, activists from the Genetix Engineering Network will be fairly unlikely to collaborate extensively with London Rising Tide because the former focuses on GM crops and the latter on climate change. The activists, some of whom work full time on their pet issue of concern are limited in time, resources and

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[1] The collaboration and information-provided networks include organisations that were nominated by questionnaire respondents but were not respondents themselves. Non-respondents were classified on the basis of their aims and field of action based on my own knowledge and/or their web pages. Organisations that were difficult or impossible to classify were excluded.

[2] Some of these organisations co-existed with RTS. Even where this is the case, RTS members formed the core membership of these newer groups.

knowledge to be able to cooperate with others campaigning on a different issue or providing a different logistical support role. However, radical GM activists have worked and frequently do work in collaboration with reformists like Greenpeace. Unlike radical counterparts, Greenpeace has the time, resources, money and manpower to commit to several issues at once (Sauven interview with Adams, 2001). Rather than an issue of identity, collaboration can become an issue of practicality.

Although organisations like FoE and Greenpeace are partially motivated by nature and biodiversity concerns, they do not specifically campaign on them, but on broader issues such as reducing resource use and challenging corporate power (FoE), and preventing the growing of GM food and campaigning on toxic waste (Greenpeace). All these projects contribute importantly, yet indirectly to conserving biodiversity. Whilst the campaigns of reformists often have overarching positive environmental objectives with recourse to biodiversity and nature protection, the management of nature reserves is perhaps too trivial, or too specialist for organisations like FoE and Greenpeace, who focus instead on the macro issues[3], leaving the nature-based meso level to more suitably qualified specialist conservationists. Other reformists are single-issue specialists e.g. CCC and Real Nappy Network or NIMBY-motivated, and find countryside issues outside of their ambit. Thus, conservationists may collaborate in reformist actions of multi-issue coalitions, but reformists rarely return the favour by participating in specifically conservationist events that they may regard as being less important than addressing broader environmental issues. That conservationists may regard collaboration efforts with reformist organisations as important can be interpreted as a function of the fact that conservationist organisations are increasingly realising the links between nature protection and broader environmental issues.

In particular, there is a noticeable absence of ties between radicals and conservationists. On the 1990s anti-roads protests there was minimal conservationist involvement:

> ... there was an endangered snail that was found along the Newbury route, a tiny little snail and there was an idea that possibly ... they would have to stop the route going that way, but that didn't happen – but they did have to move the snails and I am not sure which group actually did the moving. It may have been the Wildlife Trusts or somebody like them ... But they weren't there on the ground, they were more to sort of consult ... But I can't think of any conservationist organisations that were there officially.
> (Freeman [FoE/EDAG], interview February 2004).

Where conservationists assist radicals, this is likely to be in the provision of information, or specialist conservation tasks, such as species monitoring or relocation. At the time of writing,

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[3] This excludes local FoE groups, who do campaign on local, yet mostly reformist issues.

there are no specific site battles involving radical direct action camps within London, hence reducing the scope for collaboration. Not all conservationist organisations engage in site-battles in any case. Although LWT has been involved in planning issues, its recent financial lull has forced it to concentrate mostly on wildlife monitoring and conservation tasks. Most of the work of local conservationists is onsite, precluding the need for extensive networking (e.g. CWT and PCEG).

Figure 13.1 shows that radical organisations cooperate with reformists, and do so more frequently than with other radicals (57% of ties). In relation to identity, this is unexpected because it indicates that radical activists do not have a separate and marginalized identity – they do actually collaborate with reformists. Neither is there evidence of the expected gulf between radicals and reformists due to the former's frustration with the slow progress of the latter at bringing about concrete change. However, this can be read as an attempt by radicals to radicalise the agenda of mainstream EMOs - as EGAD and Platform are attempting to do via the No New Oil coalition. Despite being a radical take on climate change for mainstream organisations, this has still entailed a compromise for those who wanted the coalition to work on the principle of 'no new fossil fuels'. To avoid being accused of denying access to energy in developing countries, campaigning against development of coal and gas frontiers was ruled out (Rau [FoE], interview January 2004). EDAG members have commented however, that they see FoE becoming increasingly progressive and have been especially impressed by FoE's analysis of Iraq. However the cooperation between reformists and radicals is interpreted, the number of radical EMOs in this sample is too low to be considered representative of the radical environmental movement at large.

Figure 13.1 Collaboration network by organisational identity



The information-received network's main component has 100 conservationist, 134 reformist and six radical organisations. As this network was too large for UCInet to perform a partition, the network was condensed to include only respondents to the survey.[4] This reduces numbers to 31 conservationist, 36 reformist and one radical organisation.

In the information-received network, exempting the anomaly with radicals, organisations claim that their most important sources of information are from others like themselves (Figure 13.2). Radicals do not feature as important actors from which information is received, but they appear to turn to reformist national organisations for information. Information from sources like Indymedia and *SchNEWS* (Brighton) are important for the exchange of radical environmentalist information and details of actions. The data do not reveal this because of a distortion of reality due to under-representation of radicals and the focus on London. During the year I have been signed up to their email list, EDAG has shared information via email with a number of organisations, including Platform, FoE, BCC, Car Busters, Disarm DSEI, Critical Mass, the anti war movement – Voices UK and Children Against the War, New Internationalist, CCC, Queeruption, Indymedia, Carbon Trade Watch, the Wombles and the Argentine Solidarity Campaign – a range of radical and reformist organisations, and the Rainforest Information Centre, which could be perceived as a conservationist organisation.

Figure 13.2 Information-received network by organisational identity



[4] Although this means the sample size is smaller and less representative of the movement, the analysis is more valid because attributes are based upon survey responses.

Eighty conservationist interests, 87 reformist and 11 radical EMOs comprise the main component in the information-provided network. As in the information-received network, there is a tendency to choose similar organisations when providing information. For conservationists and reformists, the numbers are slightly less than in the information-received network, showing that organisations prefer the information they receive from within their class of identity to that they receive from without, but that they are much less discriminatory about where they pass information to.

With a slightly larger number of radical EMOs in the equation, a pattern emerges in their networks. Interestingly, radicals view their provision of information to conservationist organisations as among their top five of such links to a greater extent than to reformists. In identity terms, one would expect polarity and minimal links. However, the data on radicals is skewed by the over-representation of alternative-media types in the main component, which includes Positive News, Corner House (a radical splinter group of *The Ecologist* magazine), Platform and *Green Events*. *Green Events*, despite its focus on radical environmental campaigning and the 'alternative scene', reported that Dian Gorilla Fund (a northwest group), Trees For London (regional), Groundwork London (regional) and BTCV (national) are amongst its top 20 most important groups (five from each spatial dimension) for providing information to. Obviously *Green Events* has a holistic conception of the environment and wants to spread information about the 'alternative scene' across a wide web of relations.

Figure 13.3 Information-provided network by organisational identity



There are 41 actors in the information-exchange network. Nineteen are represented by conservationist interests, 21 by reformists and one radical organisation. The pattern of relations is similar to the information-received network (Figure 13.4). In particular it should be noted how the information-based networks differ from the collaboration network. Whilst conservationists' most important sources and sinks of information are other conservationists, they tend to collaborate more with reformists than other conservationists (or at least view their collaboration with reformists as more 'important' than their collaborations with other conservationists). The reason for information-sharing being higher between conservationists could be a side-effect of the specialist nature of their work.

Figure 13.4 Information exchange network by organisational identity



Inbreeding

Especially high 'inbreeding biases' are present amongst reformists in the collaboration network, and conservationists in the information-provided and information-received networks (Table 13.1). These are not surprising given the trends noticed above. For instance, conservationists are likely to require specialist information about habitat and species conservation from other like-minded organisations, but their work may be site-specific to a local nature reserve and provide little scope for collaboration. Conservationists share more information with other conservationists than any other type of group, more so than they collaborate. This amounts to sharing of information and helps explain why conservationists tend to collaborate in actual projects only to a small extent, but share information much more frequently.

13.1 Organisational identity 'inbreeding biases'[5]

	Collaboration Network	Information-provided network	Information-received network
Conservationist	26%	70%	75%
Reformists	64%	2%	4%
Radicals	38%	30%	0%

Reformists' inbreeding in the collaboration network is possibly due to the multi-issue nature of many national reformist organisations, or the fact that many local reformist organisations tend to form at critical times, join umbrella groups, and collaborate with national EMOs to assist their campaigns. The sample had too few radical organisations to draw healthy conclusions about their inbreeding tendencies. However, an interview with Coleman (EDAG) indicates that at least collaboration 'inbreeding biases' would likely be high amongst radicals:

> There is lots of interaction with EF! groups around the country ... the strongest links we have are amongst activist networks and then a small amount of interaction with FoE recently over the Baku Ceyhan ... (interview, November 2003).

This data so far suggests that conservationists and reformists have different identities, especially given the high 'inbreeding biases' shown in each network whereby reformists have a 64% likelihood of choosing other reformists to collaborate with over conservationists, and conservationists have a 70% chance of providing information to other conservationists, and a 75% chance of receiving it from others like themselves. This means that the construction of the cognitive praxis of conservationists is biased towards conservationist interests.

However, this quantitative data may underplay the extent to which radical organisations are frustrated with reform politics due to the small number of radical respondents. Qualitative data on ideological conflict illuminates the extent to which this occurs, and will now be presented.

Ideological conflict

'There is a lot of green fascism, certain green groups don't want other groups to behave in a certain way' (Bongo, interview, June 2001)

Whilst it is impossible to make foolproof generalisations, generally speaking, it can be argued that EDAGers share a belief in anarchist principles and social and environmental equity that goes hand-in-hand with these. To this end they argue that government structures should be

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[5] Goodness of fit scores are shown in Appendix 9.

abolished, economies should be localised, property should be expropriated and large companies should not exist (Walter 1969 [2002]).

This makes conflict with national organisations that work with governing structures inevitable. Whereas EDAG argues that a company like BP should not exist at all, FoE, like Greenpeace has been part of a:

> ...trend over recent years to be advocating solutions ... making the case for investment in renewables (Juniper interview with Seel June 2000).

Unlike EDAG, FoE are:

> ... not ideologically disposed to being anti-market. But ... what can the market do? How can it work? What constraints need to be put on it? What kind of economic mechanisms can start bringing externalities into what the stock market does for instance? (Juniper interview with Seel, June 2000).

The campaign approach of EDAG concerning the Baku Pipeline was very much geared towards stopping the development and attempting to expose BP as a social and environmental traitor so as to discredit its public image and help in its downfall. In contrast, the approach taken by a coalition of reformists, including FoE in Japan with regard to a similar oil development in Sakhalin, was not seeking to bring Shell into disrepute, or to completely halt the development. Instead the campaign involved asking for the pipelines to be built away from grey whale habitat and above ground (the area is highly seismic), for trenching to be avoided to protect the streams where wild salmon flourish, and for toxic waste not to be disposed of in a local bay to protect its fishing industry (FoE 2004b). For EDAG, this allows the cogs of environmental destruction and industrialism's addiction to fossil fuels to continue unabated and amounts to the cooption of EMOs and the granting of an unwarranted green image to Shell.

An EDAG action that consisted of a mock wedding between Co-opted International and BP is demonstrative of the animosity the group feels towards reformists who become heavily involved with corporate interests. Co-opted International was designed especially to signify the likes of Save the Children and Survival International, both of whom agreed to attend a BP meeting designed to help persuade stakeholders like themselves to monitor the environmental and social effects of the construction of the Baku Ceyhan Pipeline. None of the organisations that were party to BCC were invited, and there was much concern that the meeting would amount to little more than a green-washing exercise. As well as staging the wedding (Table 13.3), leaflets were handed out to prospective attendees urging them to boycott the event and stating that 'collaborations between NGOs and corporations result in the manipulation of those NGOs as pawns, disguising those corporations' true profit above all else mindset and thus giving them unwarranted credibility'.

Table 13.2 The wedding of BP to Co-opted International

Minister: Dearly beloved, we are gathered here in the presence of the devil to join together BP and Co-opted International; to signify the union between the corrupt and the corruptible; which capitalism dost adorn. Let us be reminded that marriage is not to be entered into unadvisedly or lightly; but reverently, discreetly and after considerable thought. If any person knows any just cause why this couple may not lawfully be joined together, let him now speak, or forever hold his peace. If either of you know why you should not be joined in Holy Matrimony, you should now confess it.

Minister: BP will you take Co-opted International as thy wedded wife, to corrupt her? Will you exploit her, weaken her, ignore her and use her for green wash PR spin? Will you have flings with other NGOs and divorce her when you feel like abusing the environment? Will you love her when your relationship causes her early retirement due to loss of public support?

BP: I will

Minister: Co-opted International, will you take BP to be thy wedded husband, to honour and obey his commands? Will you love him, comfort him, honour and keep him regardless of how he abuses you and breaks environmental laws? Will you forgive him for the loss of public support you will receive as a result of your marriage? Will you love him in floods, droughts, heat waves, hurricanes and typhoons so long as you both shall live?

Co-opted International: I will

Minister: BP repeat after me: 'I BP take thee Co-opted International to be my wedded Wife ...

'To use and abuse for as long as I feel like it ...

'So long as the world isn't flooded and I can continue to make money out of oil...

'And as long as it is useful for me, we shall be united ...

'And this is my solemn vow.'

Minister: Co-opted International, repeat after me: 'I Co-opted International take thee BP to be my wedded Husband ...

'To have and to hold from this day forward ...

'For better, for worse, for richer, for poorer ...

'What ever the weather, till death us do part...

'I promise to help BP convince the public that it has the interests of the environment at heart even though this is a blatant lie ...

'And this is my solemn vow.'

Minister: Capitalism dost preserve and keep you and will look upon you with merciful favour; that ye may allow the oil industry to flourish. You will help suppress information on climate change, pipeline spillages and general environmental destruction and make climate change threats and human rights abuses everlasting. Amen.

Source: EDAG 2003d

Even WWF refused to participate in this meeting, claiming that it viewed it as a 'public relations smoke-screen exercise'. WWF however have been working in close partnership with BP on the Tanguhh gas pipeline project. At a rerun of the wedding ceremony at a similar meeting to discuss the Tanguhh project, WWF representatives received a leaflet with a picture of a pawn of it 'in their tailor made pockets'. Enmity towards WWF is well expressed by one activist's re-jigging of the WWF logo as a devil (Figure 13.5).

Figure 13.5, WWF re-branded logo

Disagreements over the Kyoto Protocol

With regard to UNFCC's Kyoto Protocol for the international reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, there is a clear polarisation of views between radicals and reformists. [6] This issue demonstrates how differing ideologies can make collaboration difficult between radicals and reformists and how the process of sectarian solidarity plays out in practice.

For EDAG, scepticism about the Kyoto protocol set in at COP6 in 2000, which they dubbed as 'more of a trade fair than an intergovernmental conference'. Since, they have developed a comprehensive critique, believing that it will not lead to significant reductions in CO^2. The IPPC suggest that to avert dangerous climate change, a drop in the levels of CO^2 emissions by 60-90% is required. In contrast, the:

> Kyoto protocol was supposed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 5%, in the end it's 1% so not that great … and I just don't think the government are doing anything. I don't think they can … (Coleman [EDAG] interview, November 2003).

For EDAGers, the protocol is dangerous as they believe it will couch the public in complacency and misguided faith in international decision makers to effectively deal with climate change.

Aside from the objection to the 'minute' reductions in emissions that it entails, EDAG also say the protocol will bolster those very state-making institutions and power structures it so despises:

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[6] Note however that some activists happily hold both radical and reformist views.

... it [Kyoto] would entrench a new, 21st century version of colonialism in international law, whilst side stepping the core issue of our need to cut society's dangerous addiction to fossil fuels, not to mention economic growth (EDAG literature, 2003).

The reality is that states and corporations have no interest in reducing carbon emissions. The basis of all states is to tax people to provide the infrastructure of Western modernisation ... The basis of all corporations is to make a profit, and for most of them to mass produce goods (machinery, high energy use rather than metabolic energy) ('Jane' personal communication, 14th February 2004).

As government representatives and corporate interests dominate the COP meetings, they are seen as holding little hope. Environmentalists did not design and negotiate the treaty, but oil executives, bankers, financiers, and co-opted NGOs were the main players. According to EDAG literature (2003), what is required instead, is:

> international action required by individuals, communities and movements to challenge the power structures and create new ones.

Their critique of the JI and CDM clauses echoes some of the concerns of academics (e.g. Grubb *et al* 1997) and is well-founded. The text of a leaflet handed out during the solidarity action outside the UN offices at the time of COP9 (December 2003) that spells out EDAG's concerns is shown in Table 13.4.

Table 13.3: EDAG's assessment of Kyoto: 'Why Kyoto Is Pants'

NOW HERE'S WHY IT'S A TRAVESTY:

The targets are crap. The average reduction on 1990 levels is 5.2%, with 3 countries actually negotiating increases. The scientists say we need to reduce emissions by at least 60% on 1990 levels simply to stabilise things. Seeing that the rich world is responsible, we're going to have to cut emissions by up to 90%. 5.2% is a pretty pathetic start even without the loopholes...

Carbon Trading. The greatest weakness of the Protocol may be that it proposed an international commodity market in carbon. This allowed the talks to become dominated by the vested interests of financiers pushing for a new market opportunity on the back of vast creative accounting loopholes:

1. Joint Implementation allows countries to trade their emissions reductions -an accounting fiddle.
2. The Clean Development Mechanism allows rich countries to offset domestic emissions by funding dodgy projects in the third world which claim some vague climate change objective. It's a gift to the logging, nuclear and hydropower corporations.
3. Banking credits. Rich countries can "bank" carbon credits and use them to offset future emissions after 2010. This is a recipe for corruption, future evasions, and rampant carbon speculation.
4. Land use changes and forestry. Countries can offset land use changes and tree planting against their reductions.
5. Air transport and shipping are excluded from the targets. On top of tax-free fuel, it's another huge incentive for international air transport. Planes are extremely polluting and the fastest growing source of emissions.
6. The Third World is not in it. Any long-term solution must be just and must involve everyone. At the moment it's a kind of carbon-based colonialism.

7. Who controls it and who polices it?
Implementation is still unresolved, but it's pretty certain that it will remain as it is now: controlled by a small group of powerful rich nations and administered to serve their economic interests.
If implemented, (a big "if"), the actual reduction in emissions achieved over 20 years will be less than the increase in US emissions in just 1999 & 2000.
Source: EDAG 2003:c

The Campaign Against Climate Change agrees that the Kyoto protocol has been betrayed and undermined, but rather than seeing it as a propagator of public complacency, views it as a positive focal point around which public support can be built for the issue of climate change:

> Kyoto is one of the things that we do that ... [EDAG] don't do. Which I think is really important because I think that there is more scope for communication to the general public in making a campaign around Kyoto than anything else. I think that Kyoto has done more to raise awareness of climate change than anything else ... and that's all its done because it's achieved nothing else (Thornhill [CCC] interview, June 2003).

CCC is also supportive of Kyoto because opposing it would undermine the work of FoE and Greenpeace who are regarded by Thornhill to be the most powerful players in the fight against climate change (interview, June 2003). The other reason Thornhill gives for focusing on Kyoto is because it relates specifically to climate change issues[7], whereas campaigning against oil pipelines can detract from this important purpose because of other environmental, social and human rights issues they encompass.

Both Greenpeace and FoE have been campaigning to secure the enforcement of the Kyoto agreement since its inception. To give up on it now would mean wasting years of campaigning effort. Radicals frequently misread FoE's and Greenpeace's support of Kyoto as an ineffective compromised approach and a willing acceptance of the small CO2 reductions that it entails. According to Dorey ([Greenpeace/EDAG] interview, January 2004), Greenpeace are aware that the protocol is far from ideal, but at the very least see that an international agreement on the issue will help make the public aware of its importance. She also sees it as a fundamental first step:

> **CS** Do you know where Greenpeace stands as regards Kyoto?
>
> **CD** They are backing it, which is one of the reasons why ... [EDAG] is pissed off, because it doesn't think anyone should be backing it ... it has taken us this long to get this far and we believe that we can improve on it and a lot of countries are aiming for ... a lot more

[7] In reality, even Kyoto involves other issues – social justice, equity and GMOs to name a few.

than agreed. But if you are not even getting countries to agree on the basics, you stand no chance.

FoE agree that Kyoto is far from perfect. Rather than agree with Kyoto's inadequate emissions reduction targets, FoE are calling for UK reductions of CO2 by 80-90% by 2050 (the government's target is 60%) (FoE 2003, Climate Activity Plan).

It is something that FoE supports. We were there at the first international agreements trying to push it through. We opposed the flexible mechanisms, but they are in. But we still see it as an essential first step. But what FoE is gearing up for, is, as soon as it enters into force, we want to start pushing on the next commitment period, so that the next set of cuts are much larger, more biting and more effective (Rau [FoE], interview January 2004).

Instead of taking the offensive with regard to emissions trading, FoE accepts that it is part of the agreement and is working with the system to improve it. For example, the Emissions Trading Directive is seen as a potential vehicle for getting emission levels capped (Worthington, 2003). Despite its obvious inadequacies, FoE conceives of Kyoto as an international decision-making process that can be strengthened and improved. As the 'only serious international framework for tackling the cause of climate change' (FoE Media Advisory, 2003) and 'the first international sign of hope' (FoE 2003) FoE cannot refuse to promote and strengthen it.

The difference of opinion between the radical and reformist camps has implications for interaction between the organisations involved. There is a notable degree of animosity between CCC and EDAG who not only have different principles of organisation (CCC has a hierarchical decision-making structure dominated by a single leader, whereas EDAG is run by consensus decision-making) but differing perspectives on the efficacy of Kyoto as a campaign target. The differences are great enough to warrant a strong 'we-them' distinction to such an extent that Freeman, who is involved in both organisations, referred to CCC in an email to the EDAG strategy list as 'the other group':

CS ... you called the Campaign Against Climate Change 'the other group' ...

SF Did I, oh no!

CS And I found that interesting

SF I was thinking that because it reminded me of the Houses of Parliament where the Lords are referred to as 'that other house', it is an old tradition that you don't mention the House of Lords ... or may be it's the Lords that don't mention the Commons, any way, whatever it is, one of them doesn't mention the other (Freeman interview, February 2004).

Interestingly, Freeman is able to agree with both organisations, but notes that the stronger an individual's commitment and involvement within their own organisation, the greater the tendency to think 'our group is totally right':

> Basically I agree with both of them ... If Phil wants to go out and campaign about Kyoto then fine ... I don't see that it has to necessarily conflict with campaigning against everything else, so I don't think that there really needs to be a split there ... But there are some people, especially those who are heavily involved in each group that think "our group is totally right and the other one is wrong".

The split may not be absolute, but given EDAG's emphasis on consensus decision-making, there was considerable debate about whether EDAG's logo should feature on CCC's annual climate change march leaflet and in the end a decision was made to revoke the request. However, national EDAG went ahead without securing consensus first, and the logo was emblazoned on the bottom of the leaflet. One leading activist from national EDAG suggested that:

> Although he [Phil from CCC] is more supportive of Kyoto than we might be ... I think that it is fair enough to bang on about the US pulling out of Kyoto as this was a serious problem for making international progress.

Speaking almost verbatim of the process of 'sectarian solidarity' he went on to suggest that:

> It is a classic mistake of leftist political groups to obsess on small differences in ideology and ignore much larger commonalities. After all, 99.9% of people would not be able to spot the difference between us ...

CCC even collaborated with Manchester EF! in a piece of street theatre on the issue. Both groups are passionate about the need to address the issue of climate change and share an antipathy towards the US for the negative role it plays in the global climate, oil and war game. There certainly appears to be an element of sectarianism, but some participants in EDAG were disappointed that a national EDAG leader implied that they were being 'needlessly sectarian and possibly competitive'. The irony is that despite being more distant in issue focus, ideology and tactics, EDAG appears to have a preference for working with FoE over CCC. Organisational ecology dynamics (Chapter 11) in addition to sectarian solidarity appear responsible.

Radicalism and conservationism

I am unaware of direct conflict between radicals and conservationists, partly because their ambits overlap to a much smaller extent (organisational ecology). However, radical activists would certainly be critical of many conservationists' sources of funding. LWT's key financial donors include Aventis (a biotechnology company), Barratt Homes and British Airways plc. CWT accepts grants of around £2,000 from BAA's Environment Awards and PCEG took part in a Shell Better Britain Campaign and won a cash prize. These donors represent the antithesis of

the environmental movement, and radicals would view their donations as part of an unacceptable green-washing public relations exercise (*cf* Rowell 1999, Beder 2000).

Discontent could additionally arise between CWT and EDAG as a result of acceptance of a donation from the consultancy Environmental Resources Management (ERM) of three tonnes of scalpings for stabilising the paths after heavy rains and flooding in 2002 and help with pond clearance and tree felling (LWT & CWT, 2002). According to EDAG, ERM's social and environmental impact assessment of the Baku Pipeline was inadequate and the group undertook an office occupation and a spoof ERM website that aimed to sarcastically expose its shortcomings.

Conservationism to reformism

As Jordan & Maloney (1997) suggest, there is huge potential for animosity between mainstream environmentalism and conservationism ... 'if you're living downwind of a chemical plant, it's kind of hard to see why national groups are so concerned about spotted owls or wilderness protection' (Kriz, cited in Jordan & Maloney 1997:121). Ferriday (WLFoE) gave an example of a conflict between himself and the conservation-oriented individuals of the Selbourne Society at their nature reserve, Perrivale Woods. About 10 years ago, he displayed notice boards suggesting that the bluebells were sprouting early due to global warming.

> And gosh! They got really cross about that. That is the sort of people at the Society saying 'how dare you write that sort of comment' ... they just don't want to think about difficult issues. Especially if it is against their political beliefs, I think these people are very right wing, which is why they didn't like it (Ferriday interview, June 2003).

Conservationists generally take a more moderate line on environmental issues, even in opposition to infrastructural projects that may damage the countryside. Conservation projects at Heathrow mean that LWT may have to compromise its opposition against the development of Heathrow airport. With reference to Terminal 5:

> ... I mean you have to kind of cut your losses to some extent because if it is Government policy that we need more airports ...it is one of those things ... and campaigning against it ... there is little point. It could actually be a little difficult for us because we have got some projects at Heathrow. We have got a Water Vole Officer scheme ... we've been involved in translocation of water voles prior to development, some people say that we should be campaigning against it and that we shouldn't help them [but] ... we are not helping them, we are helping the vole population. It is going ahead and again [we are] being pragmatic about it ... (Waugh [LWT] interview June 2003).

Heathrow airport is due to have a third runway built by 2030 should pollution levels be below EU standards by that date. One local Heathrow resident wrote to his local newspaper to draw attention to what he regards as 'lunacy' given that people's homes can be destroyed without question, but that an airport at Kent was refused on wildlife grounds:

> it has been suggested that between 4,000 and 6,000 homes will have to be demolished to make way for a third runway at Heathrow. No one seems to care that by solving one problem they have created another. Where is there space in this overcrowded area to build an equivalent number of houses to replace those destroyed? I read recently that Kent was suggested as an alternative site, but this was turned down because it would disturb the local wildlife. When wildlife takes precedence over people, then for sure, the lunatics are running the asylum (Jones, 2003).

To the extent that groups have different standards and ideas and put forward different solutions, conflict will also be generated. CPRE's line on cramming development into London to prevent the countryside being paved over is ideal for countryside residents, but clearly a less favourable option for other environmental and conservationist interests in London. As Waugh ([LWT] interview, June 2003) suggests, 'by CPRE standards in London we would all be crammed into huge sky-scraping tower blocks, which isn't what we're after really'. Also for Bates (LFoE), there was a slight conflict with London CPRE over the Thames Gateway Bridge proposal. CPRE were initially supporting the bridge proposal because of their overarching objective of avoiding development on green belt land. Nigel Cursey's (London CPRE) argument was that allowing the development of the bridge would mean that higher density housing could be accommodated in the southeast and east of London and the road would provide people living in a high density area with a route in out of their home and work places. However, Bates managed to convince him of some of the negative aspects of car- based infrastructures:

> you get a far higher density infrastructure if you develop with public transport infrastructure rather than car-based – if it is car-based, you end up with spaced out development, lots of space for parking and roads and road based retail ...

The conflict of interests was resolved before it created a rift between the two organisations because Bates' arguments stood up to reason and ...'[in the end] he declared himself won over' (Bates interview November 2003).

Unlike FoE and Greenpeace, which promote renewable energy schemes because of the urgent need for the UK to meet its renewable energy targets, CPRE has a very cautious approach to the building of wind farms. In places, CPRE's literature reads like that of local anti-wind farm groups that the Yes2Wind coalition seeks to deflate. For instance, their *Policy Position Statement* on wind (CPRE 2003i) states that:

> Because they only work when and where the wind blows, greater reliance on such intermittent energy sources will require substantial and innovative changes to the way in which electricity is distributed and stored if we are to replace conventional fossil fuel electricity generation.

Although CPRE are not so hostile towards offshore wind farms as they are to onshore ones, some of the statements that they are making could be pilfered by the anti-wind farm lobby and used as ammunition against the greater interests of the environmental movement.

FoE and CPRE both have a policy of trying to ensure that brownfield land is prioritised over green-field land for development in the interests of preventing urban sprawl and further desecration of the countryside. One would have thought that such a policy would work in the best interests of all conservationist organisations. However, LWT are adverse to development on brown-field sites especially so because:

> There is no clear definition of a brownfield site except as a site that has previously been developed. That definition would include Camley Street and Sydenham Wood [LWT Key conservation sites] (Waugh [LWT] interview, June 2003).

A report commissioned by LWT and London Brownfields Forum shows how many valuable wildlife sites have been lost because of the lack of interest in the wildlife value of previously developed but recolonised sites (LWT 2002:5).

Is hypothesis 9 falsified?

Radical EMOs are clearly dismayed with the prospects of the Kyoto protocol for halting climate change, and in some instances this has led to conflict between them and their reformist counterparts. However, there is, even given the small number of radical EMOs in the quantitative sample, still evidence of amicable cooperation between radicals and reformists. Reformists may be frustrated, but instead of launching an all-out conflictual attack against reformists, there has been a constructive effort made instead to radicalise their agenda. The distance between these organisations is much less pronounced than expected, suggesting that other factors must be at play in determining the configuration of relations between radicals and reformists. It could be that the tardy progress being made in implementing climate change emission reductions via the Kyoto process has frustrated reformists and radicals alike, giving them the impression of a rather closed policy window, and thus making alliance building more likely (see section 12.2).

The existence of ideological conflicts is a result not only of the frustration of radical EMOs, but is also due to general of misunderstandings that are nurtured in the process of collective identity formation, an unwillingness to compromise (especially for radicals), and general differences in ambits (especially between radicals and conservationists). The conflict between CCC and

EDAG is not only due to EDAG's frustration with reform politics (EDAG has a healthy relationship with FoE which is arguably even more reformist that CCC) but also the result of sectarian solidarity. The process of collective identity formation and how this can lead to conflict via sectarian solidarity is discussed in more depth section 13.2. The following section also draws on the data presented in section 13.1.

13.2 Collective identities and solidarity

This section seeks to evaluate whether hypothesis 10 (presented in Chapter 7) is supported by the data. This hypothesis suggests that participants of radical EMOs are required to give up a greater proportion of personal time and resources than conservationist and reformist EMO participants. It argues that this additional commitment makes for a stronger collective identity that may be generated at the expense of hostile relations with other EMOs.

Unlike in radical environmentalism and to a lesser extent in reform environmentalism, it is possible to be a conservationist without developing an ideology that involves becoming immersed in *movement culture* and going through the processes of *cognitive liberation* and *the politics of signification* (McAdam 1998). As shown in the presentation of quantitative data in section 13.1, it appears as if the cognitive praxis of conservationists is highly biased towards conservation issues, rather than broader environmentalism. Reform and radical environmentalism have more meaningful movement identities, require an attribution of the source of a problem and the choosing of a course of action based on opportunities and constraints, and are more often called upon to defend their beliefs to adversaries and mainstream culture. Conservationism however, requires little more than a love of nature regardless of overarching political beliefs. Symbolic identifiers of conservationists, such as hiking boots and binoculars, are not indicators of a political ideology, just as conservationist behaviours, such as pruning brambles or counting butterflies, are tasks that can easily be carried out by people with a wide range of values and beliefs. In contrast, some (non-NIMBY) reformists have an underlying belief system and a sense of collective identity, as described by Hammond ([Greenwich Greenpeace Coordinator] interview, February 2001):

> ... it's nice when you go amongst people and you've got this unwritten thing that you all know .... You all know that you're concerned about green things. And somehow it's sort of like belonging to a secret club almost, where you all know that you all belong in a funny way. And you've all got the same thinking process, and you've all got the same concerns in your lives ... And you don't have to explain it to everybody. If you say about rain forests, or whatever, nobody is going to say `Why should we be worried about that?'

Although conservationists may be specialists and share ideas and information about nature conservation, it is posited that their collective identity is not so strong as in other types of environmentalism. This is because the conservationist identity is less often related to a broader set of radical values and has less impact on the lifestyle and behaviour of its adherents. For example, it was noted during field visits that LWT and CPRE use standard tea, coffee, milk and detergents, whereas FoE and Greenpeace have organic and fair-traded tea, coffee and milk and use only environmentally friendly cleaning agents. The identities of the latter organisations have manifested themselves in behaviours that accord with them. This process of homology (Hebdige 1979) appears to happen to a lesser extent amongst conservationists.

This is important in terms of networks of interaction because a strong collective identity increases internal solidarity and sharpens the 'we-them' distinction, making it harder for a particular 'we' to collaborate with other organisations. Although conservationists share information with one another more than they do with other types of environmentalists (Table 13.1 columns 3 and 4), meaning that any weak ideology that does form will be biased towards conservationist interests, their 'we-them' distinction is weak enough to permit fairly extensive collaboration with reformists. The notion that different types of environmentalism have different degrees of solidarity and levels of collective identity is now explored in more depth by considering activist identities and multiple memberships, activist motivations, and solidarity and misunderstandings. These sections are based on qualitative data.

Individual activists' identities and multiple memberships

The purpose of this section is to explore, on the basis of interview data, whether conservationists, NIMBYs, reformists, and radicals have differing views about the nature of environmental problems and solutions. It also explores key activists' multiple memberships. This helps determine if we can talk of a single collective identity for the entire environmental movement. If types of activists are motivated by similar concerns to one another, then this has implications for the solidarity of subgroups within the movement.

To determine activist's ideologies, interviewees were asked to identify what they perceived to be the main environmental problems, the underlying causes and their preferred solutions. Twelve of the 16 activists who answered this question mentioned climate change alongside others as a main environmental problem. Rau's immediate response was:

> climate change, obviously! ... Everything else is kind of subsidiary. If the planet isn't sorted, everything else is kind of stuffed really isn't it? ([FoE] interview January 2003)

Others also mentioned interconnections between pollution, oceans, habitats, biodiversity loss and climate change. Recognition of global issues such as climate change is indicative of an ecologist ideology (Table 2.5).

Three of the five conservationists interviewed indicated a primary concern with nature conservation, although one also mentioned global warming, but possibly in a nature conservation-oriented manner. For instance, conservationists at Gunnersbury Triangle have been working with the Phenology Network, recording key indicators of Spring time to monitor effects of global warming on their reserve. This is rather different from seeking ways and means to prevent climate change.

Waugh from LWT noted how the biggest environmental problems for her were 'threats to wildlife in London', but mentioned too how 'it is very difficult to separate from broader issues' (interview June 2003). This provides evidence for the idea that there is a merging of ideologies between conservationist and reformist issues as links between species conservation and global environmental problems are increasingly made. Despite this merging, the 'we' in conservationist groups clearly represents a looser and less interwoven set of political beliefs than the 'we' in radical groups.

This stands in contrast to Sobey's (NoTRAG, HSRA) views of the main environmental problems, which is much more focused on his own locality:

> The greatest environmental issue is the destruction of large areas of population for the development of the airport. I don't think there is anything bigger than that ... and of course if you knock houses down you have got to replace them somewhere ... the paper yesterday [was] ... talking about vast numbers of houses being built on green belt land' (interview February 2004).

Sobey's main concerns and the scope of issues of concern to him reflects a reformist or NIMBY stance and this ideology helps explain why he is not a member of other EMOs outside of the third runway campaign. His identification with the movement is almost solely for rational ends and therefore weaker than other types of environmentalism.

Of the five activists involved in radical direct action who answered an interview question regarding their beliefs, all take an ecological/eco-anarchist perspective concerning the nature of environmental problems and an eco-anarchist viewpoint regarding the causes, by laying blame on structures of governance and global capitalism. Torrance claimed that 'obviously the roots of it are to do with inequality of wealth, inequality of power and global industrialism' ([Greenpeace, EF! founder] interview, July 2003) and Stewart (HACAN) that 'the whole globalisation agenda is a major cause because it's putting trade and commerce above everything else' (interview

February 2004). Four of these five activists are involved in, or work for reformist organisations, and with the exception of Stewart (and Coleman), believe that reformist solutions are the best means of achieving environmental improvements. This drives home the fact that ideologically structured action (Dalton 1994) does not play out in practice. Whilst their blame-attribution is radical, their means are reformist. The correlation between EMOs' balance of activities and ideology (based on questionnaire data) is only weak (Table 13.2). Especially, in line with the qualitative findings, many thresholders have a radical ideology.

Table 13.4, Balance of activities correlated by organisational ideology

Correlations

		ACTIVITY	IDEOLOGY
ACTIVITY	Pearson Correlation	1	.305**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.001
	N	115	115
IDEOLOGY	Pearson Correlation	.305**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.
	N	115	115

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

ACTIVITY was labelled as insider, thresholder or outsider on the basis of the balance of activities that an organisation claimed to have carried out in the past 12 months (based on respondents' answers to question 7 of the questionnaire).
IDEOLOGY was labelled as conservationist, reformist, reformist/radical or radical on the basis of the attribution of underlying sources and overall solutions to environmental problems (based on respondents' questions 8 and 9 of the questionnaire).

The radical solution to the environmental crisis involves an urgent restructuring of society. For Coleman (EDAG):

> Ideally I would like to rapidly replace capitalism with something nicer ... but I don't know what that is yet (interview November 2003).

The fact that several radical environmentalists now work for reformist-type organisations and are more willing to attempt to restructure capitalism than envisage its demise in some distant future must have entailed a shift in their values towards an increased recognition of the virtues of reformist politics. This however does not reflect the beliefs of all radical activists, some of whom still have a great deal of contempt for large organisations (as shown in section 13.1).

Motivations and multiple memberships

Six conservationist 'activists' answered an interview question asking how they became involved. Five indicated motivation via 'love of nature' (three CWT volunteers, White [CPRE] and Waugh [LWT]). Robertshaw claimed 'I am in love with nature ... like I grew some plants, I think that's

how it started' ([CWT] interview February 2004). Besides a fondness of nature, Waugh (interview June 2003) mentioned how her family were green: 'I mean I grew up being interested in wildlife and my parents are very interested in that kind of thing ...'. The only other motivation mentioned by conservationists was a desire to work or continue to work in the voluntary sector, a factor that both CPRE interviewees rated. At the time of fieldwork, LWT were searching for a new director and they were keen to recruit someone from broader voluntary sector with charity experience and an ability to successfully apply for grants, rather than someone with a strong environmentalist identity. This differs from the collective identity of Greenpeace staff, where Dorey has '... not met anyone who is not 100% passionate about what they are doing in this place [Greenpeace-UK offices]' (interview January 2004).

Of the two NIMBY campaigners interviewed, both claimed that they were motivated to campaign against airports by chance circumstances, rather than by an underlying concern or passion for the environment:

> In fact we got involved with the local residents association because of the proposed closure of a school ... and we discovered that the association's principal purpose ... was to prevent the northward extension of Heathrow Airport. So that just meant that because we became officers of the association that we automatically were in the fight against the runway (Sobey [NoTRAG] interview February 2004).

Pearce (LRA) similarly suggested that the reason for her involvement was 'just by living here ... we are gradually being raped of more and more of our quality of life' (interview January 2004). Although they, or their committees, may produce 'interactive and shared definitions' and be concerned with 'the field of opportunities and constraints' (Melucci's 1989:34 definition of collective identity), they do not negotiate an all encompassing ideology that seeks to weed out social and environmental problems at root. Their aim is not to put the world to rights, but is instead a teleologically motivated attempt to prevent a development from happening and selecting the best means available to do so. NIMBY groups may have a high degree of solidarity within themselves and with other local NIMBY groups fighting against the same LULU, but the 'we' can in some cases become the 'dangerous pronoun' that Sennett (1998) warned of (chapter 6), increasing the likelihood that NIMBY groups will compete with one another to ensure that a development is placed in somebody else's backyard. However national groups have realised that local groups have a tendency to in-fight and have worked hard to prevent this, sometimes successfully (e.g. Airport Watch).

Seven activists spoke in interview about motivations for becoming reformist campaigners. Three told a similar story to conservationists, expressing a passion for wildlife, but mentioned how this broadened out to reflect a more general concern about the environment. Ferriday (WLFoE) has:

> always been interested in wildlife, ever since I was a youngster and gradually got interested in the broader issues ... it was literally FoE that made me change ... but I remember going to a FoE meeting for the first time ... it did actually change my life (interview, June 2003).

His interest in nature spurred on an interest in broader issues, but it was FoE that 'did actually change ... [his] life'. This implies a shift in personal identity in order to fit in with the more lifestyle-demanding changes and thought-provoking ideas that being a FoE activist involves. This type of reform environmentalism is different from local or NIMBY campaigning and conservationism in that the result is a stronger collective identity as its members begin to make lifestyle changes to be more resonant with their environmentalist identity. Although Ferriday has a car - which most radical activists would abhor - he is aware of the environmental effects and tries to limit his car use as much as possible. Like other FoE activists, he engages in a green lifestyle to the extent that he buys organic food, recycles his rubbish, avoids unnecessary consumerism and tries to reduce his energy use (interview, June 2003). Similarly, Sartori (FoE) strives to be as green as possible in her lifestyle:

> ... I think most of my life is really very low impact. I cycle to work, I have my Unit[E] [8] electricity ... my food is organic and I recycle everything. I am restrictive about having the heating on and don't have a car. I compost, use eco cleaning products ... and buy Christmas presents from the Natural Collection, FSC wood and the paints that I buy for the house are natural .... (interview, November 2003).

The collective identity within single-issue reformist groups however is likely to be less strong. Although Stewart – a key activist in several transport organisations - is passionate about transport issues, promotes public transport and scoffs at private motor car use, he does not recycle or reuse envelopes.

Two reformists commented on how they saw their activism as a career option. Rau, Climate Campaigner at FoE, commented that he was looking for an environmentally benign job after completing his PhD in genetics:

> ... I didn't really like the potential career options which were all plant breeding companies and things like that. I started volunteering here and then got a job (interview, January 2004).

Dorey from Greenpeace was:

> just looking round seeing what jobs were going and looking around at places like Amnesty and Greenpeace and I saw that they had a local activist group and signed up. And then

---

[8] FoE have an energy league table that lists suppliers of renewable or green tariff electricity. Unit(E) is FoE's favoured supplier.

> only a couple of months later, the Area Networker for North West London sent out a letter saying she was starting a new group in Camden, and I went along .. And I have just got more and more involved ever since (interview January 2004).

Some radicals on the other hand dislike the whole idea of jobs, which they see as being interwoven into the corrupt system they are seeking to change ...

> **CS** Has any one ever said to you 'why are you working at Friends of the Earth, you're wasting your time?' and what is your reply?
>
> **SF** Yeah, yeah, yeah! I've got into lots of arguments about that. Well, if you want to say 'no, you shouldn't have a job at all' then may be that's a fair argument. But if you are going to have a job, how many places could you work where you actually believe in what they are doing? There are plenty of organisations where it would be hard to be proud of what they are doing ... But I mean, yeah, I like the fact that Friends of the Earth are challenging the system, even if they are challenging the system more from within... (Freeman interview, February 2004).

At the height of the campaign against the M11 protest, Freeman commented on how she even considered giving up her job to become immersed in the radical sub-culture. Her rationality prevailed, despite at times feeling as if she has a split personality. Throughout the interview, Freeman showed that she identifies closely with both FoE and radical organisations by referring to both as 'we'.

Four activists who have taken part in radical direct action were asked the same question about motivations for joining. For Coleman (EDAG), the motivation was a realisation about the contradictions in the current systemic logic:

> I suddenly started looking round and started to think that things weren't being run the way they should be, or that things were wrong, or that things were annoying (interview November 2003).

In particular Coleman referred to his concerns about inappropriate advertising, especially that much of it 'is all the wrong way round', promoting often pointless products at the expense of sustainability. This is what Melucci would term a challenge of the 'symbolic universe'. It is a type of challenge that is likely to result in a 'focus on personal identity ... and ... daily behaviour ' (Melucci 1994:109), unlike a conservationist's love of nature that does not question system logics and is unlikely to trigger such changes. As Melucci would have predicted, Coleman's activism has represented itself as an objection to the social system that targets large corporations and has been accompanied by behavioural and identity changes.

Dorey (Greenpeace/EDAG) was interested in the issues that direct action groups were working on and helped set up EDAG. The impetus came from Torrance via his friendship with Marshall

who worked closely with Torrance in the early days of EF! (1991). For Torrance, co-founder of EF! the motivation lay in the realisation that:

> there was a real black hole for environmental grassroots action and national action of a radical nature ... in terms of campaigning it was pretty much the two big campaigning organisations in this country which were FoE and Greenpeace which at the time we felt weren't conducive towards people getting involved (interview, July 2003).

Freeman witnessed first hand the controversies at Twyford Down which served to reinforce the view of many radical environmentalists that FoE was too conventional to achieve any radical change. Whilst many from FoE at that stage of the anti-roads movement were concerned about the anarchistic element, Freeman herself:

> thought they were really interesting ... and that they were doing something really serious that needed to be done .. Why is there not more passion behind these things? (interview, February 2004).

By 1994, Freeman became impassioned to become an eco-activist on the M11 roads protest.

Freeman is a good example of an activist with a multiple identity, being active in FoE and direct action networks. The rest of this section explores the extent to which other interviewees have multiple membership and what this can tell us about collective identities. Figure 13.6 collates findings to the interview question asking interviewees about their involvement in other EMOs besides the one with which they affiliate most strongly.

The circles on the left hand side of the diagram represent the type of environmentalism where the activist feels most at home – in conservationism, NIMBYism, reformism or radicalism – and this is termed their 'primary identity'. The size of the circle is reflective of the number of activists interviewed with each primary identity. The boxes on the right indicate the types of organisations in which interviewed activists' multiple memberships lie.

Although four interviewees have been or are involved in direct action, three of these identify more strongly with a reformist organisation. Dorey, founder member of EDAG, is now more immersed in Greenpeace, preferring on balance to do 'mostly Greenpeace stuff' (interview January 2004). Similarly Torrance has found a home at Greenpeace and, although he keeps in touch with a handful of direct activist friends, he is no longer interested in hearing their misgivings about Greenpeace:

> I find it fairly difficult [to keep in touch] with some people that are still involved with the EF! network because there's a certain level of animosity still towards Greenpeace, which I'm not ... interested in really, although I did used to feel that way myself.

He justifies his work and others' employment at Greenpeace by:

Figure 13.6 Multiple memberships and identity



> the wider realisation and belief in Greenpeace being an organisation that can bring new people into the movement. And also a belief that Greenpeace is a successful organisation (interview July 2003).

Freeman is the other radical activist, whose affiliation to both reform and radical environmentalism was discussed in relation to motivations for joining. The fourth activist, Coleman, had no other memberships, preferring to maximise time and commitment on a single cause. He displayed a degree of animosity towards reform organisations, and although his family has a Greenpeace membership, if it lapsed, he would not insist on its renewal. In relation to involvement in other radical groups, he claimed: 'I haven't got time to go to those' ([EDAG], interview November 2003).

Other radical activists similarly commit a generous amount of personal time to EDAG. The group strategises via email (up to 8 per day, some requiring urgent response) and at weekly meetings in addition to attending social events and actions. This creates greater solidarity than FoE local groups who typically meet monthly and do little in between. Although CWT meet weekly and know each other well, their 'activism' does not permeate their lives beyond the Triangle, and many of the skills they acquire are not used in their daily lives, nor govern their behaviour.

Coleman's disposition towards his family's Greenpeace membership shows that there are radicals who are antipathetic towards reformist organisations as well as those who quite happily sit at the interface between reformism and radicalism. At least two additional EDAG activists happily join in with reformist style campaigns as active members of Dorey's Camden Greenpeace group, but this does not prevent them being critical of the moderate stance and bureaucracy of Greenpeace. One of these activists has been a particularly vocal objector to the prospect of EDAG collaborating with mainstream EMOs, stating 'I sometimes feel we should be campaigning against them, not with them' and noting how Greenpeace brandished them 'mad anarchists to be ignored' during COP protests at the Hague in 2000.

The conservationists interviewed had a majority of memberships (17) in other conservationist organisations. In addition, one was a member of the Soil Association (single issue reform), two had memberships with FoE, one was a member of Oxfam and two were members of general community groups. This indicates that conservationists *mostly* identify with other conservation organisations. Of the three NIMBY-type activists, only one was a member of another organisation and this was a local conservationist organisation. Mostly, membership implies making a small subscription and receiving updates on campaign activities. For NIMBY interests, the choices of organisations to join more limited.

Reformists had the highest proportion of multiple memberships, most notably with other reformist organisations. Notably, there were nine memberships of development/aid groups, indicating political-ecology's concern with broader economic and social issues.

Consideration of environmentalists' ideology, motivations and multiple memberships shows that NIMBY and conservationist groups are likely to have more tangential and less life-altering collective identities than reformist and radical ones. For NIMBYs, motivations for joining are generally weak, few behavioural adjustments are necessary, and overlapping memberships are few. Conservationists however share much information with one another and tend to join a wide array of other conservationist groups as well as a few reformist ones. Generally they are motivated by a 'love of nature' but the scope of their action and ideology does not require investment of the personal self. Applying for a job in the voluntary sector is a sufficient motive for some. Whilst the motivation of some reformists is career development, this is usually part of a search for a job that is at least environmentally benign. Multi-issue reformists often express how their love of nature broadened out to address global issues. Frequently their beliefs cause them to modify their behaviour to become more environmentally friendly. Those reformists with elements of eco-anarchism in their belief system seem to be at least amenable to direct action and are often involved in it. Reformists have a high degree of multiple memberships including radical, conservation and community concerns but, more significantly, other reformist concerns and development issues, reflecting the social and equity aspects of their ideology. The one radical activist who was not involved in reform activism invested all of his spare time and energy into one group, had an eco-anarchist identity, no multiple memberships, and therefore a strong identity with his own organisation.

The reasons for these differences can be attributed to Melucci's notion that new conflicts in the symbolic sphere create new types of movements that result in identity markers and behavioural changes. Conservationism is a different class of struggle and reformism requires less immersion of the personal self than radical action. At its extreme, radical activists in London live, eat and breathe in the most environmentally and socially friendly manner possible to the extent of squatting, freeganism[9], sharing drugs, visiting social centres and attending culturally affirming parties, gigs and film nights. There are clear links between squatting culture and activism as the former coheres well with anarchistic principles that form the backbone of eco-anarchism.

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[9] This involves purchasing only animal produce-free goods, but striving to survive for free by reclaiming food from supermarket skips and other outlets. One activist I met acquired a sack full of cold baked potatoes that formed a squatted household's staple diet for nearly a week.

Despite sharing information, it is questionable whether conservationists, especially those that focus on conserving a single nature conservation site, have a collective identity. Rather than working out definitions and plans for action in an interactive manner, most nature reserves have a warden who devises a management plan which volunteers and staff follow sergeant-major-style.

Reformist organisations like FoE entail a weaker collective identity than radicals, although FoE activists do talk of behavioural changes and sometimes have an eco-anarchist perspective. At FoE's 5-year consultation plan meeting for local groups in September 2002, local activists were presented with a rationale as to why FoE's organisational campaigning priority is Corporate Globalisation. This was decided on the basis of bids put in from campaign staff and an internal decision (excluding local groups).[10] This provided local group members with a pre-fabricated ideology and strategy rather than a discursively agreed solidarity-building discussion. FoE briefings fulfil a similar role by outlining the key issues, and are given to local group members on request and when a day of action is being run. Often, the packs sent out to local groups for days of action include a list of 'sticky questions' that amount to FoE party-line answers provided for activists to learn rote-style. This chapter now turns to discuss the solidarity implications of collective identities.

Misunderstandings

> *Some people think 'oh, Friends of the Earth, they are just so hierarchical and boring'. And some people from Friends of the Earth think 'these are just anarchists running around the street and doing something silly'. So there are misunderstandings all around* (Freeman [FoE/EDAG] interview, February 2004).

Perhaps as part of an attempt to place themselves on the moral pedestal and to justify the amount of personal and intellectual resources devoted to their cause, EDAG frequently criticises other organisations, sometimes only on the basis of misunderstandings. Reality is sometimes twisted to fit in with the over-generalised idea that 'NGOs, political parties - these professional priests of assimilation are simply vampires – let's do some staking' (Anon, 2004:9).

Dorey said of the criticisms that have been directed towards Greenpeace that:

> A lot of them ... aren't legitimate, I mean, they don't know these things. Most of them have never worked with Greenpeace and have never done anything with them. It is all hearsay ([Greenpeace/EDAG] interview January 2004).

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[10] This type of hierarchical decision-making is being phased out in an attempt to make FoE more accountable to local groups.

Since the rift between the direct action movement and FoE in the 1990s (Chapter 3), a fair amount of hostility has remained towards FoE. Within EDAG there are a wide variety of views with some activists feeling 'glad that they [FoE] are there' and others seeing it [FoE] as part of the problem rather than the solution by legitimising state decision making procedures. 'Bert' for instance claimed that:

> I don't think there is an overall 'FoE stinks' opinion amongst us. I got the feeling there was quite a range of opinions. To me, mostly I am glad they are there, but I'm also regularly frustrated by them, and do agree that when push comes to shove that their approach is part of an overall system that needs to be radically restructured (email discussion list, February 2004).

It is the latter view that leads to the breeding of untrue rumours and contempt. For instance it is argued quite vehemently in the latest *Do or Die* radical environmental journal that FoE is a 'foe' to the direct action movement because of its reformist nature and cautious approach to direct action (Anon 2003:9).

Some radicals have been critical of FoE's apparently reformist approach on GM food, which involved the drafting of the GM Liability Bill. This was regarded as a reformist cop-out that would allow GM crops to be planted given various conditions. However, the Bill was worded in such a manner as to make legal commercial growing of GM crops in Britain impossible. Some of the animosity between groups is based on a misunderstanding of what they stand for and of the meanings of actions (Bhrambral, FoE Local Campaigner, interview, January 2003). It could equally be argued by reformists that direct action is an ineffective means of preventing GM crops being grown as it does not make GM crop-growing illegal and is generally reactive - trashing crops after they have been planted.

FoE played a huge role in campaigning against Terminal 5 and the Third Runway at Heathrow, as did Airport Watch that continues to call for a halt to airport expansion in the southeast and for demand management instead. Despite this, a posting on Indymedia states an incorrect assumption that:

> Clearly no major pressure groups are opposed to Heathrow expansion because the alternatives are less appealing. Those alternatives are to build new airports, from scratch, in other areas of Britain (IMC website accessed March 2004).

Misunderstandings like this serve to fuel animosity between radicals and reformists and sharpen further the 'we-them' distinction.

Whilst organisations that are more radical than FoE see it as a 'namby-pamby' reformist, those that are more conventional see it as radical. Schofield from CPRE for example said:

> When there is a press release that CPRE gives it is like "CPRE gives a cautious welcome to x,y and z". Whereas FoE and Greenpeace would say "what a completely disgusting piece of action this is by the government". They are two completely different ends of the spectrum ... I don't think that FoE and Greenpeace do themselves any favours because what they say is generally very negative without giving any real thought to what they say ... CPRE's response is usually backed up by thorough research (Schofield interview, October 2003).

As with radical groups, defining a boundary around CPRE's own identity has resulted in a misunderstanding of FoE and Greenpeace. In practice both FoE and Greenpeace take considerable effort to ensure they have got their facts right (Rootes 2004).

Before detailing actual ideological conflicts between radical and reformist and reformist and conservation organisations, let me end with a summary so far. Homology leads to solidarity and commitment, but commitment to a single group can help generate animosity towards other groups. As Freeman (FoE/EDAG] phrased it (in interview February 2004):

> I can sort of see that if you are really committed you would begin to get the idea that the other groups are wasting their time.

Is hypothesis 10 falsified?

EDAG requires participants to give up a much greater proportion of individual resources than the average FoE group. Meetings are held weekly, often for at least three hours, in an attempt to reach consensus, up to eight emails are sent to the strategy list daily for attention, and full participation requires engaging in illegal direct action and the risk of arrest. Even attendees at legal radical protest events subject themselves to police inquisition. FoE local groups on the other hand usually have a meeting once a month and do not engage in any illegal activities. Although Greenpeace activists often break the law when they engage in Greenpeace's high profile actions, they are generally fully trained and have the full support of the organisation's legal team.

The intensity of meetings of radical EMOs means that there is a great deal of shared knowledge and ideas, and this encourages activists to speak about issues in ways that may be confusing to a newcomer, especially when acronyms and code language are deployed. The intensity of the group and the amount of effort that activists put in to the cause encourages them to feel that the way they are campaigning is the most effective. This encourages them to be negative about the work of other EMOs and this negativity is often fuelled by misunderstandings that allow them to justify their own approach further.

As EDAGers focus on consensus decision-making and face-to-face networking, partly as a result of paranoia about infiltration, they tend to have a degree of solidarity much stronger than groups that decide courses of action by majority vote, or by an elite. Although FoE's recent restructuring aims to create 'an evolving culture of partnership' between local groups, staff and the Board (FoE 2002c:5), in practice FoE's local groups have minimal influence upon the Board, and little face-to-face contact with senior staff and managers who make the real decisions (Rootes 2002:23). Greenpeace is even farther removed from consensus decision-making. It is managed from the top-down, is hierarchical and highly centralised, and volunteers and local group members are not granted any say in national decision-making. However, FoE and Greenpeace also have solidarity, which makes staff and local activists often feel part of the FoE or Greenpeace 'family'. This solidarity is weaker than in radical EMOs because FoE's and Greenpeace's views are more moderate, campaigners less often speak in codes, their activism penetrates their lifestyle to a lesser (although sometimes still significant) extent, and because of the lack of consensus decision-making. Although there are advantages in organising EMOs by consensus, as it allows all activists to have a say in how their group functions and can make them feel valued as members, it is a difficult practice to maintain with large numbers of activists/supporters, and with small groups it can dangerously raise levels of solidarity. Whilst some solidarity is useful to providing motivation for campaigning, it is not always beneficial to the movement at large for a sub-section of it to have high levels of internal solidarity because of the tendency for this to develop into 'sectarian solidarity'.

13.3 Spectacularisation and barriers to involvement

Focusing on EDAG, this section aims to shed light on implications of eco-anarchist ideology and praxis upon interorganisational relations. It explores whether the beliefs and behaviour of radical activists are congruent. The extent to which this solidarity creates barriers to radical involvement, 'spectacularisation', alienation, cliques and problematic relations with other organisations is explored. Thus, this section addresses hypothesis 11 (as outlined in Chapter 7). This hypothesis suggests that the spectacular image of radical EMOs has made their approach alienating, helping to drive them underground and make them more sect-like.

In certain radical environmental circles, beliefs and behaviours reinforce one another to the extent that there is a degree of homology that makes their environmentalism cohere as a way of life. For instance, a belief that global capitalism is an underlying source of environmental and social problems could encourage certain types of behaviour, such as growing dreadlocks attending counter-cultural festivals and engaging in direct action, as symbolic identifiers of beliefs. On engaging in these behaviours, beliefs are reinforced. For example, listening to protest music or attending festivals where there are like-minded people can make activists feel

assured that others share their views, legitimising and reinforcing them. Engagement in direct action is a behaviour stemming from beliefs that may, especially when deemed successful, increase an activist's passion. This is a reciprocal process whereby behaviours prop up beliefs and vice versa.

Although many radical environmentalists in London have cut off their dreadlocks (Freeman [FoE/EDAG] interview, February 2004) almost as many active members in EDAG have dreadlocks as do not. At an all night 'Synergy' festival of grassroots resistance and alternative art, five dreadlocked activists manned the EDAG stall. Synergy could be viewed as part of the counterculture that seeks to espouse alternative values to society through information sharing, music and anti-state arts with an added element of mysticism.[11] Similarly many EDAG protests are accompanied by a sound system that frequently plays political songs. During this process of homology where beliefs are expressed in behaviour and vice versa, the culture of radical protest is affirmed.

Besides linking belief systems and behaviours, direct action, especially sharing risks of arrest, or physical damage to oneself (Doherty 2000), serves to strengthen bonds between activists. EDAGers, like the radical activist quoted below see themselves as a 'family', almost to the extent of a life-long bond:

> You know that if it came to it, that person would put their life at risk and lay down to protect you. You know that when the shit hits the fan that they'll be there (Bongo interview, June 2001).

This process of homology can lead to solidarity. The downside of this is that strong homology leads to strong solidarity and can create cliques of activists who know one another exceedingly well and share similar beliefs and behaviours at the expense of extra-group relations. Personally, I found EDAG cliquey (in its inaccessibility to newcomers rather than network terminology) because of the extent of knowledge activists had concerning their key campaigns, over-use of acronyms, occasional use of coded language, the location of meetings, and the intensive demands made upon members. They are at the 'exclusive' pole of movement affiliation (Melucci 1996a:326-7).

As an example of code language, an email came through the discussion list from an activist who calls himself '7170' (code name) stating 'Hi, ill b late tomorrow. Have 2 pick up an am*dam type 4m liv street'. Another ended the following sign off 'for those that understood the above,

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[11] One 'trance-room' had a magic 'wish-tree', where you could write a wish and attach it to a sparkling sculpture of a tree which was blessed before it was dismantled.

minkiminki-mink mink moo dodi dodi dada fluff peeee duby da do beep beep' (LRT email list, 14th April 2004). The latter was intended as a joke, but the former was meant to convey a message that is cloudy to all but those involved in the organisation.

The pace of the group is so fast that if you miss a couple of meetings and then turn up to the next one, you can easily lose the thread of discussions. Newcomers are thrown in at the deep end and at their first meeting could easily be asked for their views on group literature, be persuaded to run a stall at a fete and help plan a direct action event. The group meets in a relatively rundown part of London that is decorated with 'Danger! Regular muggings are taking place' warnings in an accessible but unwelcoming back street.

Despite these strong indications of a high level of intragroup solidarity, activists involved with EDAG are less happy to use the word clique to explain the nature of group relations:

> I don't know about cliquey, but I did find it quite hard in that they expect everyone to have the same beliefs as them (Dorey [Greenpeace/EDAG], interview January 2004).

A certain degree of coherence in beliefs can come about through the process of homology, which is bolstered by the frequency and intensity of meetings. Freeman [FoE/EDAG] argues:

> Maybe it is not as cliquey as it appears. It appears cliquey and they do have discussions about this but it doesn't seem to get very far. They do try to avoid this and not everybody wants to go to a meeting in a squatted old run down building. It was the same with living in camps. That in itself excludes a lot of people ... (interview, February 2004).

But she does not doubt that it at least appears cliquey. This has important ramifications for the movement network.

If the culture of EDAG has homologised and there is a degree of solidarity that has led to clique-type tendencies, this implies that it is easy to define who is and who is not part of the group. This definition could be rooted in appearance, behaviour, beliefs or all three. A further corollary is that this can become dangerous in terms of resulting in limited or negative relations with the rest of the movement and so lead to 'sectarian solidarity' (Misztal 1996:34), likely when solidarity is high. It can result in barriers to newcomers, exaggeration of the inadequacies of other groups and/or open hostility towards them. These potential outcomes are discussed with reference to EDAG.

Radical environmentalism requires a high degree of personal commitment in terms of time and risk of arrest. These are likely to be off-putting to some potential recruits. As Hanton commented in interview:

> I don't think you can be a radical roads protestor and have a normal conventional career, business or profession. You've got to be someone who is willing to not try to climb the corporate ladder (veteran transport campaigner, interview, April 2001).

Even Coleman who is part EDAG and espouses eco-anarchistic concerns would be unwilling to give up all his time:

> ... I wouldn't be prepared to go and build a tree house and stop anything because I am in the middle of university and it is hard to just drop out (interview, November 2003).

The risk of arrest is also potentially off-putting. The actions of EDAG are less thoroughly planned and do not have the same degree of legal support as Greenpeace actions:

> **CS** ... if you were here doing an action for Greenpeace, you would get a lot of legal support from the organisation. If you are doing an action for Rising Tide and you get into trouble are you more likely to be out there on your own?
>
> **CD** I mean, they will support you, they will try to raise some money to give you a hand and try to get people to go to your hearings and things like that.
>
> **CS** Yeah, but it doesn't seem so safe.
>
> **CD** No, it's not, in a way. They kind of think that what we do isn't real because it is so planned. But I think that is really important that we protect people and do what we can to make sure they don't get arrested or sentenced (Dorey [Greenpeace/EDAG] interview, January 2004).

Is hypothesis 11 falsified?

Greater numbers of supporters are likely to be attracted to a cause that appears less cliquey and demands less time. Thus, protest-business type organisations are able to enlist thousands of semi-committed armchair activists, whilst radical EMOs enlist a few deeply committed ones. Few people have the time, resources and commitment (including risk of arrest) that EDAGers routinely accept. The spectacular image of radical EMOs does serve to deter popular support, increasing its sect-like appearance and reducing scope for cooperation. The sect-like appearance is part of radical EMOs' external public image, and not necessarily part of their collective identity. EDAG for example, attempts to adopt the broad principle of openness of the broader environmental movement, but the risks involved in becoming an activist, and the amount of commitment required, serve in practice to make it relatively closed.

13.4 Umbrella organisations and latent links

The final hypothesis to discuss is hypothesis 12 which proclaims that umbrella groups play a key role in the passage from movement latency to visibility. It was Melucci (1994:128) who suggested that umbrella organisations are important for sustaining communication channels

between SMOs during latency and for external communication during periods of visibility. Alarm UK played this role in the anti-roads movement.

Stewart, ex-chair of Alarm has remained an active campaigner since its demise and become increasingly involved in aviation campaigning. Throughout this time, he has maintained his network links with other transport organisations and EMOs and since 2001 has been a key member of the Airport Watch, seeking to coordinate the actions of local anti-airport expansion action groups. Until 2001, prior to the Third Runway Campaign and in the aftermath of the T5 inquiry, his activities remained relatively latent as his campaigning efforts focused largely on seeking and processing campaign arguments.[12] The advent of the SERAS studies saw reinvigoration of visible campaign efforts, with Stewart, as he did in the anti-roads movement, taking a key role in organising conferences, stalls and putting aviation in the media spot-light.

At the Post White Paper Airport Watch Conference (31st January 2004), several commentators drew parallels with the anti-roads movement and previously used networking channels have been reopened.

> ... we will make sure that the information which is out there and the knowledge that is out there already from the roads movement [regarding direct action strategies] is spread to the anti-airports expansion movement, and learning from the experience of *Road Raging* and other organisations ... (Bosworth, 2004).

Juniper of FoE also hopes to draw on those networks that were established in the roads movement that Stewart has maintained:

> I remember the impact that the Strategic Advisory Committee on Trunk Roads made when they put out a report in about 1994 saying quite simply, and it's obvious now, that if you build more roads, you create more traffic. The impact of that was absolutely devastating and so was the subsequent report by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. Those bodies are still out there, they will come back, they will help us. We have lots of ammunition to use in this campaign as we go forward ... We were working as a coalition, not just big groups like Friends of the Earth, but working with local groups, community groups in a coalition like this. And it succeeded. And my feeling is that we can do it again. ... And if we keep talking to each other and having strategy sessions like this, we will win (Juniper 2004).

Stewart has also been able to draw on previous links that were established throughout the course of the anti roads movement. Stewart has been responsible for circulating information on

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[12] Or as Melucci would call it, constructing meanings and producing codes (1994:127).

direct action techniques from Road Alert around the network of aviation campaigners. He has maintained links with the RSPB who were very active in the successful campaign against an airport at Cliffe. Whilst the RSPB have lapsed into latency on the airport issue, they are continuing to carry out research into the climate change implications of an expanding aviation industry. Their early findings indicate that any gains made by the government's renewable energy programme will be offset by the increase in emissions. Similarly, the National Trust are working behind the scenes by researching into the tourism implications, building on earlier findings that suggest there is a tourism deficit in this country of around £11 billion a year because British tourists spend more abroad than foreign visitors spend in Britain. FoE will continue to work on the economics of aviation with regards to the effects of tax breaks and subsidies in unnaturally inflating demand for air travel. Transport 2000 will be researching the potential for the transfer of short haul flights to high-speed rail (Stewart, 2004). Each of these organisations, many of which were involved in the anti-roads movement, are heavily involved in constructing meanings and producing 'codes' for the campaign. Only through EMOs association with one another through Airport Watch and its links with grassroots anti-airport expansion groups has the movement been transformed into a highly potent and visible campaign force.

Indeed, it does seem as if Airport Watch has been key in making the airports issue visible. Although we cannot prove whether aviation would be such a prominent issue in the absence of Airport Watch, it has allowed the organisations involved to present a united front and if nothing else, given the campaign greater credibility. Airport Watch has been able to present a challenge on specific grounds, reveal the problem to the rest of society, show that alternatives are possible, strengthen hidden linkages between organisations, bolster solidarity and attract new people to the issue – those very same functions that Melucci (1994:127) attributes to the 'visible' component of social movement activity.

Is hypothesis 12 falsified?

Examples from the anti-roads movement and airport campaigning are indicative of the role of latent networks and umbrella organisations in increasing the visibility of an environmental campaign. Stewart (founder of ALARM and currently chair of HACAN), for example, has been a key broker between local and national, and conservationist, reformist and radical campaign organisations in the anti-roads movement of the 1990s and against airport expansion in the early 2000s. ALARM and Alarm UK were crucial in uniting the spatial and ideological divisions in the movement and bringing the anti-roads campaigns into visibility. Drawing on some of the same networks, Airport Watch has played a very similar role in the anti-aviation expansion movement. Thus, it appears as if umbrella organisations facilitate the passage from latency to visibility and are important bridges between different types of environmental organisations.

13.5 Summary

Network partitioning by organisational identity shows that conservationists and reformists have high tendencies to inbreed and therefore have their own separate identities. The inbreeding in the information-based networks indicates that conservationists and reformists perhaps generate 'senses of meaning' that differ from each other, rather than the 'broader senses of meaning' that Diani (1992b:8) suggests bind a movement. In particular, collaboration and information exchange between radical and conservationist organisations is lacking. Although the lack of relationship between radicals and conservationists in the partitions is an artefact of the low numbers of radicals responding to the questionnaire, informant interviews support the notion that there is little interaction (at least during non-critical campaign times). At least some degree of ideological conflict is inevitable and exists regardless of the extent of solidarity between movement sub-groups. Examples of conflicts between reformists, radicals and conservationists were given, with special emphasis on the Kyoto Protocol. This suggests that radicals are indeed frustrated with reform politics, but this does not always manifest itself in conflict. Indeed it is clear that sometimes constructive attempts are made to radicalise the more moderate groups.

Some of the most vocal conflict is between organisations that are most similar (e.g. EDAG and CCC) and this could be a function of the process of sectarian solidarity, whereby EDAG's high degree of solidarity and clearly defined collective identity does, at least for a handful of EDAGers, result in a negative perception of other EMOs. Such conflict is futile and serves to waste valuable activist energy that could instead be directed towards positive change:

> It is just that when you are working for some group that is supposed to be trying to change the world and they are bitching about other people trying to change the world it is just like 'aargh' (Dorey (Greenpeace/EDAG), interview, January 2004).

It was argued that although conservationists may have a collective identity, this was relatively weak and manifested itself in behaviours to a lesser extent than reformists and an even lesser extent than radicals. Conservationists are the least likely to engage in environmentally friendly behaviours outside of the reserve or job they work on, and radicals are most likely to take drastic steps to alter their behaviour. EDAGers have a strong collective identity, manifest through participation in cultural events, dreadlocks, spectacular action, their unwelcoming meeting place, use of codes/acronyms and the high demands made upon members. The stronger a collective identity, the greater the likelihood that 'we-them' barriers form and influence movement networks. Thus, it is argued that the strong solidarity of EDAG has engendered a high degree of commitment amongst group members, and to an extent a belief that the ways and means of activism that they undertake are the best and most effective. This is at least a part

of the source of EDAG's contempt towards other organisations that is further nurtured through misunderstandings.

Finally the role of umbrella groups and latent networks links was discussed. This showed how ties generated during the anti-roads movement, which have since been relatively latent, have been reinvigorated in the course of aviation campaigning. As predicted by Melucci, Alarm UK and Airport Watch have been important in preventing NIMBYism and bringing these networks back into visibility.

CHAPTER 14

A Green Rainbow?

This chapter begins by reconsidering the usefulness, in the light of empirical findings, of the theoretical definition of the environmental movement that was derived in Chapter 2 and discusses whether or not environmentalism in London can be conceived as a 'movement' on the basis of its network links. This leads on to a discussion of the extent to which the movement can be regarded as a 'green rainbow'. After this, a précis of evidence found in support or contradiction of the master hypothesis using examples of climate change and aviation campaigning is presented.

14.1 What is the Environmental Movement?

In Chapter 2 it was suggested that the environmental movement consists of a network of formally and informally organised groups that are seeking to protect or preserve the environment using a variety of strategies. This definition is loosely based on Diani's (1992a:1) 'consensual' definition of a social movement, which suggests that a social movement is a network (formal or informal) of individuals and/or organisations with shared identity, that engage in political or cultural conflict 'to promote or oppose social change' (p.9).

There are two main differences between Diani's conception of a 'social movement' and the definition of the 'environmental movement' chosen for this research. The first is the emphasis on 'environmental' rather than 'social' change and the second is a focus on a common concern to protect or preserve the environment rather than the notion of 'shared identity'. There seems to be little point in sectioning off just those environmental organisations that focus on 'social change', when the overall aim of the movement is to safeguard the environment. [There is of course a difference between those who conceive of environmental protection as being possible by reforms within the existing social and political order (those whom Rucht (1990) or Dobson (1990) call 'environmentalists') and those who believe fundamental change to the social and political order is necessary ('ecologists' or 'greens' according to Rucht [1990], Dobson [1990], Doherty [2002]). The argument in favour of seeing them as forming a single movement is not so much a theoretical one as an empirical one; in Britain, at least, Rootes and Miller (2001) have demonstrated that such are the network links that it would be arbitrary and artificial to insist on this distinction.] The research was, after all, focusing on the 'environmental movement', rather than what Torrance (interview July

2003, Chapter 10) referred to as 'one big social change movement', which would not only be impossible to measure empirically, but which excludes important environmental interests (including conservationists) because of their lack of emphasis on social change. The emphasis on environmental rather than social change reflects common usage of the term 'environmental movement'.

The notion of shared identity within a movement is difficult to measure empirically, as the critique of Diani's (2002b) use of multiple memberships illustrated (Chapter 10). It is easier to determine whether an organisation belongs to the movement on the basis of its having a main aim that involves protecting or preserving the environment, or to ask EMOs if they feel 'part of a movement'. Nearly every organisation that answered the questionnaire and considered itself to be 'part of the environmental movement', had a main aim reflecting these concerns, and was also part of a network of EMOs.

Allowing both institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms of protest to form part of the collective action repertoire of the environmental movement differs from once-orthodox definitions of social movements that focused on non-institutionalised aspects and that, in particular, privileged unconventional forms of action. However, most organisations that consider themselves to be part of the environmental movement and have a main aim to protect or preserve the environment (72% of survey respondents) are 'thresholders' who use a variety of campaigning techniques from non-institutionalised protest through to negotiations with government ministers. Thresholders are bridges in the information- and collaboration-based networks between insiders and outsiders, and there are even direct links between organisations that work on the inside and outside (Chapter 10). Thus, it is safe to conclude that, as Goldstone (2003) suggests for social movements in general, the 'environmental movement' uses institutionalised, semi-institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms of action.

Interaction is an important social movement dynamic. However, Chapter 10 stressed the need to focus on collaborative networking links more than informal information-based links or friendships to determine which organisations are part of the movement. Whilst organisations might share information with one another, this does not necessarily mean that the information so shared is being used to further their policy arguments or to fuel campaigns. What really glues a movement together is its collaborative bonds, where the meanings of actions are shared. For instance, although AWOs would appear to be part of the movement if we consider only information-based networks, because of their very different issue-focus they are not involved in collaboration with the

wider movement, and therefore they are not part of the environmental movement proper. Although they may share information, this does not result in a shared issue focus or action. Similarly, NIMBY groups are not part of the movement unless they begin to generalise and address broader-range concerns via links with NIABY EMOs.

Diani's (2003b) emphasis on conflict with a nameable opponent is too rigid a requirement. Many EMOs have, as Melucci (1995) suggests, a multi-headed opponent (e.g. capitalism), and others see their opponents as an indefinable 'them'. The other problem with the focus on conflict is that it excludes campaign dynamics that involve working in partnership with industry and business as FoE and Greenpeace repeatedly do (Chapter 13). It is possible to work in partnership with a business yet still to regard it as an adversary, and publicly criticise its environmental record. Again, this definition rules out conservationists who often do not have an adversary, but seek to invoke a positive change to an area of natural environment. Shared environmental concerns and links via collaborative networks are what makes conservationists part of the movement. Given the centrality of LWT in most environmental networks in London (Chapter 10), it would be inappropriate to exclude it because it does not have a single identifiable opponent.

Thus, it is appropriate to conclude that the environmental movement consists of:

> *Formally and informally organised groups or individuals seeking to protect or preserve the environment. This may be via issues already on the political agenda, or newly emerged ones, using a variety of political and cultural strategies, from conventional to illegal. Groups and individuals may only be considered as part of the environmental movement when they are part of a collaborative network with others sharing a similar or related goal.*

However, it is important to distinguish a 'movement' from single-issue campaigns and short-term alliances/coalitions. Although these can be a part of a movement, they do not themselves constitute a movement. A movement is concerned with more than one issue and forms a frame of issues in a meaningful perspective and has a sense of solidarity/belonging (Diani 1992b:113). Its network links extend beyond the boundaries of a single issue and some of the relationships must be enduring and form links across events and activities. Organisations within a movement recognise each other as part of the same collective project and the events are 'weaved together' to form a broader narrative (Diani 2002b:4), yet a movement can be internally heterogeneous and diversified (Diani 2002a:195). Diani (2003b:303) says that:

> the expression "environmental movement" denotes little more than a set of largely independent events, and each supported by a specific coalition, but with few links across

> events and coalitions. In a coalition dynamic, the absence of collective identity would prevent the establishment of connections between activities located at different points in time and space, and the local networks would not concatenate in broader systems of solidarity and mutual obligations.

A proper movement would, in contrast, 'be perceived as part of larger, and longer term, collective effort'. On the basis of this theoretical distinction between movements and campaigns/coalitions, we can now ask the question whether or not environmentalism in London constitutes a 'movement' *on the basis of its network links.*

Chapter 12 showed how local environmental movement networks at critical campaign times manifest as broad coalitions embracing conservationists, reformists and radicals. Thus, it may be tempting to suggest that such a phenomenon is specific to critical stages of campaigns rather than the basis of broader and durable intra-movement networking, and therefore to suggest that London's environmentalism represents a series of coalition dynamics rather than a social movement dynamic.

However, LWT was central in the collaboration network despite low resources and not being actively involved in site battles or critical campaigns. This means that we can neither exclude conservationists, nor say that the 'movement' only exists at critical campaign times. In the collaboration network, the most central actors were LWT, HACAN, WEN, FoE, CPRE, LFoE, CCC, Civic Trust, Groundwork Southwark and LCRN. Four of these are conservation organisations (one is urban conservation), one is single-issue, three are multi-issue (two from the 'FoE family'), and only one is a single-issue critical campaign organisation. HACAN, FoE, CPRE and LFoE – only four of the top ten – are players in the critical campaign at Heathrow and all except the former are multi-issue organisations that engage in a number of campaigns and coalitions at a single time and thus are party to a longer term collective effort. Although local networking is more intense when there is a current critical campaign time (e.g. 73% of northwest London group's ties are directed towards other northwest London groups) this should be read as an active coalition within the broader movement rather than assuming that the movement is in abeyance in the absence of critical campaigns. The high degree of networking in northwest London is not solely the outcome of the critical campaign, but can also be explained by the relatively intense networking between conservation groups that form the Ealing Wildlife Network, and Nic Ferriday's role as a broker between conservation organisations, West London FoE and anti-aviation expansion organisations. Even in the absence of the critical campaign, there would be links at the very least between conservationists and reformists, and between radicals and reformists. Reformists/thresholders are

at the centre of the movement and act as bridges between outsiders/radicals and insiders/conservationists. Whilst conservationists are increasingly involved in reformist coalitions, reformists infrequently turn their hands to purely nature conservation issues, just as radicals only infrequently enlist the support of conservationists. Radicals criticise reformist groups such as Greenpeace and FoE, yet, despite these criticisms, many radicals are involved with FoE and Greenpeace either actively or as passive members.

Thirty-one of the 149 EMOs that responded to the questionnaire were multi-issue organisations. One hundred and seventeen respondents claimed that their organisation had a main aim to protect or preserve the environment, and 123 believed that their organisation was part of the movement. This adds weight to the argument that London's environmentalism amounts to a movement. Firstly, one-fifth of the organisations in the EMO field in London have commitment beyond a single issue, and secondly, most feel that they are part of a broader movement. It can therefore be assumed that EMOs can see how their organisation relates to a broader frame of issues with regard to safeguarding the wider environment. This also indicates some sense of belonging to the movement field. Although the intensity of the collective identities of conservationists, reformists and radicals varies, all have a concern about the environment. Generally, conservationists love nature, but appreciate also that the broader issues that reformists work on are a part of the picture. Reformists too express a broad passion for the environment, and although radicals judge that the social system needs fundamental reform, their emphasis is also upon attempting to halt damage to the environment.

The main components in all networks consist of a range of networked organisations – conservationist, radical, reformist, local, regional and national. Even when temporary instrumental coalitions fold, latent links remain and can be drawn upon for later campaign episodes. This has happened with the network links that evolved during the anti-roads movement. These networks have been revived for aviation campaigning. Further, it is clearly wrong to assume that all coalitions are short-lived and have no bearing on a movement's future. The Ilusi Dam campaign members turned their attention to the Baku Ceyhan Campaign after they had won the former campaign, and have since become members of the No New Oil coalition. This shows that the coalition networks that develop during the course of a single campaign are durable beyond the life of a single campaign, and can therefore be considered part of a movement.

Overall, we could suggest, as Rootes (2004a:611) argues on a grander scale for Western Europe, that in London there is indeed 'sufficient engagement in collective action and sufficient shared

concern to warrant continued use of the term "environmental movement"'. However, the observation that organisations with a constructive relationship to the government tend to work in relative isolation and provide information mostly to others like themselves does support the assertion made by early social movement scholars that institutionalised actors no longer belong to the movement.

14.2 A Green Rainbow?

As discussed above, the environmental movement consists of a wide range of organisations linked by collaborative networks. However, this network of relations is marked by ideological and tactical conflicts, and competition almost as much as cooperation. Despite sometimes dramatic clashes of opinions and tactical repertoires, all EMOs are working to protect or preserve the environment, which leads optimists to view the movement as a 'Green Rainbow' (Dalton 1994) in which EMOs support one another directly or indirectly for the overall benefit of the movement. Porritt for example (1987:17) views the movement as:

> A vast and diverse profusion of plant life materializing on top of an abandoned dung heap. Weeds, flowers, creepers, brambles, herbs – each different yet part of an intricate interdependent pattern of fertility and green growth.

Reformists are constantly raising issues that have implications for conservation groups, and the latter are getting the message and adjusting their policies and campaigning styles accordingly. The RSPB broadened its repertoire in the 1990s to focus on wildlife habitats and is now, via its involvement in campaigns against airport expansion, researching the broader environmental implications of aviation for the environment. Similarly, radicals keep FoE and Greenpeace on their toes. Greenpeace has especially made a more conscious effort to involve local people in its campaigns in response to radicals' charges that it had become too hierarchical and inaccessible. The actions of radicals also put FoE and Greenpeace in a compromising position as they have to balance their constructive links with government and business whilst retaining the support of the environmentalist constituency, many of whom are involved in or supportive of direct action (Rootes 1997:328). The radical flank effect serves to strengthen the movement, making demands of FoE and Greenpeace that were once viewed as overly radical appear more moderate and acceptable to their campaign targets. This interaction encourages dynamism in the movement and improves its chances of holding public and decision makers' attention.

More pessimistically, Bosso (1995:102) holds that what is commonly called the environmental movement is actually a series of movements split on ideological and tactical grounds. This contention is not supported by the findings of this research that show that the movement has ties across these divisions, especially during critical campaigns. If factions do exist, it is on the basis of a focus on specific issues (Chapter 10). This finding, however, is more a function of the large amount of effort that goes into a single-issue campaign, such as aviation, rather than a genuine factional dispute. The examples of aviation and climate change campaigning show that organisations from the movement's spatial and ideological divisions can and do work together to good effect.

Healthy networking occurs between EMOs when they have a shared agenda and use compatible campaigning tactics, and is stifled in the absence of these. Whilst NoTRAG might have NIMBY tendencies, it has an anti-airport expansion agenda similar enough to NIABY EMOs, such as FoE, to allow for cooperation and mutual gain. Indeed, airport campaigners had enough of a common agenda to be able to agree that all expansion at existing airports be ruled out. If a new airport was required, they agreed that it should be located in the Thames Estuary away from residential areas. Although EDAG and CCC both ultimately seek to halt climate change, these two groups conflict because EDAG abhors Kyoto, whereas CCC sees it as an important stepping-stone towards resolution of the problem. Realisation of the links between reformist and radical approaches could reduce the conflict that sometimes occurs between them. For example, a series of minor reforms can lead to radical change over time, and radical groups are indirectly reformist as their actions may bring about incremental changes in policies.

14.3 Master Hypothesis and Climate and Aviation Campaigning

Climate change and aviation campaigning have involved a wide range of EMOs – from local to national, and formal organisations to radical networks (Chapter 9) – making these campaigns useful for exploring the proposition that strategic, normative, dramaturgical and communicative interaction occur in tandem and that therefore movement theory requires integration (Chapter 7).

In aviation and climate campaigning, the EMOs involved are all working towards goal achievement, although the nature of goals varies between them. In airport campaigning, the range of goals varies from local people seeking to prevent their home and community being razed, to the global rhetoric of national EMOs calling for no more airport expansion *anywhere* in the UK. The primary aim of climate change campaigning is to halt it before it has deleterious effects upon people and the environment, although goals also vary. EDAG and EF! seek a new type of decentralised society

with self-sufficient communities, whereas CCC aims to raise the public profile of the Kyoto Protocol, and FoE and Greenpeace seek internationally binding stringent targets for emissions reductions via a stronger international agreement. Stop Esso seeks to expose the environmental shortcomings of Exxon Mobil and links its policies with the US's anti-Kyoto stance. Thus their aims are strategically oriented. Each organisation involved has a goal, and will choose the means that it feels are most effective to achieve it. Generally, cooperation between organisations is likely to increase the chances of campaign success via the 'strength in numbers mechanism'. All inter-movement cooperation between organisations could, in this sense, be viewed as strategic as it is oriented towards reaching campaign goals.

A subsidiary objective of the EMOs involved in aviation and climate campaigning is to keep members or activists happy. Many regions were affected by the threat of aviation expansion, and 48% of Britons are seriously concerned about climate change (ONS 2001:180). Thus, national EMOs have much credibility to gain by supporting these issues and linking up with local or radical groups that are already doing so.

The anti-roads movement network that was partly reinvigorated for aviation campaigning (Chapter 13), and on which the Airport Watch coalition modelled itself, has shown that this type of networking can be successful and has allowed for the development of trust-benefit relations (Chapter 11). In aviation campaigning especially, a natural division of labour has developed with cooperation between the parties amounting to rational interaction (Chapter 11, Tilly 1985), as each can gain from the input of the others. Local organisations have knowledge of local issues – about the importance of local wildlife areas for example – and have firsthand experience of living with the noise and pollution from the airport. They are in a unique position to challenge local governance structures, and in the case of the Third Runway, secured the support of their local council. HACAN specialises in noise aspects and the effects of living under the flight path. CPRE brought respectability to the campaign and focused upon the threat to areas of tranquillity and the English countryside. FoE used broad-based campaigning and supported its local groups and West London FoE and thereby effectively disseminated information through the network. Local FoE groups mostly played the role of supporting West London FoE that offered a more regional perspective on Heathrow airport and wrote the inquiry submissions and consultation responses on behalf of national FoE. AEF produced the background research and policy arguments that other organisations were able to draw upon. The RSPB was particularly active in the campaign against an airport at Cliffe and is continuing to work on policy arguments. LWT has been involved in mitigating the wildlife impacts of Terminal 5. Greenpeace is apparently interested in bringing its

direct action expertise into aviation campaigning and HANT, EF! and EDAG have engaged in more spontaneous direct action to raise the profile of the issue. Airport Watch loosely holds the network of aviation campaigners together.

Similarly, EMOs campaigning on climate change have a division of labour although the network of groups is less knitted together because the issue is more diffuse, and they lack an umbrella organisation to coordinate their efforts.[1] Local organisations are not such an intrinsic part of climate change campaigning partly because of the nature of the issue. However, Stop Esso is a forum that allows an army of local groups from FoE, Greenpeace and People & Planet to take to the streets. The BCC campaign had a division of labour between Platform, that was knowledgeable on oil issues, Cornerhouse, with expertise on IFIs, and FoE, that brought credibility to the campaign and was able to mobilise its local groups. Although EDAG was involved in the BCC campaign, it was not part of the formal coalition because of fear that this would tarnish the coalition's credibility.

Thus, normative interaction is also at work. This suggests that organisations have a tendency to interact with those in the same social world with whom they share norms and behaviours. Although there was interaction between EDAG and BCC, this was played down by BCC and was never formally condoned. This is partly because they belong to different social worlds, hold different norms and engage in different behaviours. For example, BCC was born into the social world of reform environmentalism that has rules that include playing the game legally. EDAG however, belongs to a social world that has little or no concern about the legality of its actions. Interaction between London EF! and EDAG is much more easily facilitated because they both believe that direct action, whether legal or not, is the most appropriate campaigning strategy. The lack of interaction between CPRE and EDAG could be attributed to the fact that they are, literally, 'worlds apart'. However, at critical campaign times, for strategic reasons CPRE has tacitly supported direct action.

SSE is located in the 'establishment' social world, and has expressed its preference for challenging the decision to build an airport at Stansted by legal avenues and conventional campaigning. This distances it from the social world of radicals with whom it is unwilling to cooperate. However, their social worlds may collide if SSE runs out of legal means by which to challenge the decision and if

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[1] Climate Action Network (CAN) UK folded in 2002 meaning that there is not a UK-based umbrella group. CAN-Europe is not equipped to act as an umbrella group for UK organisations because of its focus on International and EU policy developments.

conventional campaigning fails to deliver. This could result in a strategic alliance that allows normative constraints to be bridged.

The occupation of separate social worlds explains the interaction gap between radicals and conservationists, and explains why thresholders have broad-ranging ties to insiders and outsiders as they share a part of the social worlds of each. It could also be said that repression of radicals and their strong collective identity forces them into a separate social world that could, should repression become extreme, develop an impenetrable barrier around it and increase sect-like behaviour.

Dramaturgical interaction involves actors co-operating for the purpose of expressing themselves to an audience. Instances of this being carried out merely for the sake of the expressive act itself are relatively rare, although an anti-capitalist Cultures of Resistance squatted space near Tower Bridge consisting of an 'art gallery, a café, a bar ... a place to socialise, a coming together of artists, activists, musicians, sound systems ... and different aspects of creative culture' (CoR 2001) appears close to the mark. In most instances, dramaturgical interaction has a strategic element as organisations strive to present themselves to an audience in a favourable light, perhaps to foster public support or improve their organisation's image. One of FoE's motivations for becoming involved in aviation campaigning was because the sheer number of local groups involved made it a difficult issue to avoid. Thus, FoE's involvement in the coalition helped it secure a favourable reputation. This also helps explain why BCC sought to remain dissociated from EDAG – for the purposes of presenting itself as a respectable voice to decision-makers.

Communicative interaction involves seeking consensus decisions to attempt to arrive at universal truths. Little communicative interaction occurs between EMOs. They share information and ideas, but frequently differ on their interpretation of situations and the choice of campaign tactics (e.g. views on and response to Kyoto), failing to agree on a master plan. However, communicative interaction does occur within some EMOs. For example, at EDAG weekly meetings activists engage in hours of discussion with a view to achieving consensus. The consensus decision-making process strengthens activists' collective identity and interpretation of their campaigning methods as the most effective, strengthening the norms and behaviour of their small and relatively isolated social world and thus contributing to the realisation of normative interaction.

It is clear that strategic, normative, dramaturgical and communicative interactions are at work in London's environmental movement. These realms of interaction each represent one or more

branch of SMT, showing that each is required, in an integrated manner, to explain movement interactions. Thus, rather than viewing social movement theories as competing paradigms, this discussion confirms that it is useful to embrace them eclectically in order to advance understanding of a complex reality.

14.4 Summary

A definition of the environmental movement should include organisations that are engaged in either institutional or non-institutional forms of protest, or both. EMOs need not be conflictual to be part of the movement, as such a restriction excludes conservationists, and reformists. London's environmentalist network is sufficiently well networked to justify the use of the label 'movement'. Although networking is, unsurprisingly, more intense at critical times, some of the most central actors in the collaboration network are not actively engaged with critical campaigns. Over one fifth of the organisations surveyed have commitment beyond a single issue, and considered themselves to be part of a movement. Coalitions are an important vehicle for collaborative campaigning, and can provide networks that last well beyond the life of a single-issue campaign. Although there are some ideological clashes within London's environmental movement, the amount of networking present allows for it to be conceived of as a green rainbow. The movement's ideological clashes are not significant enough to result in factions within the network. The factions uncovered in Chapter 10 were issue-specific rather than ideology-specific. Issue-specific factions are likely to be a temporary phenomenon, and may be an artefact of a period of intense networking during critical campaigns. Instead of representing splits within the movement, issue-specific factions are indicative of the movement's capacity to rally round a cause considered to require urgent attention. Finally, this chapter has shown that there is evidence in support of the master hypothesis, which suggests that social movement theory requires integration.

CHAPTER 15

Conclusion

This final chapter of the thesis gives a summary of the main research findings, considers the relevance of major bodies of theory, and finally presents some reflections on the research.

15.1 Summary of main findings

This research has explored environmental movement networks in London and compared two sites of local environmental campaigning. It has shown that there are links across the movement's ideological and spatial divisions, especially during critical campaigns (Chapters 10 and 12). Generally, local EMOs are pleased with the support they receive from national EMOs, although they ask for support much less frequently than expected. National EMOs are unable to support all campaign initiatives, so they make decisions about where their resources can best be placed. EMOs within the same niche have a tendency to compete, and competition can be heightened by sectarian solidarity. A lack of resources appears to constrain rather than encourage network links, and a wealth of resources does not necessarily mean broad-ranging linkages (Chapter 11). National and community groups do indeed publicly shun the actions of radicals, but there are private links that are not publicly apparent, even if these links only manifest themselves as tacit support. Repression of radical EMOs reduces their accessibility for inter-movement collaboration, and also serves to strengthen their collective identity (Chapter 12). Radical EMOs' strong collective identity encourages a systemic critique of capitalism that results in a radical ideology that sits uncomfortably with reformism and conservationism. The solidarity that results from their collective identity further decreases their accessibility for collaborative campaigning as their 'we' is defined partly at the expense of other EMOs (Chapter 13). The most surprising finding was local EMOs' low level of reliance upon national and regional EMOs. CPRE, FoE and LWT all spent relatively little time providing advice and guidance to local concerned citizens and local EMOs were, by and large, content with the limited support they received (Chapter 11).

The findings of the research are, of course, likely to be shaped by the choice of location, and most probably these cannot be generalised to environmentalism in other countries, or even within the UK. Within Britain, London is unique as a centre of government, commerce and finance, and as an international metropolis. This provides London EMOs with more opportunities for collaborative ventures by comparison with those in more peripheral locations. High profile EMO actions/protests in London are much more likely to get national press coverage than elsewhere in the country, thus EMOs will perhaps be more vigilant about how

their actions may affect their public image. Even radical EMOs have expressed grave concern over the way the media frequently represent them as violent and mindless thugs. Furthermore, London has the highest density of national, mostly reformist EMOs of any area in Britain, with the result that a similar study elsewhere would be less likely to pick up so much detail on interaction between types of environmentalism (local to national, and conservationist to radical).

However, London is the largest city in the country, and it can take up to three hours to travel across it using public transport links (one radical activist told me that it regularly took her over two hours to travel from her home in north London to the meeting place of EDAG – almost as long as my journey from Canterbury). Radical social centres are mostly many miles apart, and this means that the radical part of the movement is likely to be much more fragmented than in smaller cities. My impression is that, as a result, London's radicals are quite specialised, and tend to associate with a particular preferred social centre or pet-issue, unlike in smaller towns and cities where fewer activists muscle-in on a wider range of projects via a smaller number of perhaps more centralized social centres. The infrastructure of London may stifle collaboration not just between radicals, but throughout the whole movement as geographical distance can create social barriers. It would be interesting to carry out similar research in other parts of the country to allow for a proper investigation of the effects of locality on the research. Indeed, instead of selecting two localities within London (southeast and northwest), a future study could focus on two similarly sized localities outside London. Brighton especially appears to have a vibrant environmentalist field worthy of study. Similarly, it would be interesting to apply this type of research to other movements to see whether configurations of relationships between national, regional and local, and reformist and radical SMOs can be generalized to movements in general.

Regardless of these peculiarities, it can be said that London's EMO network represents a dynamic mix of collaborative, competitive and occasionally conflictual relations. The extent of collaboration is sufficient to justify labelling London's environmentalism as a 'movement', and the competition and conflict help to keep it vibrant. The movement incorporates nature lovers, political ecologists and anarchists, making it a potent movement that attracts the support of different sectors of the population, and a force that is difficult for decision-makers to ignore.

15.2 Relevance of major bodies of theory

Studies of the environmental movement (e.g. Dalton 1996, Wall 1999) frequently claim that NSM theory is the most applicable theoretical lens through which to view radical EMOs, and that RMT is most useful for interpreting the actions of bureaucratically structured organisations or 'protest businesses' (Jordan & Maloney 1997). However, in terms of their network

interactions, it appears that some variables from the RM school are required to understand the network behaviour of at least some radical EMOs. For instance, EDAG's animosity towards CCC is not merely a result of ideological conflict, or of EDAG's strong collective identity (Chapter 13). If this were the case, then EDAG would display an equal, or greater amount of hostility towards FoE, which is even more hierarchical, bureaucratic and reformist than CCC. The behaviour of EDAG is also strategic in the sense that the group appears to keep a tacit record of its interactions with other organisations, and when they do not reciprocate, EDAG strategically withdraws from further cooperation. The strained relationship between CCC and EDAG, for example, has been strengthened by CCC's failure to reciprocate support at EDAG's actions. It thus also appears that these organisations may be in competition because of their similar size and issue focus. If we had confined the study of radical EMO linkages to NSM theory, we would not be able to have explored even the possibility that radical EMOs may act strategically or compete.

On reflection, I would suggest that the assumption that RM theory is most applicable to protest business type organisations is correct. There is little in the NSM school of thought that helps to understand why FoE and Greenpeace have the patterns of interaction in the environmental movement that they do. If we regard the invisible (i.e. non-protest) work of protest business type EMOs as part of a latent movement, the idea that umbrella groups facilitate their rise into visibility is one of a few, if not the only NSM variable that applies to these types of organisations. Even though there is evidence that protest business EMOs act rationally, the suggestion that organisational maintenance is a priority goal may be stretching the explanation too far in the direction of egotistical rationality. Although FoE and Greenpeace both have carefully crafted public images to consider, they are not-for-profit initiatives and are increasingly making a conscious effort to involve and support local campaign initiatives. FoE's recent 5-year plan contains details about how it wants to improve its public profile through its campaign efforts, there is much more detail in the plan about how it plans to bring about environmental improvements, and it has some ambitious targets. Large EMOs, both reformist and conservationist clearly have a priority to improve the environment, and, whilst organisational maintenance is necessary to sustain EMO's efforts, it is clearly ancillary to the primary aim of protecting the environment.

Whereas RM is most applicable for bureaucratically structured EMOs, and NSM variables best explain behaviour of radicals (although both theories are required to adequately explain each of these two contrasting types of EMOs), the effect of political processes upon them is much more general, even if variable in effect. As the political opportunity structure in the UK has been stable for a number of years (i.e. neither the form of electoral representation nor the degree of centralization has changed significantly), structural political variables cannot be used to explain

the changing nature of the British environmental movement (e.g. the dramatic rise in direct action in the early 1990s), or the configuration of relationships between EMOs. Neither can structural variables be used to explain the variation in the relative openness of the polity depending on a) the issue at hand, and b) the status of the EMO demanding the change.

Two factors are important in explaining this variance. First is the more temporary and non-structural notion of *policy windows*. The thesis has attempted to show that a closed policy window can be responsible for radicalising EMOs as they make a last-ditch attempt to win a campaign. It can, and has, manifested itself in unusual alliances between middle class Volvo owners and dreadlocked crusties. In contrast, when there is an open policy window, traditional pressure group tactics – such as responding to consultations and lobbying – are much more likely and appropriate courses of action (at least for reformists). However, this is where the second factor comes into play – *EMOs' position on the insider-outsider continuum*. As radical EMOs ideologically oppose the state and regard reformist ventures as mere tinkering around the edges, for them, unlike reformist EMOs, it is impossible to recognise an open policy window unless the government disbands and its members subscribe to the principles of anarchy. The large-scale issues that radicals campaign on (such as dismantling capitalism) are at odds with the current way of running the country and so are never likely to become considered as topics of policy. Not only do radical EMOs face a series of permanently closed and tightly locked policy windows, but they also face sometimes severe state repression that is pushing them further to the sidelines and possibly putting reformists off the idea of even short-term alliances.

In understanding variable patterns of interaction between conservationists, reformists and radicals over time, the first notion of *policy windows* is most useful. When a policy window is open, conservationists and reformists are likely to use conventional campaigning strategies. When it is closed, they may engage in alliances with radicals. SSE campaigners view the policy window on Stansted airport as open, which is why they have been reluctant to associate with radicals. SSE believes it can and will win by using government channels and legal avenues. To do this successfully, it has to appear a reputable organisation, and involvement with ideological outsiders would surely tarnish its reputation. However, if legal avenues fail to prevent the construction of the airport, alliances with radicals may result. The BCC coalition took a similar approach by avoiding publicly condoning the activities of EDAG in its reformist-style campaign against the BTC pipeline. In contrast, even those EMOs involved in climate change campaigning that support the Kyoto protocol view it as inadequate to address the threat of climate change , and with the exception of the conflict between EDAG and CCC, there has been alliance building between radicals and reformists, with the former seeking to further radicalise the latter.

Thus it appears that each theory amounts to a partial explanation of movement interaction. At least with regard to explaining EMO interactions, theory bashing (Chapter 3) appears to be an inappropriate pastime. This short discussion supports the evidence presented in Chapter 14 that claimed that all of Habermas' social realms are required to explain social movement interaction, and therefore that movement theory requires integration.

15.3 Final reflections on the research

This final section begins by considering the relative value of quantitative and qualitative research to the findings. This is followed by a self-critical section where I outline some changes I would make if given a chance to repeat the research.

Quantitative research was used to find out some basic characteristics of the EMOs surveyed, and to discover their top five most important links with other EMOs with regard to collaboration, providing information, receiving information and competition. One of the advantages of using a questionnaire to elicit this information was that it allowed 149 responses to be collected with relative ease in a short amount of time, allowing for a more general impression of networking to be gained than could be through qualitative research alone. The questionnaire was designed specifically with the research questions in mind, making economical use of research time. It worked most effectively when organisations gave full and clear answers.

However, there were a number of problems with the use of the questionnaire. The answers were very much dependent on who was giving them. If an environmentally conscious member of a transport group answered the questionnaire they would be likely to have answered the boundary demarcation questions in the affirmative (i.e. ticked the 'yes' boxes with regard to: having a main aim that is concerned with the environment, being part of the movement, and being part of an network of EMOs), whereas a member who was a frustrated commuter would be less likely to view the organisation as environmental. There is also a chance that, for organisations where a contact was not identified, the questionnaire could have been answered by a newcomer or a volunteer with little knowledge of the EMO on whose behalf they were answering. In addition, there is a high chance that some of the questions were misinterpreted by a number of respondents. CCND for example claimed to not be part of a network when it clearly is, and the secretary of the Peckham Society (a local environmental/amenity society) claimed that OTDOGS, the organisation he chairs, was not part of a network, despite his close involvement with both. It is possible therefore that the word 'network' was not understood in the context it was intended. Several organisations did not answer the question that asked them to define their relationship with local, regional and national governments, even though the question

was designed to cover all possibilities. The answer option 'our organisation prefers to campaign in other ways' was designed to be the 'catch all' for those lacking a relationship.

The reliability of the data was put into question by the low response rates. It is impossible to know whether any of the questionnaires were lost in the post, or failed, for some other reason, to reach their intended destinations. Very few radical organisations answered, and the response rate for national EMOs was exceedingly low. Radical EMOs probably declined to answer because of their general animosity towards academia, combined with concerns about infiltration and surveillance by the police. This could explain why London Greenpeace – an organisation known to be centrally involved in organising the Stop the City demonstrations in the 1980s, and the J18 Global Street Party – answered the network questions with the word 'various'. Identifying its close collaborators could be viewed as admitting to their complicity in illegal demonstrations. For similar reasons, radical EMOs may have been dishonest about the extent of illegal activities that they engage in.

The lowest response rates came from national EMOs. However, the most well known of them – FoE, Greenpeace and CPRE – were amongst the 10% of national EMOs that did respond. However, FoE and Greenpeace may not have answered had I not had personal contacts within these organisations, and CPRE required several reminders, and eventually replied by e-mail. It could be that the word 'activist' (the project was initially entitled 'The Dynamics of Interaction in London's Environmental *Activist Network*' rather than '*Movement*') was potentially off-putting to national EMOs whose members of staff are more likely to regard themselves as 'campaigners'. National EMOs are frequent targets for student research projects like this and many may, as Greenpeace and FoE usually do, enforce a policy of not responding to such requests. The questionnaire was also ineffective at eliciting information on competitive relationships. Only eight of the 114 organisations providing network data listed competitive relationships. Qualitative data was much more useful for finding out about competition between EMOs.

A network approach was essential to this research given the nature of the research questions and hypotheses. As the research asked only for the top five links of EMOs, there is likely to be some distortion in the data. For instance, national EMOs with thousands of linkages with other groups would be likely to pick out the most significant ties, organisations with only several ties would have carried out a ranking exercise, and newly formed or relatively isolated EMOs would be struggling to find network links to list at all. However, this was still a preferable approach to take over trying to elicit a full data set because this would have made the questionnaire unbearably long (it would have had to include a list of all actors in the network to be ticked), it could have meant that many much more insignificant ties were mentioned, and it would have increased the problem of non-response which is inevitable when trying to identify a complete

social field. The fact that a 'top five' approach was used meant that the data set was not complete (i.e. not every node in the network answered a questionnaire) and this precluded the use of positional network measures, including structural equivalence. However, relational approaches are preferred over positional analyses as the latter often produce dubiously defined blocks (see Chapter 7). For the purposes of this research, partitioning of networks by key variables and calculation of inbreeding coefficients was effective in demonstrating the patterning of relations. However, in future research, it may be useful to additionally calculate a reciprocity coefficient that seeks to identify the extent to which actors return interactions (Skvoretz 1991). This coefficient could have been effectively used to support the discussion in Chapter 11 regarding trust-benefit relations.

The survey focused on organisations rather than individual activists for a number of reasons. If I had started by looking at interpersonal relationships and asking individual activists who they were networked with, I would have ended up merely producing a snowballing effect, finding unsurprisingly dense patterns of relationships. In contrast, EMOs are much easier to publicly identify and it is possible to identify a sample without snowballing. Additionally, organisations are more easily approached than individual activists. It would be impossible, for example, to acquire a list all of the members of an EMO, to use for selecting a sample, without contravening data protection laws. Focussing on organisations also makes it possible to witness the 'coalition dynamic'. Coalitions bind movement organisations together more than interpersonal relationships as organisations actually share in the planning, carrying out and assessment of actions. Organisations are a good launching pad for making a more objective interpretation of interpersonal linkages and movement overlap, and given more time and space, I would have considered taking advantage of this. Many organisations do keep in touch with one another through personal contacts or informal linkages that would not be picked up in a study focusing on interorganisational ones. There is also, especially with radical EMOs, the problem of nomenclature. EF! RTS and Disarm DSEI (the network that formed with a view to shutting down the Defence Systems and Equipment International Conference [arms fair] in 2001 and 2003), for example, involve many of the same activists and are really loose networks rather than organisations. The latter is probably better represented as a project rather than an organisation, although had it been in existence at the same time as the sample was being drawn up for this research, it may have been included as part of the sample as an 'organisation'. Platform is represented in this research as an organisation, although it too is probably a 'project'. As a case in point, the focus on interorganisational links under-estimates the extent to which there is interaction between Platform and the wider radical environmental milieu, as the key personnel in Platform almost certainly attend the same social events as activists from EDAG and London EF!.

As the quantitative research was carried out first, the qualitative phase of the research could be tailored to compensate for its weaknesses. All interviewees were asked for their views about competition with others, and without fail, they were able to provide at least one example of a competitive relationship. It may be that EMOs view this kind of information as sensitive and feel happier relaying it face-to-face than writing it in a formal questionnaire. Perhaps they felt that admitting to competition on paper amounted to endorsing it. Following the quantitative phase with interviews and participant observation also allowed me to follow up interesting patterns that emerged from the survey results. For example, I had noticed that very few EMOs admitted to having a relationship with the GLA, and wondered why, so I used the interview with Jenny Bates from London FoE to help understand why this might be the case. The qualitative phase was also useful because it allowed for questions and answers to arise that I had not previously thought about. The interview quotes regarding the competitive nature of the SWP arose from a general question on competition, and it was a coincidence that several respondents mentioned it. One of the biggest problems I had with the qualitative data was to represent the data effectively. The pile of interview transcripts generated was over 10cm high, and the word limit for the PhD meant that I had to be exceedingly selective in my choice of what to include.

Participant observation was invaluable for seeing and experiencing the praxis of a conservation, reformist and radical EMO. I have been nearly scratched to death by deadly brambles in my conservation work, eavesdropped on national campaigner telephone calls at FoE (sorry, I couldn't help it!), and been video recorded by Forward Intelligence Team police officers whilst entering a radical social centre. I witnessed first-hand that conservationists have a relatively shallow identity, and met a number of conservationists who had no common values beyond a love of nature. I have been directly involved in FoE's recent shift towards greater involvement with its local groups, and even drew up campaigning plans seeking to take into account the interests of local groups. I have also felt the tension that mounts during the preparation of an illegal direct action, know how it feels to be under police surveillance, and can understand the reasons why radical EMOs are so sensitive about infiltration. The research findings would be much more superficial had I not had these experiences.

If I were starting the project from scratch with knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach taken, I would certainly not use the word 'activist' on any project documentation. I am certain that it acted as a deterrent to people answering the questionnaire. I would also consider using telephone interviews, as these have a much higher response rate, and so that I could be much more certain that the person I was talking to had adequate knowledge to answer the questionnaire. I may have been able to get more quantitative data from radical EMOs had I been involved in a wider range of them for a longer time, and if I had handed questionnaires out to acquaintances and collected them by hand rather than post and e-mail, both of which radicals

are suspicious of because of the chances of infiltration. The research would have been more robust had I limited the sample to a much smaller size consisting of organisations that had previously consented to participation in the research. This would have given a full data set, and allowed for a much wider range of social network methods to be used, and increased the overall reliability. It would have allowed both positional and relational approaches to be used, and provided the opportunity to see whether the former skews the results in the manner anticipated (Chapter 7).

Finally, I would like to say that this has been a valuable research experience. It would be interesting to see the approach taken up by other researchers - whether they focus on different localities, or different movements, or use relational or positional network approaches. Whichever locality, movement or network approach they take, I wholeheartedly recommend combining quantitative and qualitative research.

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APPENDIX 1

Sources for Identifying EMOs

- The main source was the Environment Council's (1998) *Who's Who in the Environment*
- Useful websites were Google (standard search engine), the People in Action for a Better World directory and the National Association of Volunteers Bureau.
- Local Studies Libraries visited at Ealing, Hillingdon and Hounslow. Local studies libraries often hold back copies of local newspapers and display EMO's posters and/or leaflets. Community data-bases consulted were Ealing Library and Information Service Community Information Sheets, *Hounslow Community Directory* (1997), Hillingdon Information Services Community Information leaflets.
- *Ealing & Acton Gazette* (searched from February 2000-December 2000), *Uxbridge & West Drayton Gazette* (searched from February 2000-August 2002), *Hounslow Chronicle* (searched from December 2001-September 2002), *The Mercury (Lewisham borough)* (searched from September 2001-October 2002).
- *Yellow Pages* 2001/2, 2002/3. Other fruitful sources include the *Ecologist's* (2001) *Go Mad !* book and Joplin (2002)

APPENDIX 2

Cover Letter and Questionnaire

UNIVERSITY OF KENT
AT CANTERBURY

Dear Sir or Madam

I am writing in the hope that you may be able to help me with my PhD project. My project is called '**The Dynamics of Interaction in London's Environmental Activist Network**', and aims to identify and account for interaction and cooperation between individuals and organisations in the environmental movement.

In particular, I am hoping to find out:

- the extent to which local environmental groups seek and receive assistance (e.g. information and advice) from national environmental groups; and
- the level of co-operation between environmental groups with different agendas (e.g. is there much exchange between conservationists and organisations representing broader environmental concerns).

This is a pioneering project, and to my knowledge no similar studies of environmentalism in London have been carried out. It is hoped that this research will be able to make a positive contribution not only to academia, but also to sustainability. The research will be of relevance to policy makers, looking to improve integration of local citizen politics, as well as to environmental organisations and activists who could use the findings to assist their recruitment policies and campaigns. I intend to disseminate my findings widely to all interested parties.

The research will have 2 phases. I am writing to you now at phase 1, which is the stage at which I am distributing questionnaires to organisations (like yours) that are of potential interest to me. I would be very grateful if you could take a few moments to fill out the enclosed questionnaire that asks general questions about your organisation's nature and extent of co-operation with other environmental organisations. You only need to answer those questions that are relevant to your organisation. On completion, please post the questionnaire back to me in the pre-paid addressed envelope ASAP.

Phase 2 will begin in April 2003, when I will begin interviewing representatives of a select few environmental organisations. I would be grateful if you could indicate whether or not you will be willing and able to participate in phase 2 of the research (please see final page of questionnaire).

I would like to take the opportunity to thank you for your help.

Yours faithfully

Clare Saunders
PhD candidate
Centre for the Study of Social & Political Movements
School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Research
University of Kent at Canterbury
CT2 7NF

Ps. I appreciate that some of the questions are hard to answer, and do not expect every organisation to be able to fully answer every question. Responses to just a few questions, or even incomplete answers are better than no response. Thank you for your time.

QUESTIONNAIRE

ORGANISATION NAME.....
(Please Note: *If you wish to remain anonymous, just the name of your organisation and a contact number will suffice. All data will be held on a secure database and will not be passed on to any third parties)*

Name of Contact .....**Position of Contact** .....

Address of Organisation
.....

Postcode..... **Email**.....

Website.....

Phone Number..... **Fax**.....

Please answer the questionnaire from the point of view of **your** organisation even if it is a local or regional branch of a national organisation.

---

1. Do you consider your organisation to be part of the environmental movement? Yes ☐ No ☐

2. What are the aims of your organisation? *(please paraphrase the relevant section of your organisation's constitution if it has one)*
.....

3. Is one of your organisation's *main* aims to protect or preserve the environment? Yes ☐ No ☐

4. Is your organisation part of a *network* of environmental organisations? *i.e. is your organisation in regular contact with at least one other organisation that you consider to be part of the environmental movement?*

Yes ☐ No ☐

If No, there are no further questions, please return questionnaire

5. At which <u>one</u> of the following levels does your organisation most often operate?

Please only one box

i.	Very local (*e.g. specific to a single road or park*)	☐
ii.	Local (*at the borough level*)	☐
iii.	Regional (*greater than one borough, or London-wide*)	☐
iv.	National (*throughout the UK*)	☐
v.	International (the UK and beyond)	☐

6. Which <u>one</u> of the following most accurately describes the primary function of your organisation?

Please only one box

i.	Single Issue Environmental Organisation	☐
ii.	Multi-Issue Environmental Organisation	☐
iii.	A Community Development Organisation	☐
iv.	A Countryside Management / Wildlife Conservation Organisation	☐
v.	A Recreational Organisation	☐
vi.	An Environmental Education Organisation	☐
vii.	An Urban Conservation Organisation (concerned with built heritage)	☐
viii.	An Amenity Society	☐
ix.	A Tenants or Residents Association	☐

7. Which of the following activities has your group engaged in within the last 12 months?

Please tick as appropriate, you may tick more than one box

i. Social Events ☐
ii. Petitions ☐
iii. Leafleting ☐
iv. Media Work (press releases or radio/TV interviews) ☐
v. Press Conference ☐
vi. Letter Writing ☐
vii. Researching and Reporting ☐
viii. Education or Training ☐
ix. Lobbying ☐
x. Practical Conservation ☐
xi. Government Consultee ☐
xii. LA21 or similar Council-ran Local Environment Committee Involvement ☐
xiii. Procedural Complaints (e.g. planning objection) ☐
xiv. Litigation ☐
xv. Marches ☐
xvi. Public Meetings ☐
xvii. Rallies ☐
xviii. Demonstrations ☐
xix. Cultural Performance ☐
xx. Boycotts ☐
xxi. Disruption of Events ☐
xxii. Blockades / Occupations ☐
xxiii. Ethical Shoplifting ☐
xxiv. Ecotage ☐
xxv. Adbusting ☐

8. Which *one or two* categories best represent the underlying source of the environmental problem(s) that your organisation works to resolve?

Please tick no more than 2 boxes

i. Erosion of nature / wilderness ☐
ii. Urban growth ☐
iii. Poor planning decisions ☐
iv. Failure to cost environmental goods ☐
v. Over-consumption in consumerist society ☐
vi. Unequal distribution of resources ☐
vii. Domination of nature under capitalism ☐
viii. Globalisation ☐

9. Which *one or two* categories best represent the overall solution to the environmental problem(s) that your organisation works to resolve?

Please tick no more than 2 boxes

i. Practical conservation / management of reserves ☐
ii. Halting building on Greenfield sites ☐
iii. Improved planning decisions ☐
iv. Technological innovation ☐
v. Participatory democracy ☐
vi. Reallocation of resources ☐
vii. Reduction of consumption ☐
viii. Self-sufficient communities (e.g. bioregions) ☐
ix. Anarchy ☐
x. Revolution ☐

10. Which *single* statement best characterises your organisation's relationship with each of national, regional and local government?

Please tick one box per column	National	Regional (GLA)	Local (Borough Council)
a) The government/council frequently seeks the advice of our organisation	☐	☐	☐
b) The government/council is friendly to our organisation, but our organisation initiates most of the contact	☐	☐	☐
c) The government/council sometimes receives our organisation with hostility and other times is welcoming depending on the issue/s or department/s involved	☐	☐	☐
d) The government/council never listens to our organisation although our organisation does try to influence them	☐	☐	☐
e) Our organisation prefers to campaign in other ways	☐	☐	☐

11. QUESTION 11 ASKS YOU ABOUT THE *ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANISATIONS* FROM WHICH YOUR ORGANISATION RECEIVES INFORMATION OR ADVICE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, OR CAMPAIGNING MATTERS. Please include local branches of your own organisation if appropriate. *If your organisation does not receive any information or advice from other environmental organisations, please tick this box and go to question 12* ☐.

a. Please list the 5 most important local environmental organisations in southeast London (within the boroughs of Greenwich, Lewisham, Southwark and Lambeth) from which you have received information or advice in the last 12 months and approximate how frequent these occurrences have been.

Please list the organisations here and tick one box for each row	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Quarterly	6-monthly	Annually
i.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iv.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
v.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

b. Please list the 5 most important local environmental organisations in north west London (within the boroughs of Hillingdon, Hounslow and Ealing) from which you have received information or advice in the last 12 months and approximate how frequent these occurrences have been.

Please list the organisations here and tick one box for each row	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Quarterly	6-monthly	Annually
i.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iv.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
v.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

c. Please list the 5 most important regional (London-based) environmental organisations from which you have received information or advice in the last 12 months and approximate how frequent these occurrences have been.

Please list the organisations here and tick one box for each row	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Quarterly	6-monthly	Annually
i.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iv.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
v.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

d. Please list the 5 most important national (London-based) environmental organisations from which you have received information or advice in the last 12 months and approximate how frequent these occurrences have been.

Please list the organisations here and tick one box for each row	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Quarterly	6-monthly	Annually
i.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iv.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
v.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

12. QUESTION 12 ASKS YOU ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANISATIONS TO WHICH YOUR ORGANISATION PROVIDES INFORMATION OR ADVICE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, OR CAMPAIGNING MATTERS. *If your organisation **does not** provide any information or advice for other environmental organisations, please tick this box and go to question 13* ☐

a. Please list the 5 most important local environmental organisations in south east London (within the boroughs of Greenwich, Lewisham, Southwark and Lambeth) to which your organisation has provided information or advice in the last 12 months and approximate how frequent these occurrences have been.

Please list the organisations here and tick one box for each row	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Quarterly	6-monthly	Annually
i.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iv.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
v.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

b. Please list the 5 most important <u>local</u> environmental organisations in north west London (within the boroughs of Hillingdon, Hounslow and Ealing) to which your organisation has <u>provided</u> information or advice in the last 12 months and approximate how frequent these occurrences have been.

Please list the organisations here and tick one box for each row	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Quarterly	6-monthly	Annually
i.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iv.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
v.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

c. Please list the 5 most important <u>regional</u> (London-based) environmental organisations to which your organisation has <u>provided</u> information or advice in the last 12 months and approximate how frequent these occurrences have been.

Please list the organisations here and tick one box for each row	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Quarterly	6-monthly	Annually
i.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iv.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
v.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

d. Please list the 5 most important <u>national</u> (London-based) environmental organisations to which your organisation has <u>provided</u> information or advice in the last 12 months and approximate how frequent these occurrences have been.

Please list the organisations here and tick one box for each row	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Quarterly	6-monthly	Annually
i.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iv.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
v.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

13. QUESTION 13 ASKS YOU ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANISATIONS WITH WHICH YOUR ORGANISATION COLLABORATES ON CAMPAIGNS AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITY. *If your organisation does not <u>collaborate</u> with other environmental organisations, please tick this box and go to question 14* ☐

a. Please list the 5 most important <u>local</u> environmental organisations in south east London (within the boroughs of Greenwich, Lewisham, Southwark and Lambeth) with which your organisation has <u>collaborated</u> on a campaign or other environmental activity in the last 12 months and approximate how frequent these occurrences have been.

Please list the organisations here and tick one box for each row	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Quarterly	6-monthly	Annually
i.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iv.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
v.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

b. Please list the 5 most important local environmental organisations in north west London (within the boroughs of Hillingdon, Hounslow and Ealing) with which your organisation has collaborated information or advice in the last 12 months and approximate how frequent these occurrences have been.

Please list the organisations here and tick one box for each row	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Quarterly	6-monthly	Annually
i.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iv.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
v.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

c. Please list the 5 most important regional (London-based) environmental organisations with which your organisation has collaborated on a campaign or other environmental activity in the last 12 months and approximate how frequent these occurrences have been.

Please list the organisations here and tick one box for each row	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Quarterly	6-monthly	Annually
i.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iv.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
v.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

d. Please list the 5 most important national (London-based) environmental organisations with which your organisation has collaborated on a campaign or other environmental activity in the last 12 months and approximate how frequent these occurrences have been.

Please list the organisations here and tick one box for each row	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Quarterly	6-monthly	Annually
i.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
iv.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
v.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

14. QUESTION 14 ASKS YOU ABOUT THOSE ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANISATIONS WITH WHICH YOUR ORGANISATION IS IN COMPETITION. *If your organisation does not compete with other environmental organisations, please tick this box and go to question 15* ☐

Please list those 5 environmental organisations with which your organisation most competes, and indicate what you compete for.

Please list the organisations here and tick the appropriate boxes. You may tick more than 1 per row if applicable	Members	Activists	Finances	Publicity	Influence	Other (specify)
i.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	.....
ii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	.....
iii.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	.....
iv.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	.....
v.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	.....

15. Please list those 5 environmental organisations that you consider to be the most similar to your own organisation (in terms of scale of influence, membership base, organisational size and structure, issues and strategies).

Local organisations, please ensure that the groups you list are local and within your locality. National and regional groups, please list organisations in London only.

Please list similar organisations here	*Please rank them here. Give them a number between 1 and 5, with 1 being the most similar and 5 the least*
i.	.....
ii.	.....
iii.	.....
iv.	.....
v.	.....

Thank you for Completing this Questionnaire

For FREEPOST return, please send back questionnaire in the addressed and prepaid envelope provided to:

Clare Saunders
Centre for the Study of Social and Political Movements
School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Research
University of Kent at Canterbury
CT2 7NF

For further information about my project, or if you have any questions about the questionnaire, please don't hesitate to contact me:
E-mail: c.e.saunders@ukc.ac.uk
Tel: 01227 827039

If you are **unable** to participate in phase 2 of the research, which will involve short interviews with key activists, please tick this box: ☐

If you would like to receive a short summary of the research on completion, please tick this box: ☐

APPENDIX 3

Leaflet

Interaction in London's Environmental Activist Network

An ESRC funded PhD

Clare Saunders
School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Research
University of Kent at Canterbury
CT2 7NF

E·S·R·C ECONOMIC & SOCIAL RESEARCH COUNCIL

UNIVERSITY OF KENT

INTERACTION IN LONDON'S ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVIST NETWORK

Brief introduction to the research

The research aims to identify and account for ***interaction*** between organisations and individuals in the ***environmental movement*** in London, emphasising variation in the incidence and forms of interaction between the movement's ***spatial*** (national, regional and local) and ***ideological*** divisions (conservationists, political ecologists / reformists and radicals).

Of special interest are the inter-organisational linkages that define the very structure of the environmental movement. Interaction between individuals within the movement is considered only where these have implications for inter-organisational ***collaboration***, ***conflict*** or ***competition***.

The study will focus on Greater London – a region which according to *Social Trends* is home the largest proportion of national environmental organisations in the UK. It is also hosts a variety of regional groups ranging from London Rising Tide to London Wildlife Trust and has a vibrant local environmentalist network including local amenity groups, friends of parks groups as well as branches of national environmental organisations.

Especially, the research will focus on an area of southeast London surrounding Greenwich and the region surrounding Heathrow airport.

Key terms and definitions

Although there has been some debate in the literature about the existence of a homogenous environmental movement (Dalton, 1994), for the purposes of this research, the 'movement' will be defined as:

> a ***network*** of organisations and individuals with a ***common interest*** or ***concern*** to protect the environment or prevent its destruction that engages in ***collective action***.

Environmental movement networks will be defined on the basis of exchanges of ideas, information and expertise between organisations and individuals which make up the wider environmental movement.

Conservationists are defined as environmental organisations that seek to preserve or protect the natural environment by practical projects or legislation. ***Reformists*** are those groups that seek wider spread environmental improvements through incremental political gains. Whereas the label ***radical*** is used to refer to those activists who seek direct or immediate change through direct action and alternative lifestyles.

Why study environmental networks?

Local environmentalist activity is generally under-reported and receives very little scholarly interest. To date there has been little (if any) research on the relationship between local and national groups in London.

Key Research Questions

- *Is the environmental movement an integrated movement, or are the ideological and spatial divisions a series of isolated movements?*
- *How different are the networks of conservationists, radicals and political ecologists?*
- *Are there any major differences between the networks of local, regional and national groups – how does the sphere of influence of a group relate to its capacity to make network links across the movement's spatial dimensions?*
- *To what extent do local activists and groups seek and use assistance from national groups? How forthcoming are national groups with requested assistance and how do national groups decide which local campaigns to support?*
- *Is there any competition between environmental organisations in London?*
- *Although national and community groups often, for tactical reasons shun the actions of radicals (so as to not damage their relations with decision makers), are there in practice private links that are not publicly apparent?*

Key Research Questions

- *Being unable to secure political access for themselves, do radical groups seek to convey their message to governmental institutions via reformists as their intermediaries?*
- *How important are umbrella organisations in maintaining linkages between environmental groups?*
- *Does the anti-capitalist ideology of radical environmentalists cohere with a withdrawal from the social praxis, and does this lead to isolated cliquey or sect-like behaviour?*
- *What role do solidarity, collective identity (including the presence or absence of sub-cultural credibility) play in determining interaction between radicals and their more staid counterparts?*

Methods and Sources

A variety of research methodologies will be used to explore these research questions.

- A Questionnaire Survey
- Participant observation in a small sample of groups
- In depth interviews with key activists
- Questionnaire data will be analysed using Social Network Analysis and interview data will be used to provide contextual background to facilitate interpretation.

Timetable for research

The research is due to be completed by October 2004. After this date, the results will be disseminated to all interested parties. It is hoped that the results will be of use to environmental organisations seeking to mprove their network links, as well as to policy makers looking to integrate local citizen politics into decision making and scholars interested in social movements, social networks or environmentalism.

Further enquiries

If you would like further information about the project, please do not hesitate to contact:

Clare Saunders
Centre for the Study of Social & Political Movements
School of Sociology, Social Policy & Social Research
University of Kent at Canterbury
CT2 7NF

Tel: 01227 827039
Email:c.e.saunders@kent.ac.uk

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APPENDIX 4

Organisations that were sent the questionnaire and attributes of organisations that responded

A4.1 List of organisations that were sent the questionnaire

Southeast

1. Bankside Open Spaces Trust
2. Barry Area Residents Association
3. Belvedere & District Campaign Against Pollution (BADCAP)
4. Bermondsey Youth Ornithologist Club
5. Blackheath Ramblers Association
6. Blackheath & Greenwich WWF
7. Blackheath Society
8. Brixton Society
9. Brockley Sociey
10. Bromley RSPB
11. Camberwell & District Allotment Society
12. Camberwell Society
13. Charlton Society
14. Clapham Society
15. Creekside Community Forum
16. Crystal Palace Campaign
17. Dulwich Society
18. East Dulwich Society
19. Eltham Church Yard Conservation Group
20. Eltham Society
21. Fare Shares/56a info shop
22. Federation of Lewisham Tenants and Residents Associations
23. Friends of Beckenham Palace Park
24. Friends of Brockwell Park
25. Friends of Devonshire Park Nature Reserve
26. Friends of Dulwich Upper Wood
27. Friends of Great North Wood
28. Friends of Greenwich Park
29. Friends of Hansons Corner
30. Friends of Nunhead Cemetery
31. Friends of Peckham Rye Park
32. Friends of Ruskin Park
33. Friends of the Earth Greenwich
34. Friends of the Earth Lambeth
35. Friends of the Earth Southwark
36. Green Party Greenwich
37. Green Party Lambeth

38. Green Party Lewisham
39. Green Party Southwark
40. Greenpeace Greenwich & Bexley
41. Greenwich Action to Stop Pollution
42. Greenwich Conservation Group
43. Greenwich Conservation Society
44. Greenwich Cyclists
45. Greenwich Environment Forum
46. Greenwich Grinpeace
47. Greenwich LETS Network
48. Greenwich Sociey
49. Groundwork Southwark
50. Herne Hill Society
51. Ladywell Fields User Group
52. Lambethian Society
53. Lee Manor Society
54. Lettsom Gardens Association
55. Lewisham Cycling Campaign
56. Lewisham Environmental Trust
57. London Centre for Wildlife Gardening
58. MILNET
59. Minet Conservation Association
60. Norwood Society
61. Nunhead Residents Assocation
62. One Hill Tree Allotment Society
63. Opposition to the Destruction of Open Spaces
64. Peckham Society
65. People Against the River Crossing
66. Pirate TV
67. Plumstead Common Environment Group
68. Quaggy Waterway Action Group
69. Queens Walk Park Society
70. Ramblers Association Blackheath
71. Ramblers Association South Bank
72. Rockingham Estate Conservation Association
73. Shooters Hill Society
74. Southwark Cyclists
75. Southwark Environment Forum
76. Southwark Heritage Association
77. Southwark Open Spaces Society
78. Southwark Pedestrian Rights
79. Streatham Society
80. St Johns Society
81. Sydenham Society
82. Southwark Social Investment Forum
83. Telegraph Hill Conservation Society

84. Thames Bank
85. Tidy Blackheath Group
86. Use Your Loaf Centre for Social Solidarity
87. Vauxhall Society
88. Walworth Allotments Association
89. Waterloo Community Development Group
90. Westcombe Society
91. Woodlands Farm Trust
92. Woolwich & District Antiquarian Society
93. World Development Movement Greenwich
94. WWF Blackheath & Greenwich
95. WWF Southwark
96. Young Ornotholigists Bermondsey

Northeast

1. A Rocha
2. Acton Gardens Association
3. Bedford Park Society
4. Bell Farm and Stockley Tenants and Residents' Association
5. Bearley Close Residents' Association
6. Bennetts Farm Tenants and Residents' Association
7. Bourne Farm Allotments and Gardens Association
8. Brent River and Canal Society
9. Brentford Community Council
10. Brentford Waterside Forum
11. Butt's Society
12. Campaign for Political Ecology
13. Chiltern Society
14. Chiltern View Residents' Association
15. Chiswick Pier Trust
16. Chiswick Protection Group
17. Colham Residents' Association
18. Colham Green Residents' Association
19. Colne Valley Visitor Centre
20. Cranford & Staines Area Conservation Group
21. Cranford Cross Residents' Association
22. Dene Road Residents' Association
23. Drive, The (North) Residents' Association
24. Ealing & Hanwell Allotments Society
25. Ealing Aircraft Noise Group
26. Ealing Allotments and Gardens Society
27. Ealing Civic Society
28. Ealing Cycling Campaign
29. Ealing Fields Residents' Association
30. Ealing FOE
31. Ealing Green Party

32. Ealing LA21Allotments
33. Ealing LA21 Community Development
34. Ealing LA21 Energy / Built Environment
35. Ealing LA21 Natural Environment and Biodiversity
36. Ealing LA21 Pollution & Public Health
37. Ealing LA21 Transport
38. Ealing LA21 Waste & Recycling
39. Ealing Watch
40. Ealing Wildlife Network
41. Ealing Wildlife Trust
42. Ealing/Harrow WWF
43. Earthworks Conservation Volunteers
44. Eastcote Residents' Association
45. Fairway Allotments Society
46. Federation of Heathrow Anti-Noise Groups
47. Ferndale Area Residents' Association
48. Five Roads Forum
49. Friends of Blondin Park Nature Reserve
50. Friends of Chiswick House
51. Friends of Colne Valley Park
52. Friends of Dukes Meadow
53. Friends of Gunnersbury Park
54. Friends of Horsenden Hill
55. Friends of Litten Local Nature Reserve
56. Friends of Osterley Park
57. Friends of Ruislip Nature Reserve
58. Gatehill Residents' Association
59. Glebe Residents' Association
60. Groundwork Thames Valley
61. Groundwork West London
62. Gunnersbury Triange Nature Reserve
63. Harefield Tenants & Residents' Association
64. Harlington Village Association
65. Harmondsworth & Sipson Residents' Association
66. Hayes End Garden and Allotment Association
67. Healing Gardens
68. Heathrow Association for the Control of Aircraft Noise (Hacan Clear Skies)
69. Heston & District Allotments & Gardens Association
70. Heston Residents' Association
71. Hillingdon Allotment and Horticultural Federation
72. Hillingdon Anti-Flouridation Society
73. Hillingdon Court Park Association
74. Hillingdon Ecology Forum
75. HiLETS
76. Hillingdon FOE
77. Hillingdon Natural History Society

78. Hillingdon Wildlife Trust
79. Hillingdon WWF
80. Hounslow & District Wheelers
81. Hounslow & Ealing Conservation Volunteers
82. Hounslow Central Residents' Association
83. Hounslow Community Transport
84. Hounslow East Residents' Association
85. Hounslow FOE
86. Hounslow LETS
87. Hounslow WATCH
88. Hounslow WWF
89. Ickenham Residents' Association
90. Independent Rambling Club
91. Isleworth Community Grp
92. Isleworth Society
93. Iver Nature Study Centre
94. Langham Court Residents' Association
95. Larchers Residents' Association
96. Lawn RoadResidents' Association
97. League for Animal Welfare & Rescue
98. Longford Residents' Association
99. Long Lane Community Association
100. Middlesex Campaign for Open Spaces
101. Mogden Residents' Action Group
102. Northold & Greenford Countryside Park Society
103. National Trust Harrow Association
104. Nicholas Way Residents' Association
105. Northwood Hills Residents' Association
106. North Uxbridge Residents' Association
107. No Third Runway
108. Oak Farm Residents' Association
109. Old Chiswick Protection Society
110. Pastures Mead Residents' Association
111. Peachey Lane Allotments and Gardens Association
112. Residents' Against Incinerator Nuisance (RAIN)
113. RSPB Pinner and District
114. Ruislip Residents' Association
115. Ruislip Woods Trust
116. Save Ealing Streets Association
117. Selbourne Society
118. South Ruislip Residents' Association
119. Southside Action Group (SAGE)
120. Spinney Hill Residents' Association
121. Spring Grove Residents' Association
122. Strand on the Green Association
123. St Laurence Residents' Association

124. Thames Explorer Trust
125. Tidy Harefield Group
126. Third Runway Action Committee
127. Tudor Way Residents' Association
128. Uxbridge Moor Residents' Association
129. Uxbridge Rovers Angling and Conservation Society
130. Vine Lane Residents' Association
131. Waterloo Road Residents' Association
132. Welsh Harp Conservation Group
133. West Ealing Residents' Association
134. West End Road (Ruislip) Allotments Association
135. West London Anarchists & Radicals
136. West London FOE
137. West London Organic & Wildlife Gardeners Assc.
138. West London Ramblers
139. West London RSPB
140. West Ruislip Commuters Association
141. West View Residents' Association
142. West Yiewsley Residents' Association
143. Whitehall Residents' Association
144. Whiteham Residents' Association
145. Wills Lane Residents' Association
146. Windsor Line Passengers Association
147. Wiselane Residents' Association
148. Woodbury Park Action Group

Regional

1. Action Resource Centre
2. Alert Londoners Against Radioactive Materials (ALARM)
3. Association for the Reduction of Aircraft Noise
4. Bioregional Development Group
5. Campaign for Peoples London
6. Campaign to Improve London Transport
7. Capital Transport Campaign
8. Central London RSPB
9. Central London WWF
10. Communities Empowerment Network
11. CPRE London
12. CHARM (Cyclists Have A Right To Move)
13. ENCAMS London
14. Emmaz Resource Centre
15. Federation of City Farms and Community Gardens Eastern Region
16. Food not Bombs
17. Groundwork in London
18. Heritage of London Trust
19. LETS Link London

20. London Activist Resource Centre
21. London Anarchist Forum
22. London Bat Group
23. London Civic Forum
24. London Community Recycling Network
25. London Cycling Campaign
26. London Ecology Centre
27. London Ecology Forum
28. London Environmental Education Forum
29. London for Sustainability Network
30. London Forum
31. London Free Information Network (FIN)
32. London Friends of the Earth
33. London Green Drinks
34. London GreenPeace
35. London Natural History Society
36. London Supporter National Trust
37. London Open Spaces Under Threat
38. London Playing Fields Society
39. London Social Centres Network
40. London SCARE
41. London Sustainability Exchange
42. London Transport Activists Roundtable (London TAR)
43. London Trust for Conservation Volunteers
44. London Walking Forum
45. London Waste Action
46. London Wildlife Trust
47. National Trust, London & W M'Sex
48. Naturewise20
49. Pedestrians Association
50. Planning Aid for London (PAL)
51. Platform
52. Radical Dairy
53. Renewable Energy in the Urban Environment (RENUE)
54. River Thames Society
55. RTS London
56. London Rising Tide
57. Stonehenge Campaign
58. Street Tree
59. Sustainable London Trust
60. Thames 21
61. Thamesbank
62. Transport 2000 (Greater London Groups)
63. Trees for London
64. Urban 75

National

1. Airport Watch
2. Alarm UK
3. Anarchist Federation
4. Animal Defenders
5. Association of Preservation Trusts
6. Aviation Environment Federation
7. British Ecological Society
8. British Entomological and Natural History Society
9. British Herpetological Society
10. British Trust for Conservation Volunteers
11. British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection
12. Byways and Bridleways Trust
13. Campaign Against Arms Trade
14. Campaign Against the Arms Trade
15. Campaign Against Climate Change
16. Campaign for Environmentally Responsible Tourism
17. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
18. Christain CND
19. Civic Trust
20. Class War
21. Common Ground
22. Commonwealth Human Ecology Council
23. Community Development Foundation
24. Conservation Foundation
25. Council for the Protection of Rural England
26. Country Landowners Association
27. Countryside Alliance
28. Countryside Link
29. Direct Action Network (DAN)
30. Earth Liberation Prisoners
31. Ecological Parks Trust
32. ENCAMS London
33. Energy Saving Trust
34. English Heritage (Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission)
35. Environment Council, The
36. Environment Trust
37. Environmental Investigation Agency
38. Environmental Justice Foundation
39. Environmental Law Foundation
40. Environmental Transport Association
41. Ethical Trading Initiative
42. Fellowship Party

43. Forest Peoples' Support Group
44. Forests Forever
45. Forum for the Future
46. Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development
47. Fresh Water Action Network
48. Friends of Conservation
49. Friends of the Earth Ltd
50. GAIA Foundation
51. Genetic Engineering Network (GEN)
52. Genetic Interest Group
53. Genetics Forum
54. Global Action Plan
55. Global Witness
56. Globalise Resistance
57. Green Alliance
58. Green Anarchist Network
59. Green Cross UK
60. Green Events
61. Green Guide
62. Greenforce
63. GreenNet
64. Green Party of England & Wales
65. Greenpeace
66. Hamlet Trust
67. Hawk and Owl Trust
68. Historic Gardens Foundation
69. Institute for Social and Ethic Accountability
70. Institute for Social Inventions
71. Institute of Science in Society
72. International Institute for Environment and Development
73. International Primate Protection League
74. International Society for Arboriculture
75. Justice
76. League Against Cruel Sports Ltd
77. Liberation
78. Liberty
79. Living Earth Foundation
80. Local Exchange Trading Systems
81. Mammal Society
82. Marine Forum
83. McLibel Support Campaign
84. MEDACT
85. Minewatch
86. National Anti-Vivisection Society, The
87. National Federation of Badger Groups
88. National Playing Fields Association

89. National Recycling Forum
90. National Small Woods Association
91. National Trust, The
92. New Economics Foundation
93. No Opencast
94. No Sweat, .
95. One World International
96. Orangutang Foundation
97. PaRTiZans
98. Peace News
99. Pedestrians Association, The
100. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
101. People's Trust for Endangered Species
102. Permaculture Association (Britain)
103. Pesticide Action Network UK
104. Pesticides Trust, The
105. Pisces - The Anti-Angling Campaign
106. Plantlife - The Wild-Plant Conservation Charity
107. Population Concern
108. Rail Future
109. Rainforest Concern
110. Rainforest Foundation
111. Ramblers Association
112. Real Nappy Association
113. Reclaim the Streets
114. Rhino Ark UK
115. Roots and Shoots
116. Save Britain's Heritage (SAVE)
117. Save the Rhino International
118. Schumacher Centre for Technology and Choice
119. Social Ecology Network
120. Socialist Countryside Group
121. Socialist Environmental and Resources Association
122. Society for the History of Natural History
123. Squall
124. State Watch
125. Stonehenge Campaign
126. Survival
127. Sustain (the Alliance for Better Food and Farming)
128. Tearfund
129. Television Trust for the Environment
130. Third World Environmental Protection Agency
131. Tourism Concern
132. Transport 2000
133. Transport on Water Association
134. Tree Council, The

135. TRIAD (Textile Recycling for Aid and International Development)
136. Trust for Urban Ecology
137. Tusk Trust
138. UN Environment & Development Foundation
139. United Kingdom Federation Against Aircraft Noise
140. War on Want
141. Waste Watch
142. Wildlife and Countryside Link
143. Wildlife Information Network
144. Women for Life on Earth
145. Women's Environmental Network, The
146. World Development Movement
147. World Society for the Protection of Animals
148. Year Zero

A4.2 List of organisations that responded to the questionnaire

(A 'Y' means that the organisation provided network data, an N means that it did not)

Southeast

1. Badair Y
2. Blackheath Group of Ramblers Association N
3. The Brixton Society Y
4. The Camberwell Society Y
5. Catford Resident's Association Y
6. Crystal Palace Campaign N
7. Dulwich Society Y
8. East Dulwich Society Y
9. Friends of Beckenham Palace Park Y
10. Friends of Nunhead Cemetery Y
11. Friends of Greenwich Park Y
12. Friends of Jubilee Gardens Y
13. Green Party Lambeth Y
14. Greenwich Action to Stop Pollution Y
15. Greenwich and Bromley Greenpeace Y
16. Greenwich Conservation Group Y
17. Greenwich Grinpeace N
18. Hernehill Society Y
19. Groundwork Southwark Y
20. Ladywell Fields User Group N
21. Lee Manor Society N
22. Lettsom Gardens Association N
23. Opposition to the Destruction of Open Green Spaces N
24. Nunhead Residents' Association Y
25. Peckham Society Y
26. Plumstead Common Environment Group Y
27. Rockingham Estate Play Association Y
28. Roots and Shoots Y
29. RSPB Wildlife Explorers – Bermondsey Y
30. RSBP Bromley Y
31. Southbank Ramblers N
32. Southwark Heritage Association Y

33. Southwark Social Investment Forum Y
34. Sydenham Society Y
35. Use Your Loaf Social Centre N
36. Vauxhall Society Y
37. Woodlands Farm Trust Y

North East

1. Bedford Park Society Y
2. Chiltern Society Y
3. Chiswick House Friends N
4. Cranford and Staines Area Conservation Group N
5. Chiswick Protection Group Y
6. Culpepper Community Garden N
7. Ealing Aircraft Noise Action Group Y
8. Ealing Allotments and Gardens Society Y
9. Ealing Civic Society Y
10. Ealing Green Party Y
11. Ealing Local Agenda 21 Allotments Group Y
12. Ealing Local Agenda 21 Pollution and Public Health Project Group Y
13. Ealing Local Agenda 21 Transport Group Y
14. Ealing Wildlife Network Y
15. Earthworks Conservation Volunteers Y
16. Federation of Heathrow Airport Noise Groups Y
17. Ferndale Area Residents' Association Y
18. Friends of Blondin Park Y
19. Friends of Dukes Meadows Y
20. Friends of Horsenden Hill Y
21. Friends of Osterley Park Y
22. Gatehill (Northwood) Residents' Association N
23. HACAN Clearskies Y
24. Harefield Tenants' and Residents' Association Y
25. Harmondworth and Sipson Residents' Association Y
26. Harrow National Trust N
27. Hayes End Garden and Allotments Association N
28. Groundwork Thames Valley N
29. Heston Residents' Association Y
30. Hillingdon Friends of the Earth Y
31. Hillingdon Natural History Society Y
32. Ickenham Residents' Association Y
33. Isleworth Society Y
34. Iver Nature Study Centre Y
35. The Larches Residents Association Y
36. London and West Middlesex National Trust Volunteers N
37. London Wildlife Trust, Chiswick Group Y
38. Long Lane Community Association Hillingdon N
39. Middlesex Campaign for Open Spaces Y
40. Northolt and Greenford Country Park Society Y
41. No Third Runway Action Group Y
42. Peachey Lane Gardens Association N
43. Ruislip Residents' Association Y
44. South Ruislip Residents' Association Y
45. Southside Action Group Ealing Y
46. The Strand-on-the-Green Association Y
47. Uxbridge Moor Residents' Association N
48. Uxbridge Rovers Angling and Conservation Society Y

49. Watch Ealing Y
50. West London Friends of the Earth Y
51. West London Organic and Wildlife Gardening Association Y
52. West London Group of the Ramblers Y
53. West Ruislip Commuters' Association N
54. Windsor Lines Passengers Association Y

Regional

1. Bioregional Development Group Y
2. CAPITAL Transport Campaign Y
3. Emmaz N
4. Friends of the Earth London Y
5. Green Events Y
6. London Greenpeace Y (but responses were vague – i.e. "various")
7. London Community Recycling Network Y
8. London Forum of Civic and Amenity Societies Y
9. London SCARE Y
10. London Natural History Society Y
11. London Walking Forum Y
12. London Wildlife Trust Y
13. River Thames Society Y
14. Street Tree Y
15. Thames Explorer Trust Y
16. Woodland Trust London Y

National

1. Anarchist Federation Y
2. UK Association of Preservation Trusts Y
3. Aviation Environment Federation Y
4. British Herpetological Society N
5. British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection N
6. Campaign Against Climate Change Y
7. Campaign for the Abolition of Angling Y
8. Civic Trust Y
9. Christian CND Y (although claimed not part of a network)
10. Commonwealth Human Ecology Council N
11. Class War N
12. Communities Empowerment Network N
13. CPRE Y
14. Environmental Law Foundation Y
15. Forests Forever N
16. Friends of Conservation Y
17. Environmental Justice Foundation Y
18. Federation of City Farms and Community Gardens Y
19. Freshwater Action Network Y
20. Friends of the Earth Y
21. Global Action Plan Y
22. Green Anarchist Y
23. Greenpeace UK Y
24. International Primate Protection League Y
25. Justice N
26. League Against Cruel Sports Y
27. Living Earth Foundation N

28. National Federation of Badger Groups Y
29. Mammal Society Y
30. No Sweat N
31. One World Action N
32. Orangutan Foundation Y
33. Platform Y
34. Rainforest Concern Y
35. Ramblers' Association Y
36. Real Nappy Association Y
37. Save the Rhino Association Y
38. Survival N
39. Waste Watch Y
40. Wildlife and Countryside Link Y
41. Women's Environmental Network Y
42. Year Zero N

Total of 149 organisations that responded to the questionnaire. Out of this 149, 35 were not part of a network and were excluded from the analysis.

A4.3 Attributes of organisations that answered the questionnaire

					Relationship to ...		
	Scale	Function	Activities	Ideology	Governm-ent	GLA	Local Authority
SOUTH EAST							
1. BADAIR	2	1	2	3	5	1	3
2. Brixton Society	2	8	1	2	3	5	3
3. Camberwell Society	2	8	1	2	4	2	3
4. Catford Residents Association	2	9	1	2	5	5	2
5. Dulwich Society	1	9	2	1	5	5	2
6. East Dulwich Society	2	8	2	2	3	3	3
7. Friends Beckenham Place Park	1	3	3	2	1	5	5
8. Friends of Nunhead Cemetery	1	4	2	1	5	5	2
9. Friends of Greenwich Park	1	8	2	1	5	5	2
10. Friends of Jubillee Gardens	2	2	2	2	5	2	2
11. Green Party Drugs Group	3	2	2	4	5	1	5
12. Greenwich Action to Stop 1	2	1	1	2	5	5	3
13. Greenwich Greenpeace	3	2	2	1	5	5	1
14. Greenwich Conservation Group	2	7	2	2	5	3	1
15. Herne Hill Society	1	8	2	2	2	2	2
16. Groundwork Southwark	2	3	2	2	1	1	1
17. Nunhead Residents Association	2	9	2	2	5	5	1

					Relationship to ...		
	Scale	Function	Activities	Ideology	Governm-ent	GLA	Local Authority
18. Peckham Society	2	8	2	2	5	5	2
19. Plumstead Common Environment Group	1	2	2	2	5	5	2
20. Rockingham Estate Play Association	2	5	2	1	5	5	1
21. Roots & Shoots	2	6	2	1	5	2	1
22. RSPB Wildlife Explorers Bermondsey	3	6	2	1	2	2	2
23. RSPB Bromley	2	4	2	1	5	5	3
24. Southwark Heritage Association	2	7	2	2	5	5	2
25. Southwark Social Investment	2	3	2	3	5	5	2
26. Sydenham Society	2	8	1	2	5	5	1
27. Vauxhall Society	2	8	1	2	2	1	1
28. Woodlands Farm Trust	3	2	2	2	4	2	1
NORTH WEST							
29. Bedford Park Society	2	7	2	2	5	2	2
30. Chiltern Society	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
31. Chiswick Protection Group	2	3	2	2	2	2	1
32. Ealing Aircraft Noise Action Group	3	1	2	2	4	5	2
33. Ealing Allotments & Gardens Society	2	5	2	2	5	5	1
34. Ealing Civic Society	2	2	2	2	5	5	2
35. Ealing Green Party	2	2	2	3	5	5	5
36. Ealing LA21 Allotments Group	2	2	2	1	5	5	3
37. Ealing LA21 1 & Public Health Group	2	3	1	2	4	4	3
38. Ealing LA21 Transport Group	2	2	1	2	5	5	2
39. Ealing Wildlife Network	2	4	1	1	5	5	2
40. Earthworks Conservation Volunteers	3	4	3	1	5	5	2
41. Federation of 9 Anti-Airport Groups	3	2	2	2	2	2	3
42. Ferndale Area Residents Association	1	9	2	2	4	5	1
43. Friends of Blondin Park	1	3	2	1	5	5	1
44. Friends of Dukes Meadows	1	3	2	2	2	4	2

					Relationship to ...		
	Scale	Function	Activities	Ideology	Governm-ent	GLA	Local Authority
45. Friends of Horsdenden Hill	1	4	3	1	5	5	2
46. Friends of Osterley Park	1	8	3	1	5	4	2
47. HACAN Clearskies	3	1	2	4	3	5	1
48. Harefield Tenants & Residents Association	1	9	2	2	5	5	1
49. Harmondsworth & Sipson Residents Association	2	9	2	2	1	1	1
50. Heston Residents Association	1	9	1	2	5	5	2
51. Hillingdon Friends of the Earth	2	2	2	3	3	5	1
52. Hillingdon Natural History Society	2	3	2	1	5	5	2
53. Ickenham Residents Association	2	9	1	2	5	3	2
54. Isleworth Society	2	8	2	2	5	5	3
55. Groundwork Thames Valley	3	2	2	2	5	5	2
56. Larches Residents Association	1	9	2	99	5	5	2
57. Chiswick Wildlife Trust	1	4	2	1	5	5	2
58. Middlesex Campaign for Open Spaces	2	4	2	2	5	5	2
59. Northolt & Greenford Country Park Society	1	8	2	2	5	5	2
60. No Third Runway Action Group	2	1	1	1	2	2	1
61. Ruislip Residents Association	2	9	2	2	5	5	1
62. South Ruislip Residents Association	2	9	2	2	5	5	3
63. Southside Action Group Ealing	1	9	1	2	5	5	2
64. Strand-on-the-Green Association	1	2	1	2	5	5	3
65. Uxbridge Rovers Angling & Conservation Society	3	5	3	1	5	5	1
66. Watch Ealing	2	6	2	2	5	5	2
67. West London Friends of the Earth	2	2	2	3	4	2	3
68. West London Organic & Wildlife Gardening Association	2	4	2	1	5	5	1
69. West London Ramblers	2	2	3	1	5	5	2
70. Windsor Lines Passengers	3	2	2	3	4	5	2

					Relationship to ...		
	Scale	Function	Activities	Ideology	Governm-ent	GLA	Local Authority
Association							
REGIONAL							
71. Bioregional Development Group	3	2	2	3	3	1	1
72. Capital Transport Campaign	3	1	2	3	3	1	2
73. Emmaz	3	99	3	4	5	5	5
74. London Friends of the Earth	3	2	2	3	3	2	2
75. Green Events	3	2	2	3	5	3	5
76. London Greenpeace	3	2	3	4	5	5	5
77. London Community Recycling Network	3	3	1	3	2	2	2
78. London Forum of Amenity & Civic Societies	3	8	2	2	2	1	2
79. London Scare	3	2	2	3	99	99	99
80. London Natural History Society	3	4	2	99	5	1	5
81. London Walking Forum	3	2	2	2	1	1	1
82. London Wildlife Trust	3	4	2	2	5	1	2
83. River Thames Society	3	1	2	2	3	3	1
84. Street Tree	3	1	1	2	4	3	3
85. Thames Explorer Trust	3	6	2	2	5	1	2
86. Woodland Trust London	3	1	1	2	3	2	1
NATIONAL							
87. Anarchist Federation	5	99	99	4	5	5	5
88. UK Association of Preservation Trusts	4	2	2	2	5	5	2
89. Aviation Environment Federation	4	1	2	3	3	3	5
90. Campaign Against Climate Change	4	1	2	99	5	5	5
91. Campaign for the Abolition of Angling	4	1	3	2	5	5	5
92. Civic Trust	4	2	1	2	1	1	1
93. Christian CND	4	1	2	3	2	5	5
94. Council for the Protection of Rural England	4	2	2	2	1	5	5
95. Environmental Law Foundation	4	3	2	3	5	5	5
96. Friends of Conservation	5	4	1	1	2	5	5
97. Environmental Justice Foundation	5	2	1	3	1	5	5
98. Federation of City	4	3	1	2	2	1	5

					Relationship to ...		
	Scale	Function	Activities	Ideology	Governm-ent	GLA	Local Authority
Farms & Community Gardens							
99. Freshwater Action Network	5	2	1	3	2	5	5
100. Friends of the Earth	4	2	2	3	3	5	5
101. Global Action Plan	3	2	1	3	3	1	1
102. Green Anarchist Network	4	2	3	4	5	5	5
103. Greenpeace	5	2	2	99	3	5	3
104. International Primate Protection League	5	1	99	99	99	99	99
105. League Against Cruel Sports	4	4	2	2	1	2	3
106. National Federation of Badger Groups	4	4	2	2	5	5	5
107. Mammal Society	4	4	2	1	5	5	5
108. Orangutan Society	4	2	2	2	2	5	5
109. Platform	3	2	2	4	5	5	2
110. Rainforest Concern	5	1	1	3	5	5	5
111. Ramblers Association	4	5	1	2	3	3	3
112. Real Nappy Association	4	1	2	3	1	2	2
113. Save the Rhino International	5	4	3	1	5	5	5
114. Waste Watch	4	1	1	3	1	1	1
115. Wildlife & Countryside Link	4	2	1	2	1	5	5
116. Womens Environmental Network	4	2	2	3	3	2	2

Key
Scale
1 Very Local
2 Local
3 Regional
4 National
5 International

Function
1 Single issue EMO
2 Multi issue EMO
3 A Community Development Organisation
4 A Countryside Management / Wildlife Conservation Organisation
5 A Recreational Organisation
6 An Environmental Education Organisation
7 An Urban Conservation Organisation (concerned with built heritage)
8 An Amenity Society
9 A Tenants' or Residents' Association

Activities
1 Insider
2 Thresholder
3 Outsider

Ideology
1 Conservationist
2 Reformist
3 Radical/Reformist
4 Radical

Relationship to ...
1 Positive
2 Ambivalent
3 Contingent
4 Negative
5 No relationship

APPENDIX 5

Partition Tables for Network Data

With reference to Chapter 11

Table A5.1: Collaboration Network partition according to scale of operation of groups

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)									
	SE		NW		Regional		National		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
SE	36	48%	0	0	14	19%	25	33%	75	100%
NW	0	0	90	73%	17	14%	17	14%	124	100%
Regional	14	13.7%	17	17%	36	35%	35	34%	102	100%
National	25	15%	17	10%	35	21%	92	54%	169	100%

Table A5.2, Information Provided Network Partitioned by Sphere of Operation

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)									
	Southeast		Northwest		Regional		National		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Southeast	15	34	0	0	9	25	14	40	36	100
Northwest	0	0	23	45	11	22	17	33	51	100
Regional	7	10	8	12	25	37	27	40	67	100
National	17	18	9	10	15	16	52	56	93	100

Table A5.3, Information Received Network Partitioned by Sphere of Operation

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)									
	Southeast		Northwest		Regional		National		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Southeast	5	14	0	0	18	39	13	36	36	100
Northwest	0	0	19	39	15	31	15	31	49	100
Regional	1	5	8	38	4	19	8	38	21	100
National	2	7	3	11	4	15	18	67	27	100

Table A5.4, Information Exchange Network Partitioned by Sphere of Operation

NB. Numbers are so small that it is not worth translating them into percentages

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)				
	Southeast	Northwest	Regional	National	Total
	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.
Southeast	1	0	4	3	8
Northwest	0	2	3	5	10
Regional	4	3	1	4	9
National	3	5	4	11	23

<u>With reference to Chapter 12</u>

Table A5.5, Collaboration Network Partitioned by Balance of Activities

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)							
	Insiders		Thresholders		Outsiders		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Insiders	6	26%	17	74%	0	0%	23	100%
Thresholders	17	12%	120	86%	3	2%	140	100%
Outsiders	0	0%	3	100%	0	0%	3	100%

Table A5.6, Information Provided Network Partitioned by Balance of Activities

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)							
	Insiders		Thresholders		Outsiders		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Insiders	3	19	12	75	1	6	16	100
Thresholders	10	18	43	78	1	2	55	100
Outsiders	1	50	0	0	1	50	2	100

Table A5.7, Information Received Network Partitioned by Balance of Activities

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)							
	Insiders		Thresholders		Outsiders		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Insiders	8	27	21	72	1	3	30	100
Thresholders	20	24	64	76	0	0	84	100
Outsiders	1	13	7	88	0	0	8	100

Table A5.8, Information Exchange Network Partitioned by Balance of Activities

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)			
	Insiders	Thresholders	Outsiders	Total
	No.	No.	No.	No.
Insiders	2	6	0	8
Thresholders	6	28	0	34
Outsiders	0	0	0	0

Table A5.9, Collaboration Network Partitioned by Relationship to Local Government

INITIATOR OF TIES (i)	RECEIVER OF TIES (j)											
	Constructive		Ambivalent		Contingent		Negative		Non Existent		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Constructive	2	9%	8	35%	3	13%	N/A	N/A	10	44%	23	100
Ambivalent	8	28%	12	41%	2	7%	N/A	N/A	7	24%	29	100
Contingent	7	44%	3	19%	0	0	N/A	N/A	6	38%	16	100
Negative	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Non Existent	2	9%	2	9%	12	55%	N/A	N/A	6	27%	22	100

Table A5.10, Collaboration Network Partitioned by Relationship to Regional Government

INITIATOR OF TIES (i)	RECEIVER OF TIES (j)											
	Constructive		Ambivalent		Contingent		Negative		Non Existent		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Constructive	5	29%	1	6%	1	6%	N/A	N/A	10	59%	17	100
Ambivalent	4	16%	5	20%	2	8%	N/A	N/A	14	56%	25	100
Contingent	1	14%	1	14%	0	0%	N/A	N/A	5	71%	7	100
Negative	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Non Existent	2	5%	4	11%	9	24%	N/A	N/A	23	61%	38	100

Table A5.11, Information Provided Network Partitioned by Relationship to Greater London Authority

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)											
	Constructive		Ambivalent		Contingent		Negative		None		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Constructive	2	8	11	46	1	4	N/A	N/A	10	42	24	100
Ambivalent	8	29	13	46	3	11	N/A	N/A	4	14	28	100
Contingent	1	20	1	20	1	20	N/A	N/A	2	40	5	100
Negative	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
None	2	13	2	13	3	20	N/A	N/A	8	53	15	100

Table A5.12, Information Received Network Partitioned by Relationship to Greater London Authority

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)											
	Constructive		Ambivalent		Contingent		Negative		None		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Constructive	9	35	5	19	1	4	0	0	12	44	27	100
Ambivalent	14	47	4	13	3	10	0	0	9	30	30	100
Contingent	3	27	2	18	0	0	0	0	6	55	11	100
Negative	0	0	1	50	0	0	0	0	1	50	2	100
None	24	39	9	15	1	2	0	0	28	45	62	100

Table A5.13, Information Exchange Network Partitioned by Relationship to Greater London Authority

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)					
	Constructive	Ambivalent	Contingent	Negative	None	Total
	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.
Constructive	6	1	0	0	4	11
Ambivalent	6	0	1	0	3	10
Contingent	0	2	0	0	6	8
Negative	0	1	0	0	0	1
None	3	1	1	0	7	12

Table A5.14, Collaboration Network Partitioned by Relationship to National Government

INITIATOR OF TIES (i)	RECEIVER OF TIES (j)											
	Constructive		Ambivalent		Contingent		Negative		Non Existent		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Constructive	1	20%	0	0%	4	80%	0	0%	0	0%	5	100
Ambivalent	1	13%	2	25%	3	38%	0	0%	2	25%	8	100
Contingent	6	22%	2	7%	13	48%	3	11%	3	11%	27	100
Negative	1	10%	1	10%	5	50%	0	0%	3	30%	10	N/A
Non Existent	0	0%	1	3%	9	29%	0	0%	21	68%	31	100

Table A5.15, Information Provided Network Partitioned by National POS

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)											
	Constructive		Ambivalent		Contingent		Negative		None		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Constructive	4	50	1	13	3	38	0	0	0	0	8	100
Ambivalent	2	29	2	29	2	29	0	0	1	14	7	100
Contingent	4	25	0	0	6	38	0	0	6	38	16	100
Negative	1	9	2	18	0	0	2	18	6	55	11	100
None	3	10	2	7	6	20	1	3	18	60	30	100

Table A5.16, Information Received Network Partitioned by National POS

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)											
	Constructive		Ambivalent		Contingent		Negative		None		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Constructive	4	29	2	14	6	43	0	0	2	14	14	100
Ambivalent	4	18	4	18	8	36	2	9	4	18	22	100
Contingent	6	24	3	12	11	44	3	12	2	8	25	100
Negative	2	13	2	13	6	40	1	7	4	27	15	100
None	10	18	7	12	14	25	1	2	25	44	57	100

Table A5.17, Information Exchange Network Partitioned by National POS

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)					
	Constructive	Ambivalent	Contingent	Negative	None	Total
	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.
Constructive	4	1	0	0	0	5
Ambivalent	2	1	2	0	2	7
Contingent	4	0	6	1	1	12
Negative	1	2	0	1	4	8
None	2	1	4	0	4	11

With reference to Chapter 13

Table A5.18, Collaboration network partitioned by organisational identity

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)							
	Conservationist		Reformist		Radical		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Conservationist	32	45%	38	55%	0	0%	70	100%
Reformist	20	18%	92	81%	1	1%	113	100%
Radical	0	0%	4	57%	3	43%	7	100%

Table A5.19, Information-received network partitioned by organisational identity

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)							
	Conservationist		Reformist		Radical		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Conservationist	47	80%	12	20%	0	0%	59	100%
Reformist	13	17%	65	83%	0	0%	78	100%
Radical	0	0	3	100%	0	0%	3	100%

Table A5.20, Information provided network partitioned by organisational identity

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)							
	Conservationist		Reformist		Radical		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Conservationist	82	77%	24	23%	0	0%	106	100%
Reformist	26	24%	81	74%	2	2%	109	100%
Radical	5	19%	13	50%	8	31%	26	100%

Table A5.21 Information exchange network partitioned by organisational identity

INITIATORS OF TIES (i)	RECEIVERS OF TIES (j)							
	Conservationist		Reformist		Radical		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Conservationist	23	77%	7	23%	0	0%	30	100%
Reformist	9	18%	41	82%	0	0%	50	100%
Radical	0	0%	2	100%	0	0%	2	100%

APPENDIX 6

Details of Interviewees

Where interviewees names are followed with (TEA), this indicates that these interviews were carried out whilst I was working as a research assistant on the Transformation of Environmental Activism project (Autumn 2000-Autumn 2001).

1. 'Bongo' (TEA), Alternative media eco-activist (Pirate TV), 23rd June 2001
2. 'Dave', 56a-goer 29th September 2003.
3. 'Rooby too Good' (TEA), eco activist at Crystal Palace, 23rd June 2001
4. Bates, Jennifer, (TEA), Greenwich & Lewisham FoE 6th February 2001
5. Bates, Jennifer, Coordinator London FoE and Greenwich FoE, 31st October 2003 and 6th November 2003.
6. Coleman, Matthew, eco activist, EDAG, 8th November 2003.
7. Collins, Shane (TEA), Ecotrip, EF!, RTS, Green Party, 11th July 2001
8. Connolly, Philip (TEA),Coordinator GASP, Living Streets Coordinator 8th February 2001
9. Cowdell, Julia (TEA) PCEG, 6th June 2001
10. Cowdell, Julia, Chair, PCEG, 20th September 2003.
11. de Zylva, Paul, Head of England Team, FoE, 16th January 2004.
12. Dorey, Cat, Greenpeace Marine Campaigner and North West London Area Networker, 17th January 2004
13. Ferriday, Nic, Coordinator West London FoE, 10th June 2003.
14. Freeman, Sheila, FoE Post Room and Volunteers coordinator and EDAG activist, 19th February 2004.
15. Gaines, Ralph (TEA), Director, London Wildlife Trust, 12th July 2001
16. Gray, Barry (TEA), People Against the River Crossing, 2nd August 2001
17. Hammond, Marie, (TEA), Greenwich Greenpeace, 12th February 2001
18. Hanton, Alisdair (TEA), Committee member South Circular ALERT (1992), vice chair of Pedestrians Association, committee member of Transport 2000, London Transport Activist's Round Table attendee, 26th April 2001
19. Hill, Edward (TEA), Greenwich Town Centre Campaign and MILNET, 28th May 2001
20. Hollemby,Peter (TEA), BETTER, 26th April 2001
21. Juniper, Tony (TEA), Campaigns and Policy Director (now Director), Friends of the Earth, interview with Ben Seel, 2000 (month unknown).
22. Livingston, John & Joanna (TEA), BADAIR, 22nd February 2001
23. Pearce, Rita, Longford Residents Association, 30th January 2004.
24. Poruun, Storm (TEA), eco activist, Environment Office, various local conservation groups, 22nd February 2001

25. Rau, Nic, Climate / Corporates Campaigner, FoE, 19th January 2004
26. Rear, David, Voluntary Warden, Chiswick Wildlife Trust, January 15th 2004
27. Redding, Sam, Campaigner, CPRE, 22nd December 2003.
28. Roberts, Karen, Voluntary Warden, Chiswick Wildlife Trust 17th February 2004
29. Robertshaw, Emma, Voluntary Warden, Chiswick Wildlife Trust 17th February 2004
30. Sartori, Claudia, Local Groups Development Officer, FoE, 24th November 2003.
31. Sauven, John (TEA), Greenpeace, interviewed by Ben Seel, 2000 (month unknown)
32. Schofield, Richard, Head of Regions, CPRE, 20th October 2003.
33. Sobey, Bryan, NoTRAG, Harmondsworth & Sipson Residents Association, 7th February 2004
34. Spencer, Patrick, (TEA), Secretary, Dulwich Society, 13th February 2001
35. Stewart, John (TEA), Chair ALARM-UK and Lambeth Public Transport Group, 25th February 2001
36. Stewart, John, HACAN, Airport Watch, 31st January 2004
37. Sweeting, Susan, Coordinator Hillingdon FoE, 2oth February 2004.
38. Thornhill, Phil, Coordinator Campaign Against Climate Change, 18th June 2003
39. Torrance, Jason, Greenpeace Network Coordinator, 1st July 2003.
40. Vincent, Stan (TEA), Logistics Director, Greenpeace, interview with Debbie Adams, 2000 (month unknown)
41. Watson, Anna, Waste Campaigner, FoE, 19th January 2004
42. Waugh, Miranda, Volunteer Coordinator, London Wildlife Trust, 10th June 2003.
43. White, Rosy, Senior Development Officer, CPRE, 20th October 2003.

Additionally an interview that Debbie Adams carried out with Stan Vincent, Greenpeace logistics coordinator, in 2000 (exact date unknown) has been quoted.

APPENDIX 7

Questionnaire Piloting Results and Amendments

Firstly there was confusion amongst FoE local groups as to whether they should answer the questionnaire from the perspective of their own local group, or from a national FoE perspective. Barrie Botley, Campaigns Co-ordinator of Shepway FoE asked:

> 'Do I include other FoE local groups / FoE Head Office as separate organisations or should we all be considered as part of one group? I would guess the latter as we all operate in much the same way and that would not help the broadness of the questionnaire' (e-mail correspondence, December 2002).

As his assumption as incorrect, the clause 'please answer the questionnaire from the point of view of *your* organisation (even if it is a branch of a national organisation)' was added at the start of the questionnaire to try to make it clear that for the purposes of this research national organisations and their local branches are regarded as separate entities.

Four of the pilot respondents recommended the additional category of quarterly as a choice for the network questions '...there is a big gap between 30 days and 180 days, if quarterly was an option I would have made more use of it' (Phil Scott, SAGE, personal correspondence January 2003) and 'could do with a quarterly or bi-monthly slot' (Jill Cliff, co-ordinator of Deal, Dover & Sandwich FoE, personal correspondence January 2003). Therefore a quarterly slot was added and has been used fairly frequently by respondents to the main questionnaire.

All the modified questionnaires were sent out with a covering letter and a leaflet that outlined the nature of the research and the key questions that it seeks to address (Appendix 2). This was carried out because of the realisation that 'it is only when respondents have a proper understanding of why each question is being asked that they be in a position to consciously formulate answers that are directed at the researcher's needs' (Foddy 1995:73).

APPENDIX 8
Interview Permission Form

UNIVERSITY OF KENT
AT CANTERBURY

Interviewee name:

.....

Organisation:

.....

Confidentiality (please delete as appropriate):

- I would prefer to be referred to using a pseudonym **YES / NO**

If yes, please state preferred code name: .....

- I would like for the organisation to be referred to using a pseudonym **YES / NO**

If yes, please state preferred code name: .....

Proof reading (please delete as appropriate):

- I would like to see how quotes are used in the text before submission of the PhD thesis or publication of articles based on the thesis **YES / NO**

Under the conditions given above, I hereby give **Clare Saunders** permission to use all statements given in the interview on .....(date) at..... (place) for use in her PhD thesis and subsequent publications.

Signed (interviewee): ..... Date: .....

Signed (interviewer): .....

APPENDIX 9

Goodness of fit scores for inbreeding analysis

The goodness of fit scores are not a representation of the integrity of the inbreeding results, but instead give an indication of the extent to which these scores could happen by chance in a random sample. I have included them because the low response rates mean that the sample is skewed. Observed partitions for all networks with the exception of the information exchange network are highly significant – i.e. the relations present are very unlikely to be due to chance interactions. The information exchange network is insignificant as a result of the much smaller sample size.

Table A9.1 Goodness of fit for inbreeding Biases According to Sphere of Operation of EMOs

	Collaboration Network	Information-provided network	Information-received network	Information Exchange Network
Gsq fit	31.1709	17.0051	25.4407	10.7581
P DF=5	>0.01	>0.01	>0.01	<0.05

Table A9.2 Goodness of fit for Inbreeding Biases According to Balance of activities of EMOs

	Collaboration Network	Information-provided Network	Information-received Network	Information Exchange Network
Gsq fit	122.1550	3.3807	3.5158	0
P DF=3	>0.01	<0.05	<0.05 (3.84)	<0.05

Table A9.3 Goodness of fit for Inbreeding Biases According to relationship to GLA

	Collaboration Network	Information-provided Network	Information-received Network	Information Exchange Network
Gsq fit	1.8171	15.0372	9.3255	18.607
P DF=5	<0.05	>0.05	(DF=11) <0.05	(DF=11) <0.05

Table A9.4 Goodness of fit for Inbreeding Biases According to relationship to National Government

	Collaboration Network	Information-provided Network	Information-received Network	Information Exchange Network
Gsq fit	19.68	20.2162	8.0924	17.342
P DF=11	<0.05	>0.05	<0.05	<0.05

Appendix 10

Blair's Blunder on Climate Change and Aviation

House Of Commons Minutes Of Evidence , Liaison Committee 3rd February 2004

Mr Ainsworth ... I was very struck, and you would have presumably seen this, by the remarks made by your Chief Scientific Adviser shortly after Christmas in which he said that "climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing today, more serious than the threat of terrorism." Do you agree with that?

Mr Blair: Looking very long term, if I look at when my children are my age, yes, I think it is the key issue that faces us ... I certainly agree, I think that sustainable development and the issue of climate change is of fundamental importance to the long-term security and stability of the world.

Mr Ainsworth: I think many people were pleased when your Government signed up to a 60% reduction in carbon emissions by 2050 but were perplexed by the announcement of a dramatic increase in aviation capacity. I am just wondering how you square the concern that obviously is being expressed about climate change with a policy which is developing at a rapid rate the fastest growing source of climate change gas.

Mr Blair: It is difficult because potentially the two are in conflict with each other. What we are looking at for our G8 chairmanship next year is an initiative that helps us investigate the full extent of the scientific and technological possibilities of reducing the damage that aviation fuel does. It is just not feasible to say that we are going to cut the number of journeys that people make.

Mr Ainsworth: But it is not a question of cutting, is it? It is a question of massively increasing. That is what the Department of Transport is doing. I just wonder the extent to which the Department of Transport is joined up to other parts of Government that are working rather hard to achieve a better environment.

Mr Blair: It is joined up but there is a very clear policy issue, is there not, because, for example, on the runways there is no doubt that we need them unless we are going significantly to reduce the number of journeys that are predicted for the future that people are going to make, and I do not see how we do that. Therefore, I think we have got to come at this from another route, which is to look at the science and technology in relation to the fuel issue whilst at the same time pursuing a whole lot of other methods that can actually reduce climate change emissions. I think there is every possibility of doing that, both in relation to cars and in relation to aviation fuel but it is going to require a heavy investment for the future.

Mr Ainsworth: Do you believe that the structures are there in government to enable this to be done?

Mr Blair: Oh yes, there is no doubt at all about it. Let me tell you that a major part of the discussion before the White Paper on aviation was published with DEFRA and with the other relevant government departments and a major component of that discussion for the aviation White Paper was, how is this going to be consistent with our Kyoto obligations? There was debate about that and we could have gone even further, frankly. I suppose a lot of people in the transport industry would have preferred us to go even further than we did in the aviation White Paper but we came to the view that it would be irresponsible not to accept, given the dramatic increase in the number of people using flights, that we were going to need extra capacity and that we were not, at least in the short term, going to be able to obviate the need for that.

Source: UK Parliament Website

APPENDIX 11

Freeman betweenness centrality scores

A11.1 Betweenness Scores in Southeast London's Environmental movement January 2003

FREEMAN BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY

Input dataset: C:\Program Files\Ucinet 6\DataFiles\ILEAN\Se\SymSECollaborate_ALL DL

Important note: this routine binarizes but does NOT symmetrize.

Un-normalized centralization: 3550.000

		1 Betweenness	2 nBetweenness
29	GroundworkSwk	84.000	8.879
1	BOST	33.000	3.488
45	WoodlandsFarmTrust	29.000	3.066
36	RootsandShoots	25.000	2.643
24	GreenwichFOE	20.000	2.114
14	FOE	13.000	1.374
21	GASP	8.000	0.846
30	LWT	8.000	0.846
35	PeckhamSoc	6.000	0.634
10	Dulwichsoc	3.000	0.317

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE

		1 Betweenness	2 nBetweenness
1	Mean	5.111	0.540
2	Std Dev	14.282	1.510
3	Sum	230.000	24.313
4	Variance	203.965	2.279
5	SSQ	10354.000	115.698
6	MCSSQ	9178.444	102.562
7	Euc Norm	101.755	10.756
8	Minimum	0.000	0.000
9	Maximum	84.000	8.879

Network Centralization Index = 8.53%

Output actor-by-centrality measure matrix saved as dataset FreemanBetweenness

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Running time: 00:00:01

Output generated: 19 Jun 04 11:45:35

A11.2 Betweenness Scores in Southeast London's Environmental movement Febraury 2001

FREEMAN BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY

Input dataset: J:\TEA\TEA\SymTEA3_London

Important note: this routine binarizes but does NOT symmetrize.

Un-normalized centralization: 651602.738

		1 Betweenness	2 nBetweenness
161	swkfoe	3669.967	20.657
28	cpc	2949.917	16.604
75	greenwichfoe	2671.070	15.035
43	envoff	2604.741	14.661
73	greenwichcyclists	2092.848	11.780
54	foe	2010.066	11.314
113	lwt	1809.148	10.183
151	southlondoncollective	550.673	3.100
37	dulwichsoc	537.561	3.026
186	wildlifegardening	533.147	3.001
162	swkgp	496.609	2.795
111	londonwalkingf	472.177	2.658
46	fareshares	465.232	2.619
169	sydenhamcnd	462.000	2.600
125	pceg	461.942	2.600
41	elthamsoc	443.191	2.495
65	gasp	390.016	2.195
21	charltonsoc	350.274	1.972
40	ef	346.478	1.950
152	southlondonlink	342.341	1.927
104	lfas	338.489	1.905
128	pedassc	326.386	1.837
68	gp	322.909	1.818
102	lewishampedassc	318.015	1.790
117	minetconsassc	316.283	1.780
133	ra	309.750	1.744
90	lambethiansoc	306.396	1.725
176	trans2000	303.145	1.706
149	soundsdissent	258.381	1.454
110	londonscare	246.806	1.389
29	cpfoundation	241.131	1.357
167	swkwildlifetrust	238.857	1.344
70	greenpeace	210.798	1.187
79	greenwichsoc	200.328	1.128
74	greenwichef	186.647	1.051
10	blackheathsoc	184.683	1.040
153	southwarkcyclists	183.787	1.034
77	greenwichgreenpeace	171.745	0.967
112	lonrspb	160.626	0.904

170	sydenhamsoc	158.202	0.890
120	norwoodsoc	155.361	0.874
132	quaggy	155.000	0.872
163	swkgroundwork	149.045	0.839
38	eastdulwichsoc	146.549	0.825
18	camberwellsoc	119.563	0.673
42	englishheritage	118.578	0.667
174	tidyblackheath	87.548	0.493
139	rspb	86.588	0.487
178	undercurrents	36.711	0.207
157	sustrans	34.460	0.194
165	swkparkrangers	19.762	0.111
183	wen	16.000	0.090
93	lamblochist	15.256	0.086
96	leemanorsoc	14.635	0.082
94	lcc	14.531	0.082
1	56a	11.444	0.064
33	ctc	10.531	0.059
121	onetreeallotmentsoc	10.000	0.056
44	envtrust	6.000	0.034
135	realnappy	6.000	0.034
31	crisp	6.000	0.034
26	corporatewatch	5.743	0.032
99	lewishamet	5.240	0.029
188	wombles	3.175	0.018
114	maydaycollective	3.175	0.018
82	hernehillsoc	3.000	0.017

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE

		1	2
		Betweenness	nBetweenness
1	Mean	240.479	1.354
2	Std Dev	526.901	2.966
3	Sum	45691.000	257.182
4	Variance	277625.063	8.796
5	SSQ	63736484.000	2019.337
6	MCSSQ	52748764.000	1671.217
7	Euc Norm	7983.513	44.937
8	Minimum	0.000	0.000
9	Maximum	3669.967	20.657

Network Centralization Index = 19.41%

Output actor-by-centrality measure matrix saved as dataset
FreemanBetweenness